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# REPUBLICAN ROME

BY

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## BOOK I.

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ROME: FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF  
THE STATE TO THE COMPLE-  
TION OF THE UNITY  
OF ITALY.

(B.C. 753-264.)



## PART I.

### THE PERIOD OF THE KINGS.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### ITALY AND THE ITALIAN PEOPLES.

THE Greeks and Romans were ethnographically closely related, and from the second century b.c. Roman life was increasingly affected and penetrated by Grecian influences. Up to that time, however, the observer is far more impressed with the difference between the sturdy Latin people and the Hellenic type, and by the rise of the Romans from small beginnings to an imposing power. As was the case with the Hellenes, the natural configuration of the country in which the Roman people arose affected the historic character of the Roman state. As little as the Greeks, did the Romans keep within the limits of their native land; and at last their history became almost co-extensive with that of the ancient world. But while the Greeks from the time of the Doric migration tended outward, and by the side of their ancient land built a new colonial world, the history of the Romans for centuries was restricted to the Italian peninsula and the adjoining islands. Its extension over the shores of the Mediterranean began when the proud structure of Hellenic power and freedom was already in decay. So up to the period of the war with Hannibal it was essentially the land of Italy that affected the development of the Romans.

The two chief peoples of the ancient world both arose upon extensive peninsulas; but the physical characteristics of Italy rendered possible a political life different from that which we have learned to know in Greece. The Alps, which in a half circle, from the coast at Nice to the Dalmatian Archipelago, enclose northern Italy, and at the same time separate it from the lands of Central Europe, sink toward the south and east to an extensive plain, the basin of the Po, which opens on the Adriatic Sea, and is commonly called Upper Italy. This

northern part of Italy has from the beginning stood in far closer relation to the peninsula proper than did the north of the Balkan peninsula to the world of the Hellenes. The actual peninsula of Italy, the land of the Italici, is separated from the north as the land of the Hellenes is from Macedonia. The low country along the Po is cut off from the south by the wall of the Apennines, which, leaving the maritime Alps at Col di Tenda, extends east-south-east to the neighborhood of Rimini. Here, only a few miles from the Adriatic, the direction of the mountains changes, and the chain extends unbroken from north to south, through the entire length of the peninsula to the strait of Messina. In the northern and central parts it is accompanied on either side by short parallel ranges. The configuration of the Italian coast is very simple, on the east side even monotonous. The only gulf worthy of attention is that of Taranto in the southeast; on the west the shore of Campania, and in the extreme north that of Genoa, are deeply indented by the sea. There are no groups of islands as in Greece; yet one of the three large islands, which to the south and west of Italy enclose the Tyrrhenian Sea, Sicily, the counterpart of the Peloponnesus, gained great historic importance. Its history from the time of the Molossian Pyrrhus is closely bound with that of Italy. Of the western islands, Corsica and Sardinia, the former had no part in ancient history, the latter only a subordinate one.

While the historic life of the Greeks found its fullest expression in those countries which lie toward the Aegean Sea, the dominant districts of Italy, down to the time when the history of the Romans absorbs that of Greece, are to be found between the western slope of the Apennines and the Tyrrhenian Sea. In Greece the western, in Italy the eastern coast is least favored by nature. The lagoons at the mouths of the Po, the vicinity of the mountains to the sea farther south, and the lack of good harbors, stood in the way of expansion toward the east. On the west side of the peninsula, however, the space between the crest of the Apennines and the Tuscan coast is so wide that extensive river-valleys could form. These usually in their upper course extend between the main mountain-chain and the western parallel chains, and in their lower course pass through the coast-land. In antiquity these rivers were for the most part navigable. On this side of Italy extensive plains, whose fertile soil permitted cultivation, reach to the sea; and the shore, from the Genoese Riviera to the straits, is much more richly provided with harbors than the Adriatic coast. Thus, as soon as the Italian peoples overstepped the boundaries set

them by the sea, their advance was directed more naturally toward the south and west than toward the east. Yet at no time did the Tyrrhenian Sea have for the Romans that paramount importance which the Aegean had for the Hellenes; and until the wars with Carthage, the development of the Italians was essentially determined by the land and not by the sea, although much of the Italian coasts was for centuries in the possession of the Hellenes; yet the opposition between the sea-peoples and the dwellers in the interior never had that importance for the Italians which it had for the Greeks. With the exception of the maritime Etruscans, the history of the peninsula, down to its union under Roman leadership, is that of a group of vigorous peoples,—shepherds, mountaineers, and peasants,—distinctly influenced by the nature of the mainland.

The plain of the Po, important though it be in the earlier time, as the base from which four of the chief peoples of Italy crowded forward into the peninsula, first became effective in the political life of Rome, when her power extended to the foot of the Alps. Till the first struggle with Carthage, the peninsula alone was important in the development of Rome. The nature of the land opposed no serious obstacles to the formation of a great and closely united state, as was the case in Greece; yet for a considerable time, even in Italy (without considering the temporary supremacy of the Etruscans), the development into two states, the Latin and the Sabellian, was not improbable.

The tendency to separate, which finds its full expression in the city republics of the Middle Ages, was discernible even in antiquity. But the configuration of the peninsula did not allow the growth of such tenacious and varied individualities as in Greece; it was more favorable to the development of several large race-districts than to the rise of a multitude of petty states. The key of the peninsula, whose conquest determined the political supremacy, was the mighty mountain-land which covers the greater portion of its central part. From the time of the Caesars to that of Odoacer the fate of Italy was repeatedly decided in the plains of the Po; but in the times of the Roman republic, as late as Sulla, the mastery of the peninsula fell to him who was master of the so-called Aeropolis of Italy, the country of the old Sabellian stocks. Its possession rendered it possible for the upholders of a systematic policy of conquest to prevent, by force of arms, all association of hostile races in the north and south. The mastery of the Romans over the peninsula was substantially decided when they could march without resistance from Gran Sasso and Monte Velino to the heights of

Venusia, and from Lago di Celano to the Caudine Passes. The opportunities which nature offered to a people striving for the control of a united land could only gain their full importance when this people was able to develop such political and military qualities as were actually exhibited by the Romans, and as at a later time enabled them to make this middle peninsula of Southern Europe the basis of a world-supremacy,—a supremacy which belonged to Italy as long as it was able to produce an inexhaustible supply of vigorous men.

The appearance of Italy as regards vegetation was essentially different in antiquity from what it is to-day. In the earliest period the peninsula had a distinctly northern aspect, very different from that of the lands of the Orient, of Sicily, and even of Greece, and was covered with vast forests of evergreens, of beeches, and of oaks. The Hellenes knew Italy for centuries as a land especially fruitful in cattle, in the products of flocks and forest, and in grain. At a later time the Italian output of grain, except in the plains of the Po, greatly diminished, while cattle-raising and pasturage correspondingly increased. Grecian civilization introduced into Italy, through the colonies in Sicily and Lower Italy, many plants and methods of cultivation, such as it had received from the East. The relations of the Romans to Carthaginian Africa and the Orient likewise had influence on vegetation and agriculture. Before the close of the period of the Roman kings, there were acclimated and widely spread in Italy the fig-tree, the vine, and the olive. In the middle of the fifth century B.C., wheat was added to the indigenous grains. Under the Republic a large part of the forests, through extensive clearing and excessive use of wood for building, for export, and for the construction of fleets, had already disappeared; and in the time of the Empire, when Italy was still wooded, the wasting was uninterruptedly continued. The loss of the forests was attended with many evils—increasing violence of the rivers, increase of drought, advance of malaria, and depopulation of many districts. On the other hand, through a more general cultivation of gardens, Italy was changed into a vast orchard. It was not till the late Empire that the orange and lemon were acclimatized, trees whose attractive appearance in Southern Italy to-day so delights the dweller of the North.

The historic life of the Apennine peninsula begins with the founding of the Greek colonies upon the bays and coasts of Southern Italy. These settlers found here a numerous population, which they partly civilized and partly subjugated, and with which they carried on

severe and repeated wars. This population was made up of two entirely different peoples. We adopt the view that the older races on the east coast of Italy belonged to the Illyrian group: in old Calabria and Apulia, the Messapians, the Iapygians, and some small neighboring tribes, and, in the district at the mouth of the Po and around the adjacent Alpine streams, the Veneti. These advance posts of the Illyrian people had not crossed the Apennines. But the Greeks had more to do with the different, and ethnographically more important, members of the actual Italian nation, the later so-called "Italici," which they met, one after another, upon the line from the Gulf of Taranto to the mouth of the Tiber. The present theory is, that the early races of Italy separated from forefathers of the Greeks at a comparatively late period, and, taking the land route around the head of the Venetian Gulf, entered Upper Italy, and then the peninsula, either crowding the Italian Illyrians to one side, or else being pushed by them toward the south and south-west. Gradually the different members of this Italian mass broke away from one another, and in times in part prehistoric a series of migrations took place which seem to have had the character of successive layers covering the same districts. Sometimes they resulted in the subjugation of the first immigrants by the later comers, and in a mixture of the greater races with divisions of other and related races. In historic times the mass of Italians appears divided into two chief groups. The western group may be designated from its chief people as the Latin, although only in the district south of the Tiber were the Latins able to gain historic importance. All the related peoples on the western and southern side of Italy, the Ausonians in Campania, the Itali in Italia,<sup>1</sup> as also the Sieuli, whom we know in Sicily,—that is, the peoples of Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium,—were first disunited and weakened by the influence of the Greeks, and then were swallowed up by the southward advance of the younger members of the eastern group. This eastern group is commonly called the Umbro-Sabellian. The parent of this branch of the Italians was the Umbrian race, at the outset widely spread between the Veneti in the east and the Ligurians, who inhabited all the upper Po district and the northern part of

<sup>1</sup> The Itali were in the southern part of later Bruttium. Their name after the fifth century B.C. was extended northward through Greek influence as far as Circii, and after Rome's struggle with Carthage was applied, with the extension of Roman supremacy, to the whole of the peninsula. Formerly 'Italia' was thought to mean 'cattle-land.' More recently it has been surmised that the popular name of the Italici, a people having left its home as the result of a 'sacred spring' (see p. 25), perhaps meant 'young bulls.'

Etruria.<sup>1</sup> Afterward the Umbrians entered the peninsula, and extended over the Italian district on the Adriatic, which at a later time was named for them, and over the larger part of the later Etruria. The migration of the most powerful members of the eastern group toward the high lands of central Italy seems to have been started by the irruption into the valley of the Po of men of an alien stock.

These are the Etruscans (or Rasennae), who remained alien and hostile to the Italians for centuries. They appear on the monuments (Fig. 1 ff.) as of short, stocky figure, with large heads, short, stout arms, and awkward, clumsy bodies, while the Italians and Greeks are characterized by a slender symmetry. The position of their language is yet undetermined. Many investigators maintain a relationship of



FIG. 1 (cf. FIG. 3).—Wall-painting in an Etruscan Tomb: a procession of dancers, preceded by a flute-player. (Rome, Vatican.)

the Etruscans with the Italians, especially in both race and language with the Latins. To some, the position of the Etruscan people is so doubtful that even their membership in the Indo-Germanic family is not accepted. On the other hand, the view now generally prevails that the Rasennae, like their possible kinsmen, the Rhaeti in the Alps, entered Upper Italy from the southern foot of the Rhaetian Alps (perhaps at the time when the national migrations on the Balkan peninsula took place, whose last movement we call the Thessalodoric), and drove the Umbrians out, first from the districts on the left bank of the Po. Hemmed in to the east of the Adige by the

<sup>1</sup> The ethnographic position of this wild and late-civilized people is not yet determined. That they belong to the Aryan group is very doubtful. The Ligurians are described as small, active, strong, and enduring, but also as very faithless.

Veneti, and on the farther side of the Ticino by the Ligurians, but occupying places like Atria, Mantua, and Melpum, they then pushed the Umbrians farther south from the Po and the Apennines out of a large part of their territory, and in other places made themselves rulers over the remnants of the Umbrians. South of the Po, places like Ravenna, and especially Felsina (Bologna), were probably founded by them. But they gained their chief importance for Italian history when they conquered the country between the Arno, the Tiber, and the Tyrrhenian Sea, in which they steadfastly maintained themselves, and which to the present day bears from them the name of Etruria. The most southern part, the district between the Ciminian Forest and the Tiber, they probably did not win till the second century after the founding of Rome.

It is now accepted that the pressure of the Rasennae upon the Umbrian peoples compelled different families of this branch of the Italians to push on, conquering as they went, farther toward the middle and south of the peninsula. Their advance was stayed by the mountain ranges and uplands of the Apennines. Single companies pressed forward into the district of the Latin peoples, where the Volsci, closely related to the Umbrians, settled on the upper Liris, as had the Aequi on the upper Anio. Occasionally a union appears to have been made between the eastern and western elements.

The chief of the Italian peoples, that were pressing southward, was no longer the Umbrians, in the narrower sense — who from now on seem to be limited to the district east of the upper Tiber — but the Sabines, whose later home we find south of the Umbrians. The valley of the upper Aternus, the oblong plateau of Amiternum, enclosed on the north and northeast by the Gran Sasso, on the south and southwest by the spurs of the Velino, is their oldest dwelling-place. Here are the advance posts of the Sabines, who settled in great numbers toward the west, and on the middle and lower Tiber toward the lowland of Latium, and, after the expulsion of the kings from Rome, gradually overflowed the middle and southern provinces. The rapid extension of the peoples of Sabine descent was advanced by a custom which early flourished among them, — viz., the migrations following a ‘sacred spring.’<sup>1</sup> To the colonists thus departing, who were guided by

<sup>1</sup> It was the custom of these Italians in times of pressing war or pestilence to vow to the divinity, probably in place of human sacrifices, a ‘sacred spring.’ Everything born in the following spring, of man and beast, was consecrated to the deities of the lower world, especially to Mars. The cattle were sacrificed; and the young people, both young men and maidens, were compelled, after twenty years, ‘like a swarm of bees in spring,’ to abandon their native home, and to win for themselves new dwellings.

the sacred animals of Mars, the bull, the wolf, and the woodpecker, the later tradition of the East Italians ascribes the origin of the different Sabellian tribes, such as the Sabellian population of Picenum and the small warlike tribes of the Vestini on the Gran Sasso, the Marrucini near Chieti, the Peligni on the Majella ridge, and the Marsi on Lago di Celano, close beside the Aequi and the Volsci, all of whom, in a half-circle to the east and south, surrounded the ancient home of the Sabines. The most important of this race were the powerful Samnites, who in the district of the Sangro River, south of the country of the Marsi and Peligni, seized on the highlands of the Apennines, south of the present Abruzzi, and divided into several families. From here the 'Sabellians' not only extended over part of Apulia, but, by the formation of new communities, conquered the southern and western provinces, which, as Lucania and Campania, played so important a part in Roman history. On the borders of Latium, the Sabellian Hernici, neighbors of the Marsi, gained a foothold to the west of the upper Liris, between the Aequi and the Volsci; while the pressure of the Sabines down the Tiber, in the direction of the infant Rome, resulted in a union of a part of this sturdy Italian people with the Latin Romans,—a fact of great importance for the future of that state.

The three races,—the Latins, the Sabines, and the Etruscans,—whose boundaries came close together, near the earliest possessions of the Seven-hilled City on the Tiber, exercised a constant influence upon the formation and the ethnographic development of the Roman people. We will take a glance at these peoples before passing to the history of the Romans, which, according to our present knowledge, first becomes full and clear at a time when two, at least, of the races—the Latins and the Etruscans—had already passed through long historical development.

The Latin element was by far the most important for the Romans from the beginning. The earliest Romans were certainly members of the Latin race. The Latins of history dwelt in the ancient Latium, i.e., 'the flatland' (in opposition to the Apennines), a district with an area of scarcely 1750 square miles, between the lower Tiber and Volscian Hills and the foothills of the Apennines, surrounding the Alban Hills, and in turn surrounded by the Volsci, Hernici, Aequi, and Sabines. They found at their coming primitive forests; and, on account of the nature of the land, they concentrated in secure settlements, and advanced from an agricultural life to the formation of numerous towns,

and to an association into a federal union. Places capable of defence, usually fortified hill-tops, gradually gained an importance, as did similar heights in Greece. So among the Latins, settlements gathered around the *arx*, the ‘Capitolium,’ or citadel, which was enclosed with a wall. The district on the Alban Hill was regarded as their oldest settlement. On a narrow, elevated plain, between the Alban Mountains (Monte Cavo) and the Alban Lake, lay, even in the first period of Rome, the town of Alba Longa. The Latin districts and cities, with their chieftains, their council of the old men, and their assembly of men capable of bearing arms, were completely autonomous. Gradually a federal relation was developed, by which the Latin communities, supposed to be thirty in number, were held together. The confederates assembled yearly on the Alban Mountain, in the district of Alba, which was the oldest and most distinguished, at a sacrifice there offered to Jupiter Latiaris. Near by, at the fountain of Ferentina, was the place of judgment, where representatives of the Latin communities assembled. The league, it seems, was at an early period so far established that every citizen of a Latin town could beget legitimate children of any Latin woman, and throughout Latium could legally acquire landed property and carry on trade. It is probable, however, that the political bond left much to be desired; and feuds appeared even between communities in the league.

How far Sabine elements afterward contributed to the enlargement of the Rome that was thus growing on a Latin foundation will be discussed later.

The Sabines, as well as the other Sabellian peoples, in the earlier centuries passed but slowly and incompletely to the life of towns. The members of this group, satisfied with their old, loose, undeveloped tribal government, trusted constantly for their defence to their almost inaccessible mountain heights, which little by little were strongly fortified, and clung in their open settlements to an essentially peasant life. These are not, however, the characteristics which were brought to the Romans by the Sabines. It is perhaps even more difficult to establish the distinguishing popular features of the Latins and the Sabines than those of the Ionians and Dorians. As the languages spoken by the two peoples were only dialectic variations, so in custom and usage, in civilization and ideas of law, they had the larger part in common. The Latins appear as an essentially agricultural people, yet in no way such strangers to external commerce as the Sabines, who held tenaciously to the primitive life of their mountains. The

peasant character, with its sterling, steadfast, and essentially conservative element, is the distinguishing mark of the Latins. This, however, together with a severe and noble dignity, they shared with the Sabines. But the Sabines, besides their very strongly developed moral earnestness, strict frugality, plainness of life, and discipline of the severest sort, were marked by a certain simplicity, a lesser mobility of spirit, and a specially tenacious adherence to old-fashioned customs and traditional institutions ; on the other hand, a biting wit and a coarse scoffing humor, brought into most active play at the country festivals, were peculiar to the Latins. It would seem that the peculiar, often frightful, severity of the Romans, the harsh and unflinching element which gave them superiority over the other Latins, was a Sabine inheritance. In the development of the Roman constitutional life, on the other hand, there appeared the more mobile and rational intellectual element of the Latins, who, with a stronger interest in political organization and active constitutional development, did not cling so obstinately to the past as did the Sabines, and were more inclined to give scope to what was new.

In their religion, as in their natural traits, the Latins and Sabines had very much in common. It may be regarded as certain that the religion of the Sabellians also, with local differences of emphasis and form, expression and ritual, rested upon fundamental similarity of conception. The Greeks and the Italians, with many an essential difference, show many analogies in language, in civilization, in household economy, dress, and arms ; and in Italy, as in Greece, the popular faith was founded on conceptions of nature that were similarly symbolized and allegorized. Thus there existed among the Italian deities a general analogy to those of the Greeks. Only, however, in a much later time did the Hellenic divinities find entrance in larger measure into Italy. In the period of its early development the Italian religion took a direction of its own. It bears the distinct character of the religion of an agricultural people. Its gods are emphatically divinities of cereal and animal fertility. They were impersonal in their nature, and their forms were incapable of representation. They were conceived as abstractions of earthly phenomena. Before the entrance of Grecian influence the Latin religion knew no images and no houses of the gods. (For a Greek temple in Italy, see Vol. III.) The collective life of nature, affecting every incident of human activity, and especially all the operations of husbandry, was spiritualized in the Italian religion, which remained entirely devoid of

imagination ; it was sober, rationalistic, and, before all else, sought practical ends. This practical character appeared clearly in the system of worship of the gods and in the various acts of service, all of which had to do entirely with the tillage of land, the raising of cattle, begetting of children, and management of the household. It did not lack, indeed, moral elements which referred man's earthly guilt and its punishment to the world of the gods, and regarded guilt as an offence against the deity, and punishment as its expiation, though for the common good and the maintenance of order the execution of the penalty was intrusted to the chief of the state. Out of this practical religion of an agricultural people arose a hard and dry ceremonial service, a superstitious exactness, a fear of the gods in the highest degree peculiar, which strangely impresses us throughout the history of the Romans.

At this point we may consider the Etruscans, the third of the peoples which dwelt by the cradle of the town on the Tiber. Ethnographically they had almost no effect upon the growth of the Roman people, but upon their inner life they exercised no slight influence. The important position of the Rasennae, in their earlier career, was largely the result of their trade with the Greeks, who as merchants, or as corsairs, visited the shores of Latium and Etruria, and established themselves in several places on the coast to develop the mineral wealth of the country and to secure its commerce. Caere in particular was the centre of an active trade, divided at a later time with the Phoenicians. Aroused by the example of the Greeks, the Rasennae in Etruria soon became equally venturesome sailors, merchants, and corsairs. In the western sea, which took its name from them, the Etruscans maintained for centuries the supremacy, which was first completely broken by Hiero I. of Syracuse. They even settled upon the coast of Central Italy and of Campania, where they occupied a considerable district : Surrentum in the far south, Antium upon the Latin coast, belonged to them. As long as they retained their supremacy between the coast of Etruria, the Alps, and the lower districts of the Po, their trade was very considerable, extending far northward into the provinces beyond the Alps, where they successfully bartered the productions of their well-managed land, excellent cereals, iron and copper from Elba, copper from Volaterrae and Campania, and silver from Populonia. Their active commerce with the Greeks at a later time, especially with Corinth and Athens, gave to their civilization a very peculiar tinge. While the acquisition of great wealth produced extraordinary and

gross luxury, especially displayed in the service of the table, in art and industry the Rasennae borrowed much from the Greeks. Hence came the minting of gold and silver coins after the Grecian standard (by the side of a native system of copper coinage), the manufacture of clay vessels and of artistic bronzes of various kinds, and the adoption of the old Grecian script, toward the middle of the seventh century B.C., as the foundation of the Etrusean alphabet. The beginnings of the painting and plastic art of the Etruscans, though their vases by some are ascribed to Punic influences, are also associated with Grecian models, which came to Etruria from Magna Graecia, Corinth, and Attica. The Etruscans did not long follow closely the line of development taken by Grecian art; though holding fast, on the whole,



FIG. 2.—Etruscan sarcophagus. From Caere.

to the old Grecian manner, they finally fell into a stiff and rigid mechanical style. Examples of their painting remain in the mural pictures of the tombs, especially those of Tarquinii. (PLATE I.<sup>1</sup> and Figs. 1–3, 6, 9–11.) The figures show more harmony of color than fidelity to nature; and, in general, the works of Etrusean art lack that fine sentiment of beauty and appreciation of the ideal that mark those of the Greeks. The painting of pottery, which they extensively practised, was never more than an awkward imitation of Greek originals, which were imported in enormous numbers, espe-

<sup>1</sup> EXPLANATION OF PLATE I.

Wall-paintings in an Etruscan Tomb. Rome, Vatican.

In the original the three bands are continuous, each decorating one wall of the tomb. The scenes represented are a banquet and dances. Possibly they have reference to the future life, but more likely they are merely genre-pictures. In the narrow bands gymnastic contests and preparations for a chariot-race are figured. At the end stands have been erected for the spectators. Here sit the nobler Etruscans, while their servants lie on the ground under them.



PLATE I



WALL PAINTING IN AN ETRUSCAN TOMB (ROME, VATICAN)



PLATE II.



Examples chiefly of Etruscan Art.

cially from Athens. The plastic art in Etruria was by preference long occupied with works in clay, images of the gods, reliefs for the adornment of the gables of the temples, and various kinds of objects, such as are found in large numbers in the tombs. From the pottery was developed the casting of bronze, in which they attained especially good results. (PLATE II.<sup>1</sup>) Sculpture in stone was less practised (Fig. 6). Far more peculiar was the development of their architecture. From the nature of many parts of their possessions in Upper Italy and in Etruria, which were scarcely serviceable from their liability to inundations, the Etruscans were compelled to study seriously hydraulic construction. Besides the art of levelling,



FIG. 3 (cf. FIG. 1).—Wall-painting in an Etruscan Tomb: a buffet with vases of all sorts, before which stand two servants. The figure at the left is a flute-player, who heads a procession of dancers. (Rome, Vatican.)

they showed in such works, even earlier than the Greeks, great skill in the application of the arch to building. In fact, they seem to have been the first to discover the arch,<sup>2</sup> formed of wedge-shaped stones, and the true vault, and to have made extensive use of them. The most important remains of their architecture are to be found in the ruins of their ancient towns. The Etruscans early adopted an urban life. From motives of safety, and also of health,

<sup>1</sup> In PLATE II. are represented various specimens of Etruscan art in bronze and other metals, in marble, and in earthen ware. At the centre, above, is a mirror-back, with carvings in incised lines; below, at the right, a jewel-box (the famous Fieoroni cista), covered with a scene from the Argonautic expedition (Hylas), most beautifully traced. In the centre, below, is an Etruscan warrior, in bronze; at the left, a sarcophagus, with figures in relief.

<sup>2</sup> But see Vol. I., p. 170, for an account of an arch discovered at Nippur, in Babylonia, which was constructed hardly later than 5000 B. C.—ED.

they chose, for the sites of their towns, heights and mountains that commanded the surrounding country. Pisa alone of the important towns of Etruria was situated in the plain. Tarquinii, Volaterrae, Perusia, Cortona, Volsinii, Falerii, Veii, Fidenae, Faesulæ, Arretium, are all upon hilltops. The summits were first levelled with great pains and skill, and partly removed. Then they were fortified, usually in the form of a quadrangle, with massive walls of colossal



FIG. 4.—City Gate at Volaterræ.

hewn stones. These at Volaterræ and elsewhere, like the walls of Mycenæ, were fitted into one another without the use of mortar, so as to secure extreme firmness, and sometimes, as at Volaterræ, rose to a height of 30 feet, with a thickness of  $16\frac{1}{2}$  feet. The arch was commonly employed in the construction of gates (Fig. 4), and of tombs.

The tombs (PLATE III. and Fig. 10) are of three kinds: some, starting from the form of rude burial mounds, develop into conical

PLATE III.



Ancient Roman (Etruscan) tomb: interior. Near Perugia. (From a photograph.)



towers and pyramids; others consist of architectural façades cut into cliff walls; while others are entirely subterranean, and excavated in tufa stone. The temple structures of the Rasennae are characterized by an imitation of wood construction in stone, but with a different form of column and a different ground-plan from those of the Greeks (Fig. 5). This plan was almost square (the breadth five-sixths of the length), and divided into two halves, the vestibule facing southward, and the temple proper, behind the vestibule, commonly containing chambers for three separate deities.

The Etruscans continued to flourish till the advance of the transalpine Celts into Italy, which will be described farther on, and of the Illyrian Veneti from the country around the Adige. When in 600–500 B.C. their power had reached its highest point, they held sway over the northern half of the peninsula, as far as the boundaries of the Sabellian races. Various Italian peoples, the Falisci, Rutuli, and Volsci, acknowledged their sovereignty. How far and how long the Latins and Romans were in any way dependent upon them is still a problem.

It was a serious drawback to the political power of the Rasennae that it was never consolidated. The Etruscans were divided, according to their territorial position, into three chief groups, each constituting a confederacy of twelve states or large city districts. The earliest was in the valley of the Po, and its capital probably was Felsina. The latest was in Campania, and its flourishing capital was the city, founded about 800 B.C., then known as Vulturum, but afterward called, by its Sabellian conquerors, Capua. But by far the most important for the period of Romano-Italic history was the league of the twelve towns in Etruria. Their bond of union was scarcely closer than that of the Ionians in Asia Minor. The tenacity with which these cantons maintained their autonomy prevented an actual leadership, for which, however, the cities of Tarquinii, Clusium, and Volsinii appear to have had the strongest rivalry. The temple of Voltumna was the central point of the league. Here in the spring of each year the people gathered for the religious festivals and markets of the league, and the representatives of the ruling class met for political purposes. There were generals of the league only in case of wars of the league, which were very infrequent. It was not uncommon for individual members to withdraw from com-




FIG. 5.—Ancient type of Etruscan temple: ground-plan.



FIG. 6.—Etruscan Sepulchral Stele in Bologna. (From a cast.)

mon undertakings, or for the minority to enter upon campaigns which the assembly of the league had refused to sanction. A community about to engage in war usually strove to gain the assistance of as many of its neighbors as possible. The heavy-armed warriors of the Rasennae fought in phalanxes, like those of the Greeks, and carried round, bronze shields, metal helmets with tall plumes and flaps at the side, coats of mail and greaves, and for attack swords, and the long lances common also among the Greeks; and, above all, the Etruscan nobility in the times of its strength served by preference on horseback; the light-armed troops fought with slings, short pikes, javelins, and light lances provided with small iron points (Figs. 7, 8). The military strength of the Etruscans seems, however, to have been lessened at a later time by the serious weaknesses of their inner political life. The

Etruscan states rested upon a broad foundation of subject classes; for the ruling people had reduced the subjugated populations to a ‘clientelate;’ that is, to bondage, or even to hard serfdom. It is not improbable that there were different orders among the Rasennae,—that there was, especially in the towns, a free commons; but it is uncertain what political rights it enjoyed. The possessors of political authority were the aristocratic families, whose members alone had

claim to the higher dignities. The restriction of power to certain families, and a priestly aristocracy, were characteristics of the Etruscan government. Yet its inner organization is but incompletely known to us. From the families, whose chiefs were known, as it seems, by the title of ‘Lueumones,’ the senates of the different cities were formed. For a long time the highest dignity was that of king; but probably it was not hereditary, and was held in check by the nobility. In the times of which we have knowledge the cities of the Rasennae, and indeed of the Latins,

were affected by the movement, which we found also among the Greeks, which resulted in the abolition of the royal dignity and the substitution for it of an annual elective chief magistracy.




FIG. 7.—Etruscan Archer. (From a wall-painting.)



FIG. 8.—Etruscan Warrior. (From a wall-painting in a tomb at Caere.)




FIG. 9.—Wall-paintings in an Etruscan Tomb: racers, dancers, boxers, and wrestlers. Head-bands are hung on the walls. (Rome, Vatican.)

The influence of the Etruscans upon the Italians, including the Romans, was very important, from their civilization, their extensive commerce, and the long existence of their power. This is especially true of the industrial arts; and in Etruria also scenic representations and mimic contests found a home (Fig. 9). These, in the debased form of gladiatorial exhibitions and murderous combats in the arena, were first transferred to Rome in 264 B.C., and had there, in the course of centuries, an extraordinary development. The pomp of the triumphal processions and the princely display of the higher officials among the Romans were




FIG. 10.—Interior of a tomb at Caere.

copied from Etruscan models. The golden diadem, the gold-embroidered *tunica palmata* and *toga picta*, the ivory sceptre tipped with the eagle, the twelve lictors with their bundles of rods, the apparitors (the other servants of the magistrates), the ivory curule-chairs, and finally the crimson-bordered *toga praetexta*, were taken from them. Even the use of trumpets in war came from the Etruscans. The Romans, however, did not take the letters of their alphabet from the Etruscans, but received them, probably in the time of the Tarquinian dynasty, from the Campanian Greeks at Cumae. We may safely conclude that everything original and fundamental in the manners and customs, in the civil and ceremonial regulations, and in the religion of the Romans

was not derived from the Etruscans, but was Latin, with a Sabellian tinge.

One element of their religion, however, certainly came from Etruria. The Etruscan religion, in its fundamental conception, was different from the Italian or the Greek. The Rasennae were addicted to a profound and sombre mysticism, an astrological regard for numbers, an interpretation of signs, and a gloomy superstition; nor did they lack conceptions of cosmology and the elements of definite speculation. Above the world with its gods—of whom Tina (Jupiter) stood at the head of the council of the twelve gods, the *consentes*—ruled in the north still higher ‘hidden’ gods, called *Aesar*, whom even the Etrus-



FIG. 11.—Wall-painting in an Etruscan tomb: laying out the dead. (Rome, Vatican.)

can Jupiter consulted. The power of the superior gods was thought to be destructive; hence the evil and harm-loving gods appear in the forefront of the Etruscan divinities. Etruscan worship, too, was cruel, and required, among other things, the sacrifice of prisoners of war. The sacred books of the Rasennae contained instruction about the propitiation of the gods, the postponement of fate, and the apotheosis of souls. The books of ritual taught the application of sacred customs to practical life. Of chief importance was the meaning of threatening signs and wonders. From the entrails of sacrifices and from the lightning the expert could declare to believers their future, even to particulars. Owing to the frequency of thunder-storms in Etruria, there was a system of divination with special reference to lightning, its meaning, and how to avert its threatened dangers. This system, professedly

revealed to the Lucumones by the dwarfish genius Tages, was developed into a science, the *haruspicina*. The Italian religion also possessed, in similar way, the art of determining the will of the gods from the voice of nature. The college of six Roman augurs ascertained, in general from the flight of certain birds, whether an undertaking would bring fortune or misfortune. Disturbances in nature they regarded as of ill omen. The assembly of the people was broken up by the occurrence of thunder and lightning. But such procedure was far surpassed by the skill of the Etrusean haruspices, who at a later time were also employed at Rome to take charge, according to the Etrusean system, of the presentation of offerings, to indicate the meaning of so-called prodigies, and the method of averting them, and to allay or avert the threatenings of the lightning. Furthermore, the idea of the *templum*<sup>1</sup> and its application in the construction of temples, the founding of towns, the survey of land, and the laying out of camps, seem to be of Etruscan origin.

<sup>1</sup> A *templum* was an arbitrary space in the sky marked off by the harnspex, within which he watched for omens. It was then applied to sacred enclosures on the earth.  
—TR.

## CHAPTER II.

### ROME IN THE TIME OF THE KINGS.

**I**N the middle of the eighth century B.C., according to the usual chronology — midway between the lands of the Rasennae, the Sabines, and the Latins — upon a series of hills on the left bank of the lower Tiber, there gradually rose, from quite insignificant beginnings, the powerful city of the Romans. No connected and detailed account of the early history of this people is possible. We could only present a mass of laborious investigations of the fragments of ancient traditions. Only from the time of the war with the Tarentines and the Epirotes is the story plain and straightforward ; till then we must content ourselves with a general outline.

The origin of the seven-hilled city on the Tiber is hidden in a mass of myths and legends handed down to us in different forms, from which historical criticism can obtain but few tangible facts. This is true even of the legend of the race and origin of the Romans. The story is that King Latinus, who immediately succeeded the mythical divine kings, was the eponymous hero of the Latins, and received, with their leader, Aeneas, the Trojans that survived the sack of Troy. Aeneas married Latinus's daughter, Lavinia. Trojans and Latins united into a single people ; and Aeneas's son, Ascanius, became the founder of Alba Longa, where, after his death, his son Iulus was compensated for the loss of his kingdom by priestly dignities, while Aeneas's son by Lavinia, Silvius, became the ancestor of the 'Silvian' line of Alban kings. Many great Roman houses in historic times derived their descent from the Trojan companions of Aeneas, while the Aemilii, and especially the Julii, who became at last the founders of the Roman empire, traced back their line through Iulus to Aeneas himself. The Silvian house reigned for about 400 years. Finally, upon the death of King Procas of Alba, his son Amulius drove his elder brother, Numitor, from the throne, and imposed perpetual virginity upon his daughter, Rhea Silvia, by consecrating her as a vestal. Yet she was loved by the god Mars, and became the mother of twin

boys. She, with her sons Romulus and Remus, was thrown into the Tiber; but, through favor of the gods, the children were carried by the stream to the shore at the foot of the Palatine, suckled by a she-wolf (the sacred animal of Mars), brought up by a shepherd of the king, and became the avengers of their grandfather, and the founders of the new city of Rome. This legend of the origin of the all-conquering city became, at a later time, firmly rooted in the minds of the people; and in the year 296 B.C. two Roman aediles set up, near the fig-tree on the Palatine, where the sons of Rhea Silvia had been cast ashore, a work of Etruscan art, a suckling wolf in bronze, which is still preserved in the palace of the Conservatori on the Capitol. Historical criticism has sufficiently shown that the only element of truth in this legend is, that in its more minute details it associates with the foundation of the earliest Latin Rome a great number of ideas connected with Roman worship, sacred objects and memorials, and with customs such as in historic times are met with in the establishment of newer Roman settlements. Otherwise it yields nothing, though the origin of the legend is clearly the outcome of the national spirit. The one safe conclusion is, that the earliest Romans were Latins. The name of the founder and first king, Romulus, is simply the name of the eponymous hero of Rome, and, like his personality, has developed from the name of the city. The date of the founding of the city the later Romans set at the time which we mark as the year 753 B.C. In celebrating April 21, the festival of the Palilia, as the day of the city's founding, they probably adopted this shepherds' festival because of its rites, which had in view the purification of men and cattle, such as would be fitting at the establishment of new settlements.

But as to the earliest history of the Romans, and as to their relations with the other Latins—to whose confederation they did not belong—investigation can give us only conjectures which rest upon the trifling remains of genuine tradition, upon the nature of the district of the lower Tiber, and upon analogy with the early history of other cities. It seems a very probable conjecture that the Roman branch was the youngest family of the Latin race; that at this point in the district of Latium the urban form of life developed itself earlier and more energetically than elsewhere. It is clear, from the nature of the oldest Roman district, that the portion of the Latin people which had been forced into this corner was compelled to settle upon this place from the lack of other possessions. In better-known times we find the Roman boundary toward the east, south, and southwest extended on

the average only eight miles ; the direction toward the Tyrrhenian Sea, the coast-land of the Tiber, was alone open. The military, mercantile, and political advantages which the position of the later city of Rome afforded its inhabitants could at the beginning have had but little weight ; but as soon as the town began to flourish they seem to have helped materially to its prosperity. The site of the future city, about fourteen miles from the mouth of the river, with its system of hills and valleys, had many disadvantages. The land was covered partly with thick forests, partly with swamps ; for the Tiber, a violent mountain stream which is still feared for its inundations, had, before the embankment of the soil and the gradual decrease of its waters, overflowed the valleys and low places between the hills of Rome, and turned them into a swamp.<sup>1</sup> The country itself was less fruitful than the rest of Latium, and not so well provided with good spring-water. The climate, too, was unfavorable, till a remedy was provided in the careful cultivation of the soil, and the drainage of the swampy depressions and valleys. When and how the peasants and shepherds of this section advanced to the establishment of a town cannot be determined. Investigators unite upon this only, that Latins and Sabines were here united. The earliest Romans were divided into three tribes. The old original Latin tribe bore the name of Ramnes. With this was merged, not without hard struggles, a Sabine tribe, the Tities, which had pressed forward into the lower valley of the Tiber. The entrance of the third member, the so-called Luperes, who once were incorrectly regarded as Etruscans, but are now recognized as Latins, was probably at a later date.

Investigation and tradition are again at one in stating that the beginning of town-life in the Roman district is to be found upon the Palatine Hill (Fig. 12). This hill, associated with the oldest forms of worship and sacred objects of the Romans, was 1900 yards in circumference and 170 feet above the sea-level. It was one of the many tufa cliffs that rise from the Roman Campagna, and of such shape that it needed only the scarping of the sides to afford complete military security to the dwellers upon it. But, for further protection, there was built around the foot of the Palatine a quadrangular wall. The remains of this were still visible under the Empire ; and the course of the oldest *pomoerium* of this ‘Roma Quadrata’ — that is, the consecrated strip of ground on both sides of the wall, on which no build-

<sup>1</sup> In antiquity the general level of valleys and plains of the city was from 20 to 40 feet lower than at present. This amount has been filled in, during the course of centuries, apparently by the destruction of buildings.

ing might be placed — was at that time marked by boundary-stones. Around the fortification on the Palatine, and the walled settlement at its base, there gradually gathered other settlements, which came partly from the natural increase in the population, and partly from the enforced settlements of Latins from neighboring states conquered by the Romans. Such suburbs, likewise walled, arose on the Cermalus, the spur of the Palatine jutting out toward the swamp, between it and the later Capitol, on the Velia, the ridge connecting the Palatine and the



FIG. 12. — Rome on the Palatine; ruins of walls.

Esquiline Hill, on the three summits of the Esquiline, and finally on the low tract between the Esquiline and the Quirinal, as also upon Mount Coelius. The bridge over the Tiber, the Tarpeian Hill,—where later the Capitol stood,—and the Aventine, also appear to have been in the possession of the Romans of the Palatine. At a very early period, however, in opposition to the town on the Palatine, the abode of the ‘Montani,’ there had already arisen in the northern part of the later city limits another town, that of the ‘Hill Romans,’ the ‘Collini.’ This lay upon an extensive hill with five elevations,—Viminalis, Quiri-

nalis, Salutaris, Mucialis, and Latiaris. The central point for the Collini, their fortress, and the place of their most sacred rites, was the Quirinal, a hill 216 feet in height. Whether the dwellers here were the Roman Sabines is a still unsettled question.

In this early period two facts may be considered to be fairly established: first, the opposition between the Romans of the Palatine and the other hills, which finally led, under conditions unknown to us, to a complete union of the two communities, yet of such a kind that in the inner organization of the three old Roman races, or 'tribes,' and especially in the religious institutions, the old duality remained apparent; second, the extension by conquest of their small territory. From the very outset the Romans appear as a vigorous, energetic peasant people, always prompt and able to take up arms, and to turn every new acquisition to the general interest of their state. The defence of the line of the Tiber against the Rasennae; the maintenance of the lower valley of the Tiber against attacks of the neighboring Sabellian peoples; the widening of their territory toward the sea; active intercourse with Etruria, especially with Caere; and the extension of their border at the expense of their Latin neighbors, are the chief features of their earliest history. It cannot be stated with certainty that the destruction of Alba Longa, the capital of the Latin league, was the work of Roman warriors; but, after its overthrow, many families from that city, among them the Julii, Servilii, Quinetilii, entered the Roman community. In the successive conquests of the Romans, the citadel of the new subjects was always demolished; their territory was added to that of the Romans, and Rome became their capital. The inhabitants were partly left in their villages as subjects in the enjoyment of personal freedom, though excluded from the political rights of the Roman community, but large numbers were compelled to remove to Rome. Out of these additions there gradually arose, besides the old citizens, a new member of the Roman people — the 'plebs.'

The early tradition, down to the time of the establishment of the republic, gathers about the names of seven kings, who fill the time between 753 and 510 b.c.,<sup>1</sup> ending with the Tarquinian dynasty, which alone can be asserted to have really existed. Romulus, who repre-

<sup>1</sup> Romulus (Latin), 753 to 716; Numa Pompilius (Sabine), 715 to 672; Tullus Hostilius (Latin), 672 to 640; Anens Martins (Sabine), 640 to 616; Tarquinius Priscus, 616 to 578; Servius Tullius, 578 to 534; and Tarquinius Superbus, 534 to 510. The three last named constituted the dynasty of the Tarquins.

sents the founding of the state and its political and military institutions, and Numa Pompilius, who represents the professed creation of the religious system of the Romans, are purely mythic forms. To Tullus Hostilius tradition ascribes the crushing of the power of the Albans; to Ancus Martius that extension of the Roman supremacy that led directly to the formation of the Roman plebs, and to the dynasty of the Tarquins, a new and considerable increase of Roman power, a brilliant advance in architecture, and the first great change in the Roman constitution.<sup>1</sup>

Our knowledge of the inner circumstances of the Romans during the time of the kings is comparatively more certain. Not till the time of Pyrrhus of Epirus, did the houses have shingle roofs; in that early peasant age they were either long log houses with high-peaked roofs of rushes or reeds, or miserable mud huts thatched with straw. Fine public buildings did not exist; numerous consecrated places, with altars of stone or turf, here and there fields with swamp and pasture-land between the settlements, separated the mass of dwellings from one another. Of art of any kind there was no thought. But the people, the warlike *populus Romanus* of the ‘Quirites,’ or the spearmen, the free warriors, appears from the outset as a vigorous race. Its history to the close of the monarchy is that of the ‘full citizens’ of the three tribes,—Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres. We find here an organization which is founded on natural relations, and modelled after the form of a family association. In the families of these full citizens the father exercised an almost boundless power, subject to no responsibility, over his wife and all his children, even over those who were grown up, over his slaves and all dependent on him. He was priest and judge for his household, with the power of life and death; and only the severest cases of misuse of this power were visited with religious anathema and legal punishment. The Roman woman as wife was in the power of her husband, and as unmarried daughter and sister in that of the father, or in case of his death, of the nearest male relative. But her dependence was that of a free woman and not a servant, and in her home she possessed complete control over the

<sup>1</sup> The controversy over the Tarquins is by no means ended. Some see in them only the expression of the supremacy of the Etruscan princes of Tarquinii, which was extended over Rome and a part of Latium, afterward overthrown by a second party of the Rasennae under Lars Porsena, of Clusium. Some, holding to the Etruscan descent of the Tarquins, see, in the founding of the republic, principally the reaction of the Roman element against the Etruscan. Others regard the gens Tarquinia as a Roman gens, which only accidentally bears the name of the Etruscan city.

female servants. Marriage was held sacred, and the strictly moral organization of family life was for long ages the foundation of Roman strength and power. A number of such families appear always to have been united into a so-called *gens*, or clan, which was bound together by an actual, or probable, or at least supposititious, descent from a common ancestor, and was marked by a common clan-name.

The *populus Romanus* was in theory so divided that ten families formed a *gens*, ten gentes a *curia*, and ten curiae one of the three tribes which constituted the people. The curia formed at that time the lowest political unit of the Romans. When the citizens assembled for voting they voted according to their curiae. The Roman territory was divided into three parts, corresponding to the tribes; probably the possessions of the different curiae were also distinguished. In the earliest times, when the Romans were masters of only about seventy-five square miles (a district which gradually increased till in the period of the Tarquins it was nearly double its earlier size), with a free population of about 10,000, they mustered for war 3000 footmen and 300 cavalry. At the head of the Romans, as for a longer time at the head of all the cities of the Latins, stood the *rex*, the King, whose position recalls in many ways that of the early Grecian princes, but who was fundamentally elective. He was named, under very peculiar forms, by the council of the clans, and confirmed by the assent of the citizens. He ruled for the period of his life, and with his death the executive power came back to the community. In war the king was the absolute commander of the army, in peace the chief priest and chief judge; he appointed also the few officials which the little state then needed,—the city prefect, the representative in civil matters of the king when absent, the quaestors or judges in capital cases, the leader of the cavalry, and the tribunes, or captains, of the infantry; in short, he possessed that administrative power which even at the beginning of the republic, before the great development of the authority of the senate, gave to the consulate, and still more in exceptional cases to the dictatorship, so great an importance.

In these primitive conditions it was natural that the power of the Roman chieftain should in each case be determined by his own personality, his strength, prudence, and ability. Furthermore, there was a moral limitation of his power in the belief of the full citizens, from whose ranks the king was taken, that the state and its institutions rested upon divine authority; that they were sanctified by the ordinances of religion, and that, therefore, a violation of long-established

principles and customs must be regarded as a sin against the gods. In addition to this, there were two public bodies, which, though their power was legally always inferior to the king's, yet limited the royal authority; in fact, much more effectively than did the corresponding bodies in Greece before the rise of the Eupatrids. By the side of the king stood the Senate, the council of the old men, the great council of the state, whose three hundred members, with a tenure of office for life, seem clearly to be the representatives of the Roman clans. Whether the clans appointed their representatives, or whether the kings had the right to fill vacancies occasioned by death, but with the limitation that no clan should be unrepresented and none doubly represented, is unknown. The senate of the kingly period, whose members, the *patres*, wore, as a token of their dignity, a crimson border on their toga, and red shoes, as did also the king, appears certainly as an advisory council for the king, who alone could call it together and consult it. But in cases of importance the king could not, without great hesitation, go counter to the custom which bade him give the greatest weight to the opinion of the senate. Since a failure to yield to the opposition of the senate, when it related to a change of the law, to an increase in the number of citizens, and to a declaration of an aggressive war, was regarded as an act of tyranny, which, in the matter of legislation at least, could have no permanent effect, the influence of the senate must have been even then very great. The whole body of full citizens, who alone had the duty and the right of carrying arms, and who, as the needs of the state demanded, bore the various burdens, especially the *tributum* (the forced contribution exacted in times of need, but as a loan to be repaid in better times), were summoned by the chieftain to the assembly, the *comitia*, where they voted in their *curiae*. They could, however, only accept or reject what was laid before them; and the vote was decided not by a majority of individuals, but by the majority of the *curiae*. Questions about the declaration of offensive warfare, the addition of new citizens, and every change in the customary forms of legal process, must come before the *comitia*.

It was probably usual for the king to obtain the opinion of the senate in advance. Probably also there existed under certain circumstances, in more important criminal cases, an appeal from the sentence of the judge to the mercy of the general assembly of the people.

In the last period of the kings several important circumstances point to a considerable increase in the power of Rome; and the first attempt is made to bring into closer association with the full citizens, on the

ground of new principles, that increasing part of the population which was without political rights. From the outset the Roman state did not consist of full citizens alone. These had common social and legal rights; they wore the national Roman dress, the *toga* (a wrap of white woollen material; cf. Figs. 13, 14); but by their side existed, in addition

to the farm-slaves, then but few in number, a class of dependents or clients, which had probably grown from the remains of a former population, allied in race, but early subdued. In better known times, with actual rather than legal freedom, they stood to the Romans in the relation of hereditary dependence; each client family was under the patronage of some family of citizens; some appear as hereditary tenants on estates, others as tradesmen and artisans. The relation was semi-filial, and seems to have had the safeguard of a religious character. The emancipation of slaves, and yet more the immigration of strangers, who put themselves under the protection of a full citizen, increased the number of clients. It was not, however, the clients, but the plebeians, that played the most important part in the development of Rome.

In all probability the great body of the plebs arose from the numerous Latins whom the Romans in the beginning reduced to a state of dependence instead of slavery, or perhaps simply compelled to a treaty re-recognition of their supremacy, and then placed under the control of the community, represented by the king. From these masses, enlarged perhaps by Umbrian fugitives who fled to Rome before the advance of the Rasennae into Southern Etruria, an unorganized multitude was gradually formed, who (to employ a political expression current at a later time), joined an ‘unequal league’ (*foedus iniquum*) with Rome, and were fast bound to the ruling state. Personally they were free, stood in no individual dependence, needed no patron to represent them



FIG. 13. — Roman Lady, with Stola.

before the courts, had part in the common law, could hold and dispose of property according to the Roman property law, the *jus commercii*. But politically they had no rights; they had only duties toward the state, and no claim on the property of the state, especially the public domain; and between plebeians and old citizens, or burgesses, there was no intermarriage, no *conubium*. Finally they had only ‘private’ worship of the Roman divinities,—no organic participation in the state religion, no access to the ceremonies and the priesthoods. The growth of this strong, essentially peasant mass beside the old citizens reacted powerfully upon them. To be sure, the power of the old citizens increased with their conquests, since they regularly took from the vanquished a part of their territory, of which the pasture-land was usually added to the state domain (*ager publicus*), and the arable land was employed for the laying out of new Roman farms. In this way the position of the *populus* toward the plebs became, as the latter increased, that of an exclusive but numerous hereditary nobility. The Patricians (so-called because they descended from those only who, in the eyes of the old Roman law, could found families) appeared now in all respects as a highly privileged class. Evils must unavoidably have sprung from such an irreconcilable duality; and even in the royal period comprehensive attempts at reform were made, but only when the external power of the Romans had been very considerably extended.

Tradition ascribes all this to the so-called dynasty of the Tarquins. Apart from the influence of Hellenic civilization, which is manifest even in this period, coming through the Grecian states in Lower Italy,



FIG. 14.—Roman, with toga. Ancient statue.

and the Phocaean colony of Massilia in Gaul, long allied with Rome, the policy of the Roman kings was directed with great success toward securing the supremacy over Latium. King Servius Tullius is said to have given up the policy of conquest; and, helped by the difficult position of the Latins between strong and hostile members of the Umbro-Sabellian group, he was able to induce them to enter into a firm alliance with Rome, which from this time to the complete blending of all the Italians with the Romans was only occasionally suspended. A league was concluded between Rome and the Latin confederacy, it would seem on equal terms. Its chief objects were peace at home and permanent union for attack and defence; but it also assured to its members the right to trade, to intermarry, the special civil rights of individual towns, and the right to all to settle in any town of the league; in consequence of

which not a few Latins came to Rome, paying to the king as settlers a tax for protection. Excepting its duties to the league, every community remained sovereign in constitution and administration, and in addition the Latin confederation maintained its autonomy in opposition to Rome. Rome was not to enter upon a separate league with any single Latin community. The command in war was to alternate between Rome and the Latins, and land or plunder gained in the wars of the league was to be di-





FIG. 15.—Wall of Servius Tullius.  
On the Aventine.

vided in equal parts. The leading part fell actually to the Romans, whose immediate territory, even in the age of Servius, embraced more than four hundred square miles, and included the district between the Tiber and the lower Anio. But it was the last king of the Romans who first substituted for a federal equality a decisive supremacy of Rome over most of the Latins, which lasted, however, only during his reign.

It is at this time that the energy of the Roman kings transformed the old dual town into a strongly fortified city by building a massive wall, commonly known as the ‘Wall of Servius’ (Figs. 15, 16). Then it seems the Palatine ceased to be the citadel. The new citadel of the city, its *arx*, or Capitolium, was Mons Tarpeius, northwest of



PLATE IV.




Mouth of the Cloaca Maxima on the Tiber, Rome. Above, the "Temple of Vesta."  
(From a photograph.)

Brundibor X A



PLATE V.



View of the northern summit of the Capitoline Hill in Rome, with the church and monastery of Santa Maria in Ara Coeli. (From a photograph.)

the Palatine. The Tiber, which to this day cannot be forded at any season below the mouth of the Anio, was in antiquity navigable to the city for ships of war of all sizes, and for merchant vessels up to twenty tons burden. The passage of the river was defended by the island in the stream, by the pile-bridge across the river, and especially by a fortification on Mons Janiculus on the right bank, which protected the bridge. The circuit of this colossal fortification on the left bank was reckoned at about six miles. The tradition associates with this time the reform in the census, and the new division of the city and its territory. The land was divided into a number of tribes (perhaps twenty-six), districts or *pagi*; the city into four quarters, or tribes (*urbanae*), Suburbana, Palatina, Esquilina, Collina. The first three of these covered the extent of the Palatine city, while the fourth included the Quirinal. The Capitol and the Aventine were excluded from this division. At the same time the Romans were forced to construct a great work, the so-




FIG. 16.—Wall (*agger*) of Servius Tullius

called *cloacae*, for the drainage of the swampy valleys between the Capitol and the Palatine, and the Palatine and the Aventine. After extensive embankments for the control of the river had been constructed, a network of subterranean arched canals was made, built of travertine blocks, and connected at a later time with the system of public sewers. These finally united in a large drain, the Cloaca Maxima (PLATE IV.), which delivered the water into the Tiber. The part next the river is an arch, gradually contracting at the outset from a diameter of 13 feet to one of 11.25, and perhaps 300 paces long. Considerable new space in the interior of the city for public squares and important buildings was gained by these works. At the end of the royal period the Mons Capitoline, a hill with two summits, became the most important point. Upon its northern summit (150 feet in height), where to-day stands the church of Santa Maria in Ara Coeli (PLATE V.), was the Arx, the fortress of the Roman people. The deep depression between the northern and southern elevations is the modern Campidoglio, while upon the southern elevation, now Monte Caprino (150 feet in

height), in the last period of kingly rule, after the influence of Grecian culture had led the Romans to construct temples and statues to their divinities, was raised an imposing sanctuary, the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter, built by Etrusean architects and in the Etruscan style. In course of time other temples were placed beside this one.

About 117 feet lower, on the southeastern declivity of the hill, was a platform-like space, squared to the points of the compass, the Comitium, where the old citizens met in their communal assemblies under the open sky. To the east, more than sixteen feet below, extended, after the drainage of the depression, the great market of the city, the Forum, from the Capitoline to the Velia. By the comitium rose the council-house of the city, the Curia Hostilia. On the west slope of the Velia, hard by the Forum, at the beginning of the ‘Sacred Street,’ stood the *regia*, the state dwelling of the king, near the ‘common hearth’ of the city, the round temple of Vesta. In the valley between the Palatine and the Aventine the Circus was marked out. Here were held the contests that so early came into favor, races with horses and chariots, in whose growth Grecian influence became more and more effective.

The internal history centres about the attempt to give a new form to the popular constitution and the overthrow of the monarchy. Tradition accords to the king Servius Tullius the glory of having introduced into Rome the new constitution of the ‘classes and centuries.’ Yet how and by what stages this new and striking change was brought about we do not definitely know. We merely see that in all succeeding time, down to the innovations of the emperors Diocletian and Constantine I., the military element holds the most prominent place in Rome. Thus the Servian reform, or the series of reforms that we are wont to group under the name of the Servian constitution, appears to have had its origin in the military needs of the people. The new Roman system of defence adapted itself to the new topographical division of the fortified city and its territory. Each district included all the citizens there settled, whether patricians or plebeians, who were liable to military service and taxation. The plebeians, though relieved from earlier burdens, were subjected to the tributum. The tribes served as the mechanism for raising troops, for assessments, and the levying of taxes. With this system was joined the new semi-political, semi-military classification of the Roman people that laid the liability to taxation and military service upon the members of the community according to the property of the individuals, reckoned, as usual in antiquity,

with reference to land. Down to the remodelling of the Roman army by Caius Marius, in the time of the war with Jugurtha, only the property-holding, and essentially the land-owning, classes had the right and the honor of bearing arms, and of service in the fully-equipped ranks of the army. On the basis of property in land, the Roman community was divided into five taxable or census classes.<sup>1</sup> It is not possible to assert with certainty how high was the census rate of the classes in the oldest time, nor what amount of landed property determined the position of individuals in the different classes. With some probability the census rate for the first class has been determined to be 20,000, and for the remaining classes respectively 15,000, 10,000, 5,000, and 2,000 heavy *asses*. In those times in Italy copper was used by preference as the medium of exchange; yet among the Romans cattle




FIG. 17.—Suovetaurilia. Relief in the Roman Forum.

and sheep were used for the same purpose, and were employed even in the discharge of legal fines. In the beginning the copper was weighed and circulated in bars. Tradition assigns to Servius Tullius the merit of having first established an approximately regular form for the copper bars, and of employing an official stamp upon them; yet it is probable that not till the time of the decemvirs were copper coins introduced, and stamped with the arms of the city and with a mark of value, and that the designation of value by the number of the new ‘whole pieces,’ or asses, became common. Though old ‘heavy’ asses nominally represented a pound of copper, in practice they were not minted at full weight, but with a loss of one-twelfth, or yet more commonly,

<sup>1</sup> According to tradition, the first levy of taxes, the first census, was accompanied by a solemn expiatory offering, consisting of a boar, a ram, and a bull. This offering (*suovetaurilia*) (Fig. 17) was to be repeated every five years, with each new announcement of taxes.

one-sixth, from the normal weight. Their actual weight, with no inconsiderable alloy of tin and lead, was about ten Roman ounces (*unciae*), equal to 4214.574 gr. Troy; and they were worth about 11.21 cents. When, shortly before the outbreak of the first Punic War, the Romans adopted a silver currency, the asses were minted much lighter than before. The reduction of the as, which repeatedly occurred in these times, represented only a change in the expression of value, not in the real value; hence the census rate of the classes, expressed in asses, was very greatly raised, since, for example, 20,000 asses issued at the rate of one-third or one-sixth, naturally represented a very different and much smaller property than the same number of heavy asses. The census of the first class was finally put at 110,000 asses, and that of the fifth at 10,000 asses.

The Romans were now called out to war according to the difference of their property. Every resident citizen between the ages of eighteen and sixty, together with his grown-up sons, was summoned to service in arms. The richest land-owners of both orders of Rome were placed above the first class, and grouped in eighteen so-called ‘centuries,’ six patrician and twelve plebeian, and allotted to the cavalry service. The infantry came from the first three classes. Of these the first had complete suits of bronze armor; the second, without a breastplate, carried long wooden shields; and the third had no greaves. All carried spear and sword. The men of the fourth and fifth classes were armed partly with lances and javelins, and partly with slings, and fought commonly as light-armed troops. All citizens whose landed property was not sufficient to include them in the fifth class, including most of the handcraftsmen, were brought together into one century, and were not called upon for military service or the tributum, except in the formation of four centuries of military workmen and musicians, which the army needed in the field. The entire army was divided into two levies, the older and the younger warriors. The men from eighteen to forty-six, inclusive, composed the army for active service; the older men were called upon to defend the city in case of need. The normal number of the active forces at the time of the introduction of this system is estimated at 20,000 men. The total number of the centuries (cavalry and infantry), including the last one, the so-called *proletarii*, is set at 193. Of these, eighty belonged to the first class, strong in landed property, and at that time also in numbers; twenty each to the second, third, and fourth; and thirty to the fifth.

It was politically important for the plebs that they could become

officers in the army, centurions, and military tribunes. Yet before the transformation of the Roman army, in the time of Marius, there existed at Rome no permanent corps of officers; but at every new levy new legions were formed, and no one could make a legal claim to the position of an officer because he had held it in a previous campaign.

How soon and how far the Servian constitution of the army served as a foundation for a new form of the national assembly is uncertain. It is probable that the right of deciding, at the demand of the king, upon a proposed declaration of war passed from the assembly of the curiae, which had thus far been the chief organ of the people, to the assembly of the centuries, the ‘voting army’ of the state. At any rate, it was of great importance to the Roman community that rights and duties had become reciprocal, and that duties were measured according to the effective value of property. This was a rational system, by which the control of a religiously and politically exclusive aristocracy was gradually overthrown. The next step, however, in the development of the Roman state was a revolution.

The Roman people had advanced greatly in civilization under the manifest working of Greek influence, even in matters of religion. Of the Grecian divinities, the Dioscuri, and Hercules as Hercules, became early popular. They were followed by such figures as the Hellenic wine-god, and Pluto as Plutus (the bestower of wealth), and Persephone as Proserpina. Yet the group of deities native to the Italian soil remained essentially unchanged; though later it became the fashion to identify them with the related Greek deities. Among these gods Mars and Jupiter held the most conspicuous place. ‘Father Mars,’ in the earliest period the centre of all Italian worship, was a purely native deity, a god of vegetable and animal fruitfulness, and a god of death. This last idea subsequently led to the conception of him as god of war, so that he is looked on as the champion of the community, hurling his spear, protecting its homes, and overwhelming the enemy. As the result of the union of the two old communities, there was a second Mars, the so-called Quirinus, originally the Mars of the Hill-Romans. The ideal reflection of the civil community of the Romans was Jupiter, the highest god of heaven, the god of the thunder, and also the giver of victory and supremacy. By his side stood his wife Juno, who finally became also the goddess of birth.<sup>1</sup> To the service of these gods were

<sup>1</sup> With these deities and the many personifications of abstractions, such as the double-faced Janus, the abstraction of beginning and opening, were placed the moon goddess, Diana; Venus, the goddess of gardens; Minerva, goddess of memory; Tellus, or the

attached the colleges of priests, with the six Vestals (Fig. 18), — pure virgins, who cared for the service of Vesta, and kept the fire on the common hearthstone always burning. The colleges of Augurs and Pontifices were distinct from the priests, who had to do only with worship. For intercourses with the gods, and to inquire into and ascertain their will, men were needed ‘thoroughly conversant with the relations to the deity.’ Before the adoption of the haruspices from the



FIG. 18. — Vestal Virgins. Antique Relief.


sors of the auspices. The six pontifices, who understood the secret of measures and numbers, had the calendar of the state to prepare, with which afterward were associated the beginnings of the city annals, which they wrote. They had to make known the days of new and full moon, and the festal days, to see that every religious service, every judicial act, was held on the proper days. Since this college had to

nourishing earth; Ceres, goddess of sprouting crops; Pales, the fructifying goddess of heads; Neptune; Vulcanus, god of fire and the art of the smith; Fortuna; Vesta (PLATE VI., goddess of the house and of the household hearth; Mercury, the god of trade, and many others.

Etruscans, two such associations existed in Rome, filled by co-optation from the burgesses. The six augurs interpreted the will of the gods, especially from the flight of birds. In their hand lay the control of the auspices, without which no public business of importance was undertaken in Rome. A scrupulous conscientiousness in the observation of required ceremonials, since defects in form could invalidate acts done under improper auspices, was thought to impose a corresponding obligation upon the gods. The augurs were allowed to take the auspices only in the service and at the call of the magistrates,

who alone were the posses-

PLATE VI.



The so-called "Temple of Vesta" (probably that of Hercules Victor), in Rome.  
(From a photograph.)



give decisions as to court days and questions of religious right, a knowledge of procedure and maxims of law became traditional with it. It gradually gained the supervision of the entire divine service of the Romans. The college of the twenty Fetiales was intrusted with the transmission and keeping of treaties made with neighboring communities; it had to decide on infractions of treaty rights, to institute demands for indemnity, and to make the declaration of war. The Greecian oracles, too, met with great favor at Rome; and many inquired at the shrine of the Delphian Apollo.

In one other point the Romans followed the Hellenic development,—the final throwing off of the monarchy. According to the Roman tradition, the last dynasty of the kings was overthrown by a revolution. The rule of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, is painted in dark colors. A tyranny of frightful severity goes hand in hand with astonishing external power. Patricians and plebeians finally unite in common hatred against the tyrant. In the year 510 or 509 b.c. an outrage by one of Tarquin's sons against a woman's honor gave the last impulse to the movement, which was headed by two of his own relatives, Lucius Junius Brutus and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus. The overthrow of the monarchy was resisted by a strong party, which sought its restoration, and which, with the entire Tarquinian house, including Collatinus, and excluding only the stern Brutus, was obliged to leave the city. The story says that the exiled Tarquins attempted to return by open force. The various wars which the Romans had to undertake soon after the adoption of the republican constitution, often indeed, as it appears, unjustly, are connected with these attempts. The republic finally became secure only after long and partially unsuccessful struggles. The last king, who survived all his sons, died in b.c. 495, at Cumae, at the court of the powerful Greek tyrant Aristodemus. Even this bit of tradition is completely legendary, and offers the most difficult problems to investigation. It is certain that several of the greater wars of this period were not undertaken by the neighboring peoples in the interest of the Tarquins. Two of these wars were of special importance. The powerful chieftain of the Rasennae, Lars Porsena of Clusium, wrested from the Romans, presumably in b.c. 507, a portion of their territory, principally that upon the right bank of the Tiber, and appears to have deprived them temporarily of their independence, till the Rasennae were overthrown by the troops of Cumae. During this time the Latins also shook off the Roman supremacy; and even a great victory of the Romans at Lake Regillus,

which they owed to the appointment of a dictator, and in which all the surviving heroes of the transition period fell, did not re-establish the old league with the Latins. The founding of the republic, — as will appear, — and the transfer of the government to aristocracy, was everywhere accompanied by serious losses to the external power of the state.



FIG. 19.—Temple of Saturn at Rome.

In respect to architecture, tradition assigns to this transition period the building in Rome of the temple of Saturn (Fig. 19), the native god of the crops (B.C. 501), which in after-times was repeatedly adorned and restored, and served as the treasury of the state (it stood at the upper end of the forum at the foot of the Capitoline Hill); and the temple of Castor (PLATE VII.), i.e., of the Dioscuri, begun after the battle of Lake Regillus (B.C. 485), and rebuilt in 6 A.D. by Tiberius.

PLATE VII.



Columns of the Temple of Castor and Pollux (Dioscuri) in the  
Roman Forum, dedicated 485 B.C. (From a photograph.)



## PART II.

### THE PERIOD OF THE CLASS STRUGGLES.

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#### CHAPTER III.

##### THE TRIBUNATE OF THE PLEBEIANS AND THE DECEMVIRIS.

THE first task of the Romans was to win back the position held in Latium by Servius Tullius. Aided probably by the constant pressure of the Volsei upon the Latins, they were able, in B.C. 493, to renew the earlier league with the Latins on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and in B.C. 486 to form a tripartite league of Romans, Latins, and Hernieci. Now begin the tedious feuds of the Romans and their allies with their surrounding neighbors,—the Etrusean cities of Veii and Fidenae on the north, the Sabines and the Aequi on the east, the Volsei on the southern border of Latium. These struggles were for the most part the prosecution or repulse of raids for plunder; yet some were serious wars, particularly those with the Etruscans and the Volsei, which were decisive for the future of Rome and of Italy. These struggles served as an effective school of war; but they are of far less importance than the internal struggles in the development of republican Rome.

After the expulsion of the Tarquins, the supreme power heretofore vested in the kings passed to a new elective magistracy. The republican chief officers, the consuls, were, to the time of the decemvirs, called *praetores*, a title which later was applied to a new, high office. The extent of the highest civil, military, and judicial authority, which passed from the kings into the hands of the new heads of the republic, was greatly limited by various devices, whose restrictive power grew more and more effective with time. From the founding of the republic the Romans always placed two Consuls at the head, so that under all circumstances the action of one could be restricted by the opposition of the other; and to this high office

they gave but a year's tenure. At the end of the year the consul retired into private life, and could be called to account for his official acts. The yearly tenure afterward showed itself very hurtful in many ways; but the idea was so deeply ingrained in the minds of both aristocratic and democratic republicans, that there was never any thought of altering it. The thoroughly practical spirit of the Romans enabled them to meet in various ways the disadvantages of the system, as they became manifest. With the fuller development of Roman life the system of offices, of 'clerks,' of subalterns, permanently connected with the service, became important in administration.

In war, where it was of course impossible that all heads of the state should show equal military ability, the plan was adopted, as soon as extensive campaigns were necessary, of extending the time of command of experienced generals by a resolution of the proper state authorities. If a consul was unable to cope with unexpected difficulties, the senate induced him to name the best man in the state as Dictator, who then chose as his lieutenant a commander of the cavalry, or *magister equitum*. But the dictatorship, to whose authority all other officers were subordinate, was limited at the longest to six months. The dictator was subject to no responsibility, and from his orders there lay no appeal; hence the patricians in the course of the internal



FIG. 20.—Lictors. From the reliefs on the Column of Marcus Aurelius in Rome.

struggles repeatedly made use of the office to overcome the stubborn opposition of the plebeians. Twelve lictors (Fig. 20) carried before the consuls the axes with the *fusces*, or bundles of rods, emblems of supreme authority; the dictator, like the early kings, had twenty-four lictors.

From the great quantity of official business, the consuls were obliged to appoint officers for special services whose term of office expired with their own. Their assistants in the care of state archives and the state treasury were the two Quaestors, the same persons, probably, whose chief business even then was the prosecution of capital cases. The consuls named two commissioners to take cognizance of sedition and high treason, and in civil cases referred

actions for decision to a private citizen whom they selected and instructed. The consuls had the unrestricted right to impose for punishment or coercion very heavy fines, especially for opposition to an enrolment. In cases involving life or bodily chastisement, they and their representatives formed a court of original jurisdiction; but from the founding of the republic (by the Valerian law, B.C. 509), the condemned had the right of appeal, unless sentenced by martial law, to the higher jurisdiction of the general assembly, and before the year B.C. 451, this appeal was extended to cases involving heavy fines.

The greatest limitation of the consular power grew out of the altered position of the senate. Strictly, this body stood in the same relation to the consuls in which it had to the kings, not above but below the heads of the state, who, as had now become customary on the occasion of the census every fourth year, had to revise the roll of the senate, and to fill existing vacancies. Slowly, but plainly, however, was shown the immense advantage which a numerous aristocratic body, consisting of members holding office for life, and deeply experienced in politics, must gain over officials who are members of the same class and who hold a responsible office for one year only. The senate represented the unity and the standing tradition of the Roman government and its policy. The haughty self-assertion of single masterful consuls could not prevent the holders of the office from gradually becoming merely the executive officers of the senate.

In the new government the assembly of the Roman burgesses also took an entirely new position. The necessity of a closer union with the plebeians compelled the clans to give a much more prominent position to the comitia of the centuries, in which the voters of both *populus*<sup>1</sup> and plebs united for decisive action. The functions of this assembly were mainly the choice of consuls, the acceptance or rejection of rogations or laws proposed by government, the declaration of offensive wars, and the decision in all criminal cases, in which the plebeians as well as the old burgesses had now the right of appeal from the court of the quaestors.

But the plebeians soon found out that in the new order of things the lion's share of all advantages of public life fell to the old burgesses. Had the patricians at the outset been ready to admit

<sup>1</sup> The author here adopts the view of Niebuhr, who refers *populus* to the old patrician families, the *gentes*, in distinction from the plebeians. For the opposite view see Lewis, "On the Credibility of Early Roman History," vol. i., chap. i., 5. — Tr.

the more closely related families of the plebeians into the *populus*, to grant to them intermarriage, entrance to the senate on equal terms, and access to the public offices, and to content the masses of the plebeian peasants by admitting them to the use of public domain, and by regular divisions of land to support new peasant settlements, there would have been no question of a hundred and fifty years' struggle between the classes. On the contrary, in their material interests the old citizens were marked by illiberal and stubborn selfishness, peculiarities which their plebeian countrymen shared with them. For many decades it was the honest conviction of the patricians that they alone could hold intercourse in correct form with the gods, and take effective auspices, and that through marriages with the plebeians the blood of the old citizens would be changed, and their ability to take correct auspices impaired. Auspices taken by plebeians had no public validity. There could, therefore, be no suggestion of intermarriage, or of the admission of the plebeians to those offices with which the auspices of the state were associated. So it was not long before *populus* and *plebs* stood opposed to one another like two separate peoples, and of equality of rights and inner unity there was no thought. The patricians formed the ruling class. They alone had the right to the civil offices and priesthoods; they alone were the guardians of priestly lore and traditional law. The election of consuls was by no means free. Probably the senate and the consuls then in office held for a long time the right of proposing lists of officers, which at the most the voters could reject, without being able to name candidates of their own. The consul who conducted an election need not receive votes for an opposition candidate, nor proclaim such a candidate elected. The *populus* assembled in its *curiae* maintained the right of conferring the '*imperium*' upon the successful candidate, by a *lex curiata de imperio*, before he could enter upon his office. The men's colleges of priests were filled by co-optation; the vestals and single priests were appointed by the pontifical college, which probably first with the republic received an official head in the Pontifex Maximus.

It was not the discontent of the well-to-do plebeians with the political inequalities that occasioned the first great struggles of the *plebs*, but the social conditions of the mass of poor peasants and farmers. The *plebs*, to be sure, found it irksome to be under the rigorous jurisdiction of patrician officials, whose decisions followed traditions and principles of law, which were unknown to the *plebs*; but other

conditions were far more oppressive. It is certainly probable that there were great differences in the holding of land among the old burgesses, and that many of them were not much richer than the better-off part of the plebs. But their position in two respects was much more favorable than that of the plebs could be. First, many of the patrician proprietors of great estates were large capitalists, if measured by the standard of simple times, before the rise of a merchant class. The wholesale trade in agricultural products was from the beginning in the hands of owners of large estates. Secondly, the profit of the appropriation of the domain, the so-called *ager publicus*, came, and in a very considerable amount, exclusively to the old citizens. Large portions of this domain could, with the consent of the government, be ‘temporarily occupied,’ at a definite rental, and employed in agriculture. The portions of the domain thus occupied could never legally lose their character as state property; the state never renounced the right to demand them back at will. In fact, however, these lands very soon were regarded as unrestricted possessions, were devised, given away, sold and mortgaged. Unjust to the plebs as this system was, the abuses connected with it made it more intolerable. With the connivance of the officials, the old burgesses were allowed to evade the payment of rent for the lands they ‘occupied;’ and such ‘possessions’ were not considered in the census, and thus did not become a basis for the tax assessment. When the needs of the state called for a tax on the citizens, the patricians were assessed only for their individual property, and thus, with their extensive and untaxed ‘possessions,’ were far better off than the plebeians, who had only assessable real estate. Moreover, in the imposition of the *tributum*, the capital of the patricians was not touched, while no allowance was made to the plebeians for the debts that burdened their farms.

And here we touch the sore spot in the condition of the poor plebeians. The repeated wars with the neighboring peoples, for a long time after the fall of the kings, bore very hard upon the plebs. Partial ravaging or plundering of their possessions, ceaseless calls to arms, and burdensome war taxes pressed heavily upon these peasants. The direct load of the *tributum* was only theoretically relieved by regarding it as an advance, which was to be repaid in better times. A considerable portion of the smaller and middle-class plebeian land-owners fell dangerously into debt. The rate of interest, at a time when means of payment were scarce, was enormously high. It was considered a great relief by the plebeians when, at a later time (about 357 B.C.), the rate of inter-

est was fixed by law at eight and one-third or ten per cent. If the debtor could not pay his debt at maturity, the overdue interest was added to the capital, and in many cases the resulting debts quickly became crushing. It was dangerous for the security of the state that the creditors of the peasants were, as a rule, their rich patrician neighbors, who, as capitalists, were the first to be asked for loans. It was clear that the land-owning nobility of Rome was on the road to make the greater part of the plebeians completely dependent in economic as well as political matters. This was the point where the position of the old citizens was first exposed to the fierce attacks of the people, because the law of debt, as was natural with a people mercilessly severe in matters of property, had developed with frightful harshness.<sup>1</sup> Practically it very often happened that the creditor nominally left the land to his overburdened debtor, over whose person and property the law gave him control, allowing him to bear, however, all its burdens, and thus actually reducing him to the position of a tenant at will. But it was much more common for debtors who had borrowed money under the form of contract then current, the *nexum*, and pledged their persons as security, instead of giving up their entire property in case of temporary inability to pay (or even after complete loss of property), to surrender themselves to their creditors as bondsmen for debt; a condition which did not at once make them slaves, or take away their civil and private rights, but one in which they might serve their creditors for years, till they succeeded in freeing themselves, or till their creditors actually sold them as slaves to foreigners. Out of such vicious conditions a deep aversion of the plebeians toward the patrician government could not fail to rise, although not all the clans of old citizens showed such harshness to the peasantry. Several great families tried to bring about a better and more harmonious relation, especially the Valerii and the Horatii. But for the time the majority of the old citizens were controlled by narrow ambition and stubborn selfishness. The representative clans are the Sabine Fabii, the newly admitted family of Appius Claudius (which, indeed, is marked by excess in both good and bad, rather than a specifically conservative spirit), the Quinctii, and the Manlii, the upholders of an iron military discipline. So it came about that an improvement in the social condition of the plebeians, and the opening of new political paths, resulted from a movement of the commonalty that bordered close on a revolution.

<sup>1</sup> According to the theory of this old law, the creditor could legally treat a bankrupt debtor like a thief, — could kill him, or sell him ‘over the Tiber’ into a foreign country.

According to the usual, but extremely doubtful, chronology, the distress of the plebeians, and their anger at the enforcement of the law of debt, had reached in the year 495 B.C. a fearful height. In 494 B.C., in the face of a threatening war, the plebeians submitted only to the command of a dictator, who was popular among them,—Manius Valerius. He enrolled the army, and was successful in the war; but failing to carry in the senate his proposals for the relief of the unhappy debtors, the patience of the plebeians came to an end. Valerius, with righteous indignation, laid down his office; but when the consuls of the year wished to continue the war, the plebeian part of the army withdrew from them and from the patrician city, and retired, under the leadership of their officers, to the so-called 'Sacred Mount' (*Mons Sacer*), three miles from the city, on the tongue of land formed by the junction of the Anio with the Tiber. Their purpose in this 'secession' was to separate entirely from the populace, and here or in some other place to found an independent city. The gravity of the situation at last forced the old citizens and the senate to yield. The results of the negotiations lasted to the time of the empire. The transitory measures for the relief of the severest pressure of debt have been forgotten in the all-important creation of those days. The agreement which was made between the two members of the Roman people, in treaty form, gave to the plebeians an independent organization within the state, and secured to them their own recognized officers in distinction from those of the old citizens. To offset the consuls, two plebeian Tribunes, 'the tribunes of the people,' were established, at a later time increased to five, and in 457 B.C. to ten, who, in all probability, were named by the assembly of the plebeian order. These tribunes, elected from the plebeians, with whom were associated plebeian Aediles as police and administrative officers, were above all the protectors of the commonalty. They had the right and the duty of protecting the members of their order against the severity and abuse of the consular authority, of strenuously upholding the right of the *provocatio*, or appeal, and, in general, of intervening everywhere against the oppression of plebeians. Only against the dictator, and the military 'imperium' of the consuls outside the city, they had no power. But in Rome they had the right, by their seasonable and personal protest, to nullify any order issued by a patrician officer, by which any citizen thought himself injured and against which he called for their assistance. They could, at their discretion, hinder or nullify the proposal of any official directed to the whole community. This was the right of intercession,

or the tribunician veto. For this reason the tribune, who always entered on his office on the 10th of December, was not allowed, during his time of office, to pass a night outside the city; and his house stood open night and day for him who sought protection. To secure the necessary strength and power for their position, it was agreed in the treaty of B.C. 494 that while in office their persons should be *sacrosancti*; i. e., inviolable. Whoever laid hands upon them, or went counter to their lawful commands, incurred the curse of the gods, and was regarded among men, also, to be worthy of death as for a lawfully proved crime. Consequently they could call to account any patrician who had interfered with their rights or their person, the consul himself not excepted; could, if necessary, arrest him, and arraign him before their court, where sentences of death or fines were pronounced. The appeal from their decision was to the assembly of the plebeians.

Down to the time of the great wars with Veii and with the Celts, the internal contests became more and more important; but the struggle of the commonalty with the clans takes on a different character after the period of the decemvirate. Till then the work of the plebeian leaders was essentially directed to the steady development of their state within the larger state, to widening the cleft between the plebs and the *populus*, and to the weakening of the power of the patrician officials over the plebeians. This period, when the two ‘peoples’ are roughly clashing, is an evil time for Rome. Nevertheless, even then the foreign enemy reckoned falsely who fancied that the nobility or the commonalty, out of hatred to their opponents in the city, would open its gates to a stranger. In days of danger from without, the united state presented to the foe an impregnable wall of brass, and fortunately for the future of Rome the tendency to a constantly increasing separation of the plebeians from the *populus* came to an end with the commotions of the decemviral period. From that time the aim of the plebeian leaders was to gain for the plebeians, within the common state, the political and social position that was their due: from that time to the beginning of the great struggle for the supremacy of Italy the interest is concentrated on controversies of a more purely political character. The sympathies of modern times, with but few exceptions, are with the plebeians. Their demands are clearly but reasonable; their political insight and temperate conduct placed them high above most of the Grecian democracies. In spite of party passion, revolution, down to the time of the Græchi, was not thought of: The peasant community strove only for that share in the government which was its

right. The worst threat, uttered only in moments of deepest resentment, was of secession, of voluntary separation from the patrician state. When the plebeians had at last attained their object, they showed that in good, as in evil, they were of the same nature as their opponents. They showed by their actions that in the struggle the right was on their side ; and they brought to the public life of the state a fulness and freshness of moral, military, and political resources that for a long time seemed almost inexhaustible. Yet, however shortsighted the selfishness of the old citizens in the agrarian controversies may seem to us, however odious their law of debt, we must not ascribe their opposition in purely political questions, adhered to for so many years, and conducted with great tactical skill, entirely to the arrogance and self-interest of a privileged class, nor call the religious basis of their opposition to the admission of the plebeians to *conubium* and to the higher civil offices, contemptible hypocrisy. We must consider the danger to an old association of citizens, rich in political experience, of giving over the management of their state to new and untried elements. The plebeians themselves never denied that their opponents in the *populus* were true and worthy men, whose rule was so able in peace and war, that even they, while hating, could never despise them, but rather took them as patterns of genuine Roman manhood on which to mould their own. And finally, in that great crisis of the constitution, it was not to force, but to a better insight and to patriotic conviction, that the old citizens yielded. The great tenacity with which the classes struggled with one another, and the conservative character of these struggles, is due essentially to the fact that in blood they were of like descent, and in their chief characteristics they were a people of husbandmen ; and to this is due the aristocratic character which down to the time of the elder Cato, even after the complete victory of the commonalty, the Roman government maintained. The constitution of the Roman state gained in the course of generations a fixedness and an elasticity that later filled more than one Greek statesman with longing envy.

What is handed down of the first period of these internal struggles is marked with legendary features by the influence of family chronicles and the tradition of the noble houses. It is characterized by incessant and seldom successful feuds with their neighbors, and by phases of the internal strife between the *populus* and the *plebs* of the most repellent description. At first the old citizens and the high officials accepted the introduction of the tribunate with great reluctance ; and

for years it was a common occurrence, when individual plebeians resisted a tax, or a summons to military service, as contrary to law, for the tribunes to protect them from the consequences of their resistance, or to ward off the encroachment of the patricians. From b.c. 476, the tribunes repeatedly enforced the rights of the plebs under the agreement, by opposing the condemnation of plebeians accused before the patrician courts; they punished violent acts of individual patricians in contravention of the agreement, by heavy fines or banishment. The irresponsibility and inviolability of the tribunes gradually enabled them to pass over from defence to attack. As long as they wished to prevent action, no obstacle lay in the way of the individual tribune; but to take positive steps, since each tribune could be stopped by the veto of a colleague, they were obliged to act in harmony. The right of intercession soon gained great practical importance. While they could not formally interfere with the general measures of the government, they were able very effectually to block its plans by the mere declaration that they would support the passive resistance of the plebs to the military service demanded by the senate and the consuls. Thus they gradually acquired an extensive power of dictation. Moreover, it is probable that the tribunes early claimed the right of attending the deliberations of the senate; and this was soon generally recognized as suitable, for the tribunes, in the interest of the commonalty, had to introduce measures of the most varied kinds. The bulk of the old citizens would gladly have wrested the tribunate from the plebs. Grounds of bitterness increased on both sides. The well-known tale of Coriolanus, which as we have it is historically worthless, and the murder of the tribune Genucius, belong to this period of strife.

The serious evils in the method of taxation and in the management of debts, and the patrician prerogative in matters of the *ager publicus*, were left untouched in the year b.c. 494. In b.c. 486 a high-minded patrician, Spurius Cassius Viscellinus, then consul for the third time, having brought about the alliance with the Hernici, as he had done in b.c. 493 with the Latins, ventured on a great attempt to settle the land question, and proposed a survey of the *ager publicus*, with the view of assigning portions to the poorer plebeians. The remainder was to be leased, and the rents from existing possessors were to be more vigorously collected than before. He actually secured, as it seems, the passage of the law; but it was never put into execution. In revenge, the members of his own order brought against this friend of the people the charge, so fatal in republican Rome, of aspiring to be a king, and at the expiration

of his term of office, had him condemned to death, whether by the curiae or the centuries is uncertain. But the tribunes continually demanded the execution of the *lex Cassia*, till B.C. 466, when the state was in great danger from the Aequi and the Volsei; constitutional advantages were won, however, in other lines. After the establishment of the tribunate, the meetings of the plebeian commonalty, which up to that time had been only irregular, coming usually on market-days, were duly organized. The patricians and their clients were excluded, though the latter voted with the plebeians in the centuries, and thus for a while strengthened the position of the nobility in their comitia; and henceforward the plebeians met under the presidency of their tribunes in their own assemblies, which were called *comitia tributa*, because the people was mustered according to local tribes, which since a new organization in B.C. 495 numbered twenty-one. The tribunes employed these comitia to develop in the plebs a common policy, to create a definite and close class-feeling, and to rouse it to a knowledge of its own interests, and its real strength and importance, so as to counterbalance the advantages given to the patricians, ever alive to their own welfare, by the support of immemorial tradition and custom, and by a long established superiority in political, religious, and social position. Gradually there appeared a succession of famous plebeian statesmen, such as the Icili, the Virginii, and later the Duilii. In B.C. 492 an Icilius secured the passage of a law imposing a severe penalty upon one who should venture in the comitia of the tribes to interrupt the tribunes when they were proposing to the plebeians their criminal sentences for ratification. Thus the tribunes became the impelling force in the agitation over the constitution, while it was through them that the plebs were kept within legal bounds and violent measures averted. It was the first work of the tribunes to win for the resolutions of the comitia of the tribes,—in which a majority of tribes, not of individuals, decided, and which at first were only expressions of opinion, without legal force,—the recognized position among the laws of the state, since the comitia of the centuries had for the plebs at that time only a very limited value. Although, through the dying out of many patrician families, particularly in the severe epidemics which in the middle of the fifth century, in B.C. 472, 466, 463, and 453, repeatedly visited Rome, the number of plebeian votes came greatly to exceed that of the old citizens; yet the grouping of the whole people as a ‘voting army’ was such that in the centuries the patricians were easily able to maintain their superiority, while the power of the richer portion of the population, without refer-

ence to rank, over the poorer, was still more marked. The first census-class alone, with the centuries of horsemen, formed a majority of all the centuries, while the very poor were all crowded into one century.

It was long before the tribunes gained for their comitia the recognition of public law. They did, indeed, obtain (B.C. 482) that in the case of one of the two consuls at least the community should no longer be bound by the previous choice of the senate. But it was not till the excitement over the murder of the tribune Genucius (B.C. 473) that an energetic, clear-headed plebeian, Volero Publilius, who became leader of the plebs, succeeded (B.C. 471) in forcing through a law which definitely gave the election of the tribunes and the aediles to the comitia tributa, won for this body a position in the constitution, and placed it beside the assembly of the centuries as a chief organ of the state. The right of the plebs was admitted to consider and determine in its separate assemblies matters affecting the whole state. The plebs had won the power to initiate legislation. Their decrees, the *plebiscita*, went through the tribunes to the senate in the form of petitions, which must be discussed with the tribunes, and could not summarily be thrown out. If the assent of the senate was gained the rogations (when they did not affect the plebs alone) were laid before the curiae for ratification, and then became laws.<sup>1</sup>

For a time the pressure of wars and plagues suspended the internal strife. In B.C. 462 a new struggle broke out, which led to an entire change in the tactics of the plebeian leaders. The tribune Caius Terentilius Harsa proposed to restrain the power of the consuls by appointing a commission of five plebeians "to draw up laws for the regulation and limitation of their official and punitive power; that a consul might exercise so much right and power over the plebs as the plebs should allow, but should not make laws of his own caprice." This rogation aimed clearly at the complete independence of the plebs within the state, and to restrict the control of the patrician officers over the commonalty, so far as possible, to the administration of justice. The old citizens, as was natural, stubbornly opposed this plan; and even the more moderate statesmen among them saw the danger to the state if the separation between the two classes should become more marked.

In this, as in later struggles, the commonalty chose year after year the same men for their tribunes; while the senate and old citizens, with equal stubbornness, refused to ratify the rogation. In vain the senate

<sup>1</sup> This is the view of those who do not believe that the curiae were completely changed at the beginning of the republic by the admission of the plebeians.

sought to soothe the plebeians by other concessions. In b.c. 457 it consented that the number of tribunes should be raised to ten; an advantage for the plebeians not entirely unmixed with evil, since it was now less difficult to find one who could be influenced by the patricians to use his intercession against the plans of his colleagues,—a means of which nobility and senate at a later time made very common use. A law was also passed restricting the right of the consuls to impose fines. Nevertheless, the commonalty stood firm until the senate succeeded in bringing about a compromise by which the punitive power of the consuls was limited, and the dangerous feature of the original rogation was avoided. An agreement was reached with the tribunes that a common system of civil and criminal legislation for the two orders of the Roman people should be prepared, and that the task of codifying the law should be committed to a commission of ten men, to be chosen by the centuries. In b.c. 452 the commission, the so-called Decemvirs, were chosen, and entered on their office on the 15th of May, b.c. 451. The nobility had succeeded in having only patricians named upon it. An entire re-formation of the old institutions was proposed; and therefore the magistracies, especially the consulate and the tribunate, were suspended, perhaps with the hope of doing away with the tribunate for the future; and with the express reservation of the established rights and privileges of the commonalty, the full control of the government was handed over to the decemvirs, with unrestricted authority and without appeal. The conduct of the public business by the decemvirs in the year b.c. 451 was excellent, not less so their legislative activity, so that by the end of their year of office the chief part of their work was done. A code of Ten Tables was first published, which, after approval by the senate, was accepted by the centuries, and ratified by the curiae, and then, inscribed upon ten copper tablets, was placed in the forum, upon the speaker's stand in front of the council hall. To complete the work, decemvirs were again appointed for the year b.c. 450; among them this time several plebeians, the first high officials, not of the nobility, which the united Roman people had had up to that time. The theory has been suggested that it was proposed to remodel the entire system of the higher offices from the foundation, to do away with the tribunate, and to appease the plebeians by the substitution for the too powerful consulate of a less powerful magistracy, which should be open to them. Whatever the plan may have been, it was rendered hopeless, according to the tradition, by the conduct of the decemvirs, who, after completing the code by two

more tables, began, under the leadership of the gross and imperious Appius Claudius, to act with unendurable despotism. Contrary to the law, they undertook to continue in office beyond the 15th of May, b.c. 449, and began a war against the Sabines and Aequi. At last the attempt of Appius Claudius, by a shameful violation of law, to gain possession of the fair daughter of the plebeian Lucius Virginius, which resulted in her death at her father's hand to save her from disgrace, led to an outbreak against the decemvirs by Virginius in the camp and by the girl's betrothed, Ieilius, a former tribune, in Rome. The plebeian legions appeared in the city, and encamped on the Aventine. When the decemvirs, supported by a part of the old citizens, refused to resign, the plebeians again withdrew to Mons Sacer, and by this new secession forced the decemvirs to retire, and through the mediation of L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus, patricians friendly to the people, obtained from the senate conditions advantageous for the future position of the plebeians in the Roman state, which now returned to the old forms of the constitution. The tribunes of the plebeians were re-established, as were the consuls, who then for the first time received that name, and were to be freely chosen by the citizens; the choice fell first on Valerius and Horatius. Of the work of the decemvirs, only the codification of the legal principles applicable to all, the code of the Twelve Tables, was retained; and the whole people now possessed a common law of marriage, property, legal procedure and penalties. In this an attempt seems to have been made to alleviate the condition of the plebeians; yet the law of debt remained very oppressive, and the maintenance of the prohibition of lawful marriage between patricians and plebeians kept alive one of the most deplorable causes of separation between the orders. The removal of capital cases from the comitia of the tribes and of the curiae to the exclusive jurisdiction of the comitia of the centuries was a decided improvement. In this period, also, it seems the Romans advanced from the use of copper bars to the coinage of copper money.<sup>1</sup> (Fig. 21.)

This settlement of Roman affairs was completed under the leadership of the consuls Horatius and Valerius, and of the prudent and en-

<sup>1</sup> The Roman heavy *as* always had a very high relief. The representations are always the same; the value of the full weight, or whole piece, and of the smaller pieces, as they circulated in Rome till just before the first Punic war, was indicated by the head of a divinity. The whole piece ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  cents) had that of Janus, the *semis* ( $5\frac{1}{4}$  cents) that of Jupiter, the *triens* (4 cents) that of Pallas, the *quadran* (3 cents) that of Hercules, the *sestans* (2 cents) that of Mercury, and the *uncia* (1 cent) that of Rome. The reverse face is, on all alike, the prow of a ship.

ergetic tribune M. Duilius. A series of laws was then passed, which may be fairly regarded as the Magna Charta of the plebs. On motion of the consuls, the right of appeal was established by the centuries in the most solemn and binding form; henceforth, on pain of death, no magistrate, not even the dictator (who otherwise retained his former authority), was to be appointed from whose decision an appeal to the people might not be taken. The inviolability of the tribunes was again



Copper As.



Copper Semis.



Copper Triens.



Copper Quadrans.



Copper Sextans.



Copper Uncia.

FIG. 21.—A series of Roman coins: the *as* and its fractional parts.  $\frac{1}{2}$  original size.  
See note on p. 72.

assured by a law, and placed under special protection of the gods; and their position was more securely established by their being henceforth regarded as the officials of the whole people, so that on occasion even the patricians sought the protection of the tribunes, and the senate made use of their support to break the opposition of the consuls. Their participation in the deliberations of the senate was now formally recognized; and while they might still fine their patrician opponents in the comitia tributa, they were obliged, when they proposed death, to ask a patrician magistrate to present the case to the centuries. With

the increased importance of the comitia of the tribes, the tribunes now obtained the right of taking auspices; and further the election of the quaestors, who now became simply financial officers (first chosen for the year B.C. 447), was transferred, under the direction of the consuls, to the comitia of the tribes.

The real advance made by the plebs appears most clearly in the new position of the comitia of the tribes, which from this time were attended by the old citizens and their clients, and, attaining the importance of a second national assembly, stood on equal footing with that of the centuries before the law. It was determined by the Valerio-Horatian legislation that ‘what the plebs decreed in the comitia of the tribes should be binding upon the whole people.’ This declaration, which was several times renewed before the war with the Tarentines, has been interpreted in different ways. We follow the theory that the parliamentary importance of the comitia of the tribes was at first no greater than that of the centuries; that is, the decrees of the comitia tributa, in matters of general import, needed, like those of the centuries, the ratification of the curiae to gain the full force of law. This may have been the practice without being expressly formulated. The senate, apparently, retained its former importance. The tribunes were obliged to come to an understanding with it in advance, and to secure its assent, or *auctoritas*, for all plebiscita which needed the co-operation of the executive authority and the assent of the senate to be carried through; all the more because the senate of the republic carefully kept in its own hand the chief direction of the finances, so that neither the consuls, nor even the otherwise unlimited dictator, could use the public money without its consent. The comitia of the tribes, not hampered by the clumsy business methods of the centuries, became from this time the field in which the Roman constitution was to develop. Under the lead of the tribunes, these assemblies took a vigorous initiative in legislation. They also aroused within the community a very marked political activity, which henceforth tended, on the part of the plebs, to level the barriers still existing between them and the *populus*, and to acquire a direct share in the government.

The advance of the plebs is steady, though at first slow. A widely scattered agricultural population could not be brought together for political action save when great interests were at stake. Weary of agitation, it preferred to secure the newly-won advantages, and to establish friendly relations with the clans. The movement to gain an immediate share in the management of the state was left to the wealthy and politi-

cally experienced families of the plebs, till a great question affecting the material welfare of the whole community, as well as its political advantage, again arose.

In B.C. 445 a successful attack upon the position of the nobility was made by the tribune Caius Canuleius, who had a law passed establishing marriage relations between the members of the two orders, upon the basis of complete civil equality. The children followed the civil status of the father; the child of a patrician father and a plebeian mother was a patrician, while under the old prohibition he would have belonged to the plebs. This step was of great importance politically, because it tended to the actual union of the two elements. This success encouraged the tribunes to press a proposal demanding the admission of the plebeians to the consulate, leaving the citizens free to choose the consuls from either the clans or the commonalty. After a long conflict the patricians agreed to a compromise, based on the military organization, by which they allowed the plebeians a chance to take part in the government. Military tribunes 'with consular authority' might be chosen, instead of consuls, by the centuries; and to this office, which in rank and honors was much below the consulate, the plebs were granted admission. For a long time the question constantly arose whether consuls or consular tribunes should be chosen for the following year; and in B.C. 444, a few months after the election of consular tribunes, among them probably two plebeians, the craft of the patricians was sufficient to force their abdication, under the pretext of an informality in taking the auspices at the elections; and for the remainder of that year and for the next patrician consuls were elected. After that time the clans were able to interfere so effectively in the elections that, till the year B.C. 401, the consular tribunate was filled by patricians alone.

Contemporaneously with the experiment of the consular tribunate the patricians took up tactics of a new kind in defence of their political position, based on the increasing amount of public business. To retain for the clans as long as possible the conduct of certain important matters, they took from the consulate, one after another, a number of functions, and founded for these new offices. Besides steadily keeping plebeian and consular tribunes from the administration of justice, they created, in B.C. 445, the new, exclusively patrician, office of Censor, to which were committed the new valuation and settlement of the budget, arranged every four years, the care of the public buildings, the management of the lists of citizens and taxes, the important preparation of

the census register for the formation of the comitia of the centuries and the tribes, the accompanying right of filling vacant places in the senate and equestrian order, and, through the determination of the lists of senators, knights, and citizens, of expelling individuals from those bodies. The official tenure of the censors (two in number) was first fixed for a *lustrum* (five years); but in b.c. 434 the time was limited to eighteen months. The censorship, which was usually conferred upon ex-consuls and consular tribunes, gradually developed to an office whose acquisition was regarded as the highest prize of Roman ambition. The later censors had also the right of punishing by a so-called censor's 'mark,' and by other means, Roman citizens who in their view were guilty of conduct dishonorable, though not illegal, or of offences against good morals and discipline. In the roll-call (*lectio*) and filling out of the senate, which fell to the censor in the time after the Licinian legislation, a senator marked by their censure was obliged to give up his seat in the senate, a knight to leave his service in the cavalry, and any other citizen his position in the tribes, and in addition to pay a heavy fine.<sup>1</sup>

In b.c. 421, on the other hand, the quaestorship was thrown open to the plebeians, and the number of quaestors was increased to four. From b.c. 400, almost regularly, one or more plebeians were chosen as consular tribunes, and the road to a gradual political equalization of the two orders seemed to have been cleared away. But the peaceful development of the Roman state was suddenly broken in upon by the fearful storm of Celtic invasion.

<sup>1</sup> This dangerous authority was limited by the fact that against such steps of a censor the veto of his colleague was effective, and that his successors in office might nullify his acts. An exclusion was usually preceded by an investigation, and the presentation of written reasons.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE FALL OF VEII.—THE CELTIC STORM.—THE LICINIO-SEXTIAN ROGATIONS.

AFTER the conclusion of the alliance with the Latins and the Hernici, scarcely a year passed in which the Romans and their new allies had not to struggle with one or another of their enemies in central Italy; although, viewed as a whole, their wars till far into the middle of the fifth century were essentially defensive. At the time of the establishment of the tribunate of the plebeians, the Etruscans of Veii were the most dangerous enemies of the Romans. The feuds with the Sabines continued till their defeat by the consul Horatius, in b.c. 449; from which time they seem to have turned with their Sabellian kindred to the conquest of the provinces of southern Italy. Stubborn and difficult were the wars which the Romans had to carry on with the Aequi on the east, and the powerful Volsci, the ancient enemies of the Latins, who strove with all their might to conquer the district along the sea-coast. The Romans sought to spread at the expense of the Volsci by holding the mountainous land east of the Pomptine marshes with military stations of Romans and Latins, thus separating the eastern from the western Volsci. These wars were not always to the advantage of the Romans and Latins, and during the internal dissensions the warfare was carried on as a rule in the neighborhood of the Roman district. The Aequi little by little gained the Latin territory about Mount Algidus, the eastern wall of the Alban range, whence they made raids on the Roman territory. A change in favor of Rome begins in b.c. 459, probably due to a peace concluded with the western Volsci, who give up Antium, and do not again appear as enemies for seventy years. The Romans now directed all their strength against the Aequi and the eastern Volsci, who, by b.c. 431, were greatly weakened by the spread of the Sabellians in their rear, so that the Roman and Latin armies, step by step, won back the territory conquered from the Latins. The Aequi were driven back to their highlands; the land of the eastern Volscians was plundered from end to end by the Roman bands. By b.c. 404 the Romans had

so exhausted their opponents that these looked on at the destruction of Veii with scarcely a movement. In b.c. 400 Tarracina was taken, in b.c. 393 the colony at Circeii renewed, and almost the whole of Latium in its later extent was subject to the Romans or allied with them. In the course of these struggles, and in consequence of them, the alliance of the Romans with their Latin allies unavoidably took the character of a hegemony. Rome claimed the right to determine by herself upon wars and treaties for the league, the Latin generals no longer alternated with the Romans as commanders, and the places of the staff-officers of the allied troops were filled by Roman appointment and very soon mainly by Romans.

In the last half of the fifth century the war with Veii is renewed after a long truce, and with several breaks lasts to the end of the century. In b.c. 425 Fidenae fell. The political conditions of the Rasennae had so changed, that the Romans could hope finally to destroy Veii, and to advance north of the Tiber against Etruria. The power of the Rasennae had reached its height at the beginning of the fifth century, when, strong in their three great provinces and the alliance with the Carthaginians, they held their ascendancy on the Tyrrhenian Sea over the Greeks and Italians; and though Sardinia belonged to the Carthaginians, the coasts of Corsica were in the possession of the Etruscans. The advance of the Hellenes was the beginning of their decline. In b.c. 474 king Hiero I. of Syracuse, in company with the Greeks of Cumae, in a sea-fight near that town, badly defeated the Etruscans; and Syracuse, Tarentum, and Massilia began to lower very decidedly the Etruscan predominance on the Italian seas. At about the same time the Campanian province of the Etruscans and the northern one in upper Italy were threatened by irresistible enemies of the most different character. In Campania these were Sabellians. The Samnite stock, at the time of the expulsion of the Tarquins, had been long in possession of the mountainous country between the coast plains of Apulia and Campania, from which, in the middle of the fifth century, powerful expeditions for conquest set out toward the south and toward the sea, and threatened equally the lands of the Italotes and the Etruscans. In the last quarter of the fifth century, the Sabellian Lucanians appeared in Magna Graecia, and the Sabellian Campanians seized the fair land around the Gulf of Naples. The Greeks lost Cyme (the Italian Cumae) to the Campanians in b.c. 420, but maintained themselves vigorously in Neapolis for centuries; while in b.c. 424 the Etruscan Capua fell, and the Rasennae were soon driven forever out of this part of Italy.

But much more disastrous to the Rasennae were the conquests in northern Italy of the Celts, who now enter the circle of Italian peoples, and first appear as terrible destroyers. The great mass of the Celtic nation seems to have dwelt at first in the later Gaul, between the Garonne, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Rhine, and to have extended over the islands of Britain. Long content with shepherd life, till far into historic times, they were ever ready to migrate; with little talent for organized civil life, they were always fond of strife; impatient of discipline and lacking in endurance, they were brave, impetuous, violent, and eager for plunder and bloodshed. In spite of chivalrous qualities, they became the mercenaries of the west. To the inhabitants of Italy they appeared in battle tall, fair-haired, with bristling moustaches, golden bands upon their necks and arms, with breeches and cloaks in place of armor, and with long swords. From Gaul the Celts migrated first over the lands along the Danube north of the Alps beyond Pannonia, and then, toward the beginning of the sixth century, pressed forward into upper Italy. The Ligurians in the south of Gaul were first subdued. Then Celtic tribes covered the Alps, and step by step drove the Etruscans out of the lowlands north of the Po, where only Mantua was successfully defended. The Insubres settled in the country about Milan, the Cenomani pushed on to the neighborhood of Verona. Later the Boii and Lingones gained a footing between the Po and the Apennines, the Boii between Parma and Bologna, and the Lingones between Bologna and Ravenna. Last of all came the Senones, who together with Insubres and Boii, on the day of the capture of Veii by the Romans, stormed the strong city of Melpum, and then settled on the low lands along the Adriatic between Rimini and Aneona. The Rasennae were driven out of upper Italy, partly into the Alps, where they remained as the Rhaetians, partly toward the Etruscan provinces west of the Apennines, and in b.c. 394 were driven back from the Apennines to Arretium, and on the coast to Pisa, by the Ligurians.

The struggle against the Celtic invaders so fully occupied the attention of the Etruscans dwelling between the Arno and the Tiber that they had little thought or time for the straits to which Veii in b.c. 405 was brought by the Romans. This war, which in b.c. 404 took the form of a blockade, and in b.c. 403 that of a close investment of Veii, in three ways marks an epoch in Roman history. It was the first time that the Romans entered on the fateful road of foreign conquest. Further, they now gave up for the first time the ancient system of short summer campaigns. The troops remained throughout the winter

in the lines enclosing Veii. This was made possible by the decision, which the senate now, for the first time, took, of paying the infantry from the public treasury. By this means the peasants and their grown-up sons, who as soldiers were obliged to leave the care of their farms to the women and servants, and yet must pay the war-tax, were enabled to serve without loss in this changed method of warfare. The tenacity of the Romans finally gained the victory over the powerful city, chiefly because they then had for the first time, in Marcus Furius Camillus, a true general at their head. A commander of extraordinary gifts, he came into prominence in B.C. 401, and then as dictator in B.C. 396 took Veii by storm, and annihilated it as a political community. It was the greatest political, military, and territorial gain which the Romans had obtained since the fall of the kings.

The war spirit of the Romans, and their greed for further conquests, were powerfully stimulated by this success. Between the years B.C. 395 and 391 they conquered the land as far as the Ciminian Forest, then an almost impenetrable wilderness. From this line to the southern border of Latium their power was firmly consolidated. But the hour of trial was at hand, when the Celts were to put the political system and the method of war of Rome to a test which tried her to the utmost, and for a long time checked the outer and inner development of the state.

The Celtic hordes, sweeping over the Etruscan lowlands south of the Po, finally threatened the country between the Apennines and the Tyrrhenian Sea. In B.C. 391 the Senones laid siege to Clusium (Chiusi), in central Etruria. The Clusians, in their extremity, begged the help of the Romans. The choice open to the Romans was merely between a strictly neutral position and an energetic support of the Etruscans, which, politically, would be very advantageous. They decided, however, on diplomatic intervention. When this failed, the Roman ambassadors, against all rules of international law, took part in a battle of the Clusians against the Celts, and gave occasion to the rightly angered barbarians to direct their attack upon Rome, and to demand the surrender of the guilty ambassadors. The demand was refused by the assembly of the citizens. In that dangerous moment, unfortunately the Romans could not command the talent of Camillus, who, a proud, imperious aristocrat, had lately drawn upon himself the wrath of the plebs, by his support of the patricians in their refusal to grant assignments of land in the newly acquired territory of Veii. Accused by the tribunes of embezzlement in connection with the booty of Veii,

he withdrew into exile at Ardea in b.c. 391, and in his absence was heavily fined. In choosing consular tribunes for the year b.c. 390, a most serious mistake was made. On the 18th of July, b.c. 390,<sup>1</sup> the 70,000 Celts under the Brennus, or chieftain of the horde, attacked the Roman army, about ten miles from the city, at the brook Allia, which falls into the Tiber on the left side, near Fidenae, and brought a great disaster upon Rome. The army, which fought with the cavalry on the wings, and left the brunt of the battle to the infantry formed in a phalanx with a depth of probably eight ranks, had thus far met only opponents who employed similar methods of fighting. Now they were faced by the gigantic Celts, who, brandishing monstrous shields in one hand, and long naked swords of ill-tempered steel in the other, rushed in mad onset, in dense masses and with furious cries, upon the lines of the Italians. The Romans did not yet know the weak side of such troops. They were unable to overcome a panic fear; and, badly led by inexperienced commanders, they suffered a severe defeat, which was still more fatal, in that a large part of the fugitives fled, not to Rome, but across the Tiber to Veii, and thus made it impossible to defend the lower portion of the city. When three days later the Celts appeared, the population had fled, and only the fortress on the Capitoline was prepared to resist. Rome was completely plundered and laid in ashes by the barbarians.<sup>2</sup>

Roman pride has allowed only an imperfect account of this calamity to be handed down. It is certain that the firm endurance with which a heroic band of Romans defended the Capitol then saved Rome's future. The long blockade of seven months, the fever of the summer, unsuccessful skirmishes with Roman and Latin troops in their raids into the heart of the land, exhausted at last the strength of the

<sup>1</sup> This is the usual reckoning. The date is really 388.

<sup>2</sup> This destruction was disastrous for the early history of the state; for, with the exception of memorials preserved abroad and in the citadel, all the material perished which might have served later ages as a safe foundation for the reconstruction of real history. There remained, first, the memory of contemporaries, good only for their own immediate past; second, a greatly confused tradition, the general history of the republic from the fall of the Tarquins, with some details in the family chronicles of the patrician clans. For the time of the kings there sprang up a luxuriant growth of legends, traditions, and myths of every description. Around the existing remains of monuments of the earlier time, as around the ancient religious, sacred, legal, and political institutions, there arose another series of myths and traditions. All these, supported by the public chronicle of the pontifices (which began apparently in the first half of the fifth century, was now put together again, and ever afterward continued); and the still preserved genuine memorials were, perhaps in the second half of the fourth century n.c., finally brought together by the pontifices. Before the Roman annalists at a later date had worked out the early history of their country, the Greek historiographers had done their best to confuse the correct knowledge of the subject.

Celts. But it was the report of an inroad of the Veneti into the newly won possessions of the Senones on the Po, together with the payment of a large ransom, that induced them to retreat, and freed the Roman territory from the fearful enemy, who often in after times made Rome tremble. The Roman state, to be sure, was saved from destruction ; but the city, in which the inhabitants again assembled, was a waste of ashes, its territory despoiled, and the courage of its hostile neighbors again aroused. Then Camillus, recalled from exile, became its saviour ; through his influence, mainly, was the cowardly thought given up of deserting the city and migrating to Veii. Rome was then rebuilt in the quickest possible way, but entirely without plan, or reference to beauty, nor was this remedied till the time of Augustus and Nero. The military genius of Camillus was especially valuable, as he won for his people, for many years, a succession of notable victories. The years to b.c. 377 were in every way hard and dangerous. The Volsci and the Aequi first rose in 389, but were so defeated by Camillus, that the Aequi do not appear again in war for eighty-four years ; and of the Volsci, only Antium and Ecetrae still continued the war. In southern Etruria the Romans maintained their conquests as far as the Ciminian Forest ; and from b.c. 385 we have here unbroken quiet for many years. Among the Latins and the Hernici there appeared serious discontent, partly from sectional aversion to the hegemony of Rome, which had lately become more marked, and partly in consequence of various self-seeking measures of the Romans. From both peoples many warriors, acting independently, had already gone over to the Volsci ; but from b.c. 383 on the last struggles of the Volsci were accompanied by the attempts of several Latin towns to make themselves independent of Rome by open revolt. All these individual risings were put down by the Romans with a strong hand ; and in b.c. 377 the Volsci, too, were so defeated that they did not again venture to attack Rome alone.

During these struggles, and under the influence of Camillus, a new system of tactics and armament was developed for the Roman army, which reached completion only in the long wars with the Sabellian races of the highlands. The essential point of this reform was that, in place of the old phalanx arrangement, the masses were broken up into a number of more flexible divisions, which were to come into action one after the other, in which the main reliance was on the discipline and skill of each individual man. The army was divided into legions of 4200 men each. These were arranged in thirty maniples, or com-

panies, of heavy infantry, in addition to 1200 *velites*, or skirmishers,—younger troops, furnished with leathern casques, small, round bucklers, short swords, and light javelins. When drawn up for battle, the legion was arranged in three ranks, formed and armed according to the time of service of the soldiers. The first rank consisted of ten maniples of *hastati* of 120 men each, which in battle were separated from each other by passages as wide as the front of the maniple. The *hastati*, the youngest warriors except the *velites*, wore brazen helmets, leathern jackets stiffened with iron plates, and carried in the left hand a rectangular, cylindrical shield, made of leather, and bound with iron. The weapon of attack of the *hastati* was the Italian *pilum*<sup>1</sup> (Fig. 22). In battle these missiles were thrown into the ranks of the enemy at a distance of from ten to twelve steps; and the bloody work was completed with the short, double-edged sword, equally serviceable for cut and thrust. Behind the first rank of the legion, far enough removed to allow free movement, stood in the same order, and armed in the same




FIG. 22.—The Pilum.

manner, the ten companies of the second rank (the *principes*), equal in strength, and so placed as to cover by their front the passages between the maniples of the first rank. They consisted of the middle-aged soldiers, and their special work was to relieve and to support the *hastati*. Behind the openings in the *principes* were stationed as reserves the *triarii*,—ten maniples of the most experienced veterans, 600 in number, armed with breastplates and long pikes. This checker-board arrangement of the legion was called the ‘quincunx’ order. The custom was also introduced to fortify the camp, even for a stay of a single night, by a regular circumvallation, behind which, in case of an unsuccessful engagement, the army could find protection.

The heavy expenses in restoring what had been destroyed by the Celts, and the incessant wars, weighed heavily on the poorer plebeian land-holders; as in the time of the establishment of the tribunate, many

<sup>1</sup> The pilum, used both to thrust and hurl, was a three- or four-edged iron shaft, with a steel point fastened to a strong wooden staff; it weighed about twelve pounds, and measured over six feet in length.

of them fell heavily into debt. The law of debt, still frightfully severe, was again enforced without mercy; and the plebeians again stubbornly resisted it. Once more the needs of the time, and the financial dependence of a large part of the peasants on their patrician neighbours, enabled the old citizens, under a leader like Camillus, to recover a large share of that political supremacy which had been so seriously shaken. Marcus Manlius, a high-minded but impetuous patrician, the saviour of the Capitol in the most dangerous moment of the siege by




FIG. 23.—Columns from the Temple of Concord at Rome, built by Furius Camillus.

the Celts, endeavored, in b.c. 385, to improve the condition of the plebeians, was led into violent acts, was tried, and condemned to death. Deliverance for the plebeians came from two leaders of great political ability from their own class, Caius Licinius Stolo and Sextius Lateranus, who as tribunes, in the year b.c. 376, presented a series of rogations which, protecting the interests of both classes, were to be of lasting effect. No one was to have set apart for 'occupation' from the public domain more than 500 jugera (311 acres) for cultivation, or to keep upon the common pasture a herd of more than 100 head of cattle and 500 sheep. Probably the right to share in the use of the *ager publicus* was also demanded for the plebeians. The land which exceeded the allowance of 500 jugera, and which was reclaimed by the state,

was to be used in assignments for the plebeians; the plebeians were to have the chance to buy cattle for the new land, which they were to gain in fee simple, or for 'occupancy,' when the patrician land-owners were obliged, through the operation of the new law, to dispose of a part of their herds. The consular tribunate was to be abolished, the consulate revived, and thereafter one of the two consuls was always to be taken from the ranks of the plebeians. These demands naturally led to a bitter struggle. The patricians were able for several years to persuade other tribunes to interpose their veto; but Licinius and Sextius, who were chosen tribunes for ten years in succession, by their interces-

sion prevented the election of consuls, or consular tribunes, for five years. Finally, when no tribune could be found to take the side of the patricians, they attempted to appease the plebeians by a promise to ratify the social rogations if the political were abandoned. When Licinius and Sextius declared that they would accept an election for the year B.C. 367 only on condition that all their rogations were accepted together, they were again elected; and the wisest men among the clans saw that it was time to give way. The aged Camillus was appointed dictator for the fifth time in B.C. 367. By his mediation the rogations became law, and L. Sextius was chosen consul for B.C. 366. The judicial functions were, however, taken from the consuls, and conferred upon the praetors,—a new magistracy open only to the patricians; and the new patrician or curule aedileship was established by the side of the plebeian aedileship. Camillus, after winning another great victory over the Celts near Alba, ended his career by founding, on a slight elevation at the foot of the Capitol, above the comitium, a temple to Concord to commemorate the restoration of internal harmony (Fig. 23).



## PART III.

### ITALY UNITED UNDER THE HEGEMONY OF ROME.

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#### CHAPTER V.

##### THE SAMNITE WARS.

WITH the triumph of Licinius and Sextius, the question of the admission of the commonalty to office was decided ; one after another the new positions which the clans created were thrown open to them,—the curule aedileship the very year after its establishment, the clans consenting that patrician and plebeian curule aediles should alternate year by year. Much more important was the fact that in B.C. 356 a plebeian, G. Marcius Rutilus, became dictator, and in B.C. 350 also censor. The old citizens were convinced that it was hopeless to try any longer to keep the plebs from a share in the leadership of the state ; and in the new and severe struggles on which Rome entered, the plebeians showed such admirable conduct, their generals displayed so nobly the old Roman vigor and skill, that the opposition between the two orders in time became less bitter. Nevertheless, a large part of the old citizens long withstood the tide ; they were able repeatedly to bring about the election of two patrician consuls, and only ceased their attempts in this direction when the embittered commonalty resolved that both consular places should be open to plebeians. The financial difficulties of the plebs could not be relieved at once, and the continued pressure of debt remained a constant source of disturbance among the poorer peasants. In B.C. 357 a maximum rate of interest was set at ten per cent, and in B.C. 347 it was lowered to five per cent. In B.C. 342 the political and social discontent seems to have caused dangerous disturbances, in which even the troops took part, and the result of which was the opening of every political office to the commonalty. Besides the plebiscitum throwing open both consular places, a law was passed forbidding the re-election of the same man to the consulate or

other high office till the expiration of ten years, and also forbidding the holding of several offices by the same man at the same time. In B.C. 339 the plebeian dictator, Quintus Publilius Philo, obtained the concession that one of the censors must be a plebeian, and two years later was the first plebeian to hold the praetorship. The binding force of the decisions of the comitia tributa on the whole people was reasserted; and the ratification by the curiae of legislative enactments of the comitia centuriata, — many believe of the tributa also, — was done away with. It is doubtful whether the agrarian provisions of the Licinio-Sextian legislation were ever put in force for any length of time; but the plebs had, at last, secured complete equality in political life. Henceforth nothing hindered the Roman people from putting the right man in the right place, and only in this way could those tasks be accomplished which lay before them.

A new insurrection within the Roman confederacy, when the struggle over the Licinian rogations was ended, was very dangerous for Rome; since it was accompanied by renewed inroads of the Celts, who repeatedly joined in the wars of the Hernici, Latins, and Volsci against Rome. The heroic spirit and military skill of the Romans gradually won them the mastery over all these difficulties. In B.C. 362 the Hernici broke away from the league; in the following year the Latins of Tibur joined them, then the Rasennae of Tarquinii, Caere, and Falerii; nevertheless, the Romans were able to force upon the Hernici and Latins a renewal of the old league, upon conditions much more unfavorable to the allies than before. It was not till B.C. 351 that the Rasennae gave up the struggle. Tarquinii concluded a truce ‘for 400 months,’ while Caere received the Roman civil rights, but *sine suffragio*, without the right of suffrage, and became a dependent though self-governing community. In the south the Romans kept close watch upon the neighboring Volsci, and by B.C. 345 had advanced close to the southern Sabellians.

It was at this time that the Romans first entered into diplomatic relations with the peoples who were to become world-renowned as their opponents. A commercial treaty was concluded with Carthage in B.C. 348;<sup>1</sup> and a ‘friendly alliance’ was made in B.C. 354 with the Samnites, who soon were to contest with the Romans for the supremacy over the whole peninsula. The struggle began in B.C. 343 in complications among the Sabellians of the south. The Campanians, enervated and

<sup>1</sup> The genuineness of the treaty assigned to the very beginning of the republic, B.C. 509, is very doubtful.

demoralized by the enchantment of their rich and beautiful land, and by Grecian influences, had lost many of the characteristics of their race. Capua, in spite of the knightly bravery and culture of its nobility, was one of the most immoral cities of the time. The Campanians of Capua had become involved in war with the Samnites, and had suffered a severe defeat. In their extremity they called upon the Romans for help; and when the senate felt obliged to refuse their request, on account of the treaty alliance, they offered the complete subjection of their province to Roman sovereignty. The Romans now came vigorously to their aid, demanded of the Samnites the immediate evacuation of the territory of Capua, and upon their refusal declared war. This led to a long succession of struggles, in the course of which, one after another, all the peoples and cities of the peninsula, and finally the veterans of the Epirote King Pyrrhus, took the field against Rome; after continuing for almost eighty years, this war ended with the most complete victory for the Romans. That they were successful over so many and such brave opponents was due to the fact that, aside from their steadily improving tactics and their eminent talent for warfare, they far surpassed all their adversaries in patriotic pride, in clear knowledge of their own interests and aims, and, above all, in united political organization. Their most skilful foes, the brave races of the plateau of Samnium, were politically still in the most primitive condition. It was long before the dangers of the war brought the entire body of their cantons and tribes into full action and to energetic union against the armies of Latium. Still longer was it before the remaining races of the peninsula or the Greek cities moved in favor of the Samnites. As it was, all these alliances against Rome's increasing ascendancy came into existence only when the decisive moment was passed. Many of the Italian supporters of the Samnites entered the struggle without any definite plan, and joined in a union that was profitless to Samnium and destructive to themselves.

A trustworthy account of these long wars is possible only for their last periods. The duration of the first war between Romans and Samnites is uncertain, but it was not long. The attention of the Samnites was claimed by a war between the Tarentines and their Italian neighbors, while the Romans had reason to expect a great insurrection of the Latins. A compact was easily arranged, which left Capua to the Romans, and left the Samnites free for operations against the Volsci on the upper Liris. In B.C. 341 the Latins, who, it is said, had in vain demanded admission to the full citizenship of the governing city and a

division with the Romans of all high offices, rose in general war against Rome. They were joined by the Volsci and the Campanians, who would gladly have freed themselves again from the Roman yoke. Only the nobles of Capua, the Hernici, and most of the Roman colonies in Latium, held fast to their alliance with Rome. The Romans were saved from their critical condition by a great victory of the consul, Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, over the Latins and Campanians, near Trifanum. In the two years following the towns of the Latins and Volsci that still continued the struggle were subdued. The Romans,

after quelling this outbreak, broke up the Latin League, and changed it into a mere association for the celebration of a religious festival. The different towns of the old league were isolated from one another; the ‘perpetual alliances’ of the individual communities were now made only with Rome; and the immemorial right of commerce and marriage between the different places came to an end. Some towns were forcibly turned into communities of Roman cities, while the other old Latin places retained their former laws and their civil autonomy. The senate devoted the many new tracts of land won in Latium and the country of the Volsci to the settlement of new colonies of poor plebeian peasants, farmers, and clients of



FIG. 24.—Samnite Warrior.  
(Vase-painting.)

the land-owning nobility, in a manner that was very serviceable and profitable. The most important points of the Volscian and Campanian territories, like Fundi, Formiae, Capua, and Cumae, were changed into dependent Roman communities, after the pattern of Caere; although Capua, for the purpose of building up a Roman party among the nobility, in opposition to the commonalty, occupied a peculiarly privileged position. Along the Samnite border, as a basis for future war, strong fortresses were planted, and peopled with large bodies of Romans. Between Capua and Teanum was the important post of Cales; on the upper

Liris, Fregellae, on the site of a town destroyed by the Samnites; and finally Sora, in a district that by treaty belonged to the Samnites.

This last encroachment of the Romans aroused the indignation of the Samnites; and the second Samnite war broke out in B.C. 326, which raged till B.C. 304. (Cf. Figs. 24, 25.) The Romans knew that the sovereignty of Italy was at stake. As they were compelled to conduct operations with several armies at the same time, they at first sought to enclose the Samnite races in their plateau, to win from them the districts that formed the slopes to their mountain fastness, and to surround this with a ring of fortresses and military colonies in Cam-




FIG. 25. — Samnite Warriors. (Vase-painting.)

pania and Apulia. Then the Roman generals attempted to lead their columns into the Samnite country, to break the nation's strength by decisive battles, and to secure the commanding positions. Roman diplomacy was successful in preventing allies of the Samnites with their natural allies, and in arousing against them other enemies, the Apulians, the ancient opponents of the Sabellians, and even the Lucanians. The strategy of the Samnites, on the other hand, was directed to vigorous sorties from their plateau, so as to render ineffectual the attempted blockade of the Romans, to defeating the Roman armies on the borderland of Samnium, and to arousing the Italian peoples, including the Greeks and Celts, to rise against Rome.

After long struggles with changing fortune, when the Romans had already begun to gain the upper hand, the Samnite general, Gavius Pontius, succeeded in B.C. 321 in entrapping in the pass of Caudium, and forcing to surrender, the army of the consuls, Spurius Postumius and Titus Veturius, who, on the report that Luceria was blockaded by the Samnites, had started to march to its relief directly across Samnium. Instead of holding the Roman army as prisoners, and at once pushing forward into Latium, and calling on the Latins to revolt from Rome, Pontius hoped to end the war upon the spot, and concluded with the



FIG. 26.—The Appian Way.

captured consuls a treaty, which required only the abandonment of Cales and Fregellae, and the renewal of the earlier league. This agreement was sworn to by the consuls and all staff-officers. The Romans were then dismissed : but, in accordance with the Italian war custom, the Samnites first disgraced them by forcing them, after laying down their arms, severally to pass under the ‘yoke,’ a gallows-like arrangement of spears. The senate rejected the peace, which the consuls were not competent to make without the authorization of the citizens. No one, of course, thought of sending the army back to the Caudine Pass. The consuls and officers who had sworn to the peace were delivered up,

as though they alone were bound by the agreement. The Samnites, with equal honor and good sense, refused to accept this offering of expiation. The transaction exhibits one of the most odious features of Roman diplomacy,—a readiness to try to overreach their opponents, and to seek justification by unworthy quibbling with words.

As the struggle went on, fortune deserted the Samnites. The Romans, under skilful generals, steadily advanced, so that in B.C. 314 the war was transferred to northern Samnium, around Bovianum, and the Samnite country was shut in by a half-circle of military stations




FIG. 27.—The Appian Way.

and colonies, from Saticula in the west to Lucezia in the east. The line from Rome to Lucezia already cut off the Samnites from the north, and then to control the country between Rome and Capua, the great military road, the *Via Appia* (Figs. 26, 27), was built by the renowned censor, Appius Claudius, with that wonderful skill in construction which marks Roman roads. Now other Italian peoples declared in favor of the Samnites,—first the Etruscans, then the Umbrians. On the new seat of war was displayed the generalship of Q. Fabius Rullianus, a highly gifted patrician, who, in employing new measures and breaking away from tradition, begins a line of great generals like the

conqueror of Zama. With astounding daring he ventured, in b.c. 310, to march through the Ciminiian Forest (near Viterbo), and completely defeated the Rasennae at the Vadimonian Lake. Another defeat the next year, near Perusia, compelled the Rasennae to make peace, which enabled Fabius to turn against and overthrow the combined forces of the Umbrians. Meantime the Samnites had tried in vain to give assistance to their friends in the north. In b.c. 310 they succeeded in forcing their way through the districts of the Marsi and the Sabines; but the senate sent against them a new army, raised with the greatest effort, under Papirius Cursor, who, near Longula, won (b.c. 309) a great victory over a powerful army which contained the last disciplined troops of the Samnites. The uprising of the small Sabellian peoples of Central Italy between Samnium and Umbria, the Hernici and the Aequi, towards the end of the war, came too late to be of service to the Samnites, and only brought the punishment of the victors upon them. In b.c. 305 the Romans, pressing in from Campania and the Adriatic, united before Bovianum, and captured the city. The Samnites and their Sabellian allies concluded, in b.c. 304, a peace which, though at first disguised under the name of an ‘equal alliance,’ sealed their subjection to Rome. The Tarentines also, who had fought only against Rome’s allies in Lucania, made an agreement with the senate, which contained the well-known provision forbidding Roman ships of war to sail around the Bruttian Cape Lacinium.

But meantime within the city patricians and commonalty were tending to a more complete equality. By the *Lex Ogulnia*, 300 b.c., plebeians were admitted to the colleges of pontifices and of augurs; the number in each was raised from six to nine, and the places divided fairly between the orders. But now a new governing aristocracy gradually rose, the so-called ‘nobility,’ which included eminent families of the plebs, and was based on having held a curule office in the state. Against this a temperate democratic opposition began to form, though for some time the relations between the nobility and people were friendly; the process for debt was improved; and large acquisitions of land made it possible to establish many thousands of the peasantry as settlers over a large and beautiful part of Italy; while the favorable condition of the finances enabled the senate to give up levying the war-tax.

Toward the end of the fourth century new difficulties arose. The institution of slavery had brought many evils with it. The many wars had largely increased the number of slaves of all races in Rome.

Most of these were employed as house servants or in the fields; the practice of the nobility of occupying large tracts of the *ager publicus* seems early to have required the employment of great numbers of field-slaves, to the injury of free labor. It gradually became the custom to give slaves their freedom, at first where a good master considered a man worthy of freedom, and later as an act of humanity, as when a number of slaves were set free by will. Speculation was soon added to these motives; since not seldom masters established their slaves as handiaftsmen or tradesmen, or provided their freedmen with business capital, reserving for themselves a considerable part of the profits. Under this system trade and industry in Rome came more and more into the hands of freedmen and their descendants. The same was true of the clerkships, the subordinate offices in the permanent bureaus of the great magistracies. These formed a new kind of clientelate, which crept into the place of that older clientelate which had become the plebs, and was to cause great political difficulties. An attempt was made to determine their position by Appius Claudius, the head of a proud family, an ideal aristocrat and highly gifted statesman, of bold and far-reaching plans, who held the censorship in B.C. 312, and made his administration memorable in many ways. He constructed the first (Figs. 26, 27) of those magnificent military roads, of which the Romans built so many in later times, and which were not less serviceable for the control of their empire than for ease of intercourse. He was also the originator of the great system for supplying water to Rome, which reached its highest point in the time of the empire.<sup>1</sup> It was amazing to the Romans that this powerful man, the friend of Greek culture, who fostered letters, and who is credited with the first written oration and the first secular poem, and thus made the beginner of Roman literature, should seek to make an entire change in the position of the freedmen, and of his own act break down the barrier which limited complete citizenship and political suffrage to those who had domi-ciles. The freedmen among the people had up to that time been enrolled in the four city tribes, where they were taxed according to their property, and, while having the ordinary rights of citizens, had no share in the regular military service or suffrage in the comitia. These, with all the free population in Rome that had no landed posses-

<sup>1</sup> Dissatisfied with the springs and wells which then supplied Rome with drinking-water, he undertook to bring into the city a supply of pure water from the neighborhood of Praeneste. His aqueduct was subterranean; those built later, and designed to bring water to the tops of the hills of the city, were for the most part above ground, and were carried on arches from the surrounding mountains to Rome.

sions, Appius, when censor, took into the civic community, without asking senate or comitia, by including them in the new ‘lists’ of citizens. A man who had no landed estate was enrolled in any tribe he chose, and then according to his property in the corresponding century. The proceeding was extremely hazardous. The territory occupied by Roman citizens was, as we have seen, constantly extending; with it the number of newly formed ‘country tribes’ increased, and already it was difficult for the Roman peasants, except for very important questions, to attend the great political assemblies at Rome. If, therefore, these new elements, which were predominant in the capital, were divided among all the tribes and centuries, they could easily control the voting, and at times form very strong majorities. The fear caused by these innovations was terminated in b.c. 304, by the renowned general, Fabius, who as censor—his efficiency won him the surname Maximus—brought together all persons without land, and all domiciled freedmen whose estate was rated at less than \$1600, into the four city tribes. Only those domiciled freedmen who possessed large estates were allowed to continue in the remaining tribes. In the centuries freeborn citizens, with domiciles or without, remained as Appius had arranged them, but they were now called upon for military service; but the freedmen again lost their right of suffrage, except where they had been taken into one of the country tribes.

After the peace with the Samnites, in b.c. 304, the Romans, aware of the slight foundation for their new power, labored to secure it by forming new colonies and building military roads, especially in the provinces of central Italy, between the Ciminian Forest and the Adriatic. In b.c. 298 the Samnites once more determined to measure themselves with the Romans. They succeeded, under Gellius Egnatius, in forcing a passage to Etruria, where the Rasennae rose in a body, and were also joined by many Umbrians and by Celts, principally from districts of the Senones. The Romans, on their side, put forth all their strength. In b.c. 295 the consuls, the plebeian Publius Decius Mus and Fabius, who had trained the soldiers to fight by companies with pilum and sword, took the field with almost 60,000 men, while reserves were stationed at Rome and at Falerii. The consuls pushed northward on either bank of the Tiber toward Umbria, where their opponents had gathered. An inroad of the Roman reserves from Falerii into Etruria drew away the bulk of the Rasennae, at a critical time, to defend their homes; and thus in the decisive battle near Sentinum, on the eastern declivity of the Apennines, the con-

suls found themselves opposed mainly by the Samnites and the Celts. As the battle was wavering, Decius, who commanded the left wing against the Senones, consecrated himself, and with him the army of the enemy, to the gods of the lower world, and thus changed the fortune of the day. The skilful tactics of Fabius completed the great victory, which, however, cost them 9000 men. The allies of the Samnites submitted separately; and, after another severe defeat, the Samnites, too, were ready to make peace again upon the old terms. The fortress of Venusia, built and garrisoned with a colony of 20,000 men, at the point where the boundaries of Apulia, Lucania, and Samnium joined, completed the ring of forts about the Samnites. The result of this war was the foundation of an Italian realm, governed by Roman arms and diplomacy, and held together by numerous colonies, fortresses, and roads, which was managed by the senate in the forms of an intricate hegemony. The peoples of the peninsula were, indeed, actually in complete dependence upon Rome; but with few exceptions they are not to be regarded as subjects. The Romans, who thoroughly understood the policy *divide et impera*, shrewdly took care to have the greatest variety in their political relations to these different races and cities, so that the formation among the Italians of a community of interests in opposition to Rome was not easily possible. The constitution of the Italian confederation, which included more than a hundred 'sovereign' states, rested upon, perhaps, 150 treaties, which had been concluded at various times between Rome and its allies. The greater number of the peoples of Italy were officially designated as 'allies' of the Romans; but there was an essential difference between the so-called 'Latins,' or the allies with the 'Latin right,' and the other allies. The Romans were wise enough not to impose tribute upon any of the different peoples united under their supremacy.

The allies without the Latin right—the Umbrian, Sabellian, and Etruscan peoples—were by far the more numerous. Nominally, while giving up their political confederations, they remained independent and sovereign; they retained their own laws and officials, and their self-government; but the relation to Rome was a league on 'unequal' terms. The diplomatic and military leadership and the right of coinage passed entirely into the hands of Rome, who, at her own discretion, decided on war and peace. The allied states could not make war or peace, either with one another or with a foreigner. The composition of internal disputes and maintenance of the general peace belonged to the chief power. Other existing conditions allowed sometimes more,

sometimes less, of freedom. The chief point was, that these allies — who were isolated from one another, but in return received the right of trade, and in part, probably, the conubium, with the Romans — furnished for war, according to their quota, the necessary supplies of men, ships-of-war, money, and provisions, while the senate determined the position of the allied troops, and on each occasion the strength of their contingents, which were armed and organized alike, and led by Roman staff-officers. The obligations of the various cities and races, and the advantages which Rome found it advisable to concede to them, were minutely stated in their treaties. After their position was made secure, the Romans faithfully kept the treaties once made, and exercised their protectorate with energy and integrity, except that they were apt to assign to the allies the furnishing of the more expensive arms of the military service.

Far different was the position of the Latins, whose relation to the Romans again became very tolerable. Latins who had settled in Rome could acquire Roman citizenship, provided they left descendants behind them in their homes. They became at once Roman citizens if in their own states they had held public office. The ‘Latin right,’ which in earlier times had been repeatedly conferred upon newly founded settlements, was often given afterward to new colonies which were formed out of Latin citizens and veteran warriōrs of faithful allies. In this way the word ‘Latin’ acquired a political significance, as the designation of allies more closely bound to Rome by the likeness of official terms and by legal advantages.

Still different, on the other hand, was the condition of the real subjects. The Italians, who were punished with passive Roman franchise, were in a condition very similar to that of the plebeians before the struggles between the orders, except that the ‘munieipia’ generally maintained their independent communal government. These compulsory citizens had been, for the most part, raised to full citizenship by the year b.c. 188 (the Sabines and some Volscian towns first in b.c. 268), and made active members of the Roman tribes, whose number was increased between b.c. 387 and b.c. 241 from 21 to 35. As the state increased in power, and showed its ability fully to assimilate new elements, it granted full citizenship with less reluctance to these originally unwilling members.

Within the city, however, at the beginning of the third century b.c., an opposition appeared which was different from the old plebeian opposition, or that of the period of the Gracchi, — the resistance of

vigorous democratic elements to the preponderance of the rich and powerful aristocracy, whose tendency was to obtain the same control of the state which the old citizens had before it. The leaders of this opposition of the middle and lower class to the great landlords and capitalists were the distinguished general, Manius Curius Dentatus, and Fabricius, the ideal type of an old Roman democrat. We know neither the causes nor the details of the events in B.C. 286; there was, as in earlier times, a rising of a portion of the plebeians and a new secession, this time to the Janiculum. The result seems to have been that the dictator, Quintus Hortensius, who was named to bring about a reconciliation, secured a restriction of the right of the curiae to confirm the decisions and the elections of the comitia of the tribes and the centuries, so that the curiae were obliged, either to state all their objections beforehand, or else to give in advance their consent to every decision and to every curule election. Thereafter, in such cases, the curiae, instead of meeting, were represented by thirty lictors. It is not likely that the law by which plebiscita of the comitia tributa became law without requiring the consent of the senate, belongs to this period. Long after it was certainly customary for the leaders of the plebeians, in all measures in which the co-operation of the senate entered, not to dispense with the authority of that house. The conservative spirit and the deep-rooted common-sense of the Roman people, as long as a real Roman plebs existed, made the weakness of the constitution harmless. The theoretically unlimited powers of the comitia of the tribes and of the tribunes, who now had the right to assemble the senate, and the often indefinitely defined functions of the magistrates, became dangerous only when both nobility and commonalty had entirely lost their old character. The condition and development of the state, and the clumsiness of the comitial system, necessarily gave the leadership to the senate. As war and foreign policy became the chief factors in the life of the state, and as the state widened into an extensive realm, the more unavoidably did its leadership fall into the hands of a college, which, representing the richest political and military experience of the nation, kept up the traditions of Roman policy. The normal number of senators was 300. It was the settled practice after the *Lex Ovinia* (passed, perhaps, in the period next after the Licinian legislation), that the censors should fill up the senate by selecting first from the number of ex-quaeestors, curule aediles, praetors, and consuls. But they could bring other men of ability into the senate, who could vote, but not discuss.

With the increasing greatness of their state, the Romans began to think about the adornment of their city. About B.C. 284 began the disappearance of shingle roofs. The Arx and the Forum were filled with statues of eminent personages of the past and with trophies from



FIG. 28.—The Wolf of the Capitol, at Rome. (Etruscan work; the infants, a modern addition.)

the great Italian wars. To these belonged the gigantic bronze statue of Jupiter on the Capitol, east (B.C. 293) from the spoils of the Samnites defeated at Aquilonia. Three years earlier the aediles set up a bronze statue of the celebrated she-wolf (Fig. 28) under the fig-tree of Rumina. The introduction of Hellenic divinities, and the adoption of their worship, now becomes noticeable, especially in the case of the




FIG. 29.—Sarcophagus of Scipio Barbatus.

Delphian Apollo, of Aphrodite, who was merged in the Roman Venus, and of the god of healing Aesculapius, who was received from Epidaurus. The knowledge of the Greek language was at this time common among Romans of rank; and Grecian customs forced their way in at many points; among these the usage, not originally an Italian one, of placing

inscriptions upon the tombstones in honor of the dead. The oldest existing example of this kind is a monumental inscription of Lucius Cornelius Scipio, who was consul b.c. 298. Upon his beautiful sarcophagus (Fig. 29), formed in Doric style, stands the well-known inscription, written in ‘Saturnian’ measure, the rude rhythm of Italy, which was afterward supplanted by the smoother metres of the Greeks: —

“ Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus, Gnaeus’ son,  
A man both brave and wise, of grace and valor equal.  
He was among you consul, censor, aedile; Taurasia, Cisauna,  
He took in Samnium, Lucania all subdued, and brought home hostages.”

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE TARENTINE WAR.—THE UNITY OF ITALY.

THE next step in assuring her supremacy over Italy brought Rome into conflict with Grecian diplomacy and Grecian arms. The great commercial city of Tarentum, with its powerful fleet and its militia (30,000 foot and 3000 horse), had seen with displeasure the Italian peoples coming under the sway of Rome ; and when the strong fortress of Venusia arose in dangerous proximity, she determined to overthrow a power which threatened her independence and pre-eminence. Diplomatic intrigue was first brought into play, as the Tarentines had no thought of actually fighting themselves, but proposed to unite the various races of barbarians in the peninsula, and use them as paid soldiers to carry on the war, while they themselves attended to the more serious matters of business and of pleasure.

The first allies of Tarentum were the Lucanians, who had been friendly to Rome, but were now greatly embittered against her, on account of her interference with their attempt to conquer the independent Grecian cities of the Bruttian peninsula. The Lucanians answered Rome's demand that they depart from Thurii, which was under her protection, by concluding an alliance with Tarentum, and by heading a wide-spread agitation against the Romans. The machinations of the Tarentines aroused the people in the north at the same time. A large part of the Rasennae, headed by Volsinii, broke into revolt against Rome, and were joined by powerful bodies of the Celts, especially the Senones, who burned to revenge their disgrace at Sentinum, by Umbrians, and large bands of Samnites. Yet Tarentum looked quietly on, while the Romans again bestirred themselves and repressed the insurrection. Manius Curius Dentatus led an army into Etruria, and sent heralds to the Senones to expostulate with them for having broken the peace. They put to death these sacred messengers. Then the Romans marched into their country, fell suddenly upon the Senones, who did not expect them, and systematically wasted the land as far as Ariminum with fire and sword. The entire people was mercilessly

driven out of its land, which became a new centre for Romano-Latin colonization. This procedure deeply excited the Celtic Boii, who called their entire force to arms, and, uniting near Arretium with the Rasen-nae and the Senones, marched directly upon Rome itself. But the Roman consuls met the enemy in southern Etruria, near the Vadimonian Lake, just as they were about to cross to the left bank of the Tiber, and completely defeated them. The Celts were obliged to make peace, and remained quiet for forty-five years, offering no further hindrance to the work of uniting Italy under Roman rule. Many of them, however, joined other branches of their race, which during the following years overran the Balkan peninsula. By b.c. 283 the Romans had already begun the settlement of the wasted country of the Senones by founding the colony of Sena Gallica (Sinigaglia).

In the south, in Lucania and Bruttium, Fabricius as consul, in b.c. 282, delivered Thurii, and forced the Grecian cities of Croton, Locris Epizephyrii and Rhegium to an alliance with Rome. The rage and apprehension of the Tarentines, when they saw Sena and Thurii in Roman hands, and their own territory nearly surrounded, led the populae to surprise and destroy a Roman fleet which, probably on the way to Sena on the Adriatic, had sailed around the Lacinian cape in violation of the treaty, and thoughtlessly attempted to enter the harbor of Tarentum. Then they attacked Thurii, and expelled the Roman garrison and the Roman party among the citizens. This made war between Rome and Tarentum inevitable; and the leaders of the Tarentine democracy at once entered into negotiations with King Pyrrhus of Epirus to gain his help. The Romans sought for a time to settle the dispute peacefully. But the leaders of the commons of Tarentum refused to make terms with the senate, and shamefully insulted the Roman envoys. In the early spring of b.c. 280 Pyrrhus crossed from Ambracia to Tarentum with 20,000 picked men, besides 2500 light-armed troops, 3000 horsemen, and 20 elephants. His general, Milo, in the fall of the preceding year, had taken possession of the fortress of Tarentum with 3000 men. Pyrrhus's arrival threw the Romans into great distress. In all probability the number of Roman citizens had by this time risen to 250,000 in all; out of these a considerable part, the 'passive citizens,' at least 50,000, could not be relied on. The tactics and system of war of Pyrrhus were known only from foreign reports, and it was yet to be seen how far defection would extend as soon as the Roman arms suffered a severe reverse. Meanwhile the Romans did not despond. The senate, with decisive energy and unsparing severity, repressed every suspi-

cious movement, gathered a strong reserve in the capital, and sent one of the consuls to operate against Etruria with over 20,000 men, while the rest of the troops, under the other consul, withstood Pyrrhus.

The king met the Romans on the river Siris, near Heraclea. He at once saw, from the way in which the Romans encamped and managed their watches, that they, at least in the art of war, could not be considered barbarians. And now in a pitched battle the tactics of the legion, with the Italian auxiliary troops arranged upon the wings, was to be measured against the Grecian phalanx armed with the long lance (*sarissa*). The might of the sarissa thrust was irresistible. The phalanxes of the king, thoroughly protected on the flanks by other troops, mowed down the maniples; yet the Roman tactics, with its relays of reserves, was able to hold out against the perfected art of Grecian warfare. Six times did the Romans try to break the Grecian lines; and only after hours of fighting was the battle decided, when Pyrrhus sent his elephants against the Italian cavalry. The furious charge of the monsters scattered the squadrons—which were also charged by the king's Thessalian cavalry—and these sought the protection of the legions. The Roman infantry was crowded together in the greatest confusion by the rush of the fugitives and their pursuers, and at the same moment the Epirote infantry made a furious charge. The Romans were obliged to give way; and at sunset, having suffered fearful losses, to withdraw into camp across the Siris. The Romans, indeed, lost 15,000 men, of whom 7000 were killed; but the 4000 lost by Pyrrhus were his best veterans, his most trusted officers, whose place he could not easily supply, while the Romans could draw upon almost inexhaustible masses of the best soldiery. At first it looked as if Pyrrhus would be successful in breaking the might of the Romans in lower Italy. The report of his victory brought the Greeks in Bruttium to his side. In the Sabellian districts of Bruttium, and to the northern limit of Samnium, there was a general uprising. Pyrrhus now hoped to be able to bring the Romans to a speedy and honorable peace, and sent to Rome his trusted friend, the Thessalian Cineas, a famous diplomat, who demanded for the Italian Greeks full freedom, and assurance of their autonomy, and for the Sabellians the evacuation of Venusia and Luceria. His skill was able to influence the proud senators, who aroused his genuine admiration; and a majority of them seemed willing to evacuate Venusia and Luceria, and perhaps Naples, until Pyrrhus had departed. But the former censor, Appius Claudius, now a blind old man, had himself led into the senate. With the clearest discernment of the condition of the times, and especially

of the condition of Pyrrhus, he delivered a burning speech, which showed all the unyielding pride of Rome, rejecting every thought of concession, and forced the senate to accept the fundamental policy, "Rome treats with no enemy, not even with King Pyrrhus, so long as foreign troops stand upon Italian soil." In vain did Pyrrhus press forward to Anagnia, in the country of the Hernici, only thirty-seven miles from Rome. He recognized that the Romans, of whose subjects and allies in central Italy no one came over to him, were not to be conquered here; that he had to struggle 'with the hydra.' He learned that at this very moment the Romans had persuaded the Etruscans to make peace under very favorable conditions, which bound them closely to Rome, and was glad to withdraw quickly to southern Campania.

His condition became steadily more uncomfortable. In the year B.C. 279 the Celts poured over the Balkan peninsula, which relieved Rome from danger from them, and rendered it very difficult for Pyrrhus to obtain re-enforcements from Greece. A victory which he gained in B.C. 279, near Ausculum in Apulia, had no lasting results; and the Carthaginians, who disliked his Sicilian plans, allied themselves with Rome against him. In B.C. 278 he made a brief truce with the Romans, and sailed with a part of his picked troops to Sicily to answer the call of the Siceliotes for help. Then, without fault of his own, after a series of brilliant successes, he saw his star pale; and during his absence the Romans gained advantages in Lucania, Bruttium, Samnium, and the Italiote districts. Toward the end of B.C. 276 Pyrrhus left Sicily, and after fighting on the sea with the Carthaginians, and in Bruttium with the Mamertines, turned back to Tarentum, where he undertook once more to fight the Romans. The valiant consul Curius Dentatus with unflagging energy prepared an army of 40,000 men, with which in the summer of B.C. 275 he met near Maleventum (later called Beneventum) the equal force of the king. On this occasion, too, the battle was going against the Romans, when they succeeded at a critical moment in throwing the elephants of the enemy into confusion, and the Grecian army was so badly defeated that Pyrrhus could no longer continue the war. He left a garrison in the citadel of Tarentum under Milo, and returned to Epirus. The contest for the supremacy of Italy was decided in favor of the Romans, though the war still continued. The Romans steadily extended the web of their colonies, fortresses, and roads, even after all anxiety from the Epirote 'Eagle,' who came to a pitiful end at Argos, had vanished. When later a Carthaginian fleet appeared before Tarentum, the citizens seemed inclined to hand over

their city to Carthage. Milo, by giving up the citadel to the Romans, bought for his men free retreat to Epirus. Tarentum in the hands of the Romans (B.C. 271) retained its autonomy, but lost its ships, weapons, and walls. The Sabellians, too, made their peace; and only in Samnium did the struggle of desperate leaders continue for a while. Rhegium, where the Roman garrison had gone over to Pyrrhus, was taken by storm in B.C. 270; and the captured mutineers were taken to Rome, and scourged and beheaded in the forum.

The new colonies, especially Ariminum and Brundisium, as also those in Picenum, caused friction and occasional struggles with the



FIG. 30.—Roman silver coins: denarius, quinarius, sestertius, and the denarius which bears the head of Numa Pompilius, ancestor of Piso. The reverse of the latter coin, with the rostrum of a ship, refers to the proconsular authority on the sea of Cnaeus Pompey the Great. The coin was struck for Pompey by Cnaeus Calpurnius Piso, one of his proquaestors in the war against the pirates. Original size.


people who were encroached upon, lasting to B.C. 266. The union of Italy under the Roman hegemony was now complete.<sup>1</sup> From Rhegium to the Anio, from the Iapygian promontory to Ariminum, one powerful will was supreme. (PLATE VIII.)

<sup>1</sup> The Romans now adopted a silver currency. Up to this time silver had circulated only in ingots. The change was due to their control of lower Italy, where were numerous mints of Hellenic style for the coinage of silver, and to their coming into closer relations with the Hellenic states; yet the copper coin was for a long time more common; and till B.C. 217 silver and copper currency existed side by side, the last at a steadily lowering rate. The new silver coins struck in the mint in the Temple of Juno Moneta were first issued in B.C. 268. The new standard coin was the ten as piece, or the denarius, which weighed in copper 3 1-2, in silver 1-72 of a Roman pound, a little more than the Attic drachma. The denarius in our money is about twenty cents; the half-piece, the quinarius, about ten; the quarter-piece, called sestertius, about five cents (Fig. 30).

All silver coins were stamped on one side with a female head (the goddess Roma) with a helmet; on the reverse, the two Diöscuri on horseback.



PLATE VIII.



Map.—Ancient Italy.

## BOOK II.

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ROME: THE RISE TO A UNIVERSAL  
DOMINION.

(B.C. 264-133.)



## PART IV.

### FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR TO THE BATTLE OF ZAMA.

(B.C. 264-202.)

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### CHAPTER VII.

#### THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

(B.C. 264-241.)

THE difficulties between Rome and Carthage arose out of a quarrel between the two Sicilian states. Hiero II. of Syracuse was pressing hard the Mamertines in Messana, who looked around for help. The choice lay between the protection of Carthage, which implied unconditional subjection ; and — what seemed preferable to the majority — that of the Romans, to whom it must be highly desirable to secure so easily a foothold in Sicily, and thereby prevent the Carthaginians from establishing themselves opposite Rhegium, and thus being able to block at will the straits and the passage from the western to the eastern sea to Italian ships. When in B.C. 265 the Mamertines asked the Romans for help, and offered to put Messana in their hands, the senate saw the importance of the decision left to them. To refuse the Mamertines would certainly give their state into the hands, not of King Hiero, but of the Carthaginians. Yet it was not a light matter to form an alliance with the friends of the rebels of Rhegium, or to venture the leap into the dark to which the acceptance of the offer would inevitably commit them. The occupation of Messana with the legions implied not only a break with Carthage, but also the beginning of a foreign policy and of new wars, beyond the range of their previous experience. The senate was unable to decide ; so the consuls put the question to the general assembly and the Roman people, which here, if ever, using its sovereign power to determine its future, decided in favor of the

Mamertines, who were taken into alliance, and were to be in the same relation to Rome as the Italian communities.

The Carthaginians, who naturally were displeased at this unexpected turn of Roman policy, at first secretly worked upon the minority of the Mamertines, who were opposed to the Roman alliance, brought about a peace between them and Syracuse, and occupied the acropolis of Messana with Carthaginian troops. In the spring of B.C. 264 the advance guard of the Roman army crossed the strait, and entered the city of Messana. The Carthaginian commander Hammo was seized by a trick, and forced to evacuate the acropolis; and thus Sicily was thrown open to the Romans. The Carthaginians could only declare war against the Romans. They attacked Messana in conjunction with King Hiero, who now joined them; but the Romans were able to bring the main army across the strait from Rhegium, and to compel both opponents to give up the siege. In the following year the war was so successful for Rome that the prudent King Hiero changed his political position, and made peace and alliance with the Romans, to whom he remained faithful for many years. This gave the Romans the entire east coast of Sicily, with its rich cities, strong fortresses, and excellent harbors, as a secure basis, which could independently support their troops in case the Punic fleet should cut off communication with Italy.

Henceforth the two greatest powers of the west stood opposed to each other as enemies. The wonderful resources and the character of both nations rendered it inevitable that this struggle should be fought out with a stubbornness whose like the world had not yet seen.

The Carthaginians were at that time at the height of their power. They ruled northern Africa from the boundaries of Cyrene to the shores of the Atlantic, either directly, or by close alliances with the chieftains of the Numidian tribes of the interior. In the western Mediterranean, after the downfall of the Etruscans, their navy had no rival. Sicily, to the boundaries of Syracuse and of Messana, the small islands between Sicily and Africa, the Baleares, the coasts of Sardinia and of Corsica, were under their sway. The ancient Phoenician settlements in southern Spain belonged to their realm. Especially important were the Tyrian Gades (Cadiz), or Gadeira, and the adjacent silver-mines. Furthermore, Carthage was the greatest money market of that time. It had in its hands the entire trade of the western Mediterranean, and a great part of the carrying-trade between the west and the east; while it drew a rich revenue from shipping and from flourish-

ing manufacturing industries. The Carthaginian merchants were also great land-owners; and in their extraordinarily fertile African possessions a highly developed cultivation was systematically and successfully conducted by slave labor. The state derived great revenues from the tribute of the subject agricultural Libyan tribes, and from the dependent nomadic shepherd tribes, from royalties of every kind, from customs, and from the plundering of the foreign provinces. In the support which a powerful fleet and great wealth could give to a policy highly energetic and imposing, in spite of its selfishness and cruel severity, Carthage was very decidedly superior to the Rome of that period. The Romans were unable to prevent the enemy's blockading squadrons and corsairs from closing the ports of Italy, and driving the Italian merchant fleet from the sea, nor to avoid destructive descents of Carthaginian troops, though it was only much later that the danger of an African invasion became real to them. On the other hand, the superiority of the Roman infantry was brilliantly proved as soon as Romans and Africans met in close conflict. Enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure, uncertain and costly experiments, repeated changes in the conduct of the war, had to be made. But as soon as the Romans could come directly to blows with their African enemy their military superiority came into play. On the battlefields of this war the stern and thoroughly disciplined troops of a nation of peasants and soldiers were victorious over the armies of a trading-state, composed of militia and mercenaries. The Roman soldier was filled with the strong national spirit, and knew exactly for what he strove.

The Carthaginians cared more for commerce than for war, and intrusted their defence mainly to hordes of mercenaries, who, as the event proved, would turn against their masters whenever pay and plunder failed. Another point of contrast between Rome and Carthage is found in the spirit of the subject population. The people of Italy were for the most part willing to fight to the death with Rome against any foreign foe; the subjects of Carthage in Africa, alienated by the tyranny and greed with which they were governed, were ready to join any revolt or invasion that gave promise of success. Both states were ruled by aristocracies. But in Rome the aristocratic element lay in the character of the people; and the constitution preserved an intelligent equilibrium between the aristocratic and the democratic elements. A mutual regard existed between people and government, and a manly confidence between the senate and the holders of authority abroad, who in success were not pursued by a narrow-minded mistrust, nor by a

bloodthirsty desire for revenge when they failed. In Carthage, on the contrary, the oligarchy, which had gained the upper hand, was actuated by the harshest and most sullen mistrust. About the middle of the fifth century the aristocracy, wishing to maintain their controlling position, and to protect their interests, secured the appointment of a magistracy, composed of members of the oligarchy, to administer the government, and to assume an oversight over the generals, and even over the *suffetes*, or executive officers. The members of this body, the judges, the 'Hundred' (in reality they were one hundred and four), filled vacancies in their own number by co-optation from the ex-quaestors; and while nominally appointed annually, in fact continued in office usually for a much longer time. They gradually drew to themselves the superintendence of all branches of the administration; and as they were quick to inflict penalties, even that of death, the chief authority of the state soon passed into their hands. In this court especially was displayed the deep distrust of the aristocratic merchants and land-owners for their own officials and servants, who were reduced to insignificance, and disastrously hampered. Even the people—a mass without a substantial agricultural or industrial middle-class, a mob without property, who earned their living in the many ways possible in a great commercial and manufacturing city, with little organization, restless and turbulent, but controlled by the money of the oligarchy—was jealously guarded, and in moral strength it was in no way to be compared with the Roman plebs. Such were the elements of the power with which Rome was now to contend for the mastery of the world.

The Carthaginians completed their preparations in 262 B.C. Their general, Hannibal, son of Gisgo, starting with 50,000 men from Agrigentum, attempted to drive the Romans out of Sicily, while Hanno from Sardinia, with an army and fleet, was to fall upon the Italian coast. The Romans, undeterred by the prospect of attacks from the fleet, sent both consuls with four legions to Sicily; and they attacked Agrigentum so vigorously that war was restricted to the siege of this one point. The distress of Hannibal became so great that Hanno gave up his sea campaign, and with a large army attempted from Heraclea Minoa to raise the siege. For two months he blockaded the camp of the Romans. Finally Hannibal, who from scarcity of provisions could no longer hold out in Agrigentum, induced Hanno to join in a general assault upon the Roman lines. But the attempts of the garrison to break through the Roman intrenchments failed; and the battle with

Hanno, which the consuls had to fight in a very unfavorable situation, ended in the destruction of the Carthaginian army; though Hannibal, with the garrison, profited by the exhaustion of the Romans to escape in the night to the fleet. Agrigentum fell into the hands of the Romans; and now that the Carthaginians had been driven back to the western fortresses of Sicily, the senate and people awoke to the daring thought of driving them out of the island once for all. This could not be accomplished simply by battles and sieges upon Sicilian soil. Their powerful fleet gave the Carthaginians a permanent superiority, as it rendered impossible the circumvallation and starvation of the Sicilian seaports, constantly threatened the coast lands of Italy, and ruined the foreign trade of Italy, especially that of the Greek cities of the south. The weak navy of the Romans, consisting of a few triremes, was in no condition to meet the enormous quadriremes and quinqueremes with which the highly developed naval art of the Carthaginians covered the sea. The Romans, in the very midst of the war, undertook the daring experiment of building a great war-fleet of twenty triremes and one hundred quinqueremes that might in some degree withstand the Punic fleet. A Carthaginian quinquereme, which had gone ashore and fallen into Roman hands, served as a model. The energy of the Romans, and their extensive resources, enabled them, the story goes, to complete this fleet within sixty days. The officers, as well as the sailors and the oarsmen, were probably taken from the Italian and Italiote commercial marine.

It was almost foolhardy, with crews but little familiar with their vessels and in part ignorant of the sea, to brave the Carthaginian sailors, who were regarded as unapproachable in the art of seamanship. The confidence of the Carthaginians, who looked with scorn upon the Roman vessels, became overweening when the seventeen Roman ships first ready for sea were captured at Lipara. But the first great sea-fight with the Romans had an unexpected outcome. Caius Duilius, the plebeian consul, with the fleet, met the Carthaginians, who were devastating the north coast of Sicily, near Mylae (Milazzo). The Punic admiral, Hannibal, with a superior force of 140 ships, well managed and swift, felt sure of a victory over the clumsy Roman ships. But Duilius, who knew that the Romans were lost if they tried to imitate the quick movements of the Carthaginian ships, made use of an ingenious device to ward off their attacks. When the Punic vanguard attacked the Romans, the latter dropped boarding-bridges, in the ends of which were heavy iron spikes, upon the enemies' ships, which were thus held fast,

while the legionaries rushed upon the decks, and with pilum and sword cut down the crews. The vanguard was soon overpowered, all further attempts to get at the Romans failed, and after the loss of fifty ships the Carthaginians took to flight. The best seamen of antiquity had been obliged to strike their flag to the self-taught Romans. The Romans, now for the first time conscious of their strength, granted to Duilius the honor of the first naval triumph. The senate erected in the forum a marble column, adorned with the iron beaks of the captured ships (*columna rostrata*), and put upon it an inscription to perpetuate the memory of the glorious victory. The remnants of a fac-simile of this column, set up in the time of Tiberius, still exist (Fig. 31).




FIG. 31.—Remains of an imitation of the Columna Rostrata of Duilius.

After repeated changes in the fortune of the war in Sicily, and after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Corsica (B.C. 259), a second glorious naval victory, near Tyndaris, encouraged the Romans to take a step by which they hoped to end the war, namely, to attack Carthage in Africa itself. Probably the Romans at first intended only to intimidate the Carthaginians, perhaps to prevent the despatch of re-enforcements to Sicily, or to throw the enemy into such confusion as to lead to a speedy peace. To secure the passage of the whole army to Africa, the war-fleet was very largely increased. In the spring of B.C. 256, 330 Roman ships of war sailed south, and took on board, at the mouth of the river Himera, the land army of 40,000 men, under

the consuls M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Volso. The Punic fleet of 350 sail, under Hamilcar and Hanno, blocked their way; and off the promontory of Ecnomus, near the Himera, was fought one of the greatest naval engagements of antiquity, in which 140,000 Romans and 150,000 Carthaginians took part. Although the Carthaginians showed naval skill far superior to the Roman, yet in close combat the boarding-bridges were again decisive, and the battle ended with a victory for Rome. Twenty-four ships were lost; but, in return, thirty of the Punic vessels were sunk and sixty-four with their crews captured. The sea to Africa now stood open to the Romans; and soon their fleet reached the Hermaean promontory (Cape Bon), and took shelter in

the excellent harbor of Cluera, south of the cape. They strongly fortified this anchorage, with the town upon a hill above the beach, and intended it as a basis for future operations. The Roman troops were able to waste and plunder the rich country at will, to set free many captive Romans and Italians, to bring as prisoners to their camps nearly 20,000 men, and within a short time to take 300 unwalled towns.

This was the extent of the Roman success ; their fortune soon began to change. The Roman military authorities, counting too much on the unwillingness of the Carthaginians to use their men and underestimating their strength, made the mistake of recalling to Italy the consul Manlius with the larger part of the fleet and half the army. In spite of this, Regulus, a man of great determination and ability, who was left in Africa with forty ships, 15,000 foot, and 500 horse, gained a number of marked successes. The Carthaginians, after recalling their troops from Sicily, took the field under Hasdrubal, Bostar, and Hamilcar, who, fearing the superiority of the Roman infantry, kept upon the heights where they could not use the cavalry and elephants, so that Regulus inflicted upon them a severe defeat near Adis, in consequence of which a considerable part of the African subjects of Carthage went over to the Romans, and Regulus advanced to Tunes, only twenty miles from Carthage. The courage and confidence of the Carthaginians were so shaken that they seriously thought of purchasing, at any cost, a tolerable peace, and to this end sent their most distinguished men to the Roman head-quarters at Tunes. Regulus foolishly demanded not only the evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia and the payment of a yearly tribute, but that Carthage should recognize the supremacy of Rome, should henceforth make war and peace only with the sanction of Rome, and should ordinarily keep but a single ship of war, and furnish Rome with an auxiliary squadron of fifty ships whenever required. Carthage was to sink at once from the position of a great power to the rank of a city like Tarentum.

The Carthaginians indignantly broke off the negotiations, and, burning with wrath, strained every nerve to save their town, and to avenge in blood the insult put upon them. All their financial resources were used to hire large bodies of African horsemen and more soldiers, especially Greeks. In the spring of B.C. 255 they succeeded also in acquiring the services of a Spartan officer, well versed in war, the brave Xanthippus, whom the senate trusted enough to associate him with the Punic generals, and who succeeded in again infusing into the people

confidence in their strength. With 12,000 foot, 4000 cavalry, and 100 elephants, they advanced under his leadership to Tunes to offer battle to the Romans. Regulus thoughtlessly accepted without delay; but this time the Roman strategy, despite all the bravery of the legions, succumbed to the tactics of Xanthippus, who had placed all the elephants in front of his army; behind this heavy mass were the Carthaginian phalanx and a part of the mercenaries, and to the left and right of the elephants the large bodies of cavalry intermixed with the light-armored troops. Only 2000 Romans escaped to Clupea. Regulus himself was brought a prisoner to Carthage. Xanthippus was shrewd enough to withdraw at once, with his glory and a rich reward, from the jealousies which he had aroused, and took service with the Ptolemies.

The Romans, suddenly startled from their hopes of victory by this unexpected disaster, sought at once to save the troops shut up in Clupea. A fleet of 350 sail put to sea, and succeeded in inflicting a heavy blow upon the Carthaginian squadron off the Hermaean promontory. The leaders made the double blunder of evacuating the very important Clupea and of abandoning the African allies of Regulus to the revenge of Carthage; and on the return, off the dangerous coast of southern Sicily, a storm destroyed all but eighty of the ships. By straining every nerve, a new fleet of 120 ships was built within three months, which did good service in the reduction of Panormus, the third of the chief Carthaginian fortresses in Sicily, and from its position the most dangerous for Italy. In b.c. 253 another great fleet was lost in a storm; and then the Romans lost all courage to continue the war by sea, and a pause occurred in the struggle, till the Carthaginians again assumed the offensive. Their general, Hasdrubal, with 30,000 men and 140 elephants, hoped for an easy victory over the force which held Panormus; but in an inconsiderate advance upon the strong intrenchments of the Romans, when the elephants reached the edge of the moat, but could not cross it on account of the steepness of the sides, they were so overwhelmed with a storm of missiles that they turned in their rage upon the Punic army. The Romans now made a sortie, and drove the Carthaginian army completely back, capturing 120 elephants (b.c. 250).

This victory encouraged the Romans to equip 200 war-ships, and attack the strong Carthaginian fortresses of Drepana (now Trapani) and Lilybaeum. An attempt of the Carthaginians to make peace failed so completely that they were not even able to secure an exchange of

prisoners.<sup>1</sup> Lilybaeum (Marsala) was blockaded by the Roman fleet; on the land side, where only a narrow passage between the lagoons led to the massive walls, lay the four Roman legions and their Sicilian allies, in two intrenched camps united with a wall and moats. The bravery of the garrison, and the daring of the commander of the Carthaginian fleet, baffled all the attacks of the Romans, whose condition became hopeless when the consul, P. Claudius Pulcher, in an attack upon the Punic fleet under Adherbal in the harbor of Drepana, was badly defeated, and out of 210 ships lost all but 30; and at almost the same time a large transport fleet of 800 ships, carrying abundant supplies for the army at Lilybaeum, and 120 ships of war, were overtaken by a furious storm while lying in the exposed roadsteads of the south coasts of Sicily, and almost utterly destroyed. After this catastrophe the war languished. The Roman senate ceased to attempt to maintain a fleet, and only allowed Roman and Italian privateers to go out on their own account; but the blockade of Lilybaeum and Drepana was continued, though the fleet of the Carthaginians, whose resources were likewise greatly exhausted, again swept the sea without opposition, and injured Italian commerce, while the Punic commerce again greatly developed.

It is not impossible that a last persistent effort, even at that time, might have obtained for the Carthaginians an advantageous peace. One man at least appeared among them who showed that the needs of the times, even among the despised Africans, could awaken genuine heroic natures. In b.c. 247 there appeared, at the head of the Carthaginian troops in Sicily, a young general, who in fertility of resources, in warlike gifts and energy, far outstripped all his contemporaries, and who proved himself a statesman of unwonted insight and skill, possessing above all the rare art of awakening the enthusiasm of even the mercenaries and the Libyan soldiers for his person and his cause,—Hamilcar, surnamed Barak, or Barcas, ‘the lightning.’ He first encamped near Panormus, upon the summit of the chalk cliff Erete (now Monte Pellegrino), rising 2500 feet above a serviceable harbor, where he intrenched his position, and made raids with his privateers upon the Italian coast as far as Cumae, while he kept up a guerilla warfare against

<sup>1</sup> Tradition reports that Regulus accompanied the Punic envoy to Rome, but with true Roman disregard of self, and with an exact knowledge of affairs, advised the senate to refuse the exchange. He seems to have died a natural death not long after as prisoner in Carthage. In Rome the utterly unauthenticated report was spread that his death was the result of foul means. The story of his torture is due to the deadly hatred for the Carthaginians that grew up in the time of Hannibal, and to the wild fancy of later rhetoricians.

the legions, which had the greatest difficulty in protecting Panormus and the interior of Sicily against him. After three years the growing distress of Drepana called him to its aid. And now the Roman people made a supreme effort to end the war. By private means a new fleet of 200 ships of war was built, thoroughly equipped, and manned with sailors trained in the privateering expeditions of the last few years, and was sent to Sicily under the consul Caius Lutatius Catulus. The Carthaginians hastily prepared and sent out a powerful fleet under Hanno, who had orders to take on board Hamilcar and his best troops, and attack the Romans. Catulus had taken his position off the extreme western point of Sicily, near the island Aegusa, the largest of the Aegates, midway between Drepana and Lilybaeum, where he could observe both harbors. When the Punic fleet, heavily laden with supplies, and manned by hastily collected crews, and driving before a strong west wind, attempted to make the harbor of Drepana, Catulus did not hesitate to fall upon it (March 10, 241 B.C.), though the sea ran high and the wind was against him. Their confidence and their superior skill gave the Romans a most decisive victory. Fifty Carthaginian ships were sunk, 70 captured, and 10,000 prisoners taken. The government was obliged to give Hamilcar full powers to make peace, which he accomplished on terms not too hard for Carthage. The political independence of the Carthaginian state and the integrity of its territory were not impaired. But it was obliged to give up the whole of Sicily with the outlying islands, and, besides some less important conditions, to pay within twenty years a war indemnity of 3200 talents (or about \$3,500,000), a thousand talents to be paid at once, and the balance in ten yearly instalments.

In Sicily the Romans obtained a rich prize, but their new position was purchased at a fearful cost. The list of Roman citizens alone, between B.C. 252 to 247, diminished by a sixth, or fully 40,000 men. Italy had suffered severely from the perpetual wasting of its coasts, from the destruction of its foreign commerce, and from the fact that so many peasants and land-owners had been obliged to leave their husbandry, and remain for years in arms. Many thousands had perished on the field of battle and in the frightful shipwrecks. At least 700 Roman ships of war were destroyed, and then for the first time great gaps were made in the forests of Italy. In the next two decades of comparative rest, however, these heavy losses in men and property were fully made good.

The close of the war was followed by changes in the constitution.

The democratic element was gaining strength, and by its side the new nobility was steadily growing; but a practice arose which rendered the comitia more unwieldy, and took away much of their value. After the year B.C. 241, when the number of local tribes became thirty-five, no more tribes were formed. All Italian communities, which after this were taken into full Roman citizenship, were enrolled in some one of the existing tribes. The result was that each of these divisions, containing on the average 8000 voters, was composed of separate towns scattered over the whole length of the Roman territory, and could not have the inner coherence and the organic life so indispensable for the effective working of the general assemblies. Moreover, in that year, it is believed, a reform was attempted by which freer range was to be given to the democratic elements in the comitia of the centuries too. Whether the arrangement of the tribes was now first made, or whether the change belongs to an earlier date, the essential innovation was introduced of making the number of centuries in each class the same, and equal in each to twice the number of the 35 tribes. Each tribe was divided into ten centuries, two for each class, one of the older and one of the younger men. To the five classes of 70 centuries each, must be added the 18 centuries of knights and the five of artisans, etc., which remained unchanged, making 373 in all. Heretofore, in the comitia of the centuries, the citizens having the largest property had possessed the controlling voice, as with the old number of 193 centuries the knights (18) and the first class (80) together formed a majority; but now out of the 373 votes they had only 88. Henceforth, even when the citizens were agreed, the vote of the third class was needed to make a majority. The wealthier citizens still had an advantage; because within each tribe they formed centuries by themselves, and therefore, as they were fewer in number, each man's vote counted for more than did a vote in a lower and more crowded class. The knights lost their earlier and very influential right of voting first, a right transferred to a division of the first class, chosen each time by lot; and finally the freedman was placed upon an equality with the free-born citizen. But despite this victory of the opposition over the new nobility, it long remained the fact, that though the assembly of the people possessed the formal sovereignty the senate held the real power.

Much more important for the future of the state was the new political system which began with Rome's first conquest outside of Italy, the island of Sicily. This became the first 'province' of the Roman

state. The analogies for the government which Rome established over its foreign possessions must be sought partly in the system of the Persian satrapies, and partly in the method by which England governs her Indian realm. At first the republic had no thought of any encroachment upon the national existence of its new subjects, nor of interference with the rights of peoples of equal culture in matters of religion, customs, or language, nor of any systematic supervision ; it did not think of a gradual union of the conquered lands with the dominant state, nor did it wish it. With the word *provincia* the Romans originally indicated a department especially committed to a consul or praetor, whether by law or by a resolution of the senate, or by lot, or agreement with his colleague, within whose limits he was to exercise his *imperium*. When it came to the organization of Sicily and of Sardinia, which was won soon after, they were obliged to define the territorial limits of the power of the great officials to whom was intrusted the administration of these countries. From this time *provincia* designated substantially a foreign governorship, and implied, first, the command in a country outside of Italy, and, by extension, the land itself subjected to the governor. It was not till B.C. 227 that Roman Sicily, where only Messana entered the Italian confederacy, and Sardinia received their new governors, whose rank and title were equal to the praetor in Rome, and who within the province stood at the head of the administration, of the army, and of justice. The management of the finances was intrusted to one or more quaestors, given as aids to the governor. The communities of the province of Sicily retained the administration of their own affairs and a certain autonomy, but lost their independence in foreign affairs, were isolated from one another, the *commercium* between the different city districts in particular being taken away, so that, except in the specially favored Centuripae, no provincial could acquire property<sup>1</sup> in land outside of his own community. On the other hand, Rome allowed the federation of the Sicilian cities, essentially limited to religious matters, to continue, and probably also the *concilia*, or 'assemblies' of the island, with the right of petition and complaints. The privilege of coinage was restricted to copper, or at most to small silver money. It became customary to divide newly acquired lands into a number of administrative divisions, each having for its centre a considerable city ; when there were no cities, country circuits took their place. Later,

<sup>1</sup> This shameful system rendered it difficult for the provincials to dispose of their land, which led to the settlement of many Roman land-owners in the province of Sicily, as later in many others, and to the formation of immense estates in Roman hands.

when all Sicily came under governors, there were sixty-eight such districts. In their dislike of democracy, outside of Italy and of the Greek deliberative assemblies, the Romans set aside the democratic constitutions in the Sicilian towns, and placed the political power in the hands of a town council that represented the local aristocracy. In the provinces, too, the Romans divided the dependent communities into graded classes with different rights, and specially favored certain places, usually on the ground of services rendered to Rome. A number of cities in the provinces were made ‘free.’ These had jurisdiction over themselves and their own common law, had no garrison, in administration and finances were free from the immediate interference of the governor, and could even impose customs duties, which, of course, were not to fall upon Romans. A special favor, that of *immunitas*, or freedom from all tribute to Rome, was sometimes granted.

The internal and external peace of the provinces was secured by a strong Italian garrison, and in case of need the governor could call upon the local forces to defend the land. In matters of justice, the governor stood at the head of the administration and law, in both criminal and civil cases. In the former he had the right over life and death, except that Roman citizens had the right of appeal. Civil cases were determined among the provincials by their several systems of law, wherever these had been confirmed by the Romans. For legal purposes the districts were brought together into a number of circuits (*conventus*), in whose chief towns the governor held regular sessions of his court. The Roman public domain was extended by taking the districts of destroyed cities and the already existing public land. This was leased through the censor to private parties for a share of the products, and even in other ways these *praediu*, ‘estates of the Roman people,’ became profitable. Rome took the revenues due to the state, including customs and tolls, and demanded from the estates of citizens or peasants, and of the city corporations, either a contribution in kind, or a fixed tax (*tributum*); in Sicily, at first, the tenth of all crops and a tax of five per cent *ad valorem* on all imports and exports. At the outset it was intended merely to defray from this income the expense of the administration and defence of the province. But the system adopted inevitably led to dangerous abuses. The direct taxes, which usually consisted of fixed sums of money, were collected by officials of the provincials themselves; but the collection of the indirect taxes and the tenth in kind was farmed out in advance, and in a lump, to speculators. Unless rich provincials or the tenth-paying communities them-

selves were able to let out the tax for their districts, and especially the indirect taxes, Roman capitalists stepped in, who, generally in associated companies, pledged themselves to pay at once to the state treasury the entire sum of the fixed contribution, and in return were empowered and enabled to collect the required taxes in the province from each taxpayer as the law demanded ; this unavoidably led to harsh and unjust exactions.

The creation of the first province introduced a system, which as it developed, down to the time of the empire, brought a burden of woes upon the world, and had a most disastrous effect upon the state. The harsh policy of the republic left to the steadily increasing number of its subjects no hope of a gradual approach to the ruling people, and therefore with every new generation was more clearly felt the great injury, early manifest, which the agricultural impoverishment of the provinces and the baneful principle of yearly change of governors brought upon the subject peoples, and the harm to the state from the growing corruption of the moneyed aristocracy.

## CHAPTER VIII.

FROM THE PEACE OF LUTATIUS TO THE INVASION OF ITALY BY HANNIBAL.

THE condition of Carthage on concluding peace with Rome was naturally anything but good, when a series of blunders on the part of the government gave occasion for a new and disastrous struggle in Africa. In paying off the mercenaries, the government undertook to withhold from the soldiers of the Sicilian army a part of the pay, still largely overdue, and the other rewards that had been promised; but they made the great mistake of allowing the entire body of mercenaries, a mass of free lances of all nations, to assemble in their capital, and after a partial arrangement of the first difficulties again allowed them to collect at Sicca, five days' march inland. A war began, which for over three years filled Carthaginian Africa with horrors. Carthage, hard pressed, strained every nerve to meet the danger. Hamilcar Barcas displayed in this dreadful war likewise the force of his genius. He finally entrapped the main army of the rebels in a chain of hills, called the 'saw,' some miles from Carthage, and completely destroyed it; and another victory near Leptis, and the capture of Utica and Hippo in B.C. 238, brought this war to a close. Carthage could now think of recovery from the deep wounds of the Roman war. And even this was only possible by silently submitting to a new humiliation and a new and heavy loss. A rebellion of the mercenaries in Sardinia was followed by that of the natives; and the protection of the Romans was invoked, who without scruple sent troops to the island, thinking that by taking it from Carthage the Tyrrhenian Sea would come completely under Rome's control. But when, after putting down the revolt in Africa, Carthage undertook to make good its right to Sardinia, the senate declared war (B.C. 237). In no condition to resist an attack, Carthage was obliged to purchase peace by renouncing her claim to the island and by the payment of an additional 1200 talents. But this unworthy trick was in the future to cost the Romans dear. It was this cruel humiliation that kindled in Hamilcar's proud soul that unquenchable hatred for Rome which he bequeathed to his entire house.

The attention of the senate was now directed to the peoples in the north and the east of Italy. The wild hordes of the Celts, in the valley of the Po, began to move uneasily, to the great alarm of the whole peninsula. At Rome, from agrarian causes, an opposition of interests broke out between the nobility and the plebeian peasantry, who were now led by demagogues of a new kind. The first of these was Caius Flaminius, a statesman of high ideas but of impetuous temper, which drove him to disregard recklessly the traditional methods and to bring into life ill feeling between the controlling powers in Rome. Flaminius conceived the plan of obtaining a large number of new and profitable farms for the people, and at the same time of strengthening the line of defence against the Celts, by assigning to Roman peasants a large portion of the old land of the Senones, north of Picenum as far as Ariminum, the bulk of which had probably been occupied only for pasturage. As tribune of the people in b.c. 232 he brought before the senate a rogation to this end; but meeting with violent opposition from the nobility, who saw that it worked injury to their interests, he broke through the barriers which custom had established for him. Relying upon a right that hitherto had been recognized only in theory, and not heeding the refusal of the senate, he carried through his purpose with the help only of the comitia of the tribes. An extensive assignment of lands was made, and soon after the North Italian road was continued to Ariminum. The occupation of the old country of the Senones by Roman colonists stirred up the Celts at once. The Boii aroused all the kindred tribes of Upper Italy—except the Cenomani around Brescia and Cremona, who held to the Romans,—especially the powerful Insubres of Milan, and enlisted mercenaries from the valley of the upper Rhone beyond the Alps. In the year b.c. 226 it was known in Rome that war was unavoidable; the anxiety was great, but the most energetic preparations were made. Italy then, with a free population of probably 9,000,000, not reckoning slaves or strangers, could furnish 700,000 able-bodied men for infantry service and 70,000 for the cavalry; of these, counting passive citizens, 273,000 were Roman burgesses. In the year b.c. 225 the Celts advanced with an army of 50,000 foot and 20,000 horse. One consul, with 25,000 foot and 1100 horse, protected Ariminum; the other was in Sardinia with an equal force; while a praetor with Sabine and Etruscan troops held the passes near Florence, and a reserve was gathered at Rome. Contrary to expectation, the Celts broke into Etruria on the west side by way of Pisa, pushed forward with frightful devastation as far as Clusium, only three days'

march from Rome, and surprising the Sabine and Etruscan troops in a very unfavorable placee, defeated them. Then they thought of returning with their plunder to Upper Italy; but on again reaching the coast, near Telamon, they fell in with the Sardinian legions, who had landed near Pisa, and blocked their way. The battle was already in progress when the other consul came up, and fell upon the rear of the Celts, who, after a long and bloody resistance, gave way, losing 40,000 dead and 10,000 prisoners.

The Romans now undertook to overthrow the Celtic power in Upper Italy. The Boii were attacked, and in B.C. 224 completely subjugated. The advance stations of the Romans had reached the line of the Po; and the country to the north of the river was next to be conquered, where they had to meet the powerful Insubres. The peasants had elected Flaminius consul, but he showed as commander neither foresight nor strategic skill. In the decisive struggle with 50,000 Insubres on the Ollius, he was forced to engage in a position which experienced generals always avoid, for he had no line of retreat open in case of defeat. But the steadfast bravery of his soldiers, and the skill of his officers, secured a brilliant victory. The Insubres were ready to make peace; but Rome demanded unconditional surrender, and, as they would not yield, the war continued. Two of the best generals of Rome, the plebeian Marcus Claudius Marcellus and the patrician Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio (B.C. 222), were sent against them, and, after capturing their capital, Mediolanum, brought the war to a close. With this success Roman Italy at last reached the foot of the Alps. The Cenomani and the Veneti stood as free peoples in friendship and alliance with Rome. The western part of the country between the Alps and the Apennines was still entirely independent. The war with the Ligurian mountaineers, which opened in B.C. 238, like that with the natives of Sardinia, seemed endless, and was merely a school for slave-hunting and sanguinary barbarity to the legions.

Meanwhile the senate had crossed the Adriatic and the Ionian Seas with its arms and diplomacy, and by a series of rapid successes gaining a foothold on the west coast of the Balkan peninsula, came into contact with the Hellenic world in Grecce. The fierce Illyrians, on the east side of the Adriatic, the ancestors of the Skipetars or Albanians of later centuries, were successful pirates, and infested the coasts from Dyrrhaeum to Messana. They were too cosmopolitan to plunder only Greeks; and the heavy losses which they inflicted upon the sea-trade of Italy, and the requests of the friendly Grecian cities of Apollonia

and Issa (Lissa) in the Dalmatian archipelago, determined the senate to intervene. They began, b.c. 230, by sending two envoys to make demands upon the powerful chieftain of Scodra (now Scutari), who held sway over the warlike tribes on the coast of the present Dalmatia, southwards as far as Apollonia. The chief's widow, Teuta, who was regent, would only agree that the state should do nothing hostile to the Romans; she could not prevent the free Illyrians, as was their ancient right, from making war on their own account with whom they would. The legates answered sharply, that among the Romans the good custom prevailed for the state to punish the crimes of individuals; and they would therefore strive, with the help of the gods, to introduce better customs among the Illyrians. The princess had the rash envoys put to death on the way home, and the Romans vigorously began war. While the Illyrians with bold defiance threatened at once Issa, Dyrrhachium, and Apollonia, and a part of their swift-sailing vessels, the renowned 'Liburnian' two-deckers, under the leadership of the Greek adventurer Demetrius of Pharos, conquered the island of Coreyra, the Roman forces began their movement to the east (b.c. 229), a fleet of 200 quinqueremes sailing to Coreyra, and an army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse going to Illyria, before whom the Illyrians on sea and on land quickly gave way. In the spring of b.c. 228 Teuta was obliged to accept the hard conditions which Rome dictated. The chieftains of Scodra were restricted to their old boundaries; all Greeks and some native tribes were withdrawn from their supremacy; armed Illyrian cruisers were not to pass south of Lissus (Alessio) on the Drilo, and of unarmed vessels not more than two might sail together. The senate did not yet form a new province on that side of the Adriatic. Demetrius of Pharos, who had betimes gone over to the Romans, received the rule in Dalmatia, and became guardian of the young prince of Scodra. The Greek cities of Dyrrhachium (Epidamnus), Apollonia, and Coreyra, were associated with the Italian realm in the form of an alliance, and upon the islands of Coreyra and Issa were placed permanent Roman commanders or prefects. The destruction of the dreaded Illyrian corsairs led the Hellenes, in b.c. 228, to establish friendly relations with Rome, and probably then a league was concluded between Romans and Athenians. The court of Macedonia, on the other hand, was much disturbed by the establishment of the Italian advance posts on the west coast of the Balkan peninsula.

After these victories over the Illyrians and the Celts, the Romans probably believed that they might expect a long period of peace. No

one of the many able men in the senate saw the signs of the fearful storm which even then was preparing in distant Spain, which up to that time was little known to the Italians. All had firm confidence in the strength of the Roman people, which, still sound and resting on a good agricultural system, appeared but little changed in its mode




FIG. 32. — Gladiators. In the lower scene a *secutor*, armed with helmet, shield, and sword, is contending with a *retiarius*, who has thrown his net over his opponent, and is attacking him with his trident. Behind stands a *lanista*. Ancient Mosaic.

of life by the admission of strange elements, although the influence of Greek civilization and the Greek language was already very marked. It was unfortunate that the early Latin rudeness assimilated one of the most hateful features of the decaying civilization of the Rasen-nae, — pleasure in the shedding of human blood in sport. In the

year B.C. 264, at the obsequies of a Junius Brutus, gladiatorial spectacles (Fig. 32), such as were common in Etruria and Campania, were first exhibited in the cattle market; but it was long before these ‘games’ completely took the fancy of the people, and became a hideous characteristic of Roman life. The senate held firmly to the order that at the public festivals no gladiators should appear, and even longer prevented the no less disgusting baiting of animals. The funeral ceremonies of the clans were dignified and solemn, and in them the procession of family images and the oration in eulogy of the dead were always impressive. The popular festivals naturally bore a different character. The oldest and most important of these




FIG. 33.—Circus Maximus. Restored. (Canina.)

was the great festival of the city of Rome, the *ludi maximi* or *Romani*, which was celebrated for four days in September in the Circus Maximus (Fig. 33), between the Palatine and the Aventine, in honor of the Capitoline Jupiter. It was introduced by festal processions, and exhibited to the spectators chariot races, horse races, and the struggles of runners, wrestlers, and boxers. The prize, as in the national games of the Greeks, was a crown. In B.C. 364 a stage of boards was erected for scenic exhibitions of different kinds,—for players, dancers to the flute, buffoons, and for poets who delivered their verses, written in Saturnian metre, with gesticulation and dancing, to the accompaniment of the flute. This was the beginning of the Roman stage. Gradually, through Grecian influence, actual theatrical representations, such as

had long been known in Greece, were introduced. The first playwright was Livius Andronicus, a Greek, who in b.c. 272 came as prisoner of war from Tarentum to Rome, and there obtaining freedom and citizenship won an enduring name, partly as actor and translator, and partly as a teacher of the Greek and Latin languages. His translation of the *Odyssey* into Latin, in Saturnian verse, long remained a Roman school-book, and through his rough translations he made known the Greek tragedies and comedies to Rome. By him the first play was brought out upon the Roman stage in b.c. 240. The next important festival seems to be the creation of Flamininus, who as censor in b.c. 220 erected the Flaminian circus, and established there, in the month of November, the new ‘plebeian games.’ Although the relations of this man to the senate and nobility after his consulate became more and more distant, he was so true a Roman, that as censor he again removed from the centuries the freedmen, who not long before had been made equal in the suffrage with the freeborn.

Hamilcar Barcas, the leader of a strong patriotic party in Carthage, after the suppression of the revolt, turned all his thoughts to finding the means to restore the power of his fatherland, and to renew at a favorable opportunity the war against the Romans. Supported by the democracy, he seems to have succeeded in materially limiting the power of the oligarchy, which in the national disasters had been shaken morally and politically. The defeated party gathered about it all who thought with dread of a new war with Rome, in particular the supporters of the general Hanno, who, in their desire for peace at all costs, and in their aversion to Hamilcar and his political plans, are said to have sought at times the support of Rome. They could not prevent the appointment of Hamilcar as commander-in-chief for an indefinite time, and the bestowal upon him of dictatorial power. The authorities at Carthage formally retained the final decision in matters of state policy, but he could be removed and called to account only by the popular assembly. Later, the appointment of the commander came practically into the hand of the officers and the senators who served in the army; but the choice had to be ratified by the people. Hamilcar’s main purpose was to create new resources in a place not exposed to the observation of the Romans and almost unknown to them. He crossed in b.c. 236, with the fleet and greater part of his army, to the colonies in Spain, to which till then but little care had been given, and with skill and energy laid the foundations of a colonial empire, which in a short time made good to the state the

loss of Sicily and Sardinia, not indeed in trade, but in its financial, military, and political importance. The southeastern coast and a considerable part of the interior became a great Carthaginian military colony; and the rich silver-mines made up to the treasury the loss of tribute, and enabled it to pay the troops promptly, and to keep the populace in a contented mood. In victorious campaigns against the native Spaniards the army gained self-confidence and thorough discipline, and drew into the Carthaginian service many soldiers from the brave and chivalrous Spanish peoples. But Hamilcar was not to live to see the accomplishment of his plans against Rome. He fell in a skirmish in b.c. 229 or 228. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, brilliantly continued his work. He showed great skill in the treatment of dependants and allies, steadily winning for Carthage, more by diplomacy than by arms, the allegiance of new races, and developed the material resources of the new realms. Especially important was his founding, on the only good harbor on the coast, a splendid city, to be the secure base and chief arsenal for the great armies with which the Barcidae proposed to make war on Rome. The Spanish Carthage, New Carthage (Cartagena), was built on the rocky shore, between a capacious harbor and a shallow lagoon, accessible by land only on the north side. Its fortifications, of the strongest kind, were 3.4 miles in circuit, and it was occupied only by Carthaginians. The hatred which the leaders of the national party nourished against Rome was no blind and furious passion; it was a deep, strong, calculating hatred, that led them to make every preparation for the struggle, calmly and thoughtfully, and at the right moment, when their plan was ready, to bring on the outbreak. The Romans, whose attention had been drawn, by the Greeks in Massilia and on the Spanish coast, to the astonishing extension of the Carthaginians in Spain, fully conscious of their superiority, sought to limit the development of the Punic power, and made demands which might easily lead to war. In b.c. 226 they took under their protection the tribes between the Pyrenees and the Ebro which would not acknowledge the supremacy of Carthage; they made alliance with the Greek town Emporiae (Ampurias), in northern Spain, and with Saguntum (Murviedro), and forced the Carthaginians to agree not to attack Saguntum or to cross the Ebro.

In the beginning of b.c. 220 Hasdrubal was assassinated; and the army, whose choice was ratified by the people, raised to the command Hamilcar's oldest son, Hannibal, a young man twenty-nine years old,

one of the greatest geniuses in war and statesmanship of whom we have record in ancient history. In his boyhood Hamilcar, on setting out on his expedition to Spain, had bound him with an oath never to be a friend of the Romans. The son kept that oath, and never did the Romans meet a more dangerous foe. Trained as a soldier by his father, and as a statesman by his brother-in-law, beloved by the troops for his personal bravery and his brilliant talent for command, a highly educated man, the most impressive figure in Carthaginian history, far above the common type of his people, whose best characteristics he represented, keen in judgment, and gifted with marvellous foresight,—this man believed that the time for action had come, and that he could now venture upon the great struggle with Italy. This must be ‘a war to the death;’ it could end only with the reduction of Rome to the rank of a petty state, or with that fate for Carthage which Regulus had once hoped to bring upon it. Hannibal’s plan was to unite in arms, by his diplomatic skill, all peoples and states which had been injured, threatened, or oppressed by Rome, and especially to join to his African and Spanish regiments the phalanxes of Macedonia and the Celts of Upper Italy. At all hazards the war must be carried into Italy; only here could the Italian allies be gradually separated from Rome by a series of military disasters, and the senate by their defection be forced to accept terms which would permanently satisfy the interests of Carthage. Since the battle off Aegusa the Carthaginian fleet had been inferior to the Roman. The campaign could not, therefore, be undertaken from the sea; and Hannibal counted on the fleet only to protect the Spanish waters, and to keep open the communication between Africa and the armies in the field. He decided to lead his army by land from Spain through Gaul to Upper Italy, where an alliance with the Celts would give an excellent basis of operations; then to advance toward Sabellian Lower Italy, which was as yet only half incorporated with Rome, and there begin his work of dissolution. Another army following from Spain would give the necessary force to the decisive blow against Rome.

After extending the Carthaginian supremacy northwesterly to the neighborhood of the modern Salamanca, Hannibal, in B.C. 220, on hearing of the events on the Adriatic and in Upper Italy, thought the time favorable for the carrying out of his plan, and sought to break with Rome. In Illyria Demetrius of Pharos had gone over to the Macedonians, and had given assistance to the Istrian pirates, but in the next year was completely overthrown by the consul L. Aemilius Paulus. In

Upper Italy the Romans were also in trouble. The new conquests about the Po were not administered as a distinct province, but by one of the consuls. To Romanize the extensive districts south of the Po, the great military road, the Via Flaminia, was extended from Spolegium over the Apennines to the coast at Ariminum. Large colonies, which were also strong fortresses, were established,—Mutina (Modena), Cremona, on the left bank of the Po, and Placentia (Piacenza), on the right. The Celts, who foresaw the entire loss of their freedom, were greatly embittered.

Hannibal, in the spring of b.c. 219, began hostilities against Saguntum. The Saguntines at once besought Rome for help. But the senate, not realizing the state of affairs, determined upon diplomatic intervention, and, when this was without result, looked quietly on while for eight months Saguntum, with heroic endurance, withstood the Carthaginians. Only when the city was taken did the Romans recognize the gravity of the situation, and send an embassy to Carthage to demand from the senate, if peace was to continue, the surrender of Hannibal. But the great majority stood by the daring general. Then the leader of the Roman embassy, the old ex-consul Q. Fabius Maximus, cut short the negotiations, and, bringing the folds of his toga together, haughtily declared that in the folds of his garment lay peace and war. They should choose which they would. "We take what you give us," was the answer. The old man let fall his toga, and cried, "Then be it war." The Roman senate believed that they could begin where Lutatius Catulus had left off. With no suspicion of the daring plans of Hannibal, they made no unusual preparations, and commissioned one consul of b.c. 218, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, to go with the fleet and his army to Sicily, and from Lilybaeum to cross to Africa. The other consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, was to sail with two legions and their regular auxiliaries from Pisa to the Spanish cantons north of the Ebro, and from this base to engage the troops of Hannibal. Sempronius set out late in the spring, and Scipio's speedy departure met with hindrances. Secret negotiations had long been in progress between Hannibal and the Celts of Upper Italy; and in the spring of b.c. 218, on the report that the Carthaginians had crossed the Ebro, the Boii and the Insubres rose. The former blockaded Mutina, and drove off a legion which came from Ariminum to its relief. The senate was obliged to send to Upper Italy the legions intended for Spain; but two new legions were raised for Scipio, who was thus able to leave Rome in August. On reaching Massilia he learned with astonishment

that Hannibal, with a powerful army, had crossed the Pyrenees, and by forced marches was approaching the Rhone. Now at last the Romans began to understand the plans of the Carthaginian leader. In order to gain information about the direction of Hannibal's march, Scipio sent up the left bank of the Rhone a strong division of cavalry, through which he ascertained that he was too late to stop the Africans at the Rhone. Hannibal had already crossed the river, and was advancing northward to enter Upper Italy over the Alps. With the true Roman consistency, and completely blind to the danger to be expected from Hannibal, Publius Scipio sent the main part of his army, under his brother Cnaeus, to Spain, and returned to Pisa that he might collect in Upper Italy the troops which he needed.

Hannibal, on completing his preparations, had taken to Africa about 15,000 Spaniards, partly as hostages, partly as a guard, and in return had brought as many Africans to Spain, leaving Carthage strongly garrisoned. The command in Spain, with a fleet of fifty-seven ships, he had committed to his brother Hasdrubal, who was also to train a new army as a re-enforcement for him in carrying out his plans. In the spring of B.C. 218, with 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse, all African, Spanish, and Balearic veterans, and with thirty-seven elephants, he had set out from Spanish Carthage for the north. After crossing the Ebro, the hostile peoples in this region disputed his passage in many fights, in which he lost 20,000 men, and obliged him besides to leave 10,000 foot and 1000 horse to hold the country. At the Pyrenees as many Spanish troops were dismissed to their homes, as Hannibal saw that they had no heart for the Italian campaign. Thus he entered Gaul (through the pass of St. Jean de Luz) with a disciplined force of only 50,000 foot and 9000 horse, but here his money and his diplomacy gave him free passage to the Rhone. He meant to enter Italy along the old route by which the transalpine Celts had long been wont to traverse the Alps. It was of importance to reach the upper Italian Celts as quickly as possible, and with the least hindrance from the Romans. Hannibal advanced up the Rhone from near Avignon to the Isara (Isère), and then on the right bank through the rich land of the Allobroges. The passage of the Alps, a wonderful feat to later times, which has been surrounded with many legendary exaggerations, was accomplished by the army in fifteen days. But it is doubtful what route Hannibal took. Lately it has been shown to be probable that from the valley of the Arc, a tributary of the Isère, he climbed the pass of the Mont Cenis, and entered Italy by the valley of the Dora

Riparia.<sup>1</sup> The attacks of hostile mountaineers, the difficulty of the road, ice, snow, cold, and hunger, wrought havoc on the army. When, toward the end of October, b.c. 218, Hannibal reached the Italian side of the Alps, his effective force consisted of only 20,000 foot (three-fifths Africans and two-fifths Spaniards) and 6000 horse. Had Publius Scipio led his army from Massilia by way of Genoa to the upper Po, he could easily have defeated Hannibal's decimated and exhausted troops. But the invaders were allowed to refresh themselves and reorganize undisturbed, then to overpower the enemies of the Insubres, and prepare for their attack upon the Romans themselves.

The news of Hannibal's entrance into Italy upset all the plans of the senate. Thus far affairs in Sicily, where King Hiero kept faith with Rome, had been very favorable. The consul Sempronius had subdued Malta, when the evil tidings called him to the north. Meanwhile Scipio had gathered the troops that were fighting the revolted Celts, crossing the Po near Placentia, and advanced up stream toward the Carthaginians, who were coming eastward from Turin. After crossing the Ticinus, he met a superior detachment of Carthaginian cavalry led by Hannibal himself; and in the fierce battle which ensued the Romans were entirely defeated, and the consul himself wounded (his life was saved only by the valor of his son Publius, a youth of seventeen), and he was forced to retreat to Placentia.

<sup>1</sup> Many authorities prefer the pass of the Little St. Bernard, as Mommsen, Niebuhr, Cramer, and Wickham.—TR.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

THERE now began upon the soil of Italy the most terrible of all the wars which down to the time of Sulla convulsed the ancient world. Rome did indeed, after seventeen years of struggle, bring the African hero to the ground; but Rome and Italy, after the victory of Zama, were changed within and without. Woeful as was his failure, the son of Hamilcar was able to inflict wounds upon the dread republic which never again were healed. His colossal figure was to the Romans of his time the object of deep abhorrence. Later generations were unable to do justice to his greatness. Opposition to Rome was the moving element in Hannibal's career, but his hatred did not blind him. He was entirely free from personal barbarity; and in a relentless struggle, in which magnanimity and forbearance were rarely seen on either side, history ascribes to Hannibal no deed which is not fully justified by the military and international code of honor of antiquity, and has transmitted to us many a knightly trait. He was the most dangerous opponent whom the Romans ever met. At the head of his army, with dictatorial power, he displayed the most brilliant gifts as a general,—extraordinary ability in arousing enthusiasm in his troops, a motley throng gathered from many peoples, and in binding them firmly to his person and his cause; inexhaustible endurance and elasticity, intellectually and physically. He was as skilful in the rush of attack as in stubborn defence; as great in planning whole campaigns as in the tactics and arrangement of a battle-field. He astonished both friend and foe by the acuteness with which he studied his adversary, and adapted his measures to the character of his opponent, by his inexhaustible fertility in stratagem, and by the unswerving sagacity with which he penetrated and forestalled others' designs.

That this heroic vigor, and this genius shown in a series of magnificent successes, could not save Carthage from its downfall, was due to a combination of very diverse circumstances. In the face of the inexhaustible might of a state which had grown together naturally, Hannibal was obliged to rely on an artificial military and political

structure, whose defects he was powerless to improve. His hopes of Macedonian help were disappointed; and the association with the wild Celtic hordes increased the deep aversion for the Africans which was felt by the Italians, of whom only a part of the Sabellians were ever led to fall away from Rome. When the Romans succeeded in destroying the sources of supplies in Spain, Africa showed herself unable to support Hannibal. Furthermore, there was no man among the Carthaginians and their allies even distantly comparable to Hannibal; and those on whom he was obliged to rely all failed in skill or in energy. But the chief cause of his failure was the strength of the Roman people, and the unbending will and heroism of the senate. It is true that during the Hannibalic wars no one appeared in Rome, hardly even the victor of Zama, who in political and military ability was above the average; but the strong qualities of the Roman people in those gloomy years appear all the more brilliantly. The forces that really won were the stern severity, the defiant, unflinching tenacity, stubborn endurance, and iron resolution of the Romans and their senate. These were enough to withstand the genius of a Hannibal, as soon as the Roman people, under heavy misfortune, had laid aside their internal contention.

After his retreat to Placentia, Scipio constructed a fortified camp on the east bank of the Trebia, above its junction with the Po. A few days later Hannibal appeared, and took a position only ten miles distant. The consul then withdrew in the night, and going farther up the river, intrenched himself in a securer place, among the foot-hills of the Apennines, on the other bank of the Trebia. In this position Scipio held the Carthaginians in check, till, late in December, Sempronius joined him from Ariminum. An army of 40,000 Italian soldiers and auxiliaries stood opposed to the Carthaginian army, that now numbered 38,000 men. The Carthaginian cavalry, increased to 10,000 by Celtic accessions, was far superior to that of the Romans. Scipio, relying upon his secure camp, upon the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, and upon the Cenomani, wished to avoid battle, and to compel the Carthaginians either to attack the Roman intrenchments in an unfavorable season, or through their inactivity to destroy the confidence of the Celts in their ability to help. Sempronius, however, would have nothing to do with such dilatory measures, and fully believed that with his strong force he must overthrow the enemy at a single blow, and quickly deliver Italy. When, therefore, Hannibal irritated him by plundering some villages between the Po and Trebia,

and then allowed the Roman cavalry to drive his men back to the Punic camp on the right bank of the Trebia. Sempronius, who on account of Scipio's wound was in command, let himself be drawn into an engagement.

In the chill rain of an early December morning Hannibal sent his Numidian horsemen over the Trebia to provoke the Romans in their camp. Sempronius at once accepted the challenge, and without allowing his soldiers time to break their fast despatched the cavalry and light infantry against the enemy, who retired across the river. When the pursuing Romans reached on the right bank, the field that Hannibal had chosen for the battle, the Numidians halted, and the Romans found themselves opposed to Carthaginian troops, who were well fed, and ready for the conflict. Sempronius followed his advance guard with the main body of the legions: but the Roman infantry was obliged to enter the battle hungry and wet to the skin; for in the night the Trebia had risen, and was breast high for the soldiers who forded it. The light troops and the cavalry were soon repulsed; but the firm Roman infantry only gave way when a detachment, placed in ambush by Hannibal, and commanded by his brother Mago, fell on their rear. The battle was then lost; and only 10,000 of the infantry with the consul were able to cut their way to Placentia. The Romans lost, probably, half their army in killed and prisoners. Under protection of night and a heavy storm, Scipio also succeeded in reaching Placentia with those who had escaped to his camp. After this splendid victory the Celtic insurrection flamed up fiercely, while Rome was appalled on learning that Hannibal had dismissed his Italian prisoners to their homes without ransom, and had declared that he had come to Italy only to deliver them from the yoke of Rome.

Meanwhile the Romans had met with success in Spain. Cnaeus Scipio, landing on the northeast coast, had secured the harbors from Emporiae to the Ebro, and then, after a victory over Hanno, had won for Rome the tribes just subdued by Hannibal. The Romans were forced to meet with all possible energy the imminent danger in Italy, and to prevent the Carthaginians from entering the peninsula proper.

Unfortunately they laid less stress on their military preparations than on their priestly duties, and the performance of extraordinary religious ceremonies to avert the wrath of the gods. Preparations were indeed made with customary energy; but it foreboded disaster that the opposition between the orders could appear in the election of consuls, and that for the year B.C. 217, along with an able officer, Cnaeus Servil-

ius, Caius Flaminius was chosen, who was on bad terms with the senate. Flaminius, who feared that the senate would find some religious excuse by which at last to keep him at Rome, without bringing to the Capitol the public offering, or completing the other ceremonies customary on entering upon the office, secretly left the city to assume his office at Ariminum,—a disastrous act, for he was not able to justify his irreligion by a brilliant victory. After all preparations were made, thirteen legions were nominally under arms. Under the immediate command of the consuls were, as usual, four new legions, with the customary Italian contingents, and the remnants of the army of the year before, whose first duty was to protect the chief passes to the Italian peninsula. Servilius encamped with two legions and the bulk of the cavalry near Ariminum; Flaminius assumed command of the other consular army, near Arretium in Etruria. But Hannibal, who with more than 50,000 men hoped to outflank the separated divisions of the Romans, toward the close of the winter crossed the Apennines (perhaps by the pass of Pontremoli), near Lueca, and entered the valley of the Arno, intending to worry Flaminius, and decoy him into rashly accepting battle before the arrival of Servilius. His march up the Arno valley, a four days' journey through a swampy country, was exhausting in the extreme, and lost him many horses and pack-animals, and Hannibal himself lost one eye from inflammation. At Faesulae the army rested on dry ground, and then turned towards Arretium, and past that into Etruria, which was plundered in all directions. The excitement in the Roman army was naturally great when Hannibal took the direction toward Rome. Flaminius was senseless enough to follow without awaiting the arrival of Servilius, and fell helplessly into the net which Punic cunning had spread for him. Close to Lake Trasimenus (Lake of Perugia) Hannibal had carefully chosen his position. The lake, except an open space on the northwest, is surrounded by hills. From that space runs a narrow road connecting Cortona and Perusia, between the hills on the left and the east shore of the lake on the right. Beyond Monte Gualandro, which comes down close to the lake, there is a plain four and a half to five miles long, and half as wide, and extending along the southeast shore of the lake. The other entrance to this plain, on the southeast toward Perusia, is commanded by a steep hill, which breaks the plain into halves. Hannibal had occupied the farther portion of the plain with his Spanish and Afriean regiments, facing the west; on the left and the right the light-armed troops; the Celts and the Numidians were on the

hills and also on Monte Gualandro, but were concealed in the ravines and the inequalities of the ground. It was the late evening of an April day when Flaminius arrived at the passage at the foot of Monte Gualandro. On the following morning, in spite of the dangerous character of the country, and although a thick fog covered the shores of the lake, he made no reconnaissances of the ground, but passed thoughtlessly through the opening into the valley at Monte Gualandro, in order to attack Hannibal's position on the hills at the southeast. As soon as the main body of the army had entered the plain, and had behind it only the wide surface of the lake and the narrow pass, Hannibal closed his net. When the fog began to lift, the Romans saw themselves surrounded in a half-circle, in front, on the flank, and in the rear, by enemies who with wild cries rushed down upon them from the hills above. Not a thought could be given to forming a line of battle; and to add to the confusion, Flaminius was killed at the very beginning of the fight. The battle soon turned into a butchery, and in three hours it was at an end. Only 6000 of the Roman infantry cut their way out from that disastrous spot, and reached an open space; but they were followed by the Numidian, Maharbal, with the cavalry and the light troops, and on the next day were surrounded on a hill, and overcome by fatigue and hunger, and not knowing the movements of Servilius, were forced to surrender. 15,000 Romans and Italians lay dead on the field; 13,000 to 15,000 were prisoners; while of the victors, only 1500, mostly Celts, were killed. A few days later 4000 of Servilius's cavalry, which had been sent in advance, were defeated by Maharbal, in Umbria, and taken prisoners.

The panic in Rome was terrible. The Celts and the Africans, whose light horsemen had already shown themselves about Narnia, were expected at any moment to appear before the walls; for no organized army stood between these and the enemy, and Hannibal's position cut off Servilius from Rome. In such extremity the senate displayed its ancient strength. The first step, to secure unity in the command, was to appoint a dictator. The old Q. Fabius Maximus, a patrician, with the old Roman vigor, calm determination, and tenacity of purpose, was raised to this position. He urged on the new preparations energetically, and raised four new legions. Contrary to the expectations of the Romans, Hannibal did not direct his march toward their city, but advanced easterly toward the countries along the Adriatic. Well knowing the strength of Rome, and never blinded, either then or afterward, by any success upon the battle-field, Hannibal, with his small army, could not

think of permanently occupying extensive hostile districts in the face of the great bodies of troops which the senate was able to put in the field, nor could he afford the great expenditure of blood and time needed to reduce a series of Italian fortresses which might serve as a secure base for an attack upon Rome, and a shelter in case of a reverse. With nothing but the better quality of his veterans and his military genius to offset numbers, he was forced to bewilder and exhaust his opponents by constant aggressive movements, and by rapid changes in his points of attack, until he could reach the firm base of operations which he hoped to establish among the Sabellian districts in the centre and south. But when, after a rest of four weeks in Picenum, he entered the districts of the Marrucini, Peligni, and Frentani, there was no sign of a defection from Rome; no city voluntarily opened its gates to him. He entered Apulia, and pitched his camp near Arpi. The dictator, Fabius, with a strong Roman army, took up his position not far from him, on the spurs of the mountains of Samnium.

The war now took on a different character. In vain did Hannibal strive to entice the old 'delayer' to a decisive battle. Fabius, whose first task was to restore the confidence of the Italian soldiers in their own strength and their leaders, to discipline the new recruits, and to find competent officers, made it his law constantly to keep in unassailable positions and to hazard nothing. All supplies and flocks in defenceless places were, on the approach of the enemy, to be securéd in the nearest fortress or destroyed. But Hannibal made it very difficult to carry out this system. Fabius could not always find a commanding position from which, without risk, he could restrict the movements of the Carthaginians, and under his eyes Hannibal first ravaged in the most fearful way the fertile land where the armies lay, and so aroused the deepest discontent in the troops, and finally even that of the *Magister Equitum*, M. Minucius Rufus; then led his army, always followed by Fabius with the greatest prudence, across Samnium toward the rich plains of Campania, and wasted the country north of the Volturnus, the Falernian district, and returned with the plunder into Apulia, adroitly foiling Fabius, who tried to force him to an engagement in a very unfavorable place. At the end of six months Fabius, according to custom, laid down his office. He had thus far saved the new army of the republic, had avoided new disasters, and at least delayed the victorious course of the great Carthaginian. In Spain the two Scipios had made it impossible for Hasdrubal to bring a new Carthaginian army into Italy in the next year.

During the winter the Romans decided no longer to continue the delaying policy of Fabius, but to try again, with a large army, to crush at once their dread opponent. The political opposition of the two parties in the city was still very bitter; and the commonalty now put forward as their candidate a man who, though not without political talent, was known only as a demagogue, Caius Terentius Varro, who advocated a vigorous policy in the conduct of the war. It was only with difficulty that the nobility were able to elect as his colleague Aemilius Paulus, who had successfully conducted the Illyrian war, in B.C. 219, and whose military talent, experience, and discretion proved in every way equal to the emergency.<sup>1</sup> The army, encamped in Apulia, was increased to 80,000 foot and 6000 horse. In the spring of B.C. 216 Hannibal made his headquarters near Cannae, on the east bank of the Aufidus (Ofanto). It was disastrous to the Romans that the military views of the two consuls did not agree. Aemilius Paulus did not wish to fight on the plain, where Hannibal could employ his cavalry with greatest effect, but hoped to take advantage of the difficulties which the Carthaginians were beginning to feel from lack of supplies. Terentius, who shared the views of the common soldiers, was impatient to meet the enemy. They reached the Aufidus, and pitched camps on either bank of the stream, between the villages of Canusium and Cannae. The main body was on the right bank, not far from the Punic camp; while a third of the army took up its position upon the left bank, a little farther down, not over two miles from the enemy. On a beautiful June morning, Terentius issued the order for a battle, which Hannibal did not dream of refusing. The Roman, leaving 10,000 men in the larger camp, and advancing with his forces, 76,000 strong, across the Aufidus, took up a position on the left bank, not far from the lesser camp, and formed his line of battle facing the south. On the right wing, which rested on the Aufidus, was the Roman cavalry, led by the consul Aemilius. The mass of infantry was drawn up in lines of unusual depth; and the Italian cavalry, under Terentius, held the left wing. Hannibal, who had over 10,000 horse to oppose to the 6000 of his enemy, but only about 40,000 infantry, employed all his skill in manoeuvring to overcome the great superiority of the Romans. On his left wing, next the Aufidus, was the Spanish and Celtic cavalry, under Hasdrubal; on the right wing the Numidian light-horse. In the centre, where he himself and Mago led the battle, the front ranks were composed of Spanish and Celtic regiments. To the left and right, behind these ranks, and extending towards the wings, the Africans,

now armed in the manner of the Romans, were so arranged that the centre, viewed from the Roman side, formed a crescent. At the beginning of the battle Hasdrubal's heavy cavalry routed the Roman cavalry on the right wing, and drove them in wild disorder over the plain. He then fell upon the rear and flank of the left wing of the Roman army, which had thus far successfully resisted the attack of the Numidians, but which now was also entirely scattered. The Roman infantry had at first successfully driven back Hannibal's Spanish and Celtic regiments; but then the African veterans, with their Roman arms, threw themselves from left and right upon their flanks, and checked their advance. While the body of the legions and the Italians strove to break through the infantry of Hannibal, Hasdrubal brought up his heavy cavalry, and charged upon their now undefended rear. The Roman infantry were gradually surrounded; and the struggle became a protracted butchery of the Romans, till at evening the army of Terentius had vanished from the earth; and by the side of 8000 of Hannibal's men, 70,000 Romans and Italians lay dead, among them almost all the higher officers and eighty men of senatorial rank. Thousands of prisoners were made; a few hundreds escaped, first to Canusium, and then to Venusia, where gradually four to five thousand men gathered around the consul Terentius, who had escaped with about seventy horsemen.<sup>1</sup>

The news of this awful catastrophe shook Rome to the very foundations. But under the hard blows of misfortune flashed up again the stern patriotism and unyielding pride which once had broken the power of Pyrrhus. Never does Roman manhood appear so great as in this moment of disasters. The senate, which had lost so many members, set the example by suppressing all signs of despondency, and calmly and energetically making new preparations. The internal discussions came to an end; and this was publicly proclaimed by the senate's going to meet the luckless Varro at the gates, and thanking him for not having despaired of the safety of his country. Every nerve was strained to gather new forces, and to prevent the allies from falling away. The Carthaginian army did not appear before the walls. Hannibal, indeed, was urged to strike the death-blow at once; but he knew that Rome was strongly fortified, and would be well defended, and that, with an army composed largely of cavalry and of Celts, with no refuge in case of repulse, the attempt would be foolhardy. He rather endeavored to obtain from the disabled enemy conditions of peace fair to Car-

<sup>1</sup> According to another estimate, 48,000 fell, 23,000 were taken prisoners, and 14,000 escaped.

thage. But Rome proudly maintained the policy of old Appius Claudius, and, far from talking of peace, would not allow Hannibal's messenger to enter the city. In that spirit, at the moment when Rome was forced to recruit its army in part with emancipated slaves, the senate, after a heated debate, refused to ransom the prisoners of Cannae, as proposed by Hannibal. Their men were thus notified that in the struggle they had to choose between victory and death; and, as a warning, the soldiers who had escaped from the rout at Cannae were formed into two weak legions, and degraded to a service that was at once shameful and unpaid, in which they remained till the end of the war.

In one part of Italy the Roman confederacy began to break up. Immediately after Cannae, Arpi and other places in Apulia, the Lucanians, and most of the Bruttiens, went over to the Carthaginians. Hannibal, marching through Samnium and Campania, personally won over most of the Samnites and the Picentini, and was able finally to bring Capua, the second city of Italy, into alliance with Carthage. The Capuans marked their revolt from Rome by murdering a number of Romans who were in their city. Hannibal had reached the highest point in his success; nevertheless, in his sober estimate of all conditions he did not give way to extravagant hopes. He knew that if he was to succeed the Italians must fall away in larger numbers, and that his active army must receive immediately important re-enforcements from without. And yet at this very time a series of reverses in Italy, and the failure of most of his expectations of help from without, together with the creation of a new Roman army, turned the balance against the Carthaginian cause.

The Carthaginian government, in the enthusiasm that followed the news of Cannae, conceded to their great general every re-enforcement for which he asked. Above all, Hasdrubal was to delay no longer to lead his army over the Pyrenees to Italy. The two brave Scipios and their warriors, however, knew that the future of their country was now to be defended on the Ebro; and when Hasdrubal attacked them, not far from the river, he was completely defeated. This victory made it possible for the Romans in Italy to recover, so that they were in a condition to meet Hasdrubal, when, after losing precious years, he was at last able to pass the Alps. Henceforth the seat of war in Spain became fully as important as that in Italy. For the Carthaginians it was essential, at whatever cost, to open the way again into Italy; for the Romans, to destroy the Spanish base of the Africans. For the present Hannibal must be content with making the best use of the

embarrassments which Cannae had brought upon the Romans throughout Italy. His purpose of gradually overcoming the Romans by Italian support was shown to be only partially practicable. Capua had expressly stipulated that Hannibal should not press Campanian citizens into his army, and among the Samnites and Lucanians the old warlike vigor and the wild fury against Rome was past. The Roman fortress-colonies in Lower Italy and the cities of the Italian Greeks, except Croton and Locri Epizephyrii, held steadfastly to Rome. Hannibal was thus compelled to employ a part of his forces in watching the fortresses in his rear, and in defending against the Romans the Italians who had joined him. The time of uneasing and dashing offensive was past; all he could do was to distract and weary his opponents till he was joined by the strong re-enforcements whose coming would decide the war. But after Cannae the tactics of the Romans were changed. In Spain and in Italy they determined upon a persistent defensive, though in Spain it was varied at times by daring advances. In Italy their first task was to learn not to be beaten by Hannibal; and this de-



FIG. 34.—Coin with portrait of M. Claudius Marcellus. (Berlin.)

pended upon their choosing as consuls and praetors only experienced officers, upon continuing them in command as long as the constitution allowed, and upon selecting with extreme care the places and times of joining battle with Hannibal. They found that this involved the heaviest sacrifices. The senate could now control only the resources of the district between the Apennines and the Volturnus, and was obliged to make constant and severe demands upon Roman Italy, weakened by the great disasters and the defection of the south. Only the employment of freedmen, and of the better portions of Romans of the lowest census, lightened in some degree for the peasants the terrible pressure of military service.

After the recall of Terentius, the senate gave the provisional command to the ex-consul, M. Claudius Marcellus (Fig. 34), who was the praetor. Only by the desperate energy of despair had a new army been gathered in and near Rome. Boys were enrolled who had not reached the military age of seventeen. Six thousand criminals and debtors were released from prison, and formed into a legion; and 8000 slaves were bought from their owners, and put into the army with the promise of freedom as a reward for good behavior. Marcellus, an experienced officer, stern and vigorous, who shrank from no harsh measure, who could, as few men can, kindle the feeling of honor in his sol-

diers, and who had the full confidence of the people, and especially of Fabius, took the field with 25,000 men, as soon as it was seen that the capital was not in immediate danger. He became the directing spirit of the new method of the warfare, and soon was enabled by a fortunate success to restore confidence in his troops. Marcellus advanced to Campania, to save the Greek and Italian towns which still held to Rome, but were endangered by seditious elements within their walls, and by the nearness of Hannibal, for whom it was of great importance to secure the harbors of this section, in order to open the direct communication with Carthage. He failed to subdue Naples, and then turned to Nola, where the people's party was inclined to join the Carthaginians; but at the last moment Marcellus entered the threatened town, assured its quiet by putting to death many of the people's party, and in a sally repulsed Hannibal himself with considerable loss. This slight success was very important for its moral effect. Hannibal continued to advance, and took the Campanian cities of Acerrae and Nuceria, and Casinglinum, a place of strategic importance. There is little foundation for the story that a part of the Carthaginian army, which had taken up its winter quarters in Capua, was demoralized by the vices of the place. Yet the war in Italy came more and more to a standstill; Hannibal, in Campania, holding in check a powerful mass of Roman and Italian troops, without being able to push again to the north.

In Spain the skilful diplomacy of the Romans worked greatly to the injury of the Carthaginians. The two Seipios inflicted two heavy defeats upon the brave Hasdrubal, first near Illiturgi (Jaen), on the upper Baetis, and again, somewhat farther north in the mountains, then, in b.c. 214 re-established Saguntum as a Roman station, and pressing forward to the mountains of Granada, and the south shores of Spain, were able in b.c. 213 to turn their attention to Africa itself. They formed an alliance with the powerful Numidian chieftain Syphax, in the west-African countries (now Algiers and Oran), which aroused a dangerous ferment among the African subjects of the Carthaginians. A great insurrection of the natives in Sardinia (b.c. 215), which was assisted by the Carthaginians, was put down by the Roman, T. Manlius Torquatus. In the south and east matters seemed to become more favorable to Hannibal. In Syracuse, King Hiero, the old friend of the Romans, died in the beginning of b.c. 215. His successor, his seventeen-years-old grandson Hieronymus, foolishly favored a party that hoped from the Carthaginians, who now seemed to have the upper hand, an extension of the territory of Syracuse. He entered into negotiations with Hannibal,

who sent to him two agents, Hippoerates and Epiydes, well qualified to advance his affairs in Sicily. In b.c. 214 the young king was put out of the way by the republican party of the aristocracy and wealthy citizens that favored Rome. But when the new governors, in a cowardly manner, put to death the whole family of Hiero, the army and the people turned against the blood-stained republic; and the Carthaginian party succeeded in having Hippocrates and Epiydes chosen generals, and in bringing about open defection from Rome. Marcellus, with a large Roman force, now encamped before the city, while a Carthaginian army of 25,000 foot, 3000 horse, and twelve elephants, landed on the south coast, and captured Agrigentum. King Philip V., of Macedonia, in the year b.c. 215, had made a compact with Hannibal, in which he bound himself to make war upon the Romans on land and sea, and to begin by a descent upon the east coast of Italy with a fleet of 200 ships of war. In return, he was to receive the Roman possessions upon the Balkan peninsula, and the Carthaginians guaranteed him the supremacy over Greece. The Romans, into whose hands Philip's messenger fell on his return, were alarmed at the prospect of again meeting the dreaded Macedonian phalanx, and prepared in all haste to resist the king's attack. Philip, however, with unexpected irresolution, shrank from hazarding his small war-ships against the fifty quinquiremes of the Romans, and, failing shamefully in an attack upon Oricus and Apollonia in southern Illyria, dispelled the fear the Romans had for the Macedonian arms; and when, in b.c. 212, he found the way to Italy clear through the capture of Tarentum by the Carthaginians, the diplomaey of the Romans kept him busy at home. Since the peace of Naupactus, Philip, by his despotic temper, his disregard of law, and the poisoning of Aratus, had alienated the sympathy of his Hellenic allies; and in b.c. 211 Rome succeeded in winning over the Aetolians, who had no taste for a long peace with its lack of piratical expeditions, by the promise of the recovery of Acarnania, and the towns which had been lost to Philip. Romans and Aetolians were to carry on war in common against Philip, and not to make a separate peace. Of all conquests made as far as Corcyra, the land was to go to the Aetolians, and all plunder, together with the inhabitants, to the Romans. This disgraceful bargain drove the Greeian confederacy to Philip's side; but Italy had henceforth nothing to fear from Macedonia, as the Greeian world again became the scene of a ruthless civil war.

In b.c. 214 the Romans put forth their utmost efforts, and em-

ploying all the resources of the state and the generosity of private citizens, raised their active army to 200,000 men, and their fleet to 150 ships. A fourth of the able-bodied men of Italy, and a much larger proportion of the Romans, were thus under arms. Tiberius Gracchus with four legions, resting upon Beneventum and Luceeria, was opposed to Hannibal, whose main army lay near Arpi, while Fabius Maximus, with four other legions, prepared for an attack upon Capua. The progress of the Roman armies in recovering territory was slow, for Hannibal conducted the defensive with extreme determination and skill. He suffered most from the lessening confidence of his Italian allies, of whom some, influenced by the barbarous penalties inflicted by the Romans upon the revolted states, and by the cessation of the Carthaginian successes, sought to win forgiveness by turning again to Rome. The attention of all was directed to the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians had thrown a fleet into the harbor, while their land forces intrenched themselves on the river Anapus. The gallant Marellus attacked the city on the sea side with fifty quinqueremes, while the praetor Appius Claudius commanded on land. Their efforts were long foiled by the genius of the great engineer, Archimedes. Not till the spring of B.C. 212, while the city was given up to the orgies of a festival of Artemis, did the Romans succeed in taking by storm the fortifications of the Epipolae, and with them the quarters Tyeha and Neapolis. In the following summer, when the army of the Carthaginians was completely broken up by a pestilence, Epicydes abandoned Syracuse, and fled to Agrigentum; and a secret understanding with the Spanish soldiers put the citadel Ortygia into the hands of the Romans, when Achradina also surrendered. The city was given up to the systematic plundering of the soldiers, whose greed had been sharpened by the long struggle, and was then ruined forever. In B.C. 210 Agrigentum was again taken by the Romans. The war in Sicily came to an end, and the whole island became Roman. The capture of Syracuse was counterbalanced by severe losses in the same year. Tarentum, embittered by the cruel treatment of its hostages, who had tried to escape from Rome, opened its gates to Hannibal; and in Spain the two Scipios, who had ventured to enlist 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries, and then to divide their forces, completely succumbed to Hasdrubal's diplomacy, money, and arms. They were killed in battle, and at one blow the Romans again lost Spain as far as the Ebro. The fragments of the legions made their way across the river, and defended it till the

senate was able to send, in B.C. 211, the propraetor Caius Claudius Nero with 12,000 or 15,000 men, and again hold the Carthaginians in check.

Hannibal was thus again compelled to wait at a moment when affairs in Italy were turning to his disadvantage. In the course of B.C. 212 the Romans prepared to attack Capua. Hannibal, in a series of brilliant engagements, showed clearly his tactical superiority, but could not prevent the Roman army of perhaps 60,000 men from closely investing the city, and defending their troops with a double line of intrenchments, equally against sorties of the besieged and attacks of a rescuing army. A daring attempt of Hannibal (B.C. 211), to break through the lines and co-operate with a sortie of the Capuans, failed. He then ventured to march past the fortresses of Campania and Latium direct on Rome, in order to compel the consuls to raise the siege. He reached the Anio between Tusculum and Tibur, crossed the river, and with the squadrons of Numidian horse approached the walls of Rome. The daring move was foiled by the coolness of the Romans. The senate, without raising the siege of Capua, called back from Campania only 16,000 men. They would not accept battle; so after a few days Hannibal withdrew southwards through the country of the Sabines, Marsi, and Peligni, ravaging the country as he went. He defeated the Roman troops that followed him, but Capua was not to be saved. The fate of this city, after it was obliged to surrender, was frightful. The Romans wished not only to punish its defection, but completely to shake Hannibal's position in Italy by the bloody proof that his power was not sufficient to protect his Italian allies. The Capuan senators, according to the infamous Roman practice, were first scourged and then beheaded. All who had fought against Rome, or had held an office since B.C. 216, with their families, were sold as slaves. The rest of the population were settled beyond the limits of Campania. Capua became part of the public domain, was filled with a population of tenants, freedmen, and slaves, and governed by Roman prefects, without a communal organization. The party favorable to the Romans everywhere now gained the upper hand. The confidence in the strength and success of the Carthaginians sank very low, and those communities which had not hopelessly compromised themselves sought to make their peace with the senate.

Hannibal, in order not to weaken his army by scattering it among the garrisons that everywhere threatened to turn against him, restricted

himself to holding the southern districts from Bruttium to Tarentum. While he waited for the arrival of Hasdrubal, this position served him as a great intrenched camp, from which he continually made assaults upon the Romans, in which the losses and gains for each side were about equal. In b.c. 209 old Fabius Maximus retook through treachery the city of Tarentum; and the Romans had to mourn the loss of Marcellus, the most vigorous and energetic of their generals, who met his death in a skirmish near Venusia.

The decision of the war thus came at last to depend almost wholly upon affairs in Spain. In the year b.c. 211, when Claudius Nero had shown himself unequal to the task assigned him, the senate decided to commit the conduct of the Spanish war to a general with proconsular authority, who, as an extraordinary measure, should be chosen by the people. The place was sought and obtained by a youth of only twenty-four years, who had been aedile, but had not reached the legal age for the higher offices, Publius Cornelius Scipio, the chivalrous and universally beloved son of the dead Publius Scipio. Around him the grateful remembrance of contemporaries, and the homage of later ages, have thrown a peculiar halo. It was never forgotten that to him fell the glory of finally conquering Hannibal, and of putting an end to the horrors of this war. His fortune was greater than his military gifts, though these far surpassed even those of Marcellus; but to his contemporaries the youthful hero was a fascinating personality. Chivalrously brave, handsome, gracious in giving, firmly believing in his star, not unconscious of his power to attract to himself the attention of the people, with lofty ideals, a clear comprehension of the relations of events, of extraordinary energy and true Roman strength, modified by Grecian culture, Seipio, a rare exception in that fierce struggle of the nations, had kept in his heart a place for the feelings of humanity and magnanimity that, after long years of murder and destruction, had become almost incomprehensible. Accompanied by his friend, the admiral Caius Laelius, he went to Spain, in the winter of b.c. 211–210, as proconsul, with 11,000 men. He perceived at once the mistakes of the Carthaginian commanders, who were at odds with one another, and were all more than ten days' march from New Carthage. When he heard that this fortress was garrisoned with only a thousand men, he advanced from Tarraco, in the spring of b.c. 210, with 25,000 foot and 2500 horse, by forced marches directly upon the central station of the Carthaginians, while Laelius led the fleet of thirty-five ships. In seven days they were before its walls. For a short time, at ebb tide,

the lagoon on the west side of the city was fordable ; and Scipio, making a demonstration with his fleet, and covering his daring attempt by an attack upon the north side, sent another part of his troops across the shoal at low tide, and stormed the walls, which on that side were weak and undefended. The military advantage of this bold venture was very great. Nevertheless, Scipio afterward made a serious blunder, which the fortune of war did not allow him immediately to make good. Dismissing his fleet, and joining to his army the troops it carried, he believed himself strong enough to bar the Carthaginians from the Ebro, and likewise to take the offensive in the south. But now Hasdrubal determined at all hazards to set out with his strong army to Italy ; and when, in b.c. 209 Scipio forced him to a battle near Baecula, on the upper Baetis, he withdrew, though with considerable loss, when the battle went against him, and, leaving the honor of the victory to the Romans, turned with the best part of his troops, and the elephants, to the upper Tagus. Scipio did not follow him, and was greatly surprised when he heard where he again appeared. By a succession of skilful movements Hasdrubal completely avoided the eyes of the Romans, and gradually marching west to Lusitania, and apparently intending to reach the ocean, he came through the ungarrisoned western passes of the Pyrenees into Gaul.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the year b.c. 208 the Romans learned through the Massiliotes that a strong Carthaginian army was approaching the Alps. The anxiety of the senate was very great, and men almost despaired of the safety of Italy. The last years of war had already shown, not indeed that there was a lack of energy or material for soldiers, but that the agricultural and financial resources of Roman Italy were dangerously diminished, and that the people were giving way to the strain. In b.c. 209 several of the cities of the Latin right had raised in Rome open opposition to new conscriptions and war taxes. A disturbance in Etruria appeared so dangerous that the province was occupied with two legions. And yet in the next year the strength of the Carthaginians in Italy was to be more than doubled. But the Romans prepared as vigorously as ever for the war, which now became a struggle for very existence. While doing everything to secure the favor of the gods by religious means, the senate, gathering all its power, put twenty-three legions in the field. For b.c. 208 two able generals were chosen as consuls, the brave Clau-

<sup>1</sup> The details of this march, and the time which Hasdrubal was obliged to give to it, are not definitely known, as the chronology of the Spanish campaigns, after the death of the two elder Scipios, is uncertain and confused.

dius Nero and Marcus Livius Salinator. The Romans could not prevent the march of Hasdrubal through Upper Italy. While Nero, with 40,000 men and 2500 horse, watched Hannibal in the south, near Canusium, Hasdrubal in the north crossed the Alps with 60,000 men, and, re-enforced by 8000 Ligurians, he roused the Celts of Upper Italy, in a body, to arms, and took the road to Ariminum. He expected to unite with Hannibal near Narnia in Umbria, and, together with his brother, to press forward against Rome. But his despatches fell into the hands of the Romans not far from Canusium. Nero now showed himself fully competent for his task. He left a part of his army in Apulia as a blind to Hannibal, hastened secretly northward with his best troops—7000 foot and 1000 horse—to Sena Gallica, where he found Livius with four legions. At all costs he must fight with Hasdrubal before Hannibal should follow. Hasdrubal, who had already come close to the Romans, was not ignorant of Nero's arrival; but, uncertain of the military situation in Lower Italy, he wished at first to avoid the consuls, and attempted to withdraw in the night; but, led astray by a faithless guide, he was attacked by the Romans as he was attempting to cross the river Metaurus. Though his troops were exhausted, he was obliged to fight, in a very unfavorable place, with the Metaurus in his rear. The Celts occupied an impregnable position on the left wing. The Ligurians and Spaniards, with ten elephants, were on the right. Against them the Roman left, under Livius, struggled long and without success, till at last Nero left his position opposite the Celts, and, passing round to Livius's extreme left, outflanked the Spaniards. The Celts took no advantage of the change in the battle; and Nero was enabled to lead a decisive charge against the Spaniards, and completely destroy the Carthaginian army. Hasdrubal himself sought and found his death in a furious cavalry charge. Italy was saved, the war decided in favor of Rome; and nothing remained for Hannibal but for four years longer, from his lair in Bruttium, by the terror of his name to restrain the Romans from using their full power.

During Hasdrubal's absence Scipio was left to drive the Carthaginians completely out of Spain (with the exception of Gades), during b.c. 207 and 206. He then returned to Italy to become a candidate for the consulate for the year b.c. 205. Carthage was making every effort to avert the impending destruction. From Macedonia nothing more was to be expected. The war in Greece dragged along, greatly to the injury of the welfare of the Hellenic peoples and cities, but without influence in deciding the conflict in Italy.

Meantime Scipio and his supporters resolutely pushed the project of carrying the war into Africa, and for the year B.C. 205 the conqueror of Spain was unanimously chosen as consul by the centuries. But many senators, headed by Fabius the Delayer, who did not approve of Scipio's previous campaigns, or of his system of warfare, so different from the old method, would not hear of the scheme before Hannibal was driven out of Italy. The young hero was preparing to obtain his object by a direct vote of the people committing to him the conduct of the war in Africa, when the tribunes proposed a compromise, and the senate granted his wish to a certain point. He received permission to go to Sicily and then to Africa. The fleet and army were first to be gathered in Sicily. The two disgraced legions of Cannae were given him, and he received the right of enrolling volunteers in Italy. Seven thousand Italian soldiers, especially Umbrians, Sabinians, Marsi, and Peligni, and many veterans of Marcellus, came to his standard.

The Carthaginian government had made every attempt to meet the danger of the Roman invasion. They succeeded in again joining to the Punic cause the powerful Numidian chieftain Syphax, by giving to him for a wife the daughter of Hasdrubal, Gisgo's son, the fair and high-spirited Sophonisba. He began a successful campaign against Masinissa, chief of the Massyli, who had been formerly betrothed to the same maiden. In the summer of B.C. 205 Hannibal's brother, Mago, leaving the Balearic Isles with 14,000 men, landed at Genoa, where he attempted to raise new Ligurian and Celtic companies against Rome. Nevertheless, in the late summer of B.C. 204 Scipio, with fifty-two ships-of-war and about 35,000 soldiers, ventured the passage from Lilybaeum to Africa, and landed on the 'Fair Promontory' (Cape Farina), on the west side of the Gulf of Carthage, not far from Utica, where he was joined by Masinissa with a few hundred horsemen. The Romans at once appeared against Utica, in order to make of it a base of operations against Carthage. The Carthaginians, under Hasdrubal, Gisgo's son, collected 20,000 foot, 6000 horse, and 140 elephants, and were joined by Syphax with 10,000 Numidian cavalry and 50,000 foot; while Scipio withdrew to an intrenched camp on a peninsula jutting out into the sea, where he had the fleet drawn up upon the shore, and where, during the winter of B.C. 204-3, he was watched by his opponents. But when, in the spring of B.C. 203, Syphax, wishing to mediate between Rome and Carthage, entered into negotiations, and consequently remitted his watchfulness, Scipio directed a night

attack upon the enemy's camp, under direction of his friend Laelius and the crafty Masinissa. They set the camp on fire, and Scipio himself fell upon the Africans, and scattered their great army. A new army of Numidians and Carthaginians, strengthened by Macedonian auxiliaries and Celtic mercenaries, was defeated on the 'great plains,' five days' march from Utica; and the Carthaginians did not venture to appear afterward in the open field. Later their fleet inflicted considerable damage upon the Roman ship-encampment; but in turn Masinissa, with the help of Laelius, took Syphax prisoner, and captured his capital, Cirta, with all its treasures and with Sophonisba; so that henceforth all Numidia stood with Rome against Carthage.

And now the voice of the peace-party was again heard in Carthage. Carthaginian envoys went to the camp of Scipio, who on his side proposed very moderate conditions. The Carthaginians were to withdraw from Spain, give up the realm of Syphax to Masinissa, pay to the Romans a contribution of 4000 talents, and reduce their fleet to twenty ships. A truce was at once concluded; and Hannibal and Mago were recalled from Italy by the Carthaginian senate, since so long as they remained on Roman soil it was not possible to expect a ratification of peace with Rome. Mago had advanced as far as the neighborhood of Mediolanum, but after a brave fight with a superior Roman force had been defeated and dangerously wounded. Retreating to Genoa, he died on the passage to Africa. Hannibal, full of grief and deepest rancor against a hostile fate, obeyed the command that recalled him from the fruitless labor of his life; and embarking his army at Croton, in the fall of B.C. 203, landed at Hadrumetum, or Leptis. Meantime the war-party in Carthage had again gained the upper hand, and trusting in the return of Hannibal broke the truce with Scipio. Thus once again the decisive appeal to arms was made. Both sides made vigorous preparations. Scipio received from Masinissa strong supports. Hannibal re-enforced his army with Ligurian, Celtie, Balearic, and African mercenaries, and also with Numidian horsemen, till he had 50,000 men and 80 elephants. At last advancing from Hadrumetum against the Roman army, Hannibal reached Zama (near the modern Jiamâa), five days' march from Carthage; and here, probably late in the summer of B.C. 202, when the Roman commander had advanced south-westerly from Utica, out of the valley of the Bagradas, the decisive battle was fought. Hannibal employed all his skill to oppose successfully upon his native soil the 34,500 Italian soldiers of Scipio, the tactical skill of their general, and the numerous squadrons of Masi-

nissa's cavalry. The eighty elephants in front were to make the first attack upon the Roman lines. On the wings were stationed the cavalry, dangerously weak, on the left the Numidian, on the right the Carthaginian. The infantry was arranged in three lines, the first consisting of 12,000 mercenaries of various peoples; the second of Carthaginian militia, Libyan recruits, and Macedonian auxiliaries; the third of Hannibal's veterans. Scipio (Fig. 35) on his side placed his Italian cavalry, under Laelius, opposite the Carthaginian horse, and Masinissa's squadrons opposite Hannibal's Numidians. To weaken the charge of the hostile elephants, the companies of the legions were

on this occasion placed so far apart that open lanes passed straight through the three Roman lines. Martial music and multitudes of missiles were to frighten the dangerous beasts. The charge of the elephants was thus without the effect which Hannibal hoped; but when the infantry of the two armies met, the conflict was obstinate in the extreme. The success of Hannibal's mercenaries against the first Roman lines was lost when the second line entered the fight; for the Carthaginian militia behaved so badly that the mercenaries believed that they were betrayed, and were thrown into confusion. Nothing then remained for Hannibal but to oppose his veterans to the charge of the Roman triarii. The remnant of the Roman army once destroyed at Cannae here strove for their revenge

FIG. 35.—Scipio Africanus. Ancient bronze bust. (Naples.)

on Hannibal's last veterans. But only then did victory decide for Scipio, when the masses of Numidian cavalry with the horsemen of Laelius took their opponents in the rear, pressing down the scale, as they did at Cannae, but this time against Carthage. Twenty thousand of Hannibal's soldiers fell, as many were captured. Hannibal himself escaped with a few hundred horsemen from this first and only, but complete, overthrow of his heroic life, to Hadrumetum, where the fragments of his army gathered. From the battle-field Scipio marched to the neighborhood of Carthage, while the fleet appeared on the water-side. After another Numidian army had been driven off, Hannibal



himself in the city earnestly pressed for peace, in order to save for Carthage its existence as a state and its future. The new conditions of Scipio were much harder than the earlier. The Carthaginians must give up all their ships but ten, and never increase their fleet. The contributions were raised to 10,000 talents, which were to be paid within fifty years. On the other hand, Carthage retained its autonomy and its African territory, but only under the fatal condition that the Carthaginians were never to carry on war outside of Africa, and in Africa only with the consent of the Romans; and, further, that they were to restore to Masinissa all the land which he and which his forefathers had possessed. These conditions were ratified by the senate and the comitia of the tribes in March b.c. 201. The political importance of the Carthaginian state was forever destroyed, and Rome was now uncontestedly the dominant power of the western world.



## PART V. FROM ZAMA TO NUMANTIA.

(B.C. 201-133.)

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### CHAPTER X.

#### WARS OF THE ROMANS WITH MACEDONIA AND SYRIA.

ROME and Italy paid a heavy price for the deliverance from the Carthaginians. While southern Italy had suffered most severely, all parts of the peninsula, even where the operations of the armies had been only temporary, showed an appalling loss of life and property. It is estimated that in those terrible years a million Italians perished by the sword, by hunger, and by pestilence; the number of Roman citizens sank from 273,000 in b.c. 220 to 214,000 in b.c. 204, and the moral deterioration in both city and country was equally marked. It became the duty of the ruling classes in the state to find the means of healing the wounds left by the war, and to provide for the future, but they proved unequal to the task; and changes took place in the social life of Romans and Italians, which, in spite of the vast development of external power, were fraught with danger to the republic. The work of reconstruction was interrupted by conflicts which arose out of the war, and which called the armies away to the Po, to Spain, and to the Greek countries of the East. The efforts of the senate to raise up again the peasantry which had been ruined by the war were inadequate, and were besides neutralized by the changes in agricultural conditions and the infliction of crushing penalties on such allies as had wavered. A few Italiote cities (like Naples, Nola, and Rhegium), which had unflinchingly held to Rome, retained their former position; the rest of southern Italy and part of Etruria now learned that the name ‘ally’ only veiled a condition of subjection. Great tracts of land, especially in Lucania and Apulia, were added to the public domain,

and, instead of being assigned to settlers, were ‘occupied’ by Roman nobles.

And now the Roman farmer was brought into ruinous competition with the products of large plantations, worked by slave labor. Capitalists in Rome leased or bought great estates in the provinces, at first in Sicily, on which they raised grain and cattle by the help of slaves, on so extensive a scale and at so low a cost as permanently to affect prices in Italy. The senate, by adopting the system of supplying the populace of the city with food at a nominal price, and of providing the armies in the field with foreign grain, helped in rapidly and effectively




FIG. 36.—Map of Rome under the Republic.

closing to the small farmer his only market. The larger land-owners could and did save themselves by using the slave system in Italy, for slaves could be easily acquired in foreign markets; and from the increasing wars, they also helped to diminish the class of free peasants, by buying up the farms of such as could not recover from the losses of the war, and of those whom long service in the army had disinclined to a farmer’s life. Free labor tended to disappear; while the introduction of large numbers of slaves, of different races, brought with it the constant fear of insurrection, changed the character of the former relation between master and servant, and led to nameless cruelties. It is

from this time that, regardless of the fidelity and devotion of most of their allies, the Romans begin to show an exclusive spirit towards the Italians, and to refuse to admit them to citizenship. For long years after 188 B.C. no new members were added to the Roman body politic; while the increased and disproportionate demands in levies and materials of war, and the haughty demeanor of the Romans, estranged and rendered disaffected the best elements among the Italians.

The great events of this period, and the increasing influence of Hellenic culture and literature, gave rise to a Roman Literature. The annalist Quintus Fabius Pictor was the first to give a connected account of the history of Rome from the earliest times to the close of the war (after B.C. 201), which he wrote in Greek. Two men of inferior social position told the history of Rome in their mother tongue. One, the first Roman poet, was Cnaeus Naevius (B.C. 264–191), born probably in a Latin community in Campania, who wrote (perhaps in B.C. 204) a history of the city in verse, which in a lively and simple style dealt particularly with the First Punic War. He also attempted to create a Roman national comedy by infusing a Roman spirit into Greek forms, and tried to adapt to tragic models subjects taken from Roman history. The other, Quintus Ennius (B.C. 239–169), a man of Messapian descent, from Rudiae, and of Grecian training, moved to Rome in his thirty-fifth year, and there supported himself partly as schoolmaster, partly as poet, receiving citizenship in B.C. 184, and was greatly aided by the patronage of the Roman nobles. His poetical chronicle, in eighteen books, came down to 177 B.C., and in the last thirteen books treated of the time after Pyrrhus. It was written about B.C. 173, in hexameter verse, and entirely in the Grecian spirit. He was equally successful in imitations of the Greek tragedies, and in plays drawn from Roman historical subjects.

The Romans were not long permitted to enjoy the blessings of peace. The senate soon found out that the government of a conquering state cannot limit its development at its pleasure, and that a great power cannot, without injury, remain indifferent to events taking place beyond its borders. The experience of seventeen years had taught the Romans how dangerous a single man like Hannibal could be, and this remembrance seems to have directed the foreign policy of the senate from Zama to the destruction of Carthage. They never forgot with what allies the great Carthaginian had hoped to overthrow them; and after Zama, the senate directed its attention to them. It was in every event desirable to secure at once and permanently Upper Italy. To give up Spain was impossible; for the Carthaginians might some day again

gain a footing there; and king Philip V., of Macedonia, by his political folly, brought the storm down upon his head much sooner than the Romans themselves wished.

The new conflicts first broke out in the country of the Celts, who now exhibited an energy which they had failed to show during the Hannibalic war. The attempt of the Romans to secure Cremona and Placentia against the Boii, in b.c. 201, caused all the Celts of Upper Italy, including the Cenomani, to rise in arms. The Romans were embarrassed at the same time by the outbreak of the Macedonian and Spanish wars, so that the Insubres were not actually subdued till b.c. 196, and the Boii not till b.c. 191. The Cenomani and Insubres were required to recognize the Roman supremacy, but kept their old national forms without expectation of Roman citizenship, notwithstanding they became rapidly Romanized; and on them was laid the task of defending the Alpine passes, to prevent the coming of new Celts from the provinces beyond the Alps. The Boii were obliged to give up to the Romans the strip of high land at the foot of the Apennines, about 150 miles long, from Ariminum to Placentia; and the district as far as the Po was so fully colonized that the great river was long the ethnographic boundary. For this purpose were established the military colony of Bononia (b.c. 189), with the Latin right, the colonies of Roman citizens at Potentia, and Pisaurum (Pesaro, b.c. 184), and Parma (b.c. 183). In b.c. 187 M. Aemilius Lepidus extended the old Via Flaminia to Placentia; and the district crossed by this ‘Via Aemilia’ is to-day called ‘Emilia.’ Arretium and Bononia were united by a road built over the Apennines. In b.c. 193 a tedious struggle, arising from the Celtic war, broke out with the wild races of Liguria. After their defeat, in b.c. 181, 47,000 Ligurians were collected, and transplanted as settlers to the neighborhood of Beneventum. The extreme north-east of the line of the Alps is open to easy approach. To protect this dangerous place the Romans, between b.c. 183 and 181, established the fortress of Aquileia, a colony with the Latin right, whose importance was often proved in subsequent centuries.

In Spain the inhabitants in the beginning imagined that the Romans had come to their country only to deliver them from the Carthaginian yoke. But when, in b.c. 197, the Roman possessions, consisting in the north of Catalonia and a part of Aragon, and in the south of Valencia, Murcia, Granada, Andalusia, were organized into two provinces, Hither and Farther Spain, separated by the mountains of Castro (Sierra Morena), a general insurrection of the Iberians broke out;

and the war continued for many years, repeatedly marked with disasters to the Romans. The frugal, chivalrous, and superstitious Spaniards showed themselves to be almost invincible in the defence of their fortresses, and in the onset of battle with the short two-edged broad-swords, which the Romans adopted from them, very dangerous to the legions. Moreover, the still unsubdued Celtiberian tribes in Castile, and the Lusitanians in Portugal and Estremadura (behind whom, in the northwest, lived the Cantabrians, the Asturians, and the Gallaeci), continually disturbed the border peoples who were subject to the Romans; so that the war penetrated into the inner part of the country. At that time Rome regularly kept in Spain an army of 40,000 men; and the impossibility of disbanding these legions after the old method, and the discontent of the soldiers who were held beyond their time, produced serious difficulties. The soldiers developed, in their conflict with the Spanish tribes, a cruelty, and the leaders a tendency to wanton violence and treachery, that demoralized the Romans, and aroused the deadly enmity of the natives.

The curbing of the insurrection of b.c. 197, in Hither Spain, was intrusted to the plebeian consul Marcus Porcius Cato (born at Tuseulum, b.c. 234), an experienced officer of the Second Punic War, and a man of simple and severe character, free from self-seeking. In b.c. 195 he defeated his opponents near Tarraco, and brought about the disarming of the Hither province. His ability, energy, and a happy alternation of mildness and severity, rendered it possible for him quickly to reduce both provinces to order, and give his attention to working the Spanish mines. Between b.c. 191 and 178 the Lusitanians and Celtiberians were suppressed; and Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, by his admirable military qualities, and his understanding of the Spanish nature, was able to induce many tribes to recognize the Roman supremacy.

Meanwhile the legions had crossed the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea, and the senate had taken part in Hellenic polities. The first great war upon Greeian soil was directed against King Philip V. of Macedon. In b.c. 205–204 King Ptolemy IV., Philopator, died, leaving Egypt to a boy of five, Ptolemy V., Epiphanes; and Philip made with Antiochus III., the Great, of Syria, a compact to seize the Egyptian possessions. The Syrian army was to conquer Cyprus, Syria, and, if possible, the Nile valley; while the Macedonians directed their efforts against the Thracian cities, the Cyclades, and the west coast of Asia Minor. The struggle between Antiochus and the Egyptians was long in doubt; but in b.c. 198 Antiochus gained a decisive victory at Mount Panium, near

the sources of the Jordan, and the Egyptians, unable to keep their Asiatic possessions, made a peace by which the young Ptolemy was allied to Antiochus's daughter, Cleopatra, with the hope of saving a portion at least of the Syrian provinces. Philip had drawn upon himself, by his method of conducting the war, the hostility of the smaller neighboring states, of the Greeks, and of the Roman senate. While his admirals won for him the Cyclades, Philip, in b.c. 201, with a strong fleet, began his conquests on the Thracian coasts, and by the capture and cruel destruction of several Greek cities, which had been under the protectorate of Egypt or of the Aetolian League, soon aroused general indignation. Stirred by his outrages in Ceos and Thasos, the Rhodians formed an alliance with Chios, Byzantium, and Attalus of Pergamum. The resulting war was carried on with varying success on the sea and on the west coasts of Asia Minor. But in the winter of b.c. 201–200 Philip, who now knew that he was threatened by the Romans, hastened back to Macedonia to avoid being cut off in Asia Minor.

The Roman senate had little desire to become involved in complications with the Greeks. But their long and ostentatious champion-  
ship of Hellenic interests, the clearly wanton outrages of Philip against the Greek cities, their old relations with Alexandria, Pergamum, and Rhodes, and finally their dislike of any increase of the Macedonian power, made it advisable to consider the chances of a war with Philip; he was, at all costs, to be placed diplomatically and morally in the wrong. Therefore, at the call of the court of Alexandria, an embassy went to Egypt, headed by M. Aemilius Lepidus, who was to prevent Antiochus III., to whom Syria was given up, from taking part against Rome in case of war with Philip. Philip, in the spring of b.c. 200, had won the coast towns of southern Thrace as far as Sestos, and then proceeded to reduce Abydos, which, after a heroic resistance, was taken late in the summer. Before the city fell, Lepidus had set before the king the demands of the senate,—that he suspend attacks upon the Greek cities and upon Egypt, restore to the latter the districts taken away, and accept arbitration for the damage done to Pergamum and Rhodes. All this Philip refused, but without coming to a declaration of war. In September, b.c. 201, the bigoted Athenians put to death, as despisers of religion, two young Acaeanians (a people on Philip's side), who at the Eleusinian mysteries had accidentally entered the temple of Demeter. The king in return, with an army of Acaeanians and Macedonians, wasted Attica with fire and sword. The Athenians,

who had long been allied with Rome, complained to the senate in March, b.c. 200, and thus afforded a convenient pretext for a declaration of war. In the fall of b.c. 200 the king returned from Abydos to Macedonia, and learned on the march that the Romans had crossed the Adriatic, that their fleet lay at Coreyra and their army near Apollonia. It was with difficulty that the senate overcame the opposition of the people in the centuries to the attack upon Macedonia; and when their consent was obtained, the senate sought to pacify the people by declaring that they should be spared as far as possible, and the chief burden put upon the allies. Six legions were raised, two of which were led by the consul P. Sulpicius Galba from Brundisium to Apollonia, in the fall, while a part of the fleet sailed to Piraeus. The senate reckoned on the assistance of the Rhodians and the Pergamenes, and of the many enemies of Philip on the Balkan peninsula; for the war was announced as undertaken to free Greece from the Macedonian yoke.

The Roman fleet sailed from the Piraeus against Chaleis, the chief arsenal of the king in Greece, devastating as it went. Philip hastened to the assistance of Chaleis. Failing in an attempt to take Athens by surprise, he vented his spite on the classic buildings in the suburbs, the Lyceum, the Cynosarges, which he wantonly destroyed, not even sparing the tombs. But he could not stir the Achaeans to aid him; for they were then fully occupied in a war with Nabis, tyrant of Sparta. This man, who cruelly avenged the Helots, and Perioeci, and the impoverished Spartans upon the old aristocracy, decimating them by murder and by judicial condemnation, robbing them of their wives, daughters, and lands, and employing the plunder to enrich new citizens of the base elements of all sorts that flocked to him,—this man strengthened the defences of Sparta, and made it the head of a piratical state, whose corsairs infested the neighboring waters, and whose fierce troops wasted the Peloponnesus. The Achaeans were strongly disinclined to unite with Philip in a war against the powerful Romans; for his outrages upon the Grecian cities had aroused their aversion, and they determined to remain neutral. The Romans, who again won over the Aetolians and some Epirote chieftains, began a vigorous campaign in the spring of b.c. 199. But neither Galba nor his allies were able to obtain any permanent advantage. By the occupation of the pass of Aoës, between the mountains of Aeropus and Asmaus, the king, in b.c. 198, completely barred the passage of the new proconsul to Macedonia. Now appeared in the Roman camp the patrician consul of b.c. 198,

Titus Quintius Flamininus, a young man of not yet thirty years, an able general, a skilful diplomatist, and an enthusiastic admirer of Greece. He was enabled to turn Philip's position, and to force the king to retreat to the pass of Tempe. Flamininus, thinking to conclude the war in the following year, removed his winter quarters to Phocis, and here succeeded in gaining over the Achaeans, who, with the allied fleet, were to besiege Corinth. In b.c. 197 Flamininus, by occupying Thebes, forced the Boeotians to renounce Philip, so that only the Acaeanians still held to him. At last both sides completed their preparations; and Philip, with 26,000 men, advanced against Flamininus, who entered Thessaly from Phocis with about the same number. A cavalry skirmish near Scotussa, close to a ridge of hills called Cynocephalae, led to a general engagement, in which at first the right wing of the Macedonians gained a decided advantage; but the Roman legions, with the help of some elephants, broke through the left wing of the phalanx, and at last outflanked the right wing also. Philip was forced to retreat to Macedonia with the loss of 8000 killed and 5000 prisoners. At the same time he received unfavorable news from Acarnania, from Corinth, and from Caria, and losing his courage, determined to enter into negotiations with Flamininus, who had advanced to Larissa. At first he concluded a truce for four months, and then accepted the Roman conditions. The Roman general would not listen to the demand of the Aetolians that Macedonia be dismembered, as it was the bulwark of Greece against the northern barbarians, and wishing to conclude the war as speedily as possible, in order to prevent, under all circumstances, a union between Philip and Antiochus III., made the preliminaries easy for the king. In the spring of b.c. 196 ten delegates were sent by the senate, who, together with Flamininus, settled the new conditions of the Macedonian and Grecian world, in which the Roman supremacy was now acknowledged, as was shown by Rome's taking to herself the right of gold coinage. Philip paid a war tax of a thousand talents, and lost all his possessions in Greece, on the islands, in Asia Minor and Thrace, retaining undiminished his Macedonian inheritance. He was obliged to form an alliance with the Romans, and furnish them auxiliaries on demand; was to conclude no other alliances without their assent, was not to support their enemies or those of their confederates, and was himself to make no attack upon the confederates of Rome. All difficulties between him and the Roman allies were to be settled by arbitration.

In respect to Greece, the sympathy of the Romans for Hellenic cul-

ture, art, and literature, and the policy of the senate, seemed to call simply for the emancipation of the Greek states. Yet there were statesmen in Rome who believed it better for the assurance of the predominance of Rome in that country, and for the protection of the Greek sea-coasts against attack by Antiochus, to leave behind a strong force, or at least to keep Italian troops in the fortresses of Demetrias, Chaleis, and Corinth, ‘the three fetters’ of Hellas, hitherto in the possession of Philip. The relations with Antiochus III. were becoming threatening. The ‘great king’ had not indeed aided the Macedonians; but he was on the point of seizing the coast provinces of Asia Minor, in order to reach the ancient boundary of the Seleucid empire. In b.c. 196 he crossed the Hellespont, and took possession of the Chersonese, with Lysimachia, and Sestos, paying no attention to the protest of the Romans. Nevertheless, Flamininus, counting on the abiding gratitude of the Greeks, whom he had freed, held to his purpose of retaining the three fortresses only temporarily in Roman hands, and at the Isthmian games of the year b.c. 196 announced to the assembled Greeks that the senate declared all races and cities which had been under the Macedonian rule free and independent.

Great was the enthusiasm of the sanguine Greeks; but the happy times which they, and Romans like Flamininus, had hoped would follow this step, did not come. Without doubt the Romans honestly intended Greece to be wholly free; but naturally hoped that the Greeks, in the enjoyment of an independence really under the kindly protectorate of the senate, would always be the natural allies of the Romans, and under no circumstances join a party against Rome. But the war left a serious variance between the Romans and the Aetolians, to whom had been granted only a moderate part of the newly ‘freed’ districts, and who had been forbidden to pass the Othrys mountains, while the Achaeans were decidedly more favored. The delivered Greeks, among whom the Boeotians manifested a persistent hatred of Rome, no longer possessed the strength to govern themselves, and for the most part, in addition to the exhaustion of their land and their moral degeneracy, were hopelessly torn by party strifes. The result was, that when the Romans came to know fully the evil qualities of Grecian character, which was at once cruel and faithless, dissolute and grasping, they were ready to adopt ruthless measures. In all parts of Greece, excepting Aetolia, two parties arose,—the Roman, consisting mainly of the aristocracy and the timocracy of the country, and the democratic, which was commonly identified with the populace, and which was always ready with foreign help to be rid of its Roman deliverers.

Flamininus had attempted to compose even the smallest difficulties in Greece. A dispute between the Romans and the double-faced Nabis led, in 195 B.C., to a war against Sparta. Fifty thousand Romans, Macedonians, Greeks, Rhodians, and Pergamenes invaded Laconia, and forced Nabis, after a part of Sparta had been taken by storm, to surrender. His territory was restricted to Sparta and its domain, and his fleet to two open barks. The Laconian cities of the Perioeci were separated from Sparta, and as 'free Laconians' put under the protection of the Achaeans. Then, in the spring of B.C. 194, Flamininus evacuated the Grecian fortresses, and returned to Italy, after the Greeks, at his request, had freed by state purchase all the Romans who had been sold in Greece as slaves during the Second Punic War.

The evacuation of the Grecian fortresses was a hazardous step; for the relations of the senate to Antiochus III. were becoming strained, and in 195 Hannibal had appeared in Ephesus. After the peace, Hannibal, at the head of one of the high offices of the Carthaginian state, probably as suffete, with the help of the commons, had done away with the life tenure of the members of the judicial senate, had made the constitution more democratic, and had arranged the finances so excellently, by putting a stop to numerous abuses and frauds, that the tribute to Rome could be paid without levying extraordinary taxes. His Carthaginian enemies denounced him at Rome for secret compacts with the enemies of the Roman state. The senate, which had a lasting fear of the great Carthaginian, acted on the warning. A Roman embassy appeared in Carthage; and Hannibal, knowing that his surrender would be demanded, secretly escaped to Ephesus, where he gave to Antiochus III. excellent counsel in regard to a war with Italy. A diplomatic rupture with Rome soon followed. The senate, chiefly at the advice of Flamininus, proposed a scheme whereby Antiochus should either give up his possessions in Thrace, and restrict himself to Asia, or, if he wished to retain Thrace, should permit the Romans to exercise their protectorate over their Asiatic allies. After long negotiations no agreement was reached, and in B.C. 192 Rome and Antiochus had both decided for war.

The struggle began in Greece, through the fault of the Aetolians, who had everywhere agitated against the Romans, and had labored to induce the Syrian king to come at once to Greece, where they were gaining allies for him. In their folly they deceived themselves and Antiochus (Fig. 37) about the temper of the Greeks, of whom many were discontented, and inclined to inveigh against the Romans, but had

no desire to take up arms for Antiochus. Nabis was persuaded to an overhasty move, and was soon defeated by the Achaeans under Philopoemen. Sparta, however, after Nabis had been killed and the Aetolian garrison turned out, was persuaded to enter the Achaean league. Flamininus, who again appeared in Greece as the political agent of the Romans, could not prevent Damocritus, the president of the Aetolian League, from inducing his countrymen to summon Antiochus in due form to deliver Greece.

The Aetolians, after taking Demetrias by surprise, urged the king to speedy action. Their envoy not only completely deceived Antiochus about the condition of affairs in Greece, but also helped the courtiers, who were jealous of Hannibal, to supplant that great man in the confidence of the king. The ‘great’ Antiochus was in reality a third-rate man, incapable of appreciating the importance of the Carthaginian and his plans. In jealous vanity he abandoned the plan of uniting all the enemies of Rome, from the Tagus to the Halys, and of committing the fleet to Hannibal for a great descent upon Italy, and preferred to begin the struggle in Greece, where no decisive result could possibly be attained.

Then he made mistake after mistake. With entirely insufficient preparation, but with foolish confidence in his Greek allies, he advanced, in October, b.c. 192, from the Hellespont, with only 100 ships of war, 10,000 infantry, 500 horse, and six elephants, to Pteleum, near Demetrias. He soon learned that his hopes of Grecian support were very deceptive; only the Boeotians, Athamanes, Eleans, and Messenians sympathized with the Aetolians, while the Achaeans remained true to the Romans. Toward the end of November, however, he secured Chaleis. Hannibal now urgently advised him to gain the help of Philip, and drawing at once all reserves from Asia to Greece, to press forward to Italy. But instead of this, Antiochus mortally insulted Philip, who had been already tempted by Rome with the promise that he might keep all the territory won from the Aetolians and their allies, and who immediately joined the Romans against the Syrian king.

By the fall of b.c. 192 Antiochus had conquered a large part of Thessaly; but he then passed the winter at Chaleis in inaction. As the spring approached, he led his troops toward Acaania, by way of Chaeronea, without having received any re-enforcement from Asia,



FIG. 37.—Coin with portrait of Antiochus III., the Great. (From Duruy.)

when he learned that King Philip was near Larissa with from 40,000 to 50,000 men. Antiochus was thoughtless enough to try to hold the intrenched pass of Thermopylae. But the Aetolians allowed themselves to be surprised, and his position was quickly and disgracefully lost. He escaped with only 500 men to Chalcis, and thence retired in all haste to Ephesus. In Greece, Chaleis soon surrendered to the Romans, and Demetrias to King Philip, who now acquired possession of all the Thessalian towns that had gone over to Antiochus, and all the Aetolian border-land.

The war in Europe would now have been abandoned, had the Aetolians listened to the advice of Flamininus and at once made peace; but at the instigation of Syrian agents, and in a spirit of stubborn defiance, they continued it for two years more. It was interrupted by truces and fruitless negotiations, and became simply a succession of embittered sieges. The Roman fleet opened communication with Rhodes, and cleared the entrance to the Aegean Sea by a victory over the Syrian admiral Polyxenidas in the harbor of Cyssus. For the year b.c. 190 both parties made great preparations. While the Greeks in Asia Minor mostly joined the Roman side, the king collected a powerful land army, strengthened this fleet at Ephesus, and intrusted to Hannibal the formation of a second fleet in Lycia and Phoenicia. The war by sea, which opened quite early in b.c. 190, brought only disaster to Antiochus. One Roman fleet captured Sestos; while another, sent southward to keep in check the ships of Hannibal, gained a victory over him near Side in Pamphylia, by superior nautical skill, and prevented him from joining Polyxenidas, who toward the last of August, 190 b.c. was again defeated by the Romans, off Cape Myonnesus. This was a heavy blow for Antiochus, who did not understand how to make an intelligent use even of his land forces. Instead of defending to the last the fortress of Lysimachia in the Chersonese and the passage over the Hellespont, the king, whose troops had spent the summer in wasting the kingdom of Pergamum, completely lost his head in consequence of the disaster to his fleet, and abandoned the Hellespont without resistance to the Roman fleet and the Roman army that was just arriving there. The Romans had intrusted the conduct of the war to the consul of the year b.c. 190, L. Cornelius Scipio, the insignificant brother of the victor of Zama; but his great brother Publius, now surnamed 'Africanus,' accompanied him as legate, and was the real leader of the army. The Scipios, on the march through Greece, granted to the Aetolians a truce of six months for negotiations in Rome; and then, aided throughout

by Philip V., marched to the Hellespont, which after the battle at Myonnesus they were able to cross without hindrance.

Antiochus was foolish enough, after the failure of his attempts to make peace, not to adopt a policy of defensive warfare, which from the extent of his realm would have been very injurious to the Romans, but to press at once for a decisive battle. This was fought late in the fall of B.C. 190, in the plain of the River Hermus, near Magnesia, while Publius Scipio lay sick. The 80,000 men of the king, including 12,000 horsemen, with their scythe chariots and their elephants, were defeated with little difficulty by scarcely half their number of Romans, Pergamenes, Achaeans, and Macedonians; the legions did not even enter the battle. The loss of the Asiatics is put at more than 50,000 in killed, prisoners, and fugitives. Antiochus hastened to make peace with Publius Scipio, and learned that the essential condition was the surrender of Asia Minor, except Cilicia. The task of definitely settling the peace, and of arranging the position of the lands between the Adriatic and the Taurus, was left to the senate in Rome, and to a senatorial commission to be sent to Asia, together with the consuls of the year B.C. 189. But it became necessary to take up arms again; for the Aetolians, at the false report of the overthrow of the Romans in Asia Minor, had renewed the conflict in the fall of B.C. 190. The consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, with Roman troops supported by Hellenic auxiliaries, by the capture of their last great fortress, Ambracia, broke their power. They were obliged to surrender unconditionally, and the political importance of their league was forever at an end. So much the more advantageous, however, was the war for the Achaeans, who, with the addition of Elis and Messenia to their league, now held the entire Peloponnesus. In Asia the Romans could not foresee that the loss of Asia Minor to the Syrian realm would annihilate its political future. The senate, in addition to the enormous war tax of 15,000 talents, obliged Antiochus to bind himself to begin no offensive wars against the states beyond the Halys, and in case of attack from them to take no territory in that direction; to surrender his war elephants, to cut down his war fleet to ten ships, and not to increase the number except in case of a defensive war; and never again to fly his war flag beyond the mouth of the Cilician Calycadnus. In this way the power of the Seleucidae was penned up behind the Cilician Taurus; and the dependent states in the north of their realm, Cappadocia and Armenia, were released from their former connection with Syria, and became independent. The provinces which the Romans had wrested from

the Syrian king were organized in such a manner that the former confederates of the senate developed into strong intermediate powers, which watched and held Syria in check, while restraining King Philip of Macedon, and also serving as a counterpoise to each other. The Grecian cities of Asia Minor, which had joined the Romans, were to be free as far as they had been at the time of the battle of Magnesia. The tribute only was to be continued which several cities had previously paid to Pergamum. The republic of Rhodes received the greater part of Caria and of Lycia, and King Eumenes II. of Pergamum the best part of the Asiatic spoil. The subjugation of the Celtie tribes in Galatia by the Romans, in B.C. 189, was especially advantageous to the states of Asia Minor, although the attack on them had no excuse, and was made merely for the sake of plunder.

## CHAPTER XI.

### COMPLETE SUBJECTION OF THE MACEDONIANS, CARTHAGINIANS, AND ACHAEANS.

ROME was now the controlling power, not only in the west, but in the Greek-speaking Orient. Its influence extended from Gades and the western boundary of Numidia to the Halys; neither the decaying power of the Seleucids, nor the more substantial but ill-managed realm of the Lagidae, could be really dangerous; yet the best period of the republic was already past. Beneath a brilliant




FIG. 38.—Entrance to the Tomb of the Scipios. Discovered in 1780 before the Porta Capena in Rome. The oldest inscriptions in the tomb date from the third century b.c. (From Reber.)

exterior were hidden elements of degeneracy,—the decay of ancient virtue and the corruption in morals, in industry, in foreign policy, and even in the military system.

The steadily increasing importance of the foreign relations of Rome brought the treatment of many grave questions of state into the hands of the more powerful families of the nobility, like the Scipios (Figs. 38, 39) and the Flaminini. These families, indeed, met with oppo-

sition on account of their policy, of the preference which some showed for Greecian culture, and of their inclination to innovations. The most relentless and energetic opponent of these men and tendencies was Cato, who, with all his defects, in his devotion to the old Roman ideals which a thorough education did not lessen, stands out as the foremost champion of the plebeians and the peasant democracy in this generation. He was from the first an opponent of Publius Scipio, a statesman whom he thoroughly disliked, and whose power in the state, beyond any known to earlier times, he with many of the old school regarded with distrust, and finally succeeded in overthrowing him. In b.c. 187 two of the tribunes demanded that the Scipios should render an account of the plunder of the Syrian war

and of certain taxes. In the large sums turned into the treasury some items had not been properly entered; and Scipio, who was probably not to blame, in deep irritation tore up the account-books in the senate. He was now accused before the people of having been bribed by Antiochus to grant too favorable a peace. This foolish charge was made on the anniversary of the battle of Zama, and Scipio easily escaped by calling upon




FIG. 39.—Tomb of the Scipios in Rome.  
Ground-plan. (From Reber.)

the people to follow him to the Capitol to offer thanks. The tribunes now ceased their attacks upon Publius, and with the open support of Cato arraigned the financial operations of his brother Lucius, who was condemned to pay a heavy fine; but the tribune Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, an opponent of the Scipios, and, like Cato, a vigorous defender of the people, interposed his veto against the arrest of a man under whose auspices a great war had been brought to a brilliant end. Publius, however, whose pride had received a mortal wound, withdrew from public life, and died in b.c. 183, in the fifty-second year of his age.

Cato, with equal harshness, strove against the weakening effects of Greecian influences. The new position of Rome, as the mistress of foreign nations, made a great change in the character of the people

unavoidable. The best fruits of Greek culture, appreciated by the few, could be introduced but slowly. What appeared at once was the effect of the contact of the Roman army with the vices of the corrupt East; the desire for luxury and display, the increase in the number of public feasts and orgies (among these the Saturnalia since b.c. 217); the growing pomp of festivals and games, in which now Greek athletes and the larger beasts of prey were employed; the sensuality and rapacity of soldiers and officers; and the demoralization of many noble families.<sup>1</sup>

Under such circumstances, in the year b.c. 184, Cato became censor. This stern and fearless man, a plain-spoken plebeian of biting wit, in his many sided ability as farmer, soldier, orator, and jurist, in his unwearied activity, his incorruptible honesty and patriotic unselfishness, in his frugality and personal dignity, the model of true Roman character, administered his office in a way that won him the surname of ‘Censorius,’ by which he is known to this day, and made the ‘strictness of Cato’ proverbial for all time. He was able, it is true, only for a time to restrain the pernicious luxury and prodigality, the tasteless accumulation of Oriental splendor, the gross extravagance of the table, the rage for gambling, and the shrinking from work,—evils which had gained too strong a hold in the capital; though many still retained the ancient virtues, while not averse to all change and all that came from Greece. Especially worthy of honor was the opposition of Cato to the dangerous striving of a part of the nobility to bring into direct subjection to the state great possessions east of the Adriatic, and to the immoral system that began to prevail, of looking only to the material advantage of the state, and of showing indifference to old allies, violence to doubtful friends, and cold-blooded cruelty to the conquered.

Rome's foreign policy at this period is far from attractive. A revival of the Carthaginian power was in every way to be prevented. The Numidian king Masinissa was, therefore, allowed to inflict every kind of oppression upon the city, and to justify it by a clause in the treaty which permitted him to demand back all that he or his forefathers had lost to Carthage. The article which forbade the Carthaginians to defend themselves by arms without the consent of Rome

<sup>1</sup> In b.c. 186 the discovery was made that a secret ‘cult of Bacchus,’ which had first entered Etruria from Greece, was spread over all Italy, that it gave rise to nightly gatherings and immorality of every kind, and also covered the worst crimes, such as perjury, falsification of wills, and murder. Numerous arrests and executions broke up the dissolute sect.

delivered them into the hands of the Roman commissions, who took care not to put an end to the persecutions of the Numidian. Their merchants found a new and worse enemy in the vulgar jealousy of the Roman traders against the ever-revived competition and the rapidly increasing wealth of the African centre of trade and manufactures. The enmity against Carthage did not die out with the death of Hannibal. The senate had demanded his surrender on concluding peace with Antiochus; but he escaped to the court of King Prusias of Bithynia, whom he assisted in a war against Eumenes II. of Pergamum. Eumenes called in the aid of the Romans; and Flamininus, their representative in Asia Minor, demanded from Prusias the surrender of the fugitive. He consented; and Hannibal, seeing no way of escape, put an end to his own life by poison, towards the end of B.C. 183 (probably in his sixty-seventh year). Still less excusable were the dealings of the senate with Philip V. of Macedon, after the downfall of the Seleucids. It had no intention of allowing him to attain a position of too great independence; and, instead of limiting him at once to a definite territory, it exasperated him by a series of diplomatic humiliations in which his gains in the war were taken from him piece by piece, and given to Eumenes II. and his Grecian neighbors, so that in B.C. 183 nothing remained to him beyond the boundaries of B.C. 196 except Demetrias. This inspired the most passionate hatred against Rome in Philip, who prepared with energy for a new conflict, but



FIG. 40.—COINS OF KING PERSEUS. (From Friedländer and v. Sallet.)

died in the midst of his preparations, leaving the carrying out of his plans to his son.

His heir, Perseus (Fig. 40), notwithstanding his deep dislike of the Romans, was neither so passionate nor so warlike as his father, and at first attempted only to strengthen the resources of his land, to collect a considerable treasure, to increase his army, and to accumulate military stores. Toward the Romans he showed entire friendliness, and sought to form alliances with the Bithynian and Syrian courts. It is probable that Perseus never definitely formed the plan of making war upon Rome. It is at least certain that the war which led to his downfall was brought about by his opponents, the Atta-

lids and those leaders in Rome who perceived that the Greeks had lost their dislike for the Macedonians, and that many regarded Perseus as the man who could free them from the burdens of Rome.


The relation of the Romans to Greece had changed decidedly for the worse since the late war. The strong hand which had broken the power of the Aetolians was at once feared and hated by the Greeks. As matters stood, Rome was the place where the fate of Greece was decided far more unmistakably than had ever been the capital of the Persian kings or of Alexander. This relation was galling to the Greeks, who looked on the Romans as half-barbarians, and on themselves as the heirs of a glorious history, the product of an old and universally admired civilization, and consequently overestimated their own importance. Moreover, Greece was then filled with fanatic factions, as confused as they were hopeless. Outside of Peloponnesus, the division between the Roman and the national parties was regularly a division between the classes holding property and the impoverished multitude. For the Achaeans the union of Peloponnesus had been disastrous, since in Sparta and in Messenia a fierce spirit of separation had been aroused, which produced incessant rebellions against the league, and gave the Romans constant pretexts for interference. Whether from indifference or from calculation, the Romans did not choose to make use of their authority to put an end to the evils that sapped the strength of the Achaean League. Apart from the question of oppression, the repeated diplomatic intervention, the half-measures and constant guardianship, were felt in Greece to be an increasing burden. In b.c. 189 Sparta broke away from the Achaeans, murdering many of their adherents, but was soon forced to surrender by an army under Philopoemen. The Achaeans demolished the fortifications of the city, transplanted to other places or sold into slavery the Helots whom Nabis had raised to citizenship, abolished the old discipline of Lyeurgus, and by the abuse of their victory compelled the Romans to interfere. They forced Sparta to remain a member of the league, though she was allowed to rebuild her fortifications, to retain her laws, and was freed from the criminal and political jurisdiction of the Achaeans. The Messenians also broke away from the league; and Philopoemen, then seventy years old, in trying to reduce them, was captured and murdered (b.c. 184). Messene surrendered in b.c. 183, and this time the Achaeans made a very temperate use of their victory. But their position at Rome became steadily worse; for Rome was coming to look on her position in Greece as an actual hegemony, and aided the

anti-national elements, who found a leader in Callicrates of Leontium. This man, who to great diplomatic skill joined insatiable avarice, proposed to acquire the chief authority in the Peloponnesus by a surrender to Rome of all the interests of the Achaean League. As envoy of the league in Rome, he gave the senate his own version of the relations of the parties in the Peloponnesus, showed how to break the power of the democratic leaders, and strengthen the oligarchy; and then with Roman support built up a party to secure his own predominance in the league, and the reduction of the Achaeans to an ‘unequal alliance.’ A national party, composed of very respectable elements, however, still existed, with leaders like Polybius. Even in the Peloponnesus there grew up a strong sympathy for Macedonia; so that the Achaeans did not hesitate to insult the chief enemy of Perseus and zealous friend of the Romans, King Eumenes II., the celebrated fosterer of art,<sup>1</sup> although, as an ardent Philhellene, he had shown kindness and liberality to the league.

The reports concerning Macedonia and the true feeling in Greece brought by Roman agents were corroborated by a report on the policy and military preparations of Perseus, which Eumenes delivered in person to a secret session of the senate in Rome in b.c. 172. War was decided upon, and diplomaey was to prepare the way; a commission presented to the king a long list of complaints, which were intended to bring about a breach. In the diplomatic preliminaries Perseus appeared in a very manly light, yet he soon showed that he was not the hero that his supporters believed him. The Romans had assembled at Brundisium only fifty ships of war and 18,000 men, and in the fall of b.c. 172 transported the advance guard to Apollonia, so that the king, with the support of Cotys, the allied prince of the Odrysae, had plenty of time to overrun all the country south of Olympus, to break up everywhere the Roman party, to bring together the Greeks, and to annihilate the Roman troops in Illyria. But Perseus never dreamed of striking the first blow, and is said to have lost advantages which money might have obtained, through avarice. He looked on while Roman

<sup>1</sup> A brilliant school of sculpture developed in Pergamum under the Attalids, which found in the victories of King Attalus I. over the Celts subjects for its artistic creations. Its most brilliant production is a work of the time of King Eumenes II., a magnificent altar (PLATE IX.) of Zeus, erected on the acropolis of his capital. Its bas-reliefs are distinguished for the expression of dramatic passion, for remarkable life-like action, and for great imagination and at the same time originality of treatment. The surface of the reliefs is 400 feet long and 7.5 feet high, and with the renowned representation of the conflict of the giants (PLATES X. and XI.) extends around the base of the altar.

PLATE IX.



On the Acropolis of Pergamum. (Drawn by Wilberg in 1879 during the excavations.)


Byzantine Wall.

Foundations of the Temple of Athena.

Northwest corner of the Altar.




PLATE X.



Sculptures from the Great Altar of Pergamum. Athena contending with the Giants. (Berlin.)



PLATE XI.



Sculptures from the Great Altar of Pergamum. Hecate contending with the Giants. (Berlin.)



diplomacy everywhere isolated him, and was even persuaded by his guest-friend, the Roman agent Q. Marcius Philippus, who wished to gain time, to send another embassy to Rome. The senate dismissed the messengers at once; and the king was forced to rely for defence upon his sturdy people, his well-disciplined army of 43,000 men, and the alliance with Cotys and other barbarian peoples. The conduct of the war by the Romans was not worthy of their reputation; but while Perseus showed that he could win battles, he did not understand how to take advantage of his successes: he clearly dreaded a decisive victory, and hoped after each success for a speedy peace.

The war began in the spring of B.C. 171. A large detachment was sent to the waters of Boeotia; and the incompetent consul, P. Licinius Crassus, with 40,000 Italian soldiers and 10,000 auxiliaries, was able to advance without opposition from Apollonia to Thessaly. When Crassus reached the neighborhood of Larissa, he found that the king had intrenched the pass of Tempe, and had drawn up his army on the declivity of Ossa. The first battle was fought on the east bank of the Peneus, near the hill Callicinus, where Perseus and Cotys, with their excellent cavalry and light-armed troops, gained a brilliant victory. Perseus at once proposed peace on the basis of the compact of the year B.C. 196, but was answered with a demand for unconditional surrender. For a long time fortune turned her back upon the Romans, owing to the incompetence of their generals, who allowed the discipline of the troops to decline shamefully. Crassus went into winter quarters in Thessaly and Boeotia sooner than was necessary, and ascribed his defeat to the cowardice of the Aetolians. Many allied communities in Asia Minor and Greece, including Athens, were almost ruined by extortionate contributions for the Romans; and the ferment in Greece might have become dangerous to Rome, had Perseus been a man like Antigonus Doson. The Epirotes rose against the Romans; and as the new Roman commanders also showed their incapacity, Perseus, in the winter of B.C. 170–169 ventured an attack, drove the Romans from Illyria, and advanced to Aetolia. In B.C. 169 the crafty diplomat, Q. Marcius Philippus, took the command, and by a bold move succeeded with great difficulty in breaking out of Thessaly by a side pass on Olympus, and forcing his way into the southern corner of Macedonia, where Perseus blocked his advance. At the beginning of B.C. 168 the Illyrian chief of Scodra came over to Perseus, which improved the chances of the king. And the Rhodians, and perhaps even Eumenes II., at his suggestion, at-

tempted to bring about an adjustment with Rome, the more earnestly that Marcius treacherously hinted that the Romans might entertain proposals. Accordingly, in b.c. 168, they despatched envoys to Pella and to the Romans, and urged the combatants to come to a settlement; whether they threatened to take part against the side which should refuse peace cannot be determined. The senate now saw that Rome's authority must be strongly asserted. For the year b.c. 168 there was placed as *consul* at the head of the largely re-enforced army L. Aemilius Paulus, the brave and sensible son of him who fell at Cannae, a soldier of proved merit in many difficult campaigns in Spain and Liguria, a man of the highest probity, and of a rare disinterestedness, who at sixty retained his soldierly vigor, and though imbued with Grecian learning, and the close friend of the Fabii and the Scipios, was on good terms with Cato also. The army in Illyria within thirty days completely scattered the enemy. The war against Perseus was not so quickly decided. With a vigorous hand Aemilius first restored the discipline of his troops, which numbered 50,000 foot and 2000 horse, and then advanced against Perseus, who had withdrawn to the fortress of Pydna, near which the decisive battle was fought, on the 22d of June, b.c. 168. The charge of the phalanx seemed at first irresistible; but when, in its progress over the uneven ground, its close ranks were broken, Aemilius sent the elephants and single companies of the Romans into the gaps, and at the same time outflanked the Macedonians. Their charge was brought to a stand, the king's cavalry on the wings gave way, and carried with them Perseus, who had been wounded; and then the heavy infantry was overwhelmed. This battle, which lasted but an hour, ended the war, and decided the fate of the eastern world for a long time to come. Perseus found no place of rest or safety, and fled to Samothrace, only to surrender at last without conditions.

Though Cato was able to prevent its being turned into a new province, Macedonia, with its thoroughly monarchical tendencies, was to be made harmless, and therefore was to be 'freed,' that is, was to be deprived of a king and dismembered. All the prominent servants, officials, and officers of the Antigonidae, with their adult sons, were transported to Italy, and forbidden to return home on pain of death. 'Free' Macedonia was then divided into four republics,—Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia,—which were isolated from one another, so that intermarriage was not allowed between them, and no citizen of one could acquire land in another,—a system unendurable, and practically impossible to the people. The country was disarmed, except

that garrisons were retained on the boundaries threatened by the wild barbarians.

With like severity and cruelty were the Greeks punished who had taken part in the war, with the exception of the Athenians. They were to learn that after Pydna nothing remained between the Adriatic and the Halys to which Rome would show indulgence. The senate wished first to put an end to the disturbing national party in all the districts of Greece, and the work was energetically pressed. The most dreadful punishment was visited upon the revolted tribes in Epirus. In revenge for their invasion of Italy under Pyrrhus, and to satisfy the rapacity of the Italian soldiers, Aemilius Paulus was obliged, by special command of the senate, though sorely against his will, to give over the seventy Epirote towns which had rebelled to be sacked; their walls were razed, and 150,000 Epirotes were sold as slaves. Similar deeds of violence were committed with the help of the oligarchies in many places of Greece, especially in Aetolia. The commission of ten senators established a kind of inquisition into the sentiments of the Greeks, and with the help of the Roman party throughout Hellas, caused the prosecution of such persons as were compromised by the captured papers of Perseus, or were known to be opposed to the Romans or their friends, and transported them beyond the sea to the Italian cities, where some were kept in prison, and others confined to particular towns. This treatment fell most heavily upon the Achaean League, which had taken no action against Rome in the war, but had shown sympathy for the Macedonian cause, and had driven from power the party of Callierates. The commission, seeking for a pretext to root out the national party, finally, at the suggestion of Callierates, declared that all Achaeans who had been in office during the war were suspected of secret negotiations with Perseus. In reply, one of the worthiest of these men said, before the Romans and the assembly of the league, that he knew that he was free from all guilt, and was ready to defend his actions before the assembly, or even before the Roman court. The commissioners at once took advantage of this rash speech, and had Callierates and his associates note the names of a thousand prominent men of the national and democratic party, who were in a body transported to Italy, and were there treated by the senate as persons condemned by their people, and distributed among the cities of Etruria, where an attempt to escape was punished with death. The most important among them was Polybius, the son of Lyeortas, who was born at Megalopolis, between B.C. 214 and 204, and who had served as hip-

parch in the year b.c. 169. The Rhodians were obliged to atone for doubting the strength of Rome. When their envoys appeared in Rome, as unbidden and perhaps menacing mediators, and the majority of the senate, in ignorance of the intrigues of Marcius, received them very coldly, they learned that a battle had been fought at Pydna. They then sought in vain to appease the Romans by a submissive demeanor and by congratulations on their great victory, and soon perceived that a party in the senate was pressing for a declaration of war against Rhodes. The party then dominant in the island was at once overthrown; but though the proposal to declare war was defeated by the intelligent opposition of Cato and the veto of several tribunes, the prosperity of Rhodes was ruined. Its possessions on the mainland were taken away, and the island of Delos declared a free port, so that the chief income of the Rhodians, the port duties, sank within four years from a million drachmae a year to 150,000, and Rhodes in b.c. 164, by an ‘alliance,’ was bound fast to Roman policy. And finally the old favorite of the Romans, Eumenes II., of Pergamum, was treated outrageously after the fall of Perseus. Only his cold reserve and extreme sagacity made it possible for him to keep in power till his death in b.c. 159, and to transmit his kingdom to his brother, Attalus II., Philadelphus, who for twenty-one years ruled as regent during the minority of his nephews. Athens alone of the Greek states preserved the favor of the Romans. It received the territory of Haliartus and the islands of Delos and Lemnos. In return the Athenians, following the example set by Smyrna in b.c. 195, built in their city a temple to *Dea Roma*, the personified fortune of Rome.

Within twenty years after the downfall of the Antigonids all the states with which the Romans had been at war, except Syria and Numidia, became immediate members of their realm. This was the result partly of the steadily growing lust of conquest among the Romans, and partly of the inherent weakness of the conditions created in the lands beyond the Adriatic. The most far-seeing statesmen of this epoch looked with anxiety to a time when the legions should be obliged to defend the Macedonian frontier on the north, and to engage in endless feuds with the wild races between the Balkans and the Danube, and when the greed of officials, capitalists, and soldiers could no longer be restrained from seizing even on Asia. They therefore sought to establish a system which in form recognized the ‘freedom and independence’ of the allied states, and yet by visitations of senatorial commissions made the Roman protectorate at all times effective. These unnatural

conditions produced, about the middle of the century, another general war in all the lands between the ocean and the Aegean Sea. The Macedonians chafed under the ‘free’ regulations forced upon them, which they disliked, and which subjected them to great material difficulties, and after seventeen years were ready for insurrection. Several Hellenic states, particularly Epirus, Aearmania, Aetolia, and Boeotia, by the continued oppression of individual rulers, or of a ruthless and rapacious oligarchy, were kept in a constant state of anarchy and deadly local feuds; while the Achaeans were united in a hatred as passionate as it was helpless, which became the more bitter as the senate paid no attention to their repeated requests for the trial of the exiles, and their return. When at last death had reduced the thousand to three hundred, the influence of the Aemilian house led Cato to raise his powerful voice for their release. About b.c. 150, on the occasion of another demand of the Achaeans, Cato declared, “We act as if we had nothing better to do than to quarrel the livelong day over the question whether a few superannuated Greeks are to be buried by our or by Aetolian grave diggers,” and with his speech ended the long strife in the senate in favor of the Greeks, who were allowed to go home. But this tardy mercy of the senate did no good, and, contrary to Roman expectation, kindled the last uprising of the Greeks.

The disturbances in Macedonia and Greece broke out at a time when the legions were entangled in Spain and Africa in wars of unwonted difficulty. Since b.c. 154, tedious conflicts had raged in Spain, which stained the name and the military honor of the Romans. The Lusitanians, in northern Estremadura and about Salamanca, first became dangerous to the Romans; and in b.c. 153, after a great victory over the governor of the ‘farther’ province, roused to arms a part of the Celtiberians. The consul of the year b.c. 153, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, with 30,000 men and 10 elephants, drove these opponents back to the strong town of Numantia, 4300 feet above the sea (near the sources of the Duero), before whose walls he was defeated. In the following year his successor, M. Claudius Marcellus, by his generalship and his wisdom in treating the Spaniards, was able to give the war a favorable turn, to arrange before Numantia a satisfactory peace with the Celtiberians, upon the basis of the former compact with Sempronius, and to bring the southern province into order. When, however, his successor, Lueullus, appeared, and learned to his extreme vexation that peace had already been concluded, he attacked without provocation the Vaccaei, a peaceful tribe; and having committed the most

frightful cruelties, turned to the farther province, and united with the praetor, Galba (a man of similar stamp, who had shortly before been defeated by the Lusitanians), with the intention of making a vigorous campaign against this people. Galba persuaded the leaders of these Lusitanian tribes to allow themselves to be transferred from the right bank of the Tagus to fertile districts where he would assign them lands so that they need not live by plunder. Seven thousand warriors appeared before him, whom he persuaded to lay aside their arms, and then caused some to be carried away by his army as slaves, and others to be cut in pieces. But few escaped this infamous massacre, among them the brave Viriathus, the future avenger of his people. The Roman comitia took upon themselves this heavy burden of shame by acquitting Galba, who was fiercely arraigned by two tribunes, and by the aged Cato, then in his eighty-fifth year.

The vengeance of the Lusitanians fell upon the Romans at a moment when every subject land, from Carthage to Macedonia, was in revolt. The long reign of the Numidian king Masinissa extended to his ninetieth year (B.C. 149). During this period he had decidedly advanced the civilization of his people; had accustomed them to agriculture, had trained them in military service, and made them more accessible to Carthaginian culture, but he also had drawn a line round Carthage on the land side, and had extended his realm from the borders of Mauretania to those of Cyrenaica, with the co-operation of Roman commissions steadily diminishing the Punic territory. The last of these conflicts, in B.C. 157, led to the catastrophe of the African capital. Cato, then at the head of a Roman commission, observed with deep displeasure the new prosperity to which Carthage had risen. It awoke in him the remembrance of the horrors of the Hannibalic war, renewed the former deadly hatred of Carthage, which triumphed over all other considerations, and even over the fact that the destruction of Carthage, for which he henceforth strove with all his might, must inevitably give the preponderance in Rome to those baser elements which he for years had resisted. The old censor, a most powerful and convincing orator, in his later years won new honors. He had written a book on Roman agriculture, and for years was busied with his *Origines*, a Latin history of the Roman people to his own time, including a careful consideration of the other Italian cities, the first historical work in Latin prose. The idea, which he never ceased to preach, that Carthage must be blotted from the earth, naturally found great acceptance in Rome. All who shared his hatred, and all who

looked on Carthage with jealousy or greed, longed for the day when the death sentence should be pronounced. Others feared that Masinissa might win the mighty city for himself. The harsh system by which, from their entering Sicily to the migrations of the Germans, the Romans tolerated on their borders no state that could withstand them in arms, and the difficulty of governing a province which should include a power such as Carthage still was, left them a choice only between completely destroying the old Phoenician state, and continuing the existing state of affairs. The more temperate party, led by Scipio Nasica, which feared the unbridled license of the people as soon as the last state should disappear which still inspired the Romans with some apprehension, was able to delay the catastrophe for only a short time. Even the Punic patience had its limit. The exasperation of the Carthaginians against their enemies in Africa and in Italy brought again into power the national party, which, with the help of the free Numidians under a grandson of Syphax, raised a strong army. The Gerusia was unable to accede to the Roman demand for the disbanding of this army; and when the seriousness of the Carthaginian preparations was fully understood in Rome, Cato at once called for a declaration of war. The senate, in secret session, determined upon an attack in case the Carthaginians refused to disband their army and burn their materials for a fleet. Meantime the conflict had begun in Africa by an open break between Masinissa and the Carthaginians. But fortune did not favor the Punic arms. They lost a great battle to the old king. Their enemies in Rome had now their opportunity. The senate determined upon war against the 'disobedient' city, and upon the immediate despatch of a strong force to Africa. The Carthaginians, disheartened by their defeat and frightened by the attitude of the senate, hoped by speedy submission to ward off destruction, and condemned the leaders of the war-party to death. But the Roman senate demanded further 'satisfaction'; and to the question of the Punic ambassadors, what atonement the Carthaginians should offer, made answer that they themselves must know best. At the be-




FIG. 41. — Ancient Carthage.

ginning of the year b.c. 149 war was declared; and the consuls with a very large army set out for Africa, with the definite command under all circumstances to destroy Carthage.

Carthage did not possess a single great man who had the insight and the power to inspire his people to make a desperate stand at once. Still hoping for safety, thirty of their foremost citizens were sent to Rome with unlimited authority. They could not believe that their unconditional submission — contrary to all custom — would be so terribly abused as it was. The senate accepted their submission, and demanded the delivery of 300 hostages within thirty days. The land, autonomy, laws, and public and private property of the Carthaginians were to be guaranteed to them, provided they obeyed the commands which the consuls would make known to them. After the Carthaginians had given up their munitions of war, including 2000 catapults and 200,000 stands of arms, the consuls in Utica announced to the Gerusia the command of the senate, that the city of Carthage must be destroyed, but the people might settle anew in any other place of their territory, not less than ten miles from the sea. At this message the fury of the Carthaginian people flamed forth with unexampled violence; and with the energy of despair the entire people resolved to defend its homes to the last breath, and to leave to the Romans only smoking ruins. The Roman consuls, from whom a respite of thirty days was sought, that one more embassy might be sent to Rome, granted the delay in the hope that the excitement of the people would be allayed. But the Carthaginians employed this precious time with wonderful energy in arming again. All slaves were set at liberty; and all in Carthage, without regard to age, rank, or sex, labored in the production of new weapons, equipments, artillery, and missiles. Hasdrubal was given the command in the field.

When at last the consuls, with their troops, approached to carry out the shameful order of the senate, they found the mighty fortress defended by half a million of embittered beings, and soon saw that a regular blockade was unavoidable, the difficulty of which was considerably increased by the army of Hasdrubal, that lay encamped near the fortress of Nepheris, on the lake or bay of Tunes, southwest of Carthage. One consul attacked from the west, on the neck of land that joins the city to the mainland (Fig. 41), while the other operated from the lagoon, and a strip of land which, jutting out from Carthage toward the south, except for a narrow opening, separates the lagoon from the gulf. Neither was able to accomplish anything. One man in their camps

maintained the honor of the Roman arms, the son of Aemilius Paulus, who had been adopted by the son of the victor of Zama, and was now called P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. Like his father, an earnest, sensible man, sound in mind and body, firm and clear in his resolves, his early training had been strict and austere, he had avoided the dissipations of youth, had acquired a thorough knowledge of the treasures of Greek learning, and now showed himself to be an excellent soldier and talented officer. His military education owed much to his reading of Xenophon, and to the instructions of Polybius, who, when exiled with the other Achaeans to Italy, had obtained, through the influence of Paulus, leave to remain in Rome, and then for many years, living in his house, had been first the teacher and then the friend of his son Aemilianus, now a legate in the army, who by his talent and his bravery, had repeatedly covered the mistakes of the incompetent generals. Even Cato, who died toward the end of b.c. 149, recognized his merit, and applied to him the Homeric phrase: ‘He alone has wisdom, the rest are empty shadows.’ At the close of the year Masinissa also died; and in accordance with his wish Aemilianus was commissioned to arrange the succession, which, owing to the king’s many descendants, was very involved. Aemilianus recognized only the three legitimate sons of Masinissa; they were to divide the government between them, the oldest, Micipsa, with the title of king, to rule in Cirta, Gulussa to command the army, and Mastanabal to act as judge.

The consuls for b.c. 148 were likewise incompetent, and unable to maintain discipline. The Carthaginians formed connections with the Macedonian insurgents, and even with the Numidians in Cirta. Under these circumstances Rome became impatient; and the consulate for b.c. 147 was given to Scipio Aemilianus, as the one officer who had distinguished himself in Africa, and as the representative of the conqueror of Carthage, although being but thirty-seven years old, he had not reached the age required for the office. Scipio took with him as legate his friend Laelius, and also Polybius, who, disheartened at the condition of affairs in Greece, gladly followed his call. Early in b.c. 147 Scipio landed in Utica, and saved one army which had been penned up by the enemy between Carthage and the sea. As soon as discipline had been re-established, he succeeded in driving the Carthaginians out of the suburb Magalia, and Hasdrubal from his position on the isthmus in front of Carthage. The city, though not a few of its inhabitants had gradually escaped, held out valiantly with 30,000 soldiers. Then the consul completely cut off all communication by land, and within

two months, by a massive mole, closed the entrance to the outer or commercial harbor of the city, through which was the entrance to the inner or war harbor, Cothon. The Carthaginians on their side dug a canal from their commercial harbor to the gulf, through which a newly constructed fleet sailed out into the open sea. Unfortunately they did not at once attack the Roman fleet; and when they did attempt it they gained only a partial success, and on their return through the canal suffered such losses from interference with one another and from the pursuit of the Romans, that they never again ventured to put to sea. The Romans finally gained a foothold on the quay of the outer harbor; and, cut off from the outer world, Carthage suffered during the winter



FIG. 42.—Remains of the ancient Sea-Gate of Carthage. (From Davis.)

of B.C. 147–146 by hunger and pestilence. In the spring Scipio attacked the inner city. The Carthaginians now evacuated the commercial fort, firing all the houses there; and soon Laelius, in spite of the opposition of Hasdrubal, forced his way into the inner harbor. The legions now pressed toward the great market of the city. From this three narrow streets, lined with houses six stories high, led to the acropolis, the Byrsa; and in these was fought a last wild fight. The Romans were obliged to hew their way with sword and pilum over the bodies of the Carthaginians, from house to house, from story to story, upon the flat roofs, through broken walls. When it was over, Scipio ordered this district to be burned in order to gain room for the assault upon the steep hill of the citadel. Seven days after the Romans had

entered the city the remnant of the inhabitants saved their lives by surrendering. Of 700,000 Carthaginians, only 30,000 men and 25,000 women remained. The rest had fled or had perished, the victims of the sword, of fire, of famine, and of pestilence. Nine hundred Roman deserters, and Hasdrubal, with his family, withdrew to the temple on the summit of the citadel, where the soldiers, exhausted with hunger, in their despair set fire to the building. Hasdrubal lost courage, and fleeing, sought mercy of Scipio, which was not refused. But his proud




FIG. 43.—Remains of the Aqueduct of Carthage. (From Davis.)

wife, who would not survive the downfall of Carthage, cast herself with her children into the flames of the burning temple, the last sacrifice in this horrible murder of a people.

The city was plundered by the soldiery; and at the command of the senate, in which national hatred and commercial jealousy carried the day, proud Carthage was razed to the ground. For seventeen days the fire raged, till everything was consumed. (Figs. 42, 43.) Then ‘site and soil were cursed forever, that neither house nor corn-field might here appear.’ Out of her possessions the Romans formed the new province of ‘Africa,’ with Utica for a capital.

In Greece, after the close of the war of Perseus, the Athenians, notwithstanding the gifts of the Romans and the favor of Hellenized kings, found their financial distress steadily increasing, as their trade was drawn away, especially by Alexandria. In b.c. 156, on some pretext, they fell upon and plundered Oropus, a city on the borders of Attica and Boeotia. The Oropians complained to Rome; and the senate gave the decision of the matter to Sieyon, which condemned Athens to a fine of 500 talents. The Athenian council sent to Rome the leaders of their schools of philosophy, Carneades the Academic, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic, prevailed on the senate to reduce the fine to one hundred talents, and afterward persuaded the Oropians to give up their claim to the money, and to admit Attic troops, with the right to separate from Attica if wrong were done them by Athens. In b.c. 150 another difficulty arose. The Athenians would not give up the city, and Oropus purchased for ten talents the promise of aid from the Achaean League. As soon as the Athenians heard of this, they again plundered Oropus, and abandoned the city, while the Achaeans, who came too late to help, turned back without striking a blow. For b.c. 149 the league chose as leader Diaeus, one of the returned exiles and a most bitter opponent of Rome, who, to cover the corruption of high officials, turned the attention of the Achaeans to their relations to Sparta, which was always favored by Rome. A controversy as to the extent of the criminal jurisdiction of the league over Sparta led the Spartans to complain to Rome. And vigorous action against Sparta seemed, as Diaeus wished to imply, a success also over the Romans. The general of the Achaeans was made still bolder by the wars then in progress in Africa and Macedonia; but the wily Spartans avoided an open break by an apparent submission, exiling the men who were compromised, who went at once, however, as a Spartan embassy to Rome to ask for help, where Diaeus likewise appeared as envoy to oppose them before the senate. The Romans returned an evasive answer, which hinted that a commission would be sent, and made it possible for each party to report a decision in its favor. The senate had so much to do in Spain, Africa, and Macedonia that it had no thought of attending to the Peloponnesus. The Achaean leaders had thus abundant time for further folly; and instead of joining the Macedonian insurgents, or of making an agreement with the Spartans in time to avoid Roman interference, Diaeus and his friends drove the Spartans to war, and left the Romans free to suppress at their leisure the rising in Macedonia.

In b.c. 149 Andriscus, the son of a fuller, who bore a strong likeness to Perseus, announced himself as Philip, the son of that king. Advancing into Macedonia with Thracian and Byzantine troops, he gained two victories over the militia of Amphipolis, aroused the Macedonian people everywhere in his behalf, and then, defeating a Roman legion which had indiscreetly entered Macedonia, he was able to enter Thessaly and even to make alliance with the Carthaginians. In the summer of b.c. 148 one of the best Roman generals, the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus, invaded Macedonia with a strong force; the Romans were first defeated in a cavalry skirmish near Pydna; but as the pretender divided his army, and sent one division into Thessaly, probably to stir up Greece in the rear of the Romans, Metellus succeeded in forcing him to a decisive battle, in which he was defeated, and driven back to the Thracian border.

In b.c. 147 Metellus routed a new army of the Pseudo-Philip, on the east border of Macedonia, obtained his surrender by the Thracians, and then turned to Peloponnesus. The anti-Roman party then, on the advance of Metellus, refrained from attacking the city of Sparta. In the spring the senate sent over a commission, to settle the affairs of the smaller states of the Peloponnesus, and to break up the Achaean League. The statesmen in Rome probably considered the Achaeans so weak, and elements of dissension so great, that a forcible decree would cause the alliance of the Peloponnesians to fall apart. But when the command of the senate was announced to the assembly of the league at Corinth, by which Sparta, Corinth, Heraclea on Mount Oeta, Argos, and Orchomenus were to leave the league, a storm of indignation broke out. The populace of the great commercial and manufacturing city fell upon the Spartans who happened to be there, arresting, beating, and killing many of them, and with violent insults compelled even the Roman commission to depart in haste. The Achaeans now had to choose between taking up arms without more ado, or obtaining easier terms from the senate by negotiations. They chose the second way, but did not continue in it, and finally plunged into a senseless war. The senate, misjudging the mood of the Achaeans, determined to withdraw its harsh demands, and leave the settlement of affairs to a time when its hands would be free. A new commission met the assembly of the league in a very friendly spirit: the insults to the former envoys would be forgiven if the Achaeans gave up the guilty for punishment, and further insults to the Romans and new attacks upon Sparta must cease. The Achaeans were glad to come to

terms again with the Romans, and arrangements were made for a meeting at which all difficulties were to be adjusted. But Critolaus, the new general, a bigoted opponent of the Romans, from their temperate demands drew the inference that their affairs were in an evil plight. He prevented the meeting, aroused the masses to a mad desire for war, and gained the proletariat by suspending the laws for debt. In vain did Metellus send a warning to the assembly of the Achaeans at Corinth. Critolaus was able to bring about the declaration of war, formally against Sparta, in reality against Rome; and on him was conferred unlimited authority. Thereupon the senate intrusted to the consul Lucius Mummius the conduct of the war against the Achaeans. Critolaus mobilized the army of the league, and in the early summer of b.c. 146 crossed the isthmus, in order, with the help of the contingents from Thebes and Chalcis which had joined him, to regain Heraclea, which, in accordance with the senate's order, had withdrawn from the league. Metellus advanced rapidly from Larissa with his legions; and the Grecian army retired through Thermopylae, but was overtaken near the Loerian village of Scarpea, and routed. Critolaus appears to have perished. Metellus, who wished to spare the Achaeans, did not press so rapidly into the Peloponnesus as to make all continuance of the war impossible, and hoped to end the conflict by the offer of tolerable proposals for peace; but Diaeus, who had succeeded to the command, determined to carry on the war 'to the knife.' He inflamed the proletariat with fanatic zeal, placed 12,000 enfranchised slaves in the army, wrung from all property-holders the necessary money, and, receiving unlimited power from the assembly of the league, in August, b.c. 146, cruelly oppressed the pease party. In September the consul Mummius arrived, and Metellus was obliged to withdraw to Macedonia. His successor, a thoroughly honest but rough soldier, soon put into the field an army of 23,000 foot and 3500 horse, besides Cretan archers and Pergamene auxiliaries. Diaeus had 14,000 foot and 600 horse; and when, in September, b.c. 146, he advanced from Corinth upon the Romans, the last battle of free Greece ended in its complete overthrow. Diaeus put an end to his wretched life by poison. The Grecian army scattered; and when, on the third day after the battle, Mummius entered Corinth, the citizens also had for the most part fled. The men who remained were put to the sword, and the women and children were sold as slaves. The city was given up to systematic plundering: many treasures of art were reserved for the state. Mummius was obliged, by the special order of the senate, to give Corinth to the flames; for the

competition of Corinthian trade in the east must be removed. The first relief for the unhappy condition of Greece appeared when Polybius, backed by the powerful influence of Scipio, arrived at Corinth from the Roman camp in Africa, and labored to help save his countrymen.

Thus came to an end the independent history of the European Greeks; thus amid scenes of horror was it merged in the history of Rome. From now on the Greeks migrate to Rome, to Italy, and to the lands of the west, in their turn to conquer and destroy the Roman nation by their superior culture, their elegance, versatility, and vices.

The reconstruction of Greece after the destruction of Corinth went hand in hand with that of affairs in Macedonia. The realm of the Antigonids, to which were joined the Ionian islands Thessaly and Epirus, was made a Roman province, and governed by a praetor, who had his residence at Thessalonica. It became the military basis for defence against the attacks of the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Thracian tribes; and, further, the governor in Thessalonica had the direct oversight over the European Greeks, which had hitherto been exercised by commissions. Greece, too, or ‘Aehaia,’—from the people last conquered,—was treated as a province, although it first appears as an independent organization in the time of Augustus. All the political confederacies were broken up; and in Greece, as among the Latins and Siceliots, communities were isolated from one another. The democracy was everywhere abolished, since the destitute multitude lost the right of participation in the communal assembly, and also suffrage for all offices; while in the cities the control was given into the hand of a council composed of property-holders. At the same time a fixed annual contribution to Rome was laid upon the community. The Greek communities, under the oversight of the governor in Thessalonica, who in questions of administration and justice was the supreme judge, retained their ownership of land, the administration of their local affairs, and their existing laws and customs. What they lost was the right to direct their own polities, to make war and peace at will, and thus unceasingly to rend one another. Several states at that time, and later, as faithful supporters of the Romans, received special favors. Sparta remained free from all taxes to Rome, as did the sacred Delphi; Athens, which for many years had enjoyed a free alliance with Rome, was scarcely a part of the province of Macedonia, yet the controlling authority in matters of government and law was transferred to the Arcopagus: the chief *strategus*, the head of the city, was

given full authority, the offices were no longer filled by lot but by election, and only the wealthy citizens were eligible as archon and strategus. The acceptance of the new order of things by the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus was made more easy and quiet by the patriotic exertions of Polybius, who, under a commission from Rome, visited all the cities of the peninsula, and with a sympathy, a practical insight, and an unselfishness rare among Greeks, carried through the prescribed changes. He persuaded the Romans to allow a formal though limited renewal of the various confederacies for the celebration of games, sacrifices, and the preparation of the petitions, which with their formalities and numerous offices had become almost a necessity for Hellenic life.<sup>1</sup> Polybius, who in Rome had come to realize the condition and power of the Roman state, and the great qualities of the Romans and of their constitution, became the historian of his time. He was the first to recognize, perhaps more clearly than the Romans themselves, the new and all-controlling position of Rome. An investigator of rare power, possessed of the best information, earnest, truth-loving, simple, clear, he wrote the history of the period from the First Punic War to the fall of Corinth; "Roman material, which with mature Grecian critical power, he treated from the point of view of universal history."

<sup>1</sup> The value of his services was recognized by the Greeks themselves, and portrait statues of him were set up in his honor in various places in the Peloponnesus. At Olympia a statue-base was discovered in 1878 inscribed thus: "The city of the Eleans [honors] Polybius of Megalopolis, son of Lycortas."—ED.

## CHAPTER XII.

### NUMANTIA AND THE ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTION.

ROME had established for centuries to come her supremacy over the states sprung from the earlier civilizations. Of the lands around the Mediterranean, Spain alone was still hostile. The great Hellenic states had shown themselves, since the downfall of Antiochus III., unable to oppose the policy of the senate. After his death, the history of the Seleucid Empire is one of rapid decay, of a series of palace intrigues and heartless family dissensions and assassinations, while a new power, that of the Turanian Parthians, under their Arsacid princes, tears away province after province of the realm conquered by Alexander. Antiochus IV. Epiphanes indeed entered Egypt, and might have conquered the country had not Rome interposed, and compelled him to withdraw in the most humiliating manner. His attempt to force the Greek gods upon the Jews in Palestine caused their revolt, who, under the lead of the family of Mattathias, the heroic Maccabees, after a long and bitter struggle regained their independence, and were taken under the protection of Rome. By the year b.c. 128 the dominions of the ‘Great Kings’ were reduced to the coast of Syria and part of Mesopotamia.

In Egypt the favor of the Romans prevented the breaking up of the kingdom; but the Ptolemies, too, were made powerless by endless quarrels, which were marked by inhuman cruelty. The dissoluteness of the court is hardly redeemed by the encouragement given to science, art, and literature.

The attention of the Romans was for a long time withdrawn from the East, although by the extinction of the house of the Attalids they gained on the soil of Asia a new province, whose capital was Pergamum (Fig. 44). Attalus II. had succeeded in regaining the favor of the Romans for his house. At the death of his nephew, Attalus III., in b.c. 133, one of his servants appeared in Rome with the announcement that his will made the Roman people his heir. Whether this will was genuine or fraudulent cannot be definitely known; but it is certain that the Roman statesmen accepted the gift, though they could secure it




FIG. 41.—The Great Altar of Pergamum. Reconstructed. (Drawn by G. Rehleiter.)

only by a war. (PLATES IX., X. illustrates important monuments recently discovered in Pergamum.)

This acquisition established the immediate supremacy of the Romans in Asia. The good times of the republic were, however, forever gone. Its strength had sufficed to bring under control the civilized states around the Mediterranean, and was afterwards to extend its power still farther; but neither senate nor republic was longer competent for the task of turning supremacy into a blessing for its own people and for its subjects. The days have come when the moral power of Rome begins to sink, and its political productiveness to be exhausted. The Roman supremacy is to work disaster to the ancient world, from Gades to the Euphrates. The horrors of revolution and civil war are at hand.

The merging of all other ancient peoples in Rome need not have been destructive to both parties. The political and social condition in which the senate found the majority of the subjected peoples would make it seem fortunate that a strong power had put an end to ceaseless and objectless feuds, and had established peace far and wide. But the Romans themselves had undergone great internal changes: their military and political strength still remained, their skill in foreign politics became masterly; but the best qualities of the old time were decaying, and taking forms which must work damage to the provinces. They understood how to command, but not how to govern and to reconcile their subjects with their position. At no time did the republican rulers entertain the thought of drawing their subjects nearer to them, or of Romanizing peoples that lay around the Italian centre of their realm, who were kept in a position of perpetual political infancy. The system of government remained the same as at the formation of their first province. The practice of changing the governors yearly inevitably worked great evil. Even with the best of intentions, the governors could not become familiar with the interests of the provinces, or undertake measures which required time to be carried out. Persons, who as governors had held almost limitless authority, found it difficult on their return to live in subordination to the law; and it seemed necessary to check this tendency by not permitting a long extension of their command. Neither did it comport with the interests of the nobility, which was rapidly degenerating into an oligarchy, to avoid frequent changes in the governorships, which had already become so lucrative that all wished to share in their profits, often only with the purpose of indemnifying themselves financially in the provinces for the increasing

expenses of candidacy for office at Rome. The theory gradually gained ground that the subject lands were mainly sources of gain for the dominant power. The direct demands of the state on the provinces for their military protection and their administration were not excessively high, nor were the taxes extortionate; but there were frequent extraordinary burdens, especially when Rome was engaged in important wars, and the Roman merchants and speculators of all sorts were a veritable scourge. The Roman capitalists overspread the provinces with their *latifundia* (large estates), with their extensive trade, with their farming of the revenues,—especially those of the mines,—and made competition on the part of the provincials well-nigh impossible. The governors resisted less and less the temptations of their position, and as they received no pay from the state, began gradually, to the injury of the subjects and the dishonor of Rome, to use any means for extortion and money-getting. No strong public sentiment existed at Rome against such conduct. Except where the relation of client to some great Roman family assisted the provincials in the capital, the only relief, in case of gross outrages by the officials, was by a direct complaint to Rome, which could have effect only after the expiration of the term of office of the offender. Then a tribune must bring the criminal charge before the people; for the civil accusation the praetor named senators who formed a jury to hear the case. In b.c. 149 was established a court *pecuniarum repetundarum causa*, a standing senatorial commission, to take cognizance of complaints of extortion made by the provincials against their officials. But it not seldom happened in such processes that the referees, of the same class as the accused, or even partners in guilt, paid little attention to honor or justice. The main evil was that the senate began to relax its supervision of the subordinate governments.

This evil was but a part of the clumsiness and inadaptability of the Roman constitution. The Romans had done what neither Sparta nor Athens, neither Macedonia nor Carthage, had done before them. They had created a national realm in which the opposition between the capital and the strong subordinate element was overcome, yet not destroyed by force. Now their political vigor, their power of adaptability, began to give way. Four causes tended to destroy their inner life, and bring about the revolution,—the disturbances in the relations between Rome and the Italians, the increasing inefficiency of the popular assembly, the growing degeneracy of the people, with the turning of the aristocracy into an oligarchy, and finally the disastrous changes in the social conditions.

Down to the victory over Hannibal, the strength of the Italian state rested upon the fact that there existed between the Romans, the Latins, and the Italian allies that had remained faithful, a relation of mutual regard and honorable friendship, and that the senate received one after another of the group of Italian peoples into the union of the Roman people. Notwithstanding the increasing extent of the subject lands in the second century B.C., the Romans abandoned this judicious practice, and developed a spirit of exclusiveness toward the Italians which put them at a disadvantage materially and politically. The Romans held with exactness to the conditions of existing compacts; but it became less and less possible for the Italians to remain content with these, as they saw that they were performing a large part of the military services which held together the realm. Many of the officials too, who in the provinces had become accustomed to harsh and imperious behavior toward subjects and allied states, behaved in the same way to the kindred races in Italy. As the widening power of the Romans became a source of profit for nobility and people, there grew up among both classes a selfish jealousy of the allies, and arrogance toward them. New rights for the Romans, such as the alleviation of military penalties, were not extended to the Latins; and they felt bitterly the rigid enforcement of laws, like those by which such as had by artifice gained the Roman citizenship were removed, or like the *Lex Claudia* (B.C. 177), by which those only who left lawful children at home were allowed to settle in the capital, and even then without the right to vote.

The disaffection which necessarily sprang from this policy was the more injurious, as the people of Rome were changing for the worse. Since the domain occupied by Roman citizens outside the city came to embrace Latium, the old Sabine land, and a part of Campania, together with the colonies on the coasts, and the new settlements in Picenum and north of the Apennines, an unavoidable change took place in the working of the constitution. The idea of a representative system occurred as little to the Romans as to the Greeks; and the city organization now extended over a wide, and therefore geographically inconvenient, territory. In theory the election of the great officers of the state, and all resolutions and laws of general importance, were to be determined by the assembly of all the citizens of the Roman state qualified to vote. Actually, however, the deciding power in the comitia lay with the masses who lived in the capital and the immediately surrounding country, while the real conduct of the state came more exclusively into the hands of the senate. It was easy to foresee

that this fact must lead to internal disturbances when once the democratic element was brought into conscious opposition to the aristocratic. It became fatal to the republic, and at last to the freedom of the people, that in the struggles between the two parties, no way was ever found of breaking through the ‘vicious circle’ which restricted the Romans to the old forms of their constitution. Nor could the struggle be postponed; for the democratic rights of the citizens were steadily extended, the body of urban citizens was composed of a very different class of men from the plebeians of old, while the nobility changed into an oligarchy, and the senate from the great council of the nation came to represent only the interests of the nobility. At the end of the period of the wars for conquest, the masses of the capital had already received a strong admixture of men of foreign descent. The number of emancipated slaves rose steadily, and the influence of those freedmen who gained the franchise was clearly manifest. This new filling up of the ranks of voters in the tribes and centuries affected greatly the character of the assemblies. The nobility seem to have favored this mixture of the commonalty with *libertini*, who for the most part remained their clients, and were much less independent than the old, self-reliant, but now fast vanishing, plebeian peasantry, and were much easier to manage in the elections. Those of purely Roman descent, who lived in Rome and the neighborhood, could offer but slight opposition to the growing power of the *libertini*, as they were mostly proletarians, market-gardeners, impoverished peasants who had sold their farms, people without land who gained their livelihood in the city in various ways. It had become difficult for men without family connections, or without the support of a great house, for a *homo novus*, a member of a new family that aspired to political honors, to break through the ‘ring’ of the great families, to advance to the consulship, and to establish a new ‘family’ among those already in power.

The opposition within the nobility itself, which rested partly upon antagonism to certain leading families, and partly upon principle, could not prevent the growth of the oligarchic tendency, which was forwarded even by measures intended to resist it. The sentiment of equality between members of the nobility, the jealousy of eminent talents in their own circle, the tendency to open the curule offices to the largest number of persons from the gentes, and even the desire of thoughtful men to keep out of the high offices too ambitious young men, worked together to establish a legal sequence of office, though it rendered it more difficult without an evasion of the law to provide the right man

in case of need. By the law of the tribune L. Villius, in b.c. 180, the holding of the military tribuneship, or a military service of ten years, must precede the quaestorship. The next step was the aedileship, curule or plebeian; then the praetorship,<sup>1</sup> the consulship, and, last, the censorship. For every grade a certain age was necessary, with a fixed interval between the offices.

The law (b.c. 152), which forbade the same man to be consul more than once, completed this system. After the war with Antiochus, the struggles of cliques for the offices of state became frequent, and with them the tendency to gain the favor of the voters in disreputable ways. The citizens wished now to be solicited personally. The young nobility paid court in every way to the voter; and it became usual, particularly for the aediles and praetors, to obtain favor by gross means, such as enormous expenditures in the public games on festival days, and by flooding the city with corn at nominal prices or even gratuitously. This method of canvassing (*ambitus*) soon led to the direct purchase of votes by money. Under such circumstances the relation between government and the governed must deteriorate. The senate relaxed its severity to avoid trouble in managing the people; and the people came to consider their new position of power as a means for easy gratification, and not as a reason for the strict performance of duty. The abundant receipts from duties and the public domains, and the plunder taken in the wars with Syria and with Persus, made it possible to do without any direct taxes upon Roman citizens while the republic lasted; the burden in case of need fell always upon the provinces. The deplorable condition of the peasants, and the dislike of the people to take part in certain foreign wars, especially in Spain, led the senate to indolent concessions, which destroyed the discipline of the army, and which made necessary heavy drafts upon the Latins and Italians.

The ruling class was by no means unresisted. Its most persistent and violent opponent was the moneyed aristocracy, composed of the powerful farmers of the taxes, or *publicani*, and the members of the great financial companies. This aristocracy of property gradually developed by the side of the aristocracy of office and of birth, with the increasing wealth and the entrance of the mercantile spirit which followed the First Punic War. In the time of the Gracchi, the practice was for-

<sup>1</sup> By the year b.c. 243 the mass of business had necessitated the yearly appointment of two praetors for the city, of whom one (*Praetor urbanus*) was intrusted with the settlement of cases between Roman citizens, while the other (*Praetor peregrinus*) took cognizance of questions arising between citizens and foreigners, or between foreigners only.

mally recognized that citizens whose property reached the ‘equestrian census’ (400,000 sesterces, or \$16,500) were reckoned as knights, even without the performance of equestrian service, and were looked on as a class by themselves, between the nobility and the commonalty. An opposition resting on the commonalty, and especially the city populace, attacked the sole government of the aristocracy; and for the ruling nobility there arose the party name of *optimates*, as they claimed to uphold the supremacy of the best in the state, meaning by that the clans; while their opponents were the *populares*, the supporters of the welfare of the people and of the will of the commonalty, though, as a rule, men of noble descent were too often more intent on their own advancement than any benefit to the people. This new demoeratic party caused only disaster; for, except in the case of Caius Gracchus, it brought forth no new ideas, and found no way to meet the evils in the constitution and the administration, so that, down to the time of Caesar, the parties, after the most fearful commotions, were always obliged to return to the government of the senate.

The struggle began with an attempt to withdraw the voting in the comitia from the control of the optimates. In elections in the comitia the written and secret ballot, instead of the *viva voce* vote, was introduced in B.C. 139 on the proposition of the tribune Q. Gabinius; and it was extended later to trials before the people, except in cases of high treason. The influence of Scipio Aemilianus was thrown in favor of this proposition, although his disapproval of demagogic acts did not allow him to join the popular party. Long the darling of the people, and holding himself above the strife of parties, he was looked on by many, who overestimated his strength and political talents, as the destined saviour of the state. And yet it was his fate clearly to recognize the impending social dangers, and still be unable to find a remedy.

To their contemporaries the foreign policy of the Romans seemed grandly imposing; there is something magnificent in the calm assurance of the messengers of the senate. After the downfall of Carthage no civilized states ventured a conflict with the powerful Romans. Yet the oligarchy allowed the marine to decline, and the extension of Roman supremacy over Southern Gaul and over the northeast coasts of the Adriatic, rendered necessary by the form of their dominions,

<sup>1</sup> In B.C. 198, probably on the proposition of Cato, a law was passed which abolished the penalty of death and of scourging for Roman citizens in Rome. Soon these provisions were extended to citizens living in Italy or the provinces, engaged in peaceful business, and even to the army; though the centurions were allowed to strike military offenders with vine-stems.

was long delayed. The monetary power of the Romans became prominent, although except for the investment of capital we can hardly speak of their trade. The business operations of their merchants and bankers were widely extended; and the Roman capitalist, like the Roman coinage (Fig. 45), followed in the wake of the advancing legions. The city of Rome presented a brilliant and imposing appearance, so far as was permitted by the defects in its arrangement, the result of the hasty rebuilding after the destruction of the Celts. It was richly adorned with the plunder of Grecian cities, and in B.C. 143 the first ornamental buildings of Grecian marble arose. In the province of literature Roman talent labored zealously in making Grecian subjects serviceable for the Roman comedy, especially the New Comedy of Athens; and yet the force of native growth was never driven out. The foremost writers of comedy were Titus Maccius Plautus, of Sarsina (B.C. 254 to B.C. 184); Statius Caecilius, of Mediolanum, an Insubrian brought as a prisoner of war to Rome and afterward freed (dying in B.C. 168); Titinius, a writer of national Latin comedy; and Terence (B.C. 196–159), who, born a slave in Carthaginian Africa, and receiving a Grecian training at Rome, adapted Greek plays for Roman audiences, especially those of Menander. The prominent Roman writers of tragedy were Marcus Pacuvius, of Brundisium (B.C. 219–129), a nephew and scholar of the great poet Ennius; and Lucius Accius (born B.C. 170), the son of a freedman from Pisaurum, who attempted imitations of the Greek tragedians. While Roman historiography did not yet rise above the grade of annals, even in the works, excellent of their kind, of Cato and other statesmen, and while the ancient pontifical chronicle was digested and edited in eighty books by the renowned jurist and *pontifex maximus*, P. Mucius Scaevola, yet its place was taken in the development of Roman literature by two subjects in which great results were obtained,—political oratory and jurisprudence. Little by little the art of the advocate had risen to the elegant treatment of cases of law difficult in form and matter. M. Lepidus Porcina, consul in B.C. 137, is named as the first master of this art.


Under this brilliant exterior was concealed an increasing moral deterioration, in commonalty and nobility alike. Grecian civilization spread a superficial polish over the boorishness of the lower classes. In the higher society the greater part turned to the frivolous and dis-



FIG. 45. — Reverse of a denarius of the Gens Furia, with the curule chair. (From Cohen.)

graceful side of Greek life. Among the populace gluttony, drunkenness, and wanton living gained the upper hand. The people no longer hesitated to choose as consuls men who in the lower offices had won an evil reputation by gross irregularities or open violence. Plebeians of the old stamp were only to be found among the peasants and land-owners in the country. The conditions of the nobility and the knights were not different except that their immorality took on more refined forms. The senate was forced to establish a standing court for the trial of poisoners and murderers. Women, too, took their full part in the growing corruption, and luxury found in them ready supporters. The nobility had reached the point where venality was less noticeable than incorruptibility. Finally, religion was beginning to lose its moral power. Many saw in the state religion, especially in the auspices, merely a political machine to be used for the purposes of the government. And neither the oriental rites, which during the wars with Hannibal entered the city, nor the allegorical and historical explanation of the Greek system of gods, which their literature and the influence of Ennius spread through the upper classes, could furnish a substitute for the vanishing ancient faith. Nevertheless, the outward magnificence of worship continued to increase, as is shown by the remains of the temples erected at this period, of which the two at Tivoli (PLATE XII.) are perhaps the best known. The number of free inhabitants in Italy and in Rome was less than it had been before the wars with Hannibal. In B.C. 159 the citizens capable of bearing arms were 328,000, but the census of B.C. 136 showed only 318,000. The chief cause of this was the decay of the peasant class through the conduct of the landlords. The peasants gradually became tenants or day laborers on their former land, or were merged in the proletariat of the capital. The senate made no attempt at saving them, nor did it try to settle as colonists over the provinces the thousands of agricultural proletarians, nor to tear down the barriers between the Romans and the subject provincials. No reformer in the senate ventured on a demand for the restoration of the domains which the nobility and knights had occupied, and all looked on inactive while the peasants were impoverished or passed into the city proletariat. In Etruria, by B.C. 134, free peasants were no longer to be found; and yet the dangers of the system were clearly to be seen. The labor of slaves and freedmen had come to be used in the most varied way. Multitudes were employed as clerks in the counting-houses of the bankers, as collectors of the indirect taxes farmed by the *publicani*, and by architects.

PLATE XII.



The two temples at Tivoli. (From Reber.)



managers of dramatic and gladiatorial schools, shippers, manufacturers, and farmers of the mines. Their treatment was much harsher than had been customary among the Greeks; although, except those who worked in the mines and the gladiators, their condition was much better than that of the agricultural slaves on the ‘plantations,’ who, beside being cruelly treated, often suffered from insufficient nourishment, and they were better able to have families and property and to obtain freedom. Since the war with Perseus the number of slaves, especially on the plantations, had enormously increased; to the thousands of unhappy Epirots were added Spanish, African, and Grecian prisoners of war; and the demand for this human commodity induced Cretan and Cilician pirates to sweep the Asiatic East, especially the Syrian lands. They readily disposed of their booty at the great slave-market at Delos.

The great Servile War, a fearful echo of the last great war of Rome for the sovereignty of the world, broke out in Sicily, where the masses of plantation slaves were largest, and where their treatment was most inhuman,—where they lived in underground ‘labor prisons,’ and worked in irons. The east of the island was the granary of Italy; the upland districts of the interior and the strip along the southern coast were used for pasturage. The cities sheltered crowds of free proletarians. The insurrection began in the wheat region of Enna, among the slaves of a man notorious for his harshness and cruelty. The planner of the movement was a Syrian, regarded as a magician and prophet, Eunus of Apamea, to whom the Syrian goddess was said to have foretold a kingdom. Under his lead four hundred rebels passed by night into the city of Enna, murdered their masters, drew to them the slaves in the city, and erected a kingdom (B.C. 143) for Eunus, who called himself Antiochus, and formed a council in which the controlling spirit was the Greek Achaeus, a man of prudence and energy, with much talent for organization. The shepherds from the pasture districts soon united with them; and with 10,000 armed men Achaeus was able to meet the attacks of the Roman praetor and the Sicilian militia. The insurrection spread like wildfire, even into Italy, where as late as B.C. 141 risings of the slaves in southern Latium had to be put down by arms, while in Sicily the uprising became more and more threatening. In B.C. 140, Cleon, a Cilician and skilful leader, called the shepherd slaves of the south to arms near Agrigentum, and with 7000 men joined ‘King’ Antiochus. About 200,000 men were now in insurrection, including 20,000 trained soldiers; and the Romans were scarcely

able to defend more than the northeast corner of the island, including Messana. The revolt spread eastward over the sea. A rising of the slaves in the mines of Laurium, in Attica, who seized the fortress of Sunium, was put down with difficulty by the Attic troops; and the mining industry of Attica seems never to have recovered. The Romans finally sent regular troops to Sicily; but only in b. c. 133 was the energetic L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi able, after a thorough restoration of discipline, to regain territory, and blockade the fortress of Enna. After a long siege, in which the strength of the insurgents was broken by famine, and after the death of their bravest leader, Enna was captured in b.c. 132. Antiochus died a prisoner in Rome; and the island was ‘quieted’ by flying columns sent in all directions, after countless slaves had perished in battle and from want, and 20,000 had been crucified.

By the side of the conflict in Sicily went on the last great struggles in Spain, in which was shown how much the power of Roman arms had diminished from the decay of the hardy peasantry. The Lusitanians, in their indignation at the outrages of Galba, had renewed their raids. Viriathus, to whom was given the command of the Lusitanians, after freeing an army of 10,000 men from the dangerous position in which they were blockaded by the Romans, decoyed the enemy into an ambush in which half their army was lost. From this time on, for several years, Viriathus displayed brilliant talents as the leader of a brave mountain people, and by his fertility of invention, by rapidity of movement, and chivalrous bravery, counterbalanced the superiority of the Romans in numbers, tactical skill, and experience. The Romans were constantly attacked unexpectedly, or enticed to unfavorable ground by this hero, who by his simple life, his love for the people, and his courage, inspired the Lusitanians, over whose tribes he ruled as king, to deeds of daring, and who, knowing the nature of the country and the character of the people, could quickly form again defeated and scattered bodies of troops, and await more favorable opportunities to strike a blow. In b.c. 144 Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, elder brother of the conqueror of Carthage, adopted into the Fabian house, advanced the Roman line to the middle and lower Baetis; and his successor, Metellus Macedonicus, in two years suppressed the Celtiberian tribes, so that only Ternantia and Numantia continued their opposition. Their inhabitants refused to surrender. This seemed folly on their part; as Numantia, although occupying a strong position on a high hill, was defended simply by moats and palisades, and by a garrison of only

8000 soldiers. Yet for years these held the Romans at bay. Viriathus managed to compel the Romans to a peace, recognizing the independence of the Lusitanians under his rule. Although this compact was ratified at Rome, it was no sooner made than a Roman commander was allowed to provoke war again; and from this time fortune deserted Viriathus, and his position became untenable. The diplomacy of Q. Pompeius, a renowned orator and jurist, brought about an agreement with Ternantia. Even Numantia concluded a compact with him. Its people consented to subject themselves to the Romans, give hostages, surrender prisoners of war and deserters, and pay thirty talents; but the Roman general agreed that their autonomy was not to be impaired, and that they were not to surrender their weapons. Yet when his successor appeared, at the beginning of B.C. 139, Pompeius, either because he could not obtain a sanction for his agreement, or because he was ashamed to defend in Rome a peace which was without glory, denied his promises, in marked contrast with the Numantines, who fulfilled theirs. While the strife was being settled in Rome, there was quiet in Numantia, and the Romans were enabled to turn all their force against Viriathus, who sought for peace on any terms; but when Roman trickery forced upon him and his people conditions of increasing severity, one after another, ending with the demand for the surrender of arms, he determined, in despair, to renew the struggle. He was, however, basely murdered by some of his people, who had entered into negotiations with the Romans. With his death the Lusitanian war came to an end. In B.C. 138 the Roman general traversed Lusitania to the Atlantic, and forced even the Gallaeci in northwestern Spain to recognize Roman sovereignty.

But the war with Numantia, which in every view is disgraceful to the Romans, was not yet at an end. The senate ordered the continuance of the war, but against the justly embittered Numantines their generals could make no headway. The discipline of the army in Spain had become disgraceful. The soldier from the mob in the capital was not to be compared with the old plebeian folk, and was urged with difficulty to the detested service in Spain. As a result this army consisted of worthless Romans, of volunteers, of great companies of Italians, of Spanish militia and mercenaries; and through the slackness and incompetence of the generals, the camps were filled with a large retinue of women, fortune-tellers, and traders, while the soldiery was sunk in sloth and disorderly living. So great was the demoralization, that in B.C. 137 the troops, upon a false report of the advance of a relieving

force, fled from before Numantia at night, and when overtaken and blockaded by the pursuing Numantines, had not the courage to cut their way out. The Numantines were satisfied with a treaty sworn to by the consul and all his staff-officers, guaranteeing to them peace and independence. The senate, however, refused to ratify the treaty, and surrendered to the Numantines the consul, whom the Spaniards, with chivalrous honor, would not receive. Finally the subjection of this heroic little town was intrusted to Rome's greatest general. Scipio Aemilianus, accompanied by his brother Fabius, undertook the command, and at once set about the difficult task of restoring discipline by the exercise of the utmost severity, and drilling the troops in making fortifications, and in arms and marches. The soldierly qualities and talents of Caius Marius then first came into notice. At last Scipio advanced against Numantia with 60,000 men, and, as before at Carthage, encircled the city with a chain of strong intrenchments to reduce it by famine. In the autumn of B.C. 133, after a siege of many months without a battle, when their strength was broken, the remnant of the defenders surrendered, and the town was razed to the ground. With the exception of the Asturian and Cantabrian peoples in the mountains of the north, all Spain was now subject to the Romans. After long disgrace the republic had again shown its vigor, but in the meantime in Rome the revolution had begun.

## BOOK III.

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ROME: THE REVOLUTION; THE  
CIVIL WAR; CAESAR.

(B.C. 133-31.)



## PART VI.

### FROM TIBERIUS GRACCHUS TO THE DEATH OF SULLA.

(B.C. 133-78.)

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### CHAPTER XIII.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF THE GRACCHI.

THE man who, with the eagerness and impetuosity of youth, undertook to cure the worst evils in the state, was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (born B.C. 162), the grandson of the elder, the brother-in-law of the younger, Africanus. His father, Tiberius, in his day the ablest statesman among the plebeians, was the tribune who had helped the Scipios in their hour of need. His mother, Cornelia, who lives in history as the noblest model of Roman womanhood, watched over him and his younger brother Caius (born B.C. 153) with affectionate care, and gave them an admirable moral and intellectual training. The noble qualities and purity of Tiberius, and his close connection with the great families that favored reforms, caused the greatest expectations to be formed for him when once he should come to serve the state. His first military experience was gained at the siege of Carthage; and later he served in Spain. He was not thirty years of age when the wretched condition of the poor in Rome, and the consciousness of the evils that must surely result from it, touched his sensitive heart, and led him to take in hand the reforms from which older men shrank. It was a misfortune for himself and for his country, that to noble and unselfish aims and to great talents he could not join the knowledge of men and their passions, and the experience in affairs of state, which time alone can give, and which were indispensable for the task before him. With little thought of aiding the country farmers, or of improving the relations of the Romans to the Latins and Italians, he selected the difficult and dangerous problem of giving relief

to the city populace as soon as possible, and expected to solve it by the traditional means of agrarian laws, and assignments of lands from the public domain in Italy. Confident of the justice of his cause, he expected to attain his object at a single bound : and it was only when his hopes were disappointed, and it was too late, that he took practical measures to combat the opposition which he had aroused by combining against it all the elements of discontent.

The plans of the young Gracchus became known ; the consul-elect for B.C. 133, P. Mucius Scaevola, one of the founders of scientific jurisprudence in Rome, was converted to them. Tiberius Gracchus was easily elected one of the tribunes of the people on December 10, B.C. 134. Without long delay Tiberius proposed his agrarian rogation, in which he returned to the old law of Licinius and Sextius, nominally still in force, though it had long been disregarded in practice, by which no Roman citizen was allowed to occupy more than 500 *jugera* of the state domain. Gracchus added clauses for the relief of the larger actual holders: that for every adult of a family, possession of an additional 250 *jugera* should be permitted; that everything beyond this limit which citizens held contrary to the law was to be reclaimed by the state, but compensation was to be paid for the land reclaimed, and for buildings and improvements of every kind.

This rogation naturally precipitated a furious storm. While the peasantry was filled with hope, the moneyed aristocracy and the great land-owners, whose interests were rudely jeopardized, were aroused to determined resistance. In vain did Tiberius appeal to patriotic feeling in favor of his plan. With the best will on all sides, his rogation, if pressed, must entail the greatest hardships, while the difficulties of an extensive calling in of the domain were so serious that the strict enforcement of the law must lead to results that bordered hard on social revolution. It could not be denied that large portions of the public land had remained for years in the same hands, that they had consistently been treated as private property, and at last been generally regarded as such, and that the line between land that had been simply ‘occupied’ and actual property was often hardly to be distinguished. The possessors of cultivated lands had spent large sums in rendering the land productive, and in improvements of every sort. Large tracts had passed by sale into other hands like private property, and had been bought, bequeathed, mortgaged, and had been given as the dowry of women. Losses also were often to be considered, for which it would be very difficult to arrange any compensation. Had

the future of the Roman peasantry actually depended only on the heroic measure proposed by Tiberius, no means should have been neglected to convince or persuade the opponents of the assignment; but that was not done. At first Tiberius inflamed the people by his eloquence and noble earnestness, and from all parts of the Roman territory there came to the capital a stream of peasants and farmers, who wished to cast their votes on this occasion in the decisive comitia. The nobility seized upon the oft-tried means of weakening the attack upon them, and induced, though not without difficulty, Marcus Octavius, a tribune and former friend of Tiberius, to employ his veto against the threatening rogation. In return Tiberius intensified his proposal by dropping the compensation clause. When at last, on the day of the decisive vote in the comitia of the tribes, in the Forum, where the assemblies of the commonalty were held after B.C. 145, the rogation of Gracchus was about to be recited, M. Octavius arose to interpose his veto, and, notwithstanding the passionate entreaties of Tiberius, held fast to his purpose. Tiberius adjourned the vote till the next comitia, and meanwhile, following the ancient practice in conflicts between the orders, laid his tribunician veto upon the exercise of all official authority by the magistrates 'until the acceptance of his rogation.' The passion of both parties increased daily; and when, in the second meeting of the comitia, Octavius repeated his veto, affairs began to take on a violent character. Thereupon two ex-consuls came to Gracchus, and urged him to go with them to the senate-chamber, and consult with the assembled senate on the question. No ground of agreement was found; and, after a violent altercation, Gracchus was obliged to return with empty hands to the people. For him the crisis had arrived; only one step more, and revolution began. The scheme of speedy agrarian reform was shattered in its beginning, as it seemed, by the veto of Octavius; and now was shown the fatal lack of experience of public life of Tiberius. It is surprising that, having followed the example of Licinius and Sextius, he did not also adopt their practice, when reform failed for one year, of energetically and stubbornly urging it, and working with all legal means to carry future elections, and to convince opponents. If years passed before the victory was secured, they were not to be regarded as lost. A strong party could have been built up which might have made the agrarian rogation the starting-point for a comprehensive reform. But his reform being for the time blocked, he ventured on a step which carried him and the republic helplessly on to revolution. When he returned to the comitia he

adjourned the assembly till the next morning, and announced, as the business for the day, besides the agrarian question, the decision of a new question, plain to every one, ‘whether a tribune who acted to the disadvantage of the plebeians could still occupy his office.’ When, on the next morning, Octavius again interposed his veto, Tiberius actually brought in the new rogation directed immediately against him; and, on its acceptance, the deposition of Octavius was at once declared.

It was the beginning of monstrous evils. In his passion, and from motives of momentary expediency, Tiberius had violated the constitution of the state, and destroyed the protection which the sovereign people itself had erected against the unlimited power of the tribunate. He had thereby not only declared that the arbitrary will of every bold demagogue was law, but had shaken the sanctity and inviolability of the tribunes, and wrecked the foundation on which he himself stood. This breach of the ancient law was the reproach which his enemies constantly held up against him, and which made credible the wicked and slanderous reports by which he was thenceforth traduced.

At first, however, the comitia passed with acclamations the agrarian rogation, and chose for the current years as commissioners for assigning the land, Tiberius, his brother Caius, a youth of scarcely twenty years, and his father-in-law, Appius Claudius; giving them also the power of independent and final decision in the multitude of disputes that must arise in establishing the boundaries between the *ager publicus* and private property. When these men began their difficult and complicated task the difference became evident between the peasants’ way of thinking and that of the city populace. The country people had left the city; and Tiberius had to seek new measures to retain the majority of the city dwellers, who had only a subordinate interest in the agrarian question, and to make them his protection against the resentment of the nobility. He was forced to lead new attacks, of a clearly democratic tendency, against the existing powers of the senate. It was with a good purpose that he demanded that the treasures of King Attalus (p. 193) should be used to establish the poor burgesses on the land allotted them; but the proposition was a direct interference with the financial and provincial administration of the senate, and the tribune thereby increased the hatred of the senate and the optimates, who spread the report that Gracchus aspired to be king. He was threatened with impeachment on laying down his office; and it became important for him again to hold the tribuneship for the year B.C. 132. In order to secure the sympathies of the masses in Rome, in

whose hands lay the decision, he indicated a new series of rogations, aimed more decisively at breaking down the rule of the senate. When the election came, and it became clear that Gracchus would carry the day, the optimates interposed the objection that it was contrary to the law for the same citizen to hold the tribunate twice in succession. No case had occurred for a long time that could serve as a precedent; and as the presiding tribunes could not agree upon other questions, the comitia were adjourned. When they met to vote at the temple on the Capitol, the supporters of the optimates renewed their objection to the legality of re-electing Tiberius. A tumult arose in which the parties came to blows. Masses of the opponents of Gracchus surged toward the neighboring Temple of Fides, where the consul Mucius Scaevola was holding a meeting of the senate. The report was circulated that Gracchus was demanding for himself a crown. The optimates now saw their opportunity. The most violent among them, the pontifex maximus, Publius, son of brave old Scipio Nasica, demanded at once the employment of force; and when the careful Scaevola held back, Nasica fiercely cried, "If the consul himself is a traitor to his country, let all who wish the welfare of the republic and the stability of the constitution, follow me," and was followed by the majority of the senators. They were joined by many knights, by their dependents among the people and numerous slaves; as they climbed to the Capitol the people ventured no opposition to them. The nobles armed themselves with cudgels, and legs of chairs or broken benches, while their followers gathered stones, and bent on murder, rushed upon Gracchus and his followers, who quickly dispersed. Gracchus was murdered before the door of the Capitoline temple; and three hundred Romans were killed that day, some clubbed to death, others thrown from the Tarpeian Rock. At evening the bodies were thrown into the Tiber. Tiberius had broken the constitution by his deposition of Octavius, and in return the optimates violated the sacred person of a tribune of the people. The period of revolution had begun.

In defending itself for the death of Tiberius, the senate insisted that he had actually aspired to royalty, or at least was guilty of high treason in attempting a violent breach of the constitution. Even men of a more temperate character, like Scipio Aemilianus, regarded the violent death of Tiberius as justifiable. The violence of Nasica could not, indeed, be overlooked; and not long after he was sent away under cover of a mission to Asia, where he died. The agrarian reform once introduced was for the time maintained, being supported by many eminent

men, such as Metellus Macedonicus, and Aemilianus on his return from Spain in b.c. 132, the more earnestly from the fact that country people at least had been satisfied, though the city populace continued to oppose the aristocracy with growing bitterness.

The transfer of Pergamum to Rome was made at this time, after a hard struggle. Aristonicus, a natural son of Eumenes II., was unwilling to give up an inheritance which, according to the usage of the Hellenistic courts, could descend to an illegitimate son. He gained a part of the royal treasures and mercenaries; the people everywhere took up his cause, and most of the Grecian cities on the coast were obliged to do him homage. He called to his aid the slaves of the interior provinces, which were then in revolt, and at the same time rallied about him the old, free, but impoverished natives who were opposed to the Greeks and the Hellenized upper classes, announcing for all a new state of general freedom and equality, whose citizens he named ‘Heliopolitae.’ With these fanatical companies and with Thracian soldiers he was able to capture and sack all places which closed their gates against him, including the rich cities of Thyatira and Apollonis. At last the Romans were obliged to take up arms. In b.c. 131 the consul, the able P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, with a Roman army, landed at Elaea, the port of Pergamum, and received accessions from the dependent kings of Cappadocia, Pontus, Paphlagonia, and Bithynia; but in January, b.c. 130, he was completely defeated by Aristonicus, and taken prisoner, when, to escape disgrace, he struck his Thracian keeper, who at once killed him. His successor, M. Perpenna, was able to surprise and defeat the king while still in winter quarters, to enclose him in Stratonicea, and after a long siege to force him to surrender. Aristonicus was strangled in b.c. 129 in Rome. The remnants of the ‘Heliopolitae’ resisted with the fury of despair, but were everywhere systematically hunted down and exterminated; and the new province of ‘Asia’ was established, which included Mysia as far as Mount Olympus, Aeolis, Ionia, Lydia, and Caria. The seat of government was at Ephesus.

In Rome the land commission at first entered earnestly upon its labors; but when, in b.c. 131, Appius Claudius died, a change took place. Caius Græchus received as associates two violent leaders of the popular party, M. Fulvius Flaccus and the highly gifted but reckless and unprincipled Caius Papirius Carbo (b.c. 130), men who had nothing of the noble character of Tiberius Græchus. In this period Scipio lost entirely the favor of the city populace and of the Gracchan

family, headed by Sempronius and Cornelia, because he had not condemned the murder of Tiberius, and had given repeated expression to his displeasure at the increasing mixture of the *plebs urbana* with foreign stock and with freedmen and their descendants. Though he actively supported the carrying out of Gracchus's agrarian law, he would not aid the plans of the radicals, which sought to limit the power of the senate, nor pay any regard to the uneasiness of the Italians at the agrarian question. In b.c. 131, when Carbo was tribune, Scipio had a rogation defeated which legalized an immediate re-election to the tribunate; and only some years later was this permitted. Not long after, Scipio changed his attitude even toward the agrarian reform. The labors of the land commission had, according to Mommsen, produced very considerable advantages for the peasant class. The census at the beginning of the year b.c. 132 gave only 319,000 Roman citizens capable of bearing arms, while that of b.c. 125 gave 395,000, a result probably attributable to the working of the reform of Gracchus. But the commission now approached very delicate ground. Senate and people had in times past granted to various allied communities of Italy, and especially to 'Latin' colonies, exclusive use of large tracts of the domain, while other portions had been occupied by Latin citizens with or without permission. When the commission began to interfere with these lands, bitter complaints came to the senate from the allied communities; and the 'Italian question' stood at the door. Even now the optimates let slip the opportunity of righting an ancient wrong, and by an action which would have shown political greatness making the Italian confederates their truest supporters against the popular party; but they were compelled, nevertheless, to consider seriously protection of the material interests of allies who had long been justly disaffected, while the popular party was to pay dearly for its indifference to the rights of the Italians. Scipio consented, in b.c. 131, that the use of the ballot in the comitia should be extended to legislative enactments; and when the Italian allies pressed for his support, in the beginning of b.c. 129, he took an active part. It was through his influence that by vote of the people its judicial power was withdrawn from the commission, and the decision as to what was public domain and what was private property transferred to the censors and to the consuls, to whom it constitutionally belonged. Of course this restricted further assignments by the commission. All sections of the democracy, in city and country alike, now united in deadly hatred of Scipio: and as he was about to present to the assembly of the people a statement of his views

concerning the relation of the Romans to the Italian allies, to the deep horror of the city he was found dead in his bed. The cause of his death was never made known, but at the time and afterward it was fully believed that the conqueror of Carthage was the victim of an assassin; that this was the democratic answer to the outrage on Tiberius Gracchus. The popular party sought to make good their earlier mistake, and to gain the friendship of the Italians, who would gladly have entered into the agrarian reform if they could have shared in the full Roman citizenship. M. Fulvius Flaccus when consul, in b.c. 125, proposed a rogation that every Italian ally might apply for Roman citizenship, but found so little support that he gladly withdrew to carry on the war against the Transalpine Celts (Fig. 46).

Of the Celtic races between the Alps and the Atlantic Ocean the Suessiones (near Soissons) at that time had the dominant position in the northwest. In the central and southern provinces the power was in the hands of the partially civilized Arverni (in Auvergne), who were supposed to be able to put 180,000 warriors into the field, and who were at constant feud with the Haedui (near Autun). Fulvius began the interference of Rome in the affairs of Gaul by attacking the tribes between the Alps and the Rhone, which were composed of an old Ligurian stock with Celtic additions. His successes in b.c. 125 and b.c. 124 aroused the Allobroges, near the Isère (whose capital was Vienne), to take up arms; but they were subdued, and in b.c. 122 Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus entered their territory. The Haedui joined the Romans, while the Arverni sent all their forces to aid the Allobroges. A grandson of Aemilius Paulus, the consul Q. Fabius Maximus, on August 8, b.c. 121, near where the Isère falls into the Rhone, utterly defeated the Arverni, and securely founded the supremacy of the Romans in Southern Gaul. The Allobroges were forced to accept the Roman rule, and in a second great battle the Arverni were again defeated by Ahenobarbus. These successes made it possible to erect a new Roman province between the Alps and the Pyrenees, according to the plan of the democratic party, whose gifted young leader, Caius Gracchus, hoped to win in Gaul for the Roman peasants a new district for colonization, excellent in climate and natural advantages, and from the very outset free from the burden of Roman capital, which pressed upon Africa and Sicily. The new province, Gallia Narbonensis, extended from the sea and the Alps (as far north as Lake Geneva) to the Rhone, the Cévennes, and the upper course of the Garonne. The new Roman coast road, which united Upper Italy with Spain, was defended by a

garrisoned fortress, Aquae Sextiae (Aix), and by the founding of a large and strong Roman colony, Narbo Martius (Narbonne), as the residence of the governor, which was completed in B.C. 118, and very soon rivalled Massilia (Marseilles) in its commerce.




FIG. 46.—From a Gallo-Italian tomb at Sesto Calende, in Italy. Cinerary urn, sword, helmet, wind-instrument, arrow-head, and spear-head. (From *Revue archéol.*, 1867.)

The Italians were so embittered at the hostile reception given to the plan, which in B.C. 125 Fulvius had proposed in their favor, that Fregellae, the most important of the Latin colonies, sought to extort equal rights for itself by an open defection from Rome; but it was soon

subdued, destroyed, and its territory divided among the neighboring towns. Then it was that the ablest leader of the popular party, and the one most feared by the senate, again took up open hostilities against the optimates. Caius Gracchus, though of less simple character than his brother, was like him distinguished among Roman young men for his morality, affability, temperance, bravery, unselfishness, and integrity. He stood for the tribuneship in B.C. 123, and after a hard canvass in a comitia that was unusually full, was chosen, and at once secured a controlling influence over his colleagues. Thus a Gracchus stood once more at the head of the masses against the optimates, and this time the struggle was far more serious than ten years before. Caius was a great man, a political genius. Friends and foes were at one in wondering at the mighty flow of language which stood at his command, at the tremendous passion that lent such power to his speeches, which yet were dignified, restrained, rich in thought, and always direct,—a power which still lives in the fragments that have come down to us. In him, with a rich and creative spirit, with a fulness of new and serviceable ideas, and with a great administrative talent, were united qualities which Tiberius lacked,—the ability to mature a comprehensive and practical plan, complete in its details, and a peculiar fertility in new expedients. It was a misfortune for Rome that so great a man should come into public life in opposition to the ruling power as an implacable enemy bound to revenge his brother. The greatest and most fruitful ideas which he introduced into the struggle became serviceable only in the next generation; while some of the dangerous methods which he employed to attack the optimates were adopted in their most objectionable shape, and had the worst effect upon the life of the state. Caius planned to put an end to the supremacy of the senate, and the existing power of the nobility, and to make real the theoretical sovereignty of the commonalty, and thus to secure the predominance in the state to the democratic elements. With this purpose he labored to reconcile to one another the city populaee, the peasants and farmers, and the Italians by a well digested system of laws, and to bring about a settlement by which the entire commons of the peninsula should be entirely separated from the nobility, and formed into a sure support of the democracy and its leaders. By other measures the closed phalanx of the aristocracy was to be broken up, and one part was to be forced aside with the help of the other. The rogations of Caius in this direction show a strange combination of grand and fruitful reforms, and of measures impressed by him with a demagogic character, and aimed directly at the nobility.

The statements of the ancients, and the views of later investigators, concerning the assignment of his proposals to the two years B.C. 123 and B.C. 122 vary widely from one another. While it is impossible to arrange the order of events with certainty, the following account seems the most probable.

At first Caius wished to bind closely to himself his immediate supporters and the city populace. By only a bare majority he put through a law forbidding any curule officer under heavy penalties from bringing a Roman citizen before criminal commissions, except at the bidding of the people. He wished thus to put an end to the practice of the senate of inflicting, under cover of the Porcian Law, death penalties on political offenders, who for this purpose only were declared traitors, 'enemies of their country,' and thus put outside the protection of the law. With hard struggles he then carried a corn-law. Henceforth every Roman burgess in the city, who should personally present himself, was to receive monthly from the public granaries a certain amount of corn (presumably 5 *modii*), at a merely nominal price, 6½ *asses*, 6 cents for the *modius* (4 bushel), which was scarcely a third of the average price. Caius thus went far beyond the nobility in the bidding for popular favor, which had been common among the nobility, and for a time secured a staunch majority in the comitia. But it was a most dangerous step. The influx of the proletariat into the city from all Roman villages and country towns, led by the desire for bread that was more than cheap, increased in the most alarming manner. Henceforth the *aerarium*, the public treasury, was permanently burdened with the task of providing the city proletariat with cheap and even with free corn. This evil system continued after the death of Gracchus. Of even greater political effect was the attempt of Gracchus to divide the senate and the knights, to win the powerful financial aristocracy as allies for the democracy. He proposed that the sworn jurymen (*judices*) in the standing commissions, who decided the more important civil and criminal causes, should no longer be taken from among the senators, but from the equestrian order. This rogation passed the more easily because public sentiment had lately been shocked by shameful acquittals by jurymen of the senatorial order of officers who had been accused of peculations. The equestrian order now formally broke away from the senate; and Caius selected 300 men from it, from whom the law commissions were to be formed. Unfortunately the sins of the jurymen of the equestrian order soon cast those of the senatorial order in the shade; for the knights were not only open to bri-

bery, and ready to acquit, in violation of justice, those of their own order, but upright officials of senatorial rank, who in the provinces resisted the caprice and extortions of the Italian tax-collectors and merchants, were themselves exposed to malicious accusations and partisan condemnation. Like evils grew out of another step which Caius took in order to gain the knights. By a vote of the people he withdrew from the senate the regulation of the taxes of the new province of Asia, and imposed on this land a number of direct and indirect taxes, among them the ground-tax, and decreed that the collection of these revenues should be farmed only in Rome, by which a monopoly was given into the hands of the knights, who were the *publicani*.

The grand qualities of Caius appear much more clearly in his comprehensive attack upon the financial and general administration of the senate. The versatility, administrative ability, and power to work, which Gracchus displayed in the midst of his restless activity as legislator and agitator, were extraordinary. By useful works, such as the extensive laying out of new roads, which were to complete the existing system, and promote intercourse and the market of agricultural products, he attached increasing numbers of all classes of the people to his interests,—the many mechanics and laborers that thus found occupation, surveyors, engineers, the country people to whom he opened new markets, and even the capitalists. But to elevate the Roman peasantry, Caius thought the surest means were to break down the wall which the nobility had raised between Italy and the provinces, and to turn the stream of emigration of the Italian proletariat to the Roman possessions in the provinces, and here upon free soil to transform countless pauperized men into serviceable and well-to-do citizens. He first had a law passed which rendered possible the sending of 6000 colonists to the ruins of Carthage, where the new settlement, ‘Junonia,’ was to receive the rights of a Roman colony. The last step in his reforms was to be the admission of the Italians to citizenship, though, perhaps, by the establishment of various grades, by which the supremacy of Gracchus and his party would have been permanently assured. It is truly tragic that the most beneficent and the most promising plans of the great demagogue should bring about his downfall.


Caius had thus far been victorious over the nobility and senate at all points, and had transferred the political power to the comitia, but he had only made new combinations of the dominant elements. The superiority of the comitia only implied that of the tribunes instead of that of the consuls, so long as the capricious multitude did not

forsake their leaders, and did not weaken them by the choice of unreliable colleagues. If the relation had remained as it then was, the internal history of Rome would have taken the form of a long-continued civil war between nobility and commonalty, between senate and tribunes, till a tyrant emerged from the demagogue. But Graecchus did not think of acquiring tyranny, nor would the nobility give up their political position without repeated struggles. The optimates knew only too well the weakness of the position of their great opponent. They knew that the populace would refuse to follow him, if but once his rash plans miscarried, or their own gross material interests seemed to be injured. In the year b.c. 122 the opponents of Caius found their opportunity. The Italian rogation met with the most stubborn resistance from the Roman populace, which had no desire to share the advantages of citizenship even with Latins. The efforts of Caius and Fulvius were without effect. Divisions appeared in the college of tribunes; and one of them, M. Livius Drusus, in support of the senate, undertook by his veto to bring the rogation to naught. After making this first wide breach in the popularity of Graecchus, the senate pushed energetically forward, and Drusus was ready to lead the attack. The first attempt was to convince the short-sighted, thankless, and grossly covetous multitude that the senate desired to give their poor fellow citizens more valuable gifts than did Caius,—if only this man were put aside, who disturbed the good relations between the senate and the people. The plans of the optimates were skilfully laid. Caius was elected upon the commission to establish the colony of Junonia. While he was thus removed from Rome for sixty or seventy days, Drusus, a man of great personal popularity and brilliant oratorical powers, and now in all points supported by the senate, proposed rogations which went far beyond the plans of Graecchus. Instead of emigration, twelve new colonies of 3000 men each were to be founded in Italy itself, and the burdens laid upon the occupiers of the newly assigned peasant estates by the Graecchan legislation were to be remitted. The intrigue was completely successful. The blind mob did not see the gross trick played upon it. The people were won over to the senate, a general coldness toward Graecchus was apparent, and the rogations of Drusus were accepted; and Q. Fabius Maximus and L. Opimius, the most violent of the optimates, were chosen consuls for the year b.c. 121, while Caius was defeated in suing anew for the tribuneship.

In the beginning of the year b.c. 121 Opimius began by purposely upsetting several of the new regulations of Graecchus, with the view of

enticing him or his party to some violence, which would justify the senate in proceeding against him as it had formerly done against his brother. As soon as the report came from Africa of evil prodigies which were said to have appeared at the foundation of the new colony on the site of Carthage, which had been ‘cursed for eternity,’ the senate persuaded the tribune Minucius Rufus to assemble the comitia of the tribes in order to annul the law which established the colony. Late in the spring or early in the summer the comitia assembled upon the Capitol; and Fulvius Flaccus and many democrats appeared, armed with daggers and pointed writing-stiles, that they might not be surprised as Tiberius Gracchus and his friends had been. A lictor of the consul Opimius, who insulted and threatened Caius, was stabbed by his infuriated followers; whereupon Opimius prepared for violent action. During the following night he took possession of the Capitol with a company of Cretan archers. In the early morning the senatorial nobility, with their dependents, and with them the younger knights and whoever of the moneyed aristocracy held with them, each knight being accompanied by two armed slaves, gathered in arms under his command. The consul then had the body of the murdered lictor carried through the Forum with wild lamentation, and so excited the senate that under the formula used in cases of need, *videat consul ne quid res publica detrimentum capiat*, it conferred dictatorial power on him, which Opimius did not delay to use. The formal occasion for violence was offered by Caius and Fulvius themselves, who, when the senate cited them before it to answer for the deed of the day before, seized with their partially armed supporters the strong and easily defended Aventine (PLATE XIII.), the ancient citadel of the plebeians, where Fulvius fortified the temple of Diana. Any attempt at negotiation was prevented by Opimius, who proclaimed that whoever brought the heads of Caius and Fulvius to the senate should receive their weight in gold, and ordered Decimus Junius Brutus to attack the insurgents with all his force. At the same time the announcement was made that every one should receive amnesty who before the battle surrendered, and laid down his arms. Thus the mass of the people forsook the cause of the democrats, who in the attack upon the temple on the Aventine were shot down in great numbers by the Cretan archers. Fulvius and his company were soon overpowered, and flight was general, and the massacre began. Caius, who had taken no part in the fight, fled across the bridge over the Tiber, and in the grove of Furina had himself put to death by a trusty slave. In all, 3000 people fell in the massacre,

PLATE XIII.



The Aventine Hill. (From a photograph.)



Fulvius among them. The corpses were this time also thrown into the Tiber. The possessions of the murdered leaders were confiscated ; and with them Opimius was able to erect in the Forum, on the open place at the foot of the Capitol, on the site of the older shrines, a new and splendid temple to the goddess of Concord.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### CAIUS MARIUS AND THE REVOLUTION OF THE ITALIANS.

THE Roman popular party had been defeated in the first great battle. The optimates had once again exhibited the vigor which often in the past had saved Rome in the hour of need, but their bloody victory brought them no prosperity. They had only put out of the way the dreaded tribune and intimidated the people; the new rights of the moneyed aristocracy and the distributions of corn were left untouched. The soundest ideas of Caius, the reconciliation of Italy and the Romanizing of the provinces, were for a time put aside, though the influence of the merchant class brought about the establishment of the colony of Narbo ; of the colonies of Drusus there was, of course, no further mention. Artful means were devised to undo the work of Tiberius Gracchus. The injunction against the sale of the newly assigned farms was removed, and within twenty years capitalists and large land-owners had again bought up the new peasant holdings. In b.c. 119 the senate secured a vote of the people abolishing the allotment commission, and laying a fixed tax upon the occupiers of the domain-land, the proceeds of which were to be divided among the people. In b.c. 111 a new law changed all the domain-land hitherto occupied, ‘as far as the legal measure had not been exceeded,’ into private property free from taxation. In the future the domain-land that still remained, or that might be acquired, was only to be leased, or under definite limitations used as pasture.

The oligarchy soon displayed their ancient faults, — selfishness, venality, and avarice, — with a lack of concealment which proved fatal to them as soon as they also showed themselves incompetent to defend the honor and safety of the state.

At first the task of defending the long northern boundary, from the Lake of Geneva to the Thracian Chersonese, against the Celtic peoples of the Alps, and the Thracians, was very incompletely performed. Great difficulty was experienced in subduing Illyria. In the course of the struggle the Romans crossed the Eastern Alps in b.c. 115, estab-

lished relations with the Celts in Styria and Carinthia,—whose chief city was Noreia (near Klagenfurt), and who possessed important iron and gold mines,—and by b.c. 111 they reached the Danube.

Far more serious, however, were the wars in Numidia, and with the Germanic peoples, who now for the first time appear in history. In Numidia, Mieipsa, owing to his great age and literary tastes, had left the conduct of affairs after the death of his brothers to Jugurtha, an illegitimate son of his brother Mastanabal. Jugurtha, who was educated at the court, and held in equal honor with the young sons of the king, by his beauty, and by his military and administrative ability, gained the affections of the people, and by his assistance at Numantia secured the favor of prominent Romans. Mieipsa adopted Jugurtha (b.c. 120), and at his death gave him by his will, which was made subject to the ratification of the senate, an equal share in the government with his own sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal. A quarrel soon broke out between the princes. Hiempsal was murdered by assassins employed by his cousin; and a war between Adherbal and Jugurtha obliged the senate, which was at last called in, to send a commission under L. Opimius to divide the Numidian kingdom. The Roman envoys took good care of their own private interests. They were bribed by Jugurtha, and gave to Adherbal Cirta and the east half of the kingdom, while Jugurtha received the fertile western portion. Soon a new war broke out again between the two kings; and Adherbal was besieged in his capital, when he received active assistance against his assailant from the many Italians living in the city. But the gold of Jugurtha had such effect in Rome that the senate, instead of interfering vigorously, merely sent envoys to Africa, who accomplished nothing. Cirta capitulated in b.c. 112; and Jugurtha cruelly put to death Adherbal, with all the male inhabitants of the city, Italians as well as Africans. The indignation of the Roman moneyed aristocracy, which had suffered severely in Cirta, at this outrage, and the energy with which Caius Memmius, tribune elect for the year b.c. 111, gave expression to the public discontent, led the senate to declare war, and to intrust the command to the consul L. Calpurnius Bestia, who had under him as legate the ex-consul Aemilius Scaurus, then *princeps senatus*, and a man of great military experience. Everything seemed to favor the rapid success of the Roman arms and the acquisition of much booty; but Jugurtha, by bribing the consul and Scaurus, whose reputation had been irreproachable, induced them to conclude a peace. The king in form submitted, but received back as a favor his entire realm, and had to pay only a small

war-tax — thirty elephants, and a number of horses and cattle — to the Romans. The report of this agreement aroused the bitterest indignation at Rome. Again Memmius gave voice to the public anger, and insisted that the senate should summon the king to Rome, and inquire into the methods by which the treaty had been made, and into the guilt of the negotiators. When Jugurtha, under a safe-conduct, appeared, Memmius made ready to examine him before the assembled commonalty. Another tribune, who had been gained over, interposed his veto, and ordered the king not to answer. A new crime of Jugurtha, committed in Rome itself, brought on his ruin. He caused a rival claimant to the throne of Numidia to be put out of the way before the senate had ratified the compact of Calpurnius. The senate ordered him out of Italy, and determined to renew the war. The army, which had lost all discipline, and in which the rapacity of the soldiers kept pace with the venality of the officers, after an unsuccessful attack upon Suthul (Guelma), where the king's treasures were kept, was lured by Jugurtha into a desert, overwhelmed in a night attack, and forced to capitulate. Jugurtha demanded the renewal of the compact made with Calpurnius and the departure of the Romans from Numidia within ten days, and was senseless enough to disgrace his captives by sending them 'under the yoke.' In so doing he dictated his own death sentence. The new treaty was instantly rejected at Rome; and the tribune Mamilius was able to put through a rogation for an investigation against all those by whose connivance Jugurtha had rendered ineffective the decisions of the senate, and who as envoys or generals had received money from him. This investigation was by no means searching, and the judgments may not have been just; for at the head of the commission stood Scaurus, who later was known to have himself taken bribes. Some of the most hated optimates, including L. Opimius and Calpurnius Bestia, were banished.

The command in Africa was given to one of the best of the optimates, the nephew of the conqueror of Macedonia, Q. Caecilius Metellus, who was free from the common faults of his order, and was also a general of distinguished skill. With him as legates went P. Rutilius Rufus, who afterward established an improved system of tactics, and the energetic Caius Marius, a peasant's son, who had already held the praetorship. The task of restoring discipline to the African army, and making it fit for service, was first performed rapidly and severely, but without barbarous harshness. The new war was very difficult. The entire strength of Numidia stood opposed to the Romans, and since his

victory Jugurtha was regarded by the Numidians as invincible. Metellus determined to destroy the king, the one cause of the war, and was ready to make use of any means to accomplish his purpose. He defeated Jugurtha so severely in a great battle near the river Muthul, in B.C. 109, that the king determined to open negotiations; but when he found that after the surrender of his elephants, many horses, 200,000 pounds of silver, 300 hostages, and 3000 deserters, the Romans still demanded that he give up his person, he renewed the contest with increased energy. Metellus fought his way to Southern Numidia, and after perilous desert marches reached the oasis of Thala, or Thelepte, not far from the Great Desert, and after a siege of forty days took by storm the city where Jugurtha with his best troops was defending his treasures, though the king escaped, and the best part of the booty was lost in the flames. Undaunted, Jugurtha persuaded the wild Gaetulians on the southern slope of the great Atlas range, and his Mauretanian father-in-law, King Bochus, to join in the war against the Romans; but the swarms of horsemen from the west and south, powerful as they were, could gain no advantage over the Romans, who had formed an intrenched camp near Cirta. Metellus, however, now ceased operations on learning that the Roman people had taken the command from him, and tried to end hostilities by negotiation with Bochus.

The new commander was Caius Marius, whose appearance marks the beginning of a new epoch in the revolution. Born near Arpinum, B.C. 156, of a poor peasant family, a stranger to the cultivation and the corruption of the city world, Marius was the true pattern of a Roman plebeian of the ancient type, both in his ability and his honesty, his faults and superstition. Tribune in B.C. 119, praetor in B.C. 115, acquiring property, and connected with the nobility by his marriage with Julia, the aunt of the great Caesar, this vigorous, self-made man hoped to attain even the consulship. At that time Marius had no inclination to the opposition. He despised indeed the incompetence and indolence of the officers from the nobility; but he was a conservative of the type of Cato, and his sympathies were chiefly with the peasants, whose hard condition distressed him. But when, in applying for the consulship for the year B.C. 107, he met the scorn and decided hostility of Metellus, who had till then been his supporter, the ambitious *homo novus* was filled with a fierce and persistent rage against the nobility, which later drove him to frightful excesses. In Rome, where tidings were then received of battles lost in the lands beyond the Alps, his candidacy aroused great enthusiasm among the opposition. The merchants grum-

bled at the long continuance of the African war, and Marius did not hesitate sharply to criticize his general, and to the delight of the masses was chosen consul. The democratic party had again found a leader, who this time was a great general. The political talents of Marius were very limited; and his first step as consul, an innovation fruitful of most serious consequences, was taken innocently, without thought of the future. The command against Jugurtha, in spite of a resolution of the senate, was taken by the commonalty from Metellus, and conferred upon Marius, who, in recruiting his army for the new campaign, thought to relieve as far as possible the poorer peasants from the heavy weight of military duty, and contrary to the immemorial custom threw open the ranks to the proletarians, without dreaming of what the change meant. From the day when the old principle was given up, of intrusting the arms of the legionaries only to the propertied classes, the Roman peasants and burgesses began to disappear from

the legions, and their places to be supplied by proletarians. There came into existence a class of soldiers, of persons who made a trade of war. Differing from mercenaries scarcely more than in name, and soon considering themselves the followers of the general rather than the citizens of the republic, these troops became the instruments, first of civil war, and in the end of the establishment of the rule of the Caesars.



FIG. 47.—  
Sulla, portrait on a  
coin. (Berlin.)

For a time the new system showed only its military advantages. Soldiers who had no interest in returning as soon as possible to their peasant labors, could be formed more firmly into legions, and war could be conducted with them much more efficiently than before. Marius did not succeed in subduing Jugurtha so rapidly as he and his friends had hoped. By a daring march into the country south of Thala, he wrested all eastern Numidia from the king, and in b.c. 106 led his army across western Numidia to the boundary of Mauretania, where he besieged a fortress regarded as impregnable, which contained Jugurtha's treasures. In the camp here appeared the young noble, Lucius Cornelius Sulla (Fig. 47), born b.c. 138, who was to be the peasant general's most dangerous enemy. Sulla, who like many another young Roman noble, had considerable literary training, had spent his youth in reckless living until several legacies enabled him to enter upon public life, and thus to be sent as quaestor to Marius, who was by no means rejoiced at receiving this notorious voluptuary. But Sulla was a born general, who in the school of Marius unfolded his

eminent talents with surprising rapidity, and soon gave proof to his proud commander of his versatility. The fortress was taken, but Bocchus now determined upon active intervention; and on the march back to Cirta, Marius was twice attacked by vast hordes of Moorish and Numidian cavalry, which were with difficulty beaten off. In the second of these fights Sulla showed talents of the highest order as an independent commander. The Romans, in the winter of B.C. 106–105, employed all their arts to win Bocchus from his alliance with Jugurtha. They seemed to have agreed, when Bocchus required, in seizing his son-in-law, the aid of Sulla, whom he had come to know. Notwithstanding the known duplicity of Bocchus, the bold quaestor undertook this hazardous venture, and with a small body of Roman troops entered the Mauretanian camp (B.C. 105), where Bocchus delivered Jugurtha into his hands (Fig. 48). The price of this treachery was part of

Numidia. The rest of Masinissa's kingdom was given to a half-brother of Jugurtha. The king himself, who for seven years had resisted the power of Rome, after gracing his victor's triumph, was put to death in a Roman prison. Marius received the most splendid reward for his victory, which was really due to the boldness of Sulla, in the consulship for the next year, to which the people had chosen him in his absence. He seemed the only man who could check the terrible Germans, who had annihilated one Roman army after another beyond the Alps, and by these blows had announced to the Romans a danger now near at hand.

For years there had appeared, on the frontiers of the Celtic races that dwelt beyond the Roman provinces, a people characterized by giant stature, fair hair, and blue eyes, who on their march brought with them on carts their wives and children and household belongings.

These were the Cimbri, whose advance toward the south is the first migration of the German peoples in historic times. Determined, perhaps, by over-population or by disastrous convulsions of nature, the Cimbri and the Teutones left their home on the North Sea (the Cimbrian peninsula), and on the western part of the Baltic. The Cimbri seem to have advanced up the Elbe, and, after attacking the Celtic Boii in Bohemia, to have turned east, and recrossed the Danube, when the consul of the year B.C. 113, Cn. Papirius Carbo, ordered them out of the territory of the Taurisci. They obeyed the command; but when Carbo attacked them treacherously near Noreia, they inflicted a dis-



FIG. 48. — Jugurtha kneeling before Sulla. Reverse of a coin. (Berlin.)

astrous defeat upon him, and then pressed westward. After they had traversed the country of two Celtic peoples,—the Helvetii, who occupied the whole land between the Main and the Lake of Geneva, and the Sequani,—they entered the lands west of the Jura, where the Roman general, M. Junius Silanus, appeared in B.C. 109 to defend the lands on the Rhone. The request of the Cimbri for an assignment of a district for peaceable settlement was answered by an attack, which again resulted in a complete overthrow of the Romans. The victors now turned upon the Celts in the interior of Gaul; and the senate had abundant time to despatch a new army to the Transalpine lands, which, under the consul L. Cassius Longinus, was defeated on the Garonne (near Agen) by Helvetian tribes which had followed the invasion. The authority of the Romans was so greatly shaken that one city of their Gallic province, Tolosa (Toulouse), ventured to revolt, but was at once subdued and punished. In B.C. 105, the senate provided three armies for the defence of the Gallic province. The Cimbrian chieftain Boiorix now turned boldly against the Roman province, fell upon the united armies, and on October 6 B.C. 105, near Arausio (Orange), thanks to the mutual jealousy of the Roman leaders, he inflicted upon them a crushing defeat, in which 80,000 men are said to have fallen. The wasting of the lands overrun by the victors was fearful; and to celebrate their victories, the prisoners were hung, or sacrificed to the gods by the white-robed priestesses. All Italy was terrified, for the Alpine passes now lay unprotected. The salvation of Rome lay in the fact that the absence of system in the advance of the Germans rendered useless the successes which their bravery secured. Instead of following the Romans, they turned aside to plunder the Arverni, and then unexpectedly directed their steps toward Spain, so that Marius, upon whom the consulate had been again conferred for the year B.C. 104, in complete disregard of the election laws, found time to make the necessary preparations, to discipline thoroughly the newly formed army, which was re-enforced by contingents from Massilia, and from the Allobroges and the Sequani, and to select an excellent position for covering the Alpine passes at the point where the Isère falls into the Rhone.

The Cimbri were not able to master the Celtiberian raees in Spain, and in B.C. 103 turned again toward Gaul. Passing northward, probably along the coast as far as the lower Seine, they met with stubborn resistance from the Belgian Celts. Here they united with the Teutones and the Helvetian bands in Gaul, and decided upon the invasion of Italy. The booty already taken was left in northern Gaul, under

the protection of 6000 warriors. The invaders then divided into two powerful columns, which were to meet again upon the soil of Italy. The Cimbri went by way of the Rhine toward the passes of the Eastern Alps, while the Teutones, under their chieftain, Teutobod, advanced against Marius. Meantime Marius had introduced among his troops the changes which from that time determined the form of Roman tactics. Aside from the introduction of the silver eagle and many lesser changes in equipment, the legions were raised to an effective strength of 6000 men, and divided into ten battalions, or cohorts. The old distinction of the three members or ranks was completely done away with; and by abolishing the *velites* all the soldiers were made equal in rank and armor, while the best men were transferred from the third to the front ranks.

When, in the summer of B.C. 102, the Teutones crossed the Rhone, and appeared before the Roman camp near Valentia (Valence), Marius held firmly to the defensive, and accustomed his young troops behind their intrenchments to the sight of the northern giants, to their deafening war-cries, and, regardless of his soldiers' eagerness for battle, allowed the barbarians to pass his camp toward the south, where they intended to seize the coast-passes of the Alps. Marius followed with the utmost prudence; and one afternoon, not far from Aquae Sextiae, a great battle grew from a skirmish of the auxiliary troops, in which the Romans were victorious, which was followed on the second day after by a decisive battle. Scarcely had Marius arranged his army upon the hill where his camp stood, before the Teutones made their fearful onset. For hours the struggle remained undecided, but at last the Roman arms proved superior to the poorly tempered weapons of the Germans. The Teutones, who were oppressed by the heat of the Provençal sun, were driven into the plain; and when their rear was attacked by a detachment which lay in ambush they were unable to rally. The battle ended with the complete annihilation of the Teutones. But the fate of Italy was still in the balance, for at the same time the Cimbri had opened a passage on the upper Adige. The consul Q. Lutatius Catulus had not been able to defend the Alpine passes; and when, in the summer of B.C. 102, he attempted to hold his position on the Adige, below Trent, his troops mutinied, and he was barely able to prevent his retreat from becoming a panic. The Romans were obliged to give up the larger part of the plains between the Po and the Alps. The Cimbri wintered in Upper Italy, awaiting the arrival of the Teutones, of whose overthrow they knew nothing. So Marius could lead

his victorious army from Aquae Sextiae to Italy, and unite with the demoralized troops of Catulus. In the summer of B.C. 101 Marius, now for the fifth time consul, and Catulus, crossed the upper Po with 50,000 men; and on July 30, on the 'Raudian Fields,' near Verona, occurred a battle which began with the rout of the Celtic horsemen by the Italian. The discipline and superior tactics of the Romans, aided by the heat and dust of the Italian summer, brought upon the Cimbri, notwithstanding their superior numbers and despairing bravery, the same fate as upon the Teutones the year before.

The difficulty of these struggles with the northern peoples was increased by a very dangerous uprising of slaves and proletarians, that in B.C. 104 broke out in Sicily. The insurrection, beginning in the east of the island among the slaves, led by Salvius, as 'King Tryphon,' and spreading to the west, under the highly gifted Cilician slave, Athenion, was prolonged by the folly of the Romans. It was finally suppressed only in B.C. 101 and B.C. 100, by the consul Manius Aquilius, fresh from service under Marius, after a hard struggle.

The fairest, proudest day in the life of Caius Marius, whom the Roman people placed beside Romulus and Camillus as the 'third founder' of their city, was that of his triumph in the summer of B.C. 101, after the conclusion of the German war; but it was the last unclouded day in his career, for the great general now sought to play the part of a statesman, and, entering into a struggle for which he lacked every qualification, in a single year was cast aside as a political failure. Incontestably the first man of the state for the time, he hoped to maintain this position in opposition to the optimates, by becoming the chief leader of the democracy, which from the year B.C. 107 had looked upon him as its natural head, and with whose new champions he already was closely associated. The really dangerous opponents of the optimates were two demagogues of low descent, the witty C. Servilius Glaucia, a powerful popular speaker, and the far more important and estimable Appuleius Saturninus, a gifted orator, but extremely violent, who, since B.C. 104, had been on the worst possible terms with the senate, and was a bitter personal enemy of Metellus Numidicus. After his return from Upper Italy, Marius entered into close relations with both these men in order to gain at once another consulship. But it was his misfortune that he had no far-reaching plans of reform to propose, that he had not the gifts needed to play a parliamentary part, and had neither the strength nor the skill to control the agitators who now crowded round him. Thus he first became the tool of these people,

and afterward, when he recognized the incompatibility of their views and violence with his own simple ideas, he broke with them in a way that brought ruin on himself. He was elected consul for the sixth time for the year b.c. 100, with Glaucia as praetor, and Appuleius as tribune, though in the election an opposition candidate was murdered. A vast agrarian law was now proposed, which aimed at a comprehensive emigration of the Italian proletariat under the direction of Marius. For the veterans of Marius, probably for the Italian and the Roman alike, Appuleius demanded a settlement in the provinces wherever the senate had immediate possessions. The land beyond the Po lately recovered from the Cimbri, and also that beyond the Alps, was to serve the same purpose. The adhesion of the populace was to be gained by reducing the price of the Roman modius to five-sixths of an *as* in the distribution of corn. A clause was added to the rogation, a shameful act of demagogic despotism, requiring, in case of its passage, that every member of the senate should swear obedience to it within five days, and that any one refusing should be expelled from the senate. The confederates gained the victory in the comitia, though not without violence, and the senate was called upon to take the oath. Marius at first hesitated, but after some days acknowledged the necessity of taking the oath. If the law had been passed irregularly, the oath would not have been binding; and one could thus swear ‘to obey the law as far as it was law.’ This expression he at once used, and in its surprise the senate actually followed his example. Metellus, who alone bravely refused the shameful assent, was obliged to leave Rome; and Appuleius procured his banishment in regular form. But the radicalism of the demagogues frightened all property-holders, especially the knights, and drove them to the side of the senate; and the elections of the next year led to a bloody catastrophe. Appuleius again sued for the tribuneship, and Glaucia for the consulship. The able Memmius was put forward by the senate as a candidate against Glaucia, but the democratic leaders caused him to be murdered by their hirelings. This daring outrage awoke the opposition and indignation of all elements in the city which still held to the old Roman order. Marius was almost in despair. He was clearly not master of the democracy; with his limited but honest mind he shrank from following where it led; and when the senate by the well-known formula intrusted the consuls with dictatorial power, he could not refuse to fulfil his duty as consul, and take the lead of the party of order against his allies. The whole nobility and the equestrian order with their dependants, their slaves

and gladiators, took up arms; and soon, on December 10, b.c. 100, a pitched battle took place between them and the democrats in the Forum. The democrats retreated before the troops of the senate led by Marius, to the Capitol, to the temple of Jupiter, where they were obliged to capitulate. Marius was not able to save their lives. So little control had he, that as soon as the prisoners were brought to the Curia Hostilia, the senate house on the Forum, the young nobles with their following climbed upon the roof, tore up the tiles, and killed the most prominent and most hated of the prisoners with volleys of stones and other missiles. The second great battle of the democracy with the optimates was lost, and this time because of the unhesitating opposition of the knights and of public opinion. The wretched Marius, scorned by all parties, could do nothing but absent himself, and after a long journey to Asia withdrew into deep retirement, to await the day which was to bring the seventh consulship which had been foretold him.

There was no thought of a great reaction in Rome; the senate began by annulling the laws of Appuleius. Some limit was put on the recent practice of the radical tribunes of imposing their decrees upon the state by a vote of the comitia, without any agreement with the senate, by prescribing that every new legislative proposition must be announced at least seventeen days before it was brought to vote, and that separate and disconnected propositions were no longer to be joined in one rogation.<sup>1</sup>

The more noble and intelligent part of the aristocracy determined to attempt a thorough reform on the side of the senate,—a determination to which they were led by the miscarriage of justice and the growing discontent of the Italian allies. The courts, controlled by jurymen from the equestrian order, gave increasing occasion for complaint; since only those officials could be employed in the provinces who would leave unchecked the extortions of tax-gatherers and usurers. Whoever ventured as governor to interfere in behalf of the rights and the interests of the subjects was exposed to false accusations and outrageous judgments. Among the Italians a feeling of deep indignation was steadily growing at the persistent disregard of their claims and at the repeated deeds of violence and oppression on the part of Roman officials and nobles. Even the citizens of the Latin right in the cities founded for the subjection of Italy came to share the anger of the other Italians

<sup>1</sup> In the year b.c. 97 the senate put an end by law to the human sacrifices, which in disastrous times had repeatedly brought disgrace upon the Roman name.

against Rome. As their claims for ultimate political equality became better founded, so much the more their resentment grew, when they saw that all the attempts of Roman statesmen to do them justice led only to their injury. At last, the growing ferment overcame the opposition between the aristocracy and democracy, which existed among them too; and the thought of taking up arms against Rome began to spread.

In Rome itself, however, a group of far-seeing and well-meaning men among the optimates, essentially conservative in their views, saw that there was imperative need of great reforms. Their representative was the son of the former opponent of Caius Gracchus, young Marcus Livius Drusus, a gifted, brilliant orator, of clean character and warm patriotism, who, as tribune, in B.C. 91, for the last time in the history of the republic, sought to avert the coming evils by a comprehensive plan of reform. He demanded that the equestrian order should no longer alone fill the juries, that the senate should be increased by 300 members from the equestrian order, and that from the senate thus enlarged the juries should in the future be taken. To win over the city populace he proposed a considerable increase in the distribution of grain. The country people were to be assisted by new colonizations, for which all the domain still remaining in Italy, including that in Campania, and considerable parts of Sicily, were to be employed. To complete his system Drusus had formed a close alliance with the leaders of the Italians, and made them a definite promise of admission to the Roman citizenship. These propositions aroused a general storm. While the bulk of the equestrian order, and the consul L. Marcius Philippus, bitterly opposed him, all Italy, except the great land-owners of Etruria and Umbria, was afame for Drusus. At the same time, perhaps against his wish, throughout all Central and Lower Italy a secret league was founded, determined upon revolt in case of the failure of the rogations. Drusus laid first before the commonalty only the first three rogations, united contrary to the law into one, and, in spite of the violent opposition of the consul Philippus, secured their passage. But when, on the ground of the violation of the law, the consul demanded that the senate refuse to ratify the new proposals, and when at the same time the tribune's plans for the Italians were made known, and the enmity of the city populace was awakened, Drusus, in the face of the mad cry of 'treason,' was obliged to put off the presentation of his proposal. The elections for the next year conferred the tribuneship upon the opponents of his plans; and at last

the majority of the senate decided, on the ground of the formal illegality, not to sanction the three rogations already accepted. In the autumn of b.c. 91 Drusus himself was stabbed in his house by an unknown hand, and the leaders of the Italians determined to wait no longer. They did not wish to be pursued, according to the Roman practice, with fatal prosecutions for treason on account of their alliance with Drusus; and they thought now in all seriousness to destroy the power of Rome by a general defection, and to establish a league of Italian states.

In the districts which had determined on revolt, the Marsi, Marrueini, Peligni, Vestini, Picentini, Samnites, and Lucani, earnest preparations were everywhere made for the struggle; and the alliance matured into a regular political organization. It was learned at Rome that the town of Asculum, in Picenum, had sent hostages for some unknown purpose to Corfinium; and when, toward the end of the year b.c. 91, the praetor, C. Servilius, was sent there, and uttered cruel threats in the theatre, the explosion took place. He and his attendants were murdered on the spot; and then all the Romans, men and women, in the town, were massacred. Thus began the Social War. The rising spread rapidly throughout Central and Lower Italy. The Marsi were the first to declare war in due form against the Romans. Once again the Italians sent messengers to Rome to demand citizenship. There they naturally received a proud and defiant refusal, which was intensified by the appointment of an extraordinary commission of investigation, which adjudged as traitors many distinguished men in Rome, ‘as guilty of this war through enticing the allies to defection.’

Etruria and Umbria, many cities of the Latin right, and some favored communities, like Nola and Nuceria, and the Greek cities of Naples and Rhegium, still held for a time to the Romans. Many portions of the local aristocracy, too, did not fall away; and in the midst of the insurgents, single towns stood bravely out against their countrymen. Nevertheless, the Romans suddenly saw themselves face to face with a danger such as they had not seen since the time of Hannibal. Could they by straining all their energies, and with the help of the provinces and of their foreign allies, succeed in maintaining at once the existence of the state and the old system of control over Italy? To determine this they prepared with all energy to advance, in the spring of b.c. 90, against the Italians, who already had attacked the Roman fortresses in their districts.

As far as we can ascertain, the constitution of the Italian league

was little more than a mere imitation of the Roman system. The city of Corfinium, in the district of the Peligni, was chosen as the central point, and named ‘*Italica*,’ or *Italia*, and shared its citizenship with the burgesses of all the revolted communities. A senate of five hundred was to establish the constitution, and take the conduct of military affairs. After the appointment of the senate, the Italians named temporarily for the war with Rome two consuls, Q. Pompaedius Silo, and the Samnite, C. Papius Mutilus, each of whom was assisted by six praetors. The silver coins of the league bore the Oscan inscription, ‘*Vitelio*,’ or the Latin ‘*Italia*,’ displaying simply a bull as the emblem of the land. One of them represents the Italian bull as goring with its horns the Roman wolf prostrate on the ground.

Their Roman training and skill in war made the Italians very dangerous opponents for Rome. The Romans by a vigorous advance, as in the time of the old Samnite wars, succeeded in actually dividing their enemies, and were able from the beginning to assume the offensive, while the Italians were obliged to employ a large part of their forces in besieging the Roman fortresses within their borders, like Venusia, Canusium, Aesernia in Samnium, and Alba in the country of the Marsi. In b.c. 90 the Romans appeared in the field with 100,000 men, re-enforced with light-armed troops and cavalry from Africa and other foreign countries, while the Greek maritime cities in Europe and Asia were called upon to furnish a fleet. The Italians on their side also mustered 100,000 men. The Romans had the double task of relieving the beleaguered fortresses and defeating the armies of the enemy, and thus of making simultaneously their attacks upon the long line from Picenum to southern Lucania. The form of the peninsula determined two chief theatres of the war,—a northern, from Picenum to the border of Campania, and a southern, embracing Campania, Samnium, and the southern districts. In the north the Roman consul, P. Rutilius Lupus, commanded, assisted by five legates with proconsular authority, among whom were the old Marius and Cn. Pompeius Strabo, father of the great Pompey; these were to engage the Italian consul, Silo, and his six praetors. In the south the Roman consul, L. Julius Caesar, with five legates, among them Sulla, met the Italian consul Mutilus with his six subordinate generals. Each Roman legate was to operate against a definite district, while the consuls were to direct the general campaign.

Success did not attend the operations of the consul Caesar in the south. After the loss of two battles in Samnium, he saw the Campa-

nian cities pass into the hands of the Samnites, who soon invested Acerrae, between Naples and Capua. Only when an attack of the Italians before Acerrae upon Caesar's camp resulted in the complete defeat of Mutilus with the loss of 6000 men, did the Romans breathe again. At other points, however, the Roman cause had on the whole been successful. The consul Rutilius Lupus was defeated by the Marsi, was himself mortally wounded, and 8000 of his soldiers fell. The command now devolved upon Marius, who not long after took the camp of the Marsi, whom his advance and a victory of his legate, Servius Sulpicius, over the Peligni compelled to withdraw to the east; and gradually pressing far into their country he was able to win two great victories over the enemy, the second of which, with the assistance of a corps of the southern army under Sulla, was decisive for the Romans. In Picenum, Pompeius and Sulpicius closely invested Asculum. Nevertheless, the cause of Rome was still in doubt. In Etruria and Umbria confidence was wavering, and when, with the powers of the Roman people already taxed to the utmost, the war clouds loomed up on the Asiatic horizon, the senate resolved to save the future of the state by judicious concessions. Toward the end of the year B.C. 90, the consul Caesar carried through a rogation conferring full Roman citizenship upon all members of Italian communities not in revolt against Rome, upon all the old Latins who still remained in Latium, upon all cities of the Latin right which had not gone over to the rebels, upon communities in Etruria and Umbria which had not rebelled, upon cities in the south like Nuceria, and especially upon the faithful Hellenic cities, and giving the allies in revolt with whom they did not wish to make a formal peace, the opportunity of returning to their allegiance. The law of the tribunes Plautius and Papirius (B.C. 89) provided that every one belonging to the Italian league should receive citizenship if within sixty days he sent his name to the city praetor. The consul Pompeius Strabo secured the Latin right for the newly organized district between the Po and the Alps. But again the stubbornness of the Romans made them put petty restrictions upon the great concessions to the 'new citizens.' They were to be enrolled in only eight tribes; this had the result of driving the Italians into the arms of the radical demagogues. At first, however, the concessions prevented the spread of the great conflagration, and sensibly relieved the senate in the conduct of the war for the year B.C. 89, in which the consuls were to operate in the north, while Sulla commanded in the south. A victory near Teate (Chieti) reduced the mountaineers of

Central Italy to subjection, and soon they everywhere gave up the struggle. The chief blow was delivered by the consul Pompeius, who, advancing with 75,000 men against Asculum in Picenum, routed the Italian praetor Judaeilius with 60,000 men, and after the capture of the town avenged most fearfully the blood of Servilius. All the Italian officers and prominent citizens were put to death; the remaining inhabitants lost their entire property, and were driven out as beggars. After the place where the fire of revolt was first kindled was thus savagely destroyed, the rest of Central Italy was rapidly subdued. With not less energy had Sulla conducted the war in the south. After two victories over the Campanians, Sulla was able to enter the country of the Samnites. A great success over Mutilus opened the way to Bovianum, and the capital of this brave people was forced to surrender. Yet the sturdy Samnites, in whom the spirit of the old times had again awaked, held out with stubborn resistance. In the south 30,000 foot, 1000 cavalry, and 20,000 emancipated and armed slaves, still held the field under Silo, Mutilus, and other generals against the Romans. In B.C. 88 a decisive battle was fought in Samnium, in which the Marsian hero Silo was defeated and slain, and Sulla as consul overran Campania with the exception of Nola alone. The war was thus nearing its end when a new flood of disaster rolled over the Roman people. The east seemed to be wholly lost, and in Rome itself a new revolution broke out, and kindled the first of the Civil Wars that prepared the way for the empire of the Caesars.

## CHAPTER XV.

### MITHRADATES THE GREAT. SULLA AND THE FIRST ROMAN CIVIL WAR.

AFTER the conquest of Asia the senate had bestowed little attention upon the political conditions of the East, where the curtailment of the Greek and Syrian naval power had allowed the Cretan and the Cilician pirates to become dangerous in spite of the occupation of a part of the rugged coast of western Cilicia as a province in b.c. 103, and where new complications among the Asiatic powers by the beginning of the last century b.c. had greatly increased the importance of the kings of Pontus and of Armenia.

The Pontic realm was founded by a Mithradates, a chieftain from Cius on the Propontis, in the wild time after the battle of Ipsus (b.c.

301). It lay on either side of the lower Halys, and was gradually extended eastward beyond the Thermodon. King Mithradates V. Euergetes, a friend of the Romans, was murdered in his capital, Sinope, in b.c. 120, and left his kingdom to his minor son, Mithradates VI. Eupator (Fig. 49), called the "Great," who in b.c. 115, or b.c. 113, took the government into his own hands. This mighty man, with many of the faults of an eastern sultan, possessed great and uncommon qualities. Of imposing size and great strength, fond of the chase and bodily exercises, rough, harsh, prone to excesses of all kinds, he was able to speak the language of all the peoples united in his motley realm, to appreciate and assimilate the culture of the Greeks, and strongly to attach to



FIG. 49. — Mithradates the Great. (From Friedländer and von Sallet.)

himself the national feeling of the Asiatics. When aroused to exertion in his contest with the Romans, he showed an energy, a tenacity, a restless activity, and ability to conceive great plans, that made him feared by them only less than Hannibal.

Not content with his original possessions, which extended along the south coast of the Black Sea to the borders of Colchis, Mithradates proposed to subjugate the east and north coasts. His operations in these regions met with a complete success. He now turned his thoughts toward Asia Minor. In b.c. 106 he joined Nicomedes II. of Bithynia in seizing Paphlagonia, then extended his sway over the chieftains of Galatia, and began to intrigue for the power in Cappadocia. Here, after the murder of his brother-in-law Ariarathes VI., he at first (b.c. 102–101) secured the succession for his young nephew; but in a quarrel in b.c. 100, the Pontic king slew his nephew with his own hand, and placed his own eight-year-old son on the Cappadocian throne, as Ariarathes VIII. Afterward Nicomedes of Bithynia supported another pretender; and in b.c. 93, the intervention of the Roman senate was asked, which decided that the foreign powers should evacuate the country, and the Cappadocian leaders should elect their king. The power of Rome was still so great that these commands were obeyed. The Cappadocians chose Ariobarzanes I. for their king; but he was soon obliged to call the Romans to his assistance against a new and strong power which the intrigues of Mithradates had raised against him, that of the Artaxiad king of Greater Armenia, Tigranes II., who had been on the throne since b.c. 94, was married to the daughter of the Pontic king, and was greatly extending his territory at the expense of the Parthians and the Seleucidae.

Sulla, then governor of Cilicia, with a small force crossed the Taurus in b.c. 92, and drove the Armenian auxiliaries out of Cappadocia; but scarcely had he left the country, when Tigranes returned into Cappadocia, and set up Ariarathes VIII. as king in place of Ariobarzanes. At the same time Mithradates supported another claimant against Nicomedes III. of Bithynia, who had succeeded his father. When Nicomedes III. and Ariobarzanes appeared in Rome with their complaints, the senate, fully occupied with the Social War, was unable to do more than send the ex-consul M. Aquillius in b.c. 90 as envoy to Asia Minor, who could control only the resources of the governor of Asia and the Asiatic allies. Still, King Mithradates, in his dread of the legions, avoided open war, and allowed the envoy to reinstate the exiled kings. Then with monstrous folly, in blind ignorance of the strength and the character of Mithradates, and heeding only his desire for glory and for plunder, Aquillius determined, notwithstanding the desperate condition of Italy, to bring about a war at any cost. He obliged Nicomedes to declare war against Mithradates, and to send a

marauding expedition into the district of Amastris, and commanded the Pontic king under no circumstances to withstand Nicomedes. The patience of Mithradates was exhausted, and the Romans saw themselves face to face with an opponent such as they had not had since the death of Hannibal.

In the autumn of B.C. 89 Mithradates prepared for a war of extermination against the Romans. His son was replaced in Cappadocia, the alliance with Armenia was drawn more close, the Cretans aroused in the interest of the king, and relations established with the people of the province of Asia, who were deeply embittered against the Romans. By gathering all his resources he raised an army, it is said, of 250,000 infantry, and 40,000 cavalry, commanded by excellent generals. A fleet of 400 ships controlled the Black Sea, and was joined by many corsairs. The Romans at first acted only on the defensive. Sulla, as consul for B.C. 88, was to lead his army as soon as possible from Lower Italy to Asia; but in the meantime Aquillius could rely only on the Bithynian army, and on the Asiatic militia with a few Roman companies, while the Roman fleet held the Bosphorus. In B.C. 88 Mithradates began the war at all points with great success. His Greek generals, Archelaus and Neoptolemus, completely defeated the Bithynians. The Asiatic militia of the Romans made no stand against the attacks of the Pontic troops, and the Italian soldiers could not keep the field alone; and when the king's army overran the province of Asia amid the rejoicings of the inhabitants, and the news came from Italy that the dreaded Sulla was engaged at home in open war with his civil enemies, it seemed as if the Roman power in the East was gone forever. The former subjects of Rome, and the king himself, could now take their revenge. Aquillius fled to Lesbos, but was given up to the king, who with insults of every kind, had him bound upon an ass, driven through the cities of Asia Minor, and finally put to death at Pergamum, melted gold being poured down his throat. Mithradates then issued from Ephesus the command that on a certain day all persons of Roman and Italian origin, without distinction of age or sex, free or bond, should be killed, their property seized and divided, half to the slayer and half to the treasury. Except in a few cases, notably at Cos, his command was obeyed, often accompanied by horrible refinements of cruelty. According to the lowest estimate 80,000, according to the highest 150,000, persons of the Latin tongue were then put to death. This deed of blood, in which the king committed the blunder, by the massacre of the Italians, of forcing their countrymen to join the Romans in their

thirst for revenge, called out every energy of Rome. Everything in Asia which did not think of defection turned against the Pontic bloodhound with the fury of despair. Rhodes, to which came all the fugitives from Asia, bravely and successfully withstood all attacks by land and sea; but the Roman troops, which were to avenge the outrage, were far away. Mithradates sent his fleet and his armies against the provinces of the Balkan peninsula, which since b.c. 92 had been attacked by the wild tribes on the borders of Macedonia. The successes of the king aroused the hopes of the Greek democracy that under his lead the Roman yoke might again be thrown off. The Peripatetic philosopher, Aristion of Athens, after the first victories of Mithradates, was sent as envoy to the Pontic court. Returning to Athens with the proposals of the king, and securing his own appointment as first *strategus*, he restored the democracy to power, and then began a violent persecution of the oligarchy that favored Rome. Toward the end of the year the king's son, Ariarathes, led a strong army over the Hellespont, occupied Thrace, and threatened Macedonia, while a strong fleet and army under Archelaus secured the Cyclades, and after seizing the Piraeus roused the Boeotians and Peloponnesians. The Romans, though they retained Demetrias, and won an advantage near Chaeronea, were obliged to withdraw to Thermopylae, and hold out there till Sulla could reach Greece.

Sulla was kept in Italy by a revolution which was begun in b.c. 88, at Rome, by a statesman of great gifts, the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, who had a brilliant record in the Social War, and who, among other measures, now made the sagacious proposal of giving complete political equality to the new Italian citizens. The war, which had swept away 300,000 men from Italy, was practically over; but a few Samnites still remained in arms, and the many new burgesses that had already received Roman citizenship were seriously disaffected because they felt that they were treated as inferiors. They were thus naturally the tools of every demagogue. Sulpicius does not seem to have wished a radical change, but to have demanded simply the division of the new citizens among all the tribes. But fearing from the stubborn opposition of a part of the senate, and of the knights, the fate of the Gracchi, he surrounded himself with a hired train of 3000 men, and with a company of 600 young men of the better families who were called his 'opposition senate.' The senate and the consuls who opposed him sought to check him by refusing to transact the public business. He then aroused a great riot, in which the parties fought

with sticks and stones; and Sulla escaped being killed only by taking refuge in the house of Marius. The refusal to transact business was withdrawn, and the comitia accepted the propositions of Sulpicius. Sulla at once left the city, and hastened to his army in Campania. It is quite probable that he intended to reduce Nola as speedily as possible, and to lead his troops to Asia in order to conduct the war already assigned him by the senate, for which he was fitted above all others. But unhappily Sulpicius believed the legions were to be used against the city, and now, as it appears, formed a closer alliance with Marius, who promised him his help on condition that the Asiatic war should be assigned to him.

Sulpicius now carried through the assembly the unheard-of resolution to deprive the consul of his command, and to put in his place at the head of the army the aged Marius, then only a private citizen, with proconsular authority, at the same time committing to him the conduct of the war in Asia. Two tribunes went to Nola to remove Sulla from his command; and now for the first time the power of constitutional forms failed with the army, which, composed as it was of paid proletarians, did not hesitate to follow its popular general against its own country. Sulla was the first Roman on whose cool calculation the spell was broken with which thus far law and custom had surrounded even the caprice of the sovereign people and its tribunes. The speech in which Sulla described his condition so excited his soldiers that they killed the tribunes, and demanded to be led against their general's enemies in Rome. Only the higher officers, with one exception, still held to their duty as citizens, and refused. Sulla, with his 35,000 men, hastened to the capital, and with two legions forced the passage of the Porta Esquilina. At evening, after a hard struggle in the streets, he was in possession of Rome, and his troops encamped at night in the Forum. He used his success with unexpected moderation. In view of the terrible news from Asia, he tried merely to put affairs in Rome as quickly as possible into a position favorable to the optimates, and without delay to cross the Ionian Sea. He did, however, cause twelve of his leading opponents, at their head Sulpicius, Marius, and his son, to be proscribed as enemies of their country by a resolution of the senate ratified by the people. Of the proscribed, Sulpicius alone perished, betrayed by a slave. At Sulla's command his head was placed upon the rostra in the Forum as a warning, the hateful beginning of a series of horrors. In political matters Sulla reversed by vote of the people the new laws of Sulpicius, a grave error, so far as concerned the

vexed Italian questions. To control the powers of the comitia and the caprice of the tribunes, it was determined that no measure should be brought to a vote before the commonalty without the previous consent of the senate. The voting order of the centuries was changed, and the earlier practice revived, by which the first tax-class (with property at or above 100,000 sesterces, or \$4800) possessed almost half the votes. Yet Sulla must have seen that his opponents were only temporarily put down, and that it was impossible before his departure to place the control of the government without violence in trustworthy hands. Only one of the consuls-elect for the year b.c. 87, Cn. Octavius, was a determined optimate; the other, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, the candidate of all the discontented, gave little security for the quiet conduct of the state. Sulla was obliged to be contented with binding him publicly by a solemn oath that he would do nothing against the newly established order, and then hastened, in the beginning of b.c. 87, to Campania, where Metellus Pius was to take command against the Sannites and Lucanians, who still continued the contest. No sooner had Sulla led his army, in the spring, to Dyrrhachium, than Cinna in Rome, supported by a majority of the tribunes, introduced propositions which were to give the democracy abundant allies, to effect the division of the new Italian citizens and the freedmen among all the tribes, and the recall of the men banished by Sulla, as far as they were alive. During the vote, which was taken in spite of the veto of several of the tribunes, Octavius, the consul of the optimates, came upon the armed democracy and his colleagues, with many supporters likewise armed. A pitched battle was fought in the Forum. The supporters of Cinna were overpowered; and the massacre only ended when 10,000 men had fallen. Cinna himself fled the city, and another was chosen consul in his place.

Meanwhile Sulla's position in Greece was one of very great difficulty. He had only about 30,000 disciplined Roman troops under his command, with no fleet and little money; but pressing forward from Epirus into Boeotia, he secured auxiliaries, provisions, and money from Aetolia and southern Thessaly, and after a slight success so frightened the Greeks that the Boeotians and Peloponnesians sought reconciliation by the delivery of money and supplies. He then took up a strong position near Megara and Eleusis, from which he blockaded Athens, and began a regular siege of the Piraeus, where Archelaus commanded. The means for these operations Sulla obtained by a pitiless draft upon all the resources of Greece. The property and treasures of the temples were seized; the groves of the Lyceum, and the giant plane-trees of

the Academy near Athens were cut down and used in siege operations. But Sulla could make no progress so long as his brave opponent had free communication by water. Therefore in B.C. 86 he turned all his force upon Athens, where the tyranny of Aristion and the increasing lack of provisions gradually brought the inhabitants to the extreme of exhaustion. On the night of March 1 the lower city was taken by storm; and Aristion, a few days later, surrendered the citadel. But Archelaus still held out in the Piraeus, while powerful Asiatic forces were on the march from Macedonia, and a new democratic revolution had overthrown the power of the optimates, and cut Sulla off from all prospect of help from home.

The fatal example of Sulla had brought on the era of civil wars. Cinna and his companions, after the flight from Rome, visited the most important cities of Italy, raised troops and contributions of money, and won over the army which lay before Nola. This army recognized Cinna as consul, and formed a centre to which the Italians from all sides gathered. It was advancing against Rome when Marius again appeared. After his proscription he had escaped to Ostia, but was discovered by his pursuers, and brought to Minturnae, where the executioner was sent to put him to death in prison; but when this Cimbrian slave, terrified at the fiery eye and thundering voice of the old hero, threw away his sword, and cried that he could not kill Caius Marius, the townsmen were so deeply ashamed that they allowed the man who had saved the state to escape. Joined by other fugitives, Marius drifted to the ruins of old Carthage, whence at the call of Cinna he returned to Italy, late in B.C. 87. With 1000 armed followers, he landed in the harbor of Telamon, in Etruria, assembled on all sides liberated slaves, new Italian citizens and exiles, and, receiving proconsular authority from Cinna, with forty ships and six thousand men, which soon increased to three legions, blockaded the mouth of the Tiber. The senate called for help upon Pompeius Strabo with his army in Picenum. He pitched his camp near the Porta Collina of the city, but aroused mistrust by the indifference with which he allowed the enemy to surround Rome. Cinna took up a position opposite the Janiculum. The Sabine, Quintus Sertorius from Nursia, an experienced officer of great ability, distinguished since the Cimbrian war on many battle-fields, the noblest character of the democratic party of this period, who had been driven into the arms of Cinna by the opposition of Sulla to his candidacy for the tribuneship, encamped opposite the wall of Servius Tullius. Strabo showed energy in several engagements; but the senate, which did not

wish to be dependent on a man whose policy was believed to be determined by interest, at last concluded to grant to the new citizens the right which they demanded, of voting in all the tribes. It was impossible to withdraw the army of Metellus Pius from Samnium; for the Samnites and Lucanians proposed conditions which were insulting to the Romans, but which Cinna and Marius at once conceded. The presence of such large armies on the Tiber by degrees produced great scarcity, and the power of resistance came to an end when pestilence visited the city. Strabo died of the plague; and the increasing desertions forced the senate at last to treat with Cinna, who promised that he would shed no blood. But the maddened Marius could not forego his savage revenge. Scarcely had the tribes at his demand hastily freed him from the proscription, when he entered Rome with his wild bands to make his name a reproach for all time. Masses of savage soldiers and fugitive slaves streamed through the city eager for plunder and murder, and headed by bloodthirsty leaders like the abominable Fimbria, and, before all, by Marius himself. Five days and nights the massacre raged unchecked. Individuals who escaped or were overlooked were afterward killed from day to day in Rome and Italy. Among the many eminent Romans who perished were the consul Octavius and the ex-consul Catulus,—the colleague of Marius in the Cimbrian war,—the great orator and advocate Marcus Antonius, Lucius Caesar, and Publius Crassus. The corpses were not allowed burial; and their heads, after the evil example of Sulla, were placed upon the rostra in the Forum. In vain did Sertorius, and even Cinna, seek to check these atrocities. The reign of terror only came to an end when Marius, who had received for the seventh time the consulship, shortly after entering upon office, on January 13, b.c. 86, was carried off by a violent fever; and Sertorius, in agreement with Cinna, caused 4000 of the bloodhounds of Marius to be cut down by trustworthy troops.

Sulla, whose camp in Attica was the refuge of many of his party, learned, soon after the capture of Athens, that the comitia had taken from him his command, that the consul Flaccus, with Fimbria as a legate and a small force, was marching against him, and that he was proclaimed an enemy of his country. The Asiatic army of 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse advanced toward Thermopylae. Sulla caused the works at the Piraeus to be razed, and the arsenal of Philon to be burned, then hastened northward; and in March of b.c. 86, with a force scarcely a third as large as his enemies', and composed in part of Greeks and Macedonians, he met, near Chaeronea, the Pontic army.

His strategy gained him a complete victory, and the remnants of the foe fled in wild flight back to Chaleis. But Sulla's position continued to be very difficult, as he could not restrict the movements of the fleet with which Archelaus disquieted the coasts. The danger from Italy passed over with unexpected ease. On the approach of the democratic legions, the desertions to the victor of Chaeronea so alarmed the leaders that they at once marched north to Macedonia and Asia. Sulla passed the winter in Athens recruiting and organizing, till Mithradates himself made it possible for him to escape from his position. The position of the Pontic king also was far from comfortable. The war in Europe, so costly in money and men, strained all his resources, so that soon his government appeared to the inhabitants of Asia Minor more unendurable than that of the Romans. When, after the defeat at Chaeronea, they seemed to waver, Mithradates proceeded with savage cruelty against the suspected. Scenes of horror increased; the king sought to crush by violence the risings which everywhere took place; but in the end he was unable to prevent Ephesus and many other cities from declaring for the Romans. He could collect a new army only with difficulty in the spring of B.C. 85. Hard by Orchomenus, in the plains of the Copais and the Cephisus, Dorylaus and Archelaus encountered the Romans, only to suffer, after a battle that for two days hung in doubt, an utter defeat. Archelaus escaped to Chaleis with but a few attendants. Sulla was now able to free the mainland of Greece from the garrisons of the enemy, and to drive the Asiatics out of Macedonia also. He took up his winter quarters for B.C. 85-84 in Thessaly, and there prepared a fleet with which in the next spring he intended a descent upon Asia.

During this time other Roman generals were pushing Mithradates hard in Asia. On one side Fimbria, who, though a cruel scoundrel, was a capable soldier, after assassinating his superior officer in Chalcedon, had seized the command, and was pressing the Asiatics with the utmost energy. On the other side, Sulla's first great successes in Greece had made it possible for his legate, L. Licinius Lucullus, to equip, during B.C. 86, in the seaports of Syria, Cyprus, and Pamphylia, a fleet which, re-enforced from Rhodes, gained Cnidus, Colophon, and Chios. In B.C. 85 Fimbria gained a victory which opened the way to Pergamum. Lucullus also, by two naval victories, secured a position near the island of Tenedos that controlled the Hellespont. Under these circumstances Mithradates was inclined to conclude peace, and made overtures to Sulla, who personally impressed him most, and who,

as enemy of the democracy then dominant at Rome, seemed to have reasons for wishing his friendship. In the winter of B.C. 85-84 he allowed Archelaus to make Sulla the proposition that he should leave Asia to the king, who on his part would support Sulla against the democrats in Rome. But Sulla, though a partisan, was far too true a Roman to conclude such a compact; and in reply he demanded, besides other things, the evacuation by Mithradates of all his conquests in Europe and Asia Minor, especially the provinces of Asia, Bithynia, Galatia, Cappadocia, and Paphlagonia. Archelaus was inclined to accept these conditions, and therefore concluded a truce; but the king wished to retain at least Paphlagonia, intimating that Fimbria was ready to offer him better conditions. Sulla then began his march through Thrace to the Hellespont that he might finish with Mithradates and Fimbria at once. At last, however, Archelaus secured the acceptance of the preliminaries; but Sulla, in order to complete the negotiations with Mithradates in person, and afterward make an attack upon Fimbria, crossed the Hellespont with his army, and met the king at Dardanus, where the treaty of peace was ratified on both sides.

Sulla now turned against Fimbria, who lately had committed the most inconceivable atrocities, and in particular had horribly treated Ilium, by tradition the original seat of the Romans, because it had negotiated with Sulla. Sulla had him surrounded near Thyatira; and, as his soldiers refused to fight, nothing remained for him but to fall upon his own sword, while his troops passed over to Sulla. The Roman rule in the province of Asia was now re-established; on the organization of Sulla all subsequent governors built. For the purpose of tax-gathering, he divided the country into forty-four districts, each with its chief town, where were to be kept the archives, records of surveys, and titles and mortgages, while a number of these districts formed a *conventus*, or court circuit. The province of Cilicia, which had been lost by the victories of Mithradates, was also reconstructed. As judge over the Asiatics and Eastern Hellenes, there were but few places to which he could give thanks and rewards, like the brave Rhodians, who received an enlargement of their territory; on the contrary, he was obliged to demand heavy atonements for the outrages upon Romans and Italians. There was indeed no lavish shedding of blood, but the province, already exhausted by Mithradates, was burdened with additional financial loads; the back taxes and tithes of the last five years had to be paid; and, besides, the country was called upon to pay a war-tax of 20,000 talents, which Sulla needed for the war against the

democrats. It helped the unhappy Asiatics very little that, in his dislike of the knights, and the system of the Græchi, Sulla put an end to the farming of the taxes by middle-men, and changed the back taxes, the contributions, and the future taxes into a fixed assessment divided among the forty-four districts; for the terrible financial burden plunged the inhabitants heavily into debt, and quickly gave them over into the hands of the Italian bankers, who drove many of the inhabitants to leave house and land and join the corsairs, whose numbers were still more increased by the discharged soldiers of Mithradates and by many of those of Fimbria. In the spring of B.C. 83 Sulla embarked his army at Ephesus for the Piraeus. Now was to begin the last struggle against the Italian democrats.

In Italy, after the death of Marius, Cinna maintained external quiet for several years. But when, in the spring of B.C. 84, Sulla sent a communication to the senate, in which, while promising to recognize the rights of the new citizens, he announced his purpose to punish the authors of the persecutions against his friends, and when, in reply to the proposal of the senate for mediation, he demanded the restoration and indemnification of the exiles, the legal punishment of the crimes committed, and declared that he should bring an army as a guaranty of his safety, it was recognized by all that the decision must be made by the sword. Cinna was murdered in a riot at Ancona by some angry soldiers, but his colleague, Carbo, made energetic preparations. He had on his side the largest part of the Italians, who mistrusted Sulla, fearing that he would restrict their now unlimited right of suffrage. It was therefore not difficult to collect considerable masses of troops, as many, it is said, as 200,000 men. The mistake was made of electing two incompetent consuls.

When in the spring of B.C. 83 Sulla embarked, he had, including Greek and Macedonian auxiliaries, only about 40,000 men. With so small an army, trustworthy veterans though they might be, the united opposition of Italy could not be broken. With equal prudence and temperance he therefore asserted his respect for the newly acquired rights of the Italians, and caused his soldiers to take an oath that they would meet them as friends and fellow-citizens.

The democrats allowed themselves to be completely surprised. Lower Italy was unoccupied; and Sulla was able, without drawing his sword, to land in Brundisium, where he was well received. This community at once received the confirmation of its rights, and a new announcement once again assured the Italians of the preservation of

all their rights obtained from the democrats, and proposed full favor to all who should even now break away from the government. Messapia and Apulia followed the example of the Brundisians. On the march to Samnium and Campania supporters flocked to him from all sides. Metellus Pius at once entered his service with proconsular authority; with him came the son of Publius Crassus, M. Licinius Crassus (born in b.c. 115), who now began his notable political career. Of still greater importance was the accession of Cnaeus Pompeius (Pompey), the youthful son of Strabo (born September 29, b.c. 106). He, like his father, was not in reality a supporter of the optimates, but was influenced by the dissatisfaction of the popular party with the actions of his father in the last crisis. Although he had taken service under Cinna, he was accused by the enemies of his house, and was asked to give up the booty which his father was believed to have retained after the capture of Asculum. The ruin to his property was averted by the eloquence of his advocate, the orator Q. Hortensius Hortalus (Fig. 50), and by the favor of Carbo. When Sulla landed in Italy Pompey hastened to Picenum, where he had large estates and great personal influence, inherited from his father, and, raising his standard at Auximum, won over the people of the district to sympathy for Sulla, to whom he led three legions in Apulia. Sulla marched toward Campania, defeated the one consul, Norbanus, at Mt. Tifata, while the other, Scipio, saw his entire army go over to Sulla, though the latter was so magnanimous as to dismiss him with his superior officers, among them Sertorius, without molestation. While Sulla and Metellus wintered in Campania, and Sulla won over to his side very many Italian communities, which by special compacts secured the guaranty of their rights, the democrats, instead of placing Sertorius at their head, sent him as governor to Spain, and chose as consuls two of their most violent leaders, Carbo, and Caius, son of old Marius, a youth only twenty, and yet already guilty of horrible cruelty. To the old soldiers of Marius, and the new citizens from Etruria, and from the districts of the Po, were added the Samnites and Lucanians who had not yet been conquered.




FIG. 50. — Hortensius.  
Antique bust.

Sulla pressed forward into Latium, where he totally defeated young Marius near Sacriportus. The fragments of the democratic army took refuge in the fortresses of Norba and Praeneste, and Sulla was able, without opposition, to occupy Rome. Leaving Praeneste to be blockaded by a part of his army, Sulla, after a short stay in Rome, marched north to support Metellus and Pompey against Carbo, who had advanced a strong force into Etruria. A bloody battle at Clusium went against the hitherto victorious general; but when Carbo sent eight legions south to the relief of Praeneste, they fell in with Pompey at Spoletum, and were defeated, in part through their own lack of discipline.

Meanwhile the struggle for Praeneste became more stubborn, and here was struck the last great blow of this war. To deliver Marius, the Samnites and Lucanians set out under Pontius of Telesia, and M. Lamponius, to the number of 70,000, and pressed forward to the vicinity of the beleaguered city. While they tried in vain to draw Sulla from his strong position south of Praeneste, the democrats in the north gave way, a general desertion to the cause of Sulla began, and Carbo escaped to Africa. When the leaders of the Samnites and Lucanians, and the democrats who were with them, saw that all was lost, they determined to make a desperate attempt to relieve Praeneste, and, if this failed, to bring destruction upon Rome, which was feebly garrisoned, and thus waste 'the wood in which the wolves gathered that robbed Italy of her freedom.' The entire relieving army took up its march for the capital, distant only 18.5 miles. Rome was actually in the extremest danger. Sulla hastened immediately after them, and at noon of November 1, b.c. 82, before the enemy, still distant two miles from the Porta Collina, had opened the attack upon the city, Sulla appeared with his main force, and, despite his exhausting forced march, offered battle at once. He arranged his army before the Porta Collina; and, as soon as his soldiers had eaten, late in the afternoon, advanced, he himself at the head of the left wing, and Crassus on the right. The Sabellians, in this last battle, fought with such despairing energy that at evening Sulla regarded the battle as lost. M. Crassus, however, on the right wing, victoriously broke the enemy's power. The conflict was renewed on the following day, the enemy was completely routed, and on the third day after this battle, in which each side is said to have lost 50,000 men, 4000 Sabellian prisoners were massacred in the Campus Martius in Rome.

With this victory the war in Italy came to an end, but not the

shedding of blood. Sulla had hitherto been temperate toward his enemies, always excepting the Samnites; but now came the terrible time in which this iron man, whom anger seldom overmastered and pity never, inaugurated his new political creations with countless deeds of blood. In the cities, which surrendered only after this victory, the most frightful cruelties were perpetrated,—in Praeneste, which fell after the death of Marius, in Naples and Norba, and in the provinces which had held out, Samnium and Etruria, Sulla wasted the land, and pursued the inhabitants relentlessly, to complete, by the destruction of the last opposition of races, the Romanizing of the peninsula. Nola capitulated in B.C. 80, when the last Samnite hero, Mutilus, killed himself. In Etruria, Populonia and Volaterrae held out longest, the latter till B.C. 79. The subject countries also quickly fell into the hands of the optimates. Sertorius, with his troops formed of Spanish militia and Roman citizens, could not maintain himself against Sulla's legate, and in the spring of B.C. 81 fled with 3000 men to Africa. Pompey, who with 120 ships and six legions, was sent to Sicily, gained the island (B.C. 82–81) without drawing the sword, and afterward went to Africa, where a number of fugitive democrats, under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, had established themselves and made alliances with Numidian and Mauretanian chieftains; and in a comparatively short time he was able to overpower them.

Sulla, meantime, was devoting all his mighty energy to the rebuilding of the Roman state. Master of the world, in fact, but filled with no craving for power, he had never intended to establish a tyranny, and therefore even now acted only as the most important champion which the Roman oligarchy had thus far produced. But he, too, was unable to find a way of salvation by breaking through the ancient forms. He believed that the source of all evil lay in the preponderance of the democratic elements in the constitution. Though infinitely superior to the remaining optimates in insight, yet his work was only a ‘restoration,’ a work which indeed brought together the results of the changes in Italy since B.C. 91, and completed the Romanizing of the peninsula, but which forced the life of the state into the lines which it had left since the time of Caius Gracchus. Sulla's ordinances, therefore, proved to be only a new discord, from which grew a far more deadly hatred against the oligarchic restoration than from all the battle-fields of the civil war.

In November, B.C. 82, not long after the battle at the Porta Collina, Sulla received, by a resolution of the senate and the people, the dicta-

torship "to frame laws and restore order to the state." Clothed with an authority which gave him the right to dispose unconditionally of the lives and the property of citizens, and to establish or dissolve civic communities in Italy, it was left to himself to determine when he would lay down his office; and it was in his will whether the consulate should subsist side by side with his power or not. Then he began a new and terrible work of blood, to take vengeance on his enemies, to punish the crimes of the supporters of Marius, and to render the democratic party helpless in the future, and to obtain the means to reward his own soldiers and other supporters. It was the deed of a cool calculator, who without special pleasure in cruelty, but pitiless and indifferent, waded knee deep through blood, and destroyed whatever stood in the way of the work to which he had devoted himself. By a proclamation, Sulla proscribed as enemies of their country all citizens, who, since the end of the year b.c. 83, had been prominent as leaders of the democratic cause. Whoever killed one of these proscribed persons received a reward of 12,000 denarii; whoever assisted one of them was to incur a heavy fine; the estates of the victims, as well as the estates of those who fell in battle against Sulla's troops, were confiscated to the state. Their children and grandchildren were excluded from a political career; and, where they were of senatorial rank, compelled to retain the senatorial burdens. Then began the work of the assassins of the oligarchy. As the dangerous vagueness of the proclamation aroused general terror, the dictator determined to publish the lists of the outlawed or proscribed, a practice continued till June 1st. of b.c. 81. The official lists are said to have contained 4700 names, among which were those of more than forty senators, and more than sixteen hundred men of the equestrian rank. The worst evil was the ease with which informers of every kind were able to secure orders for execution. Men were often proscribed who were only enemies of one of Sulla's dependants, and the names of men already murdered were frequently added to the list. A vulgar desire for revenge and brutal greed, and the hope of putting out of the way a creditor, or even of obtaining personal safety by such information, gave occasion to outrageous acts. For all such crimes, as well as for the more common ones, there was no redress. Not less abominable was the indulgence which Sulla showed to his supporters of every grade who undertook to grow rich by the bidding in of the confiscated estates. It was now that M. Crassus laid the foundation for his great wealth, yet the state treasury also gained from these confiscations immense sums.

Those Italian cities, which to the last had resisted the optimates, were forced to pay fines according to their ability, or to tear down their walls and fortresses, or lose a part or all of their territory. To complete the system of Romanizing, to secure his new ordinances, and to reward his soldiers, Sulla employed the great part of these comprehensive confiscations in planting new and extensive colonies. A hundred and twenty thousand men are said to have been settled, for the most part in Etruria, in the district of Praeneste, and in Campania. The colonists were generally included in already existing communities, and in some cases were placed by the side of the older inhabitants within the same enclosing wall.

But along with this the dictator was occupied for some years with the scheme of organization. The citizens of the revolted communities that had been deprived of their land became ‘homeless,’ and were reduced to the ‘lowest Latin right;’ but with exception of these all new Italian citizens were to be and to remain Roman citizens with full and equal rights. In b.c. 91 the number of Roman citizens capable of bearing arms was about 400,000, of Italian about 500,000 to 600,000; but in the census of b.c. 70 a round 900,000 citizens were reckoned. The best powers of the entire land of Italy now gathered in Rome, and entered upon a competition for the prizes of political ambition, while at the same time the Italian proletariat considerably increased that of the capital. The freedmen were brought back to their old relation, and limited to a definite number of tribes. The territory of the Roman-Italian people now received the definite boundaries which it long retained. In b.c. 81 Sulla formed, from the country between the Apennines and the Alps, the new province of Cisalpine Gaul. The northeast boundary of ‘Italy’ was the Rubicon (Fiumeieino), a small river which empties into the Adriatic a few miles north of Ariminum.

The government of Rome was to be conducted by the senate, enlarged by 300 members of knightly rating, young men of senatorial families, officers of Sulla, and other new men. For the future entrance into the senate was to be connected with the holding of the quaestorship, and the number of quaestors chosen yearly was raised to twenty. The right of removing senators by revision of the lists every five years was taken from the censors. The main point now was to secure the power of the senate on all sides. The order of knights or capitalists lost the control of jurors, and this was restored to the senate. The position of the great officials of the state was defined so as not to be dan-

gerous to the oligarchy. In the succession of officers the aedileship might be passed over, but the quaestorship and the praetorship must have been held to secure the consulship. Between the holding of different offices at least two years must intervene, and between the first and second holding of the same office, at least ten years. Sulla further divided the civil and the military functions of the praetors, now increased from eight to ten, and of the consuls, so that every consul and praetor remained two years in office, the first in Rome in the discharge of civil business, and the second as propraetor or proconsul in command of one of the ten provinces of the realm. Italy, however, was not to be under military control, and no governor was to remain in his province more than thirty days after the arrival of his successor. Finally Sulla delivered a destructive blow at the tribunate. This office became worthless and unimportant to every ambitious Roman after Sulla decreed that the holding of it should render a man ineligible to all the higher state offices. The function of the tribunes was limited to the old original right of intercession, and the misuse of this right was to be punished with heavy fines.

The culmination of the Sullan constitution was in a comprehensive rearrangement of the criminal law; the part of the system which afterward received the most recognition, and which formed the foundation for the legislation of the following time. The reform of greatest political importance was that concerning the ‘Violation of the majesty of the people,’ which was intended to secure the internal safety and external peace of the oligarchic republic against the schemes of powerful governors. It was directed primarily against those who did not leave their provinces within thirty days after the arrival of their successors, who did not strictly remain within their provinces, who overstepped the boundaries of their provinces with an army, and began war without the consent of the senate, and finally against all who attempted to entice an army to revolt. The jury courts were considerably extended. Criminal cases came before such juries as were under the presidency of the praetor; civil cases came before juries under the presidency of other magistrates. For all kinds of public and private offences a large number of such standing jury courts was established. When the formation of a standing commission for high treason and the dishonoring of the Roman name had withdrawn the most serious political processes from the comitia, the penalty of death for political offences practically came to an end, for the jury courts could not give sentences involving life or imprisonment. To this period also belongs the municipal or-

ganization of the cities and civie districts of Italy, which were arranged after the pattern of the old sovereign Latin communities.<sup>1</sup>

While engaged in these labors Sulla was also busied with foreign affairs. King Mithradates, who could not rest quietly under the humiliation of his defeat, drove back an unprovoked raid of the Romans into his territory; but Sulla's authority was sufficient to restore peace. The pirates, too, were becoming more dangerous, and were now joined by many of the opponents of Sulla, who had been driven out of Italy. Finally the democracy had again appeared in arms in Spain. In b.c. 81 Sertorius, who had gone to Mauretania, was thinking of retiring to the Canary Islands, when he was asked by twenty revolted Lusitanian communities to accept the command of their warriors. He accepted this invitation, and joined his new friends in the beginning of b.c. 80, with 2600 men, to whom they added 4000 foot and 700 horse,—the substantial core of an organized army, which was increased by troops of volunteers or guerillas. Sertorius, knowing the land and the people, now ventured to attack Sulla's legates in Spain with such success that Sulla, in the beginning of b.c. 79, was obliged to send his trustworthy supporter Metellus to the Baetis, who could not, however, suppress the dangerous uprising. Meantime, for the year b.c. 79, Sulla had left the entire organization of the Roman state to its regular working; and, believing that his measures could be left to themselves, he laid down his dictatorship, and retired to his Cumæan villa, near Puteoli. The future was to decide whether the conditions which he had established were secure or strong enough to last. The opponents of the new order of things were many. The democratic party, though greatly diminished, was not blotted out. Many persons, who, as supporters or children of the fugitives or the proscribed, were in an unendurable condition, the numerous prominent men, the multitudes in Etruria who had been driven out of house and home, and the persons of every sort that had been ruined, naturally formed very dangerous elements. Furthermore, the prospect that the colonized veterans of Sulla would become actual peasants and useful social members of the state was far from hopeful; for among these new proprietors there were many who gladly sold their

<sup>1</sup> The assembly of burgesses had the right of choosing the officers of the community. The controlling body was the senate of a hundred members. Two territorial judges, corresponding to the curule aediles, and two ordinary judges as highest officers of the community, corresponding to the consuls, administered justice, while two quaestors managed the city finances. In matters of justice all important criminal and civil cases were probably transferred to the courts of the capital, while the less important and less involved were left to the courts of the individual communities.

estates, and having spent the proceeds in debauchery increased the number of the discontented. It was unfortunate for the optimates that, while they counted in their ranks several men of military talent, they developed no statesman who at Sulla's death could undertake the conduct of the aristocratic republic, and with energy and foresight meet the opposition to be expected. As long, indeed, as Sulla lived, he was able, by his great authority and by his hold upon his veterans, to keep in check the varied elements of this opposition. Actual radical democrats; men of bold ambition who could not accommodate themselves to the strict forms; temperate aristocrats, for whom Sulla had gone much too far; finally, the greatly injured moneyed aristocracy,—all these were obliged to await their time, a time that came sooner than was expected.

The consuls chosen for the year B.C. 78 were Q. Lutatius Catulus, son of the conqueror of the Cimbri, a steadfast optimate, and M. Aemilius Lepidus, who at first was a very zealous adherent of Sulla, but lately had fallen out with him, and was prepared to be the leader of the opposition. In the spring of B.C. 78 Sulla suddenly died, in the sixtieth year of his age. The news of his death caused an intense commotion, and Lepidus was dissuaded only by the influence of Pompey and the temper of the veterans that streamed to Rome by thousands from preventing the solemn celebration of the obsequies of the dictator. The body of Sulla was accordingly brought in imposing funeral procession from Puteoli to the capital, and was committed to the flames on the Campus Martius with royal magnificence.

## PART VII.

### FROM THE DEATH OF SULLA TO THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM.

(B.C. 78-31.)

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### CHAPTER XVI.

#### POMPEY THE GREAT.

SARCELY were the funeral ceremonies of Sulla over, when Lepidus began his attacks upon the work of the dictator, formed alliances on all sides with the discontented elements, and seriously thought of reviving the old rights of the tribunes of the people and of the comitia of the tribes, and recalling the exiles and restoring their property. The senate sent him to his allotted province, Narbonensian Gaul; but he stopped in Etruria, and prepared an army, while his friend, the Marian, M. Junius Brutus, roused Upper Italy; and when in b.c. 77 Lepidus peremptorily demanded these political changes, and a new consulate for himself, there was no decision possible except by arms. Pompey quickly put down the rising of Brutus near Mutina; and after being defeated in a bloody battle at Rome upon the Campus Martius and again in Etruria, Lepidus fled to Sardinia, where he died. His legate, M. Perpenna, with part of his army, joined the remnants of the Marian faction in Spain. There Sertorius had induced the larger part of the native tribes of the south to come over to him; his agents stirred up the communities in Gaul against the senate; while from Valentia, on the coast, he kept in communication with the corsairs. Sertorius did not appear as a chief of Spanish insurgents. He steadfastly announced himself as a Roman governor representing the state: but he understood how to arouse the enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and how to bind them permanently to himself by a sensible, mild, and just system of government, and thus to open the way for the gradual Romanizing of this people. The fear of an invasion of Italy by the

democrats in Spain forced the senate, in looking about for an able general with a strong force, to take the fateful step of employing Pompey. Though by disposition and education an aristocrat, Pompey was by no means a friend of the optimates, and had no interest in the defence of Sulla's measures. For the time he simply wished to gain a controlling and brilliant position in the state, if possible with the concurrence of the senate, but if necessary even against its will and with the help of the people. He pursued no deep-laid political plans; he had no thought of creating new disturbances; he lacked the imagination, with all his egotism, to wish for kingly power. The controlling position in the state, yet without a break of republican forms, the glory without the duties, an abundance of triumphal crowns,—this was the ambition of this cold, vain man, who with many distinguished qualities shirked the responsibility, as he lacked the strength, to remould the future of Rome with vigorous hand, and who till the decisive crisis of his life never dreamed of bending the constitution of the state to his own purposes.

The senate, which had no choice, reluctantly and as an extraordinary measure, in direct opposition to Sulla's ordering of the state, conferred upon Pompey, who had administered no regular office of the state, proconsular authority over Spain. In B.C. 76 he opened the war in Spain, and the legates of Sertorius were unable to prevent his crossing the lower Ebro. But when after this first success he undertook to relieve Lauro (south of Valentia), which Sertorius was then besieging, he suffered a complete reverse, and was obliged to look on helplessly while the town was taken. Not till Metellus joined him from Baetica was Pompey, after a victory on the river Turia (Guadaliar), able to drive Sertorius into northern Spain, where, holding a number of fortified towns, Sertorius sought, by a skilful guerilla warfare, to weary out his opponents.

The pirates, who had almost complete possession of the Mediterranean, were leagued together, and under their own leaders were carrying on a war of extermination against Rome. Their strongholds were a part of Cilicia, which was still independent, with the adjoining Tauris and the island of Crete; and they possessed many places of refuge on the coasts of southern Asia Minor, of Dalmatia, and Mauretania. Offering assistance to every opponent of the government, especially to Sertorius and afterward to Mithradates, by wasting, kidnapping, plundering, and ransoming, they ruined many cities and sanctuaries on the coasts and islands of the Aegean Sea, and endangered the foreign

trade of Italy, and especially the importation of grain from Sicily, Africa, and Egypt, which had now become indispensable to the capital. The senate attempted to subdue the pirates by a campaign against their mountain fastnesses. Publius Servilius, B.C. 78 to 74, in a successful war, captured the greater part of their Asiatic strongholds, including Isaura, with its district, from which he gained the name Isauricus; but Crete remained unsubdued.

In Asia, after the death of Sulla, King Tigranes greatly extended his realm to the east and south, at the expense of the Parthians. Northern Mesopotamia came into his hands, and then he attacked the empire of the Seleucid. In the conflicts between the last princes of that dynasty, new powers had arisen, such as the strong Jewish prince, Alexander Jannaeus, and the Nabataean Aretas of Petra, who won Damascus and Lebanon; and several of the great cities had become independent. Tigranes conquered the Syrian kingdom in B.C. 83, gained eastern Cilicia, 'the plain,' and by B.C. 74 had extended his power along the coast to Ptolemäis. As a central point for his kingdom, he founded, on the right bank of the Tigris, fifty miles northwest of Nisibis, the new city of Tigranocerta (Tel-Ermen), and settled it with Grecian and half-Grecian inhabitants, forcibly transported thither. The Romans, however, had greater suspicion of Mithradates than of Tigranes; for the former held intimate relations with Sertorius and the democrats in Spain, and had given positions in his army to Italian fugitives, and having strongly established his power at the northeastern end of the Euxine, was reorganizing his fleet and army. When, in B.C. 74, Nicomedes III., king of Bithynia, at his death left his kingdom by will to the Romans, and they without delay entered upon their inheritance, Mithradates allied himself more closely to Sertorius and the pirates, and declared war.

Overrunning Cappadocia and Phrygia, he sent his fleet of 400 ships along the north coast of Asia Minor, and advanced in person against Bithynia at the head of his main army of 100,000 men. It was fortunate for Rome that at this time in Spain Sertorius was reduced to extremities, and that in Lucius Lueullus, the consul for B.C. 74, she had a general of great ability. With only 30,000 men he defended his province till the defeat of his colleague, whom Mithradates shut up in Chalcedon, called him to his relief. The king withdrew before him, and with great boldness marched toward the Propontis, where he attempted to surprise Cyzicus. The brave resistance of the citizens led to a protracted siege, which enabled Lueullus to come up, and, taking

a strong position in his rear, to cut off his communications with the land. Want and pestilence made fearful havoc with the king's forces; and in the spring of B.C. 73 he was forced to raise the siege, and on the retreat to the Hellespont suffered fresh and very severe losses, while part of his fleet was destroyed off Tenedos by Lucullus, with a squadron of vessels gathered from the Asiatic coast towns. The Romans cleared Bithynia of all Pontic troops, Mithradates was obliged to retreat in haste to Sinope, and in the fall Lucullus with his army invaded Pontus itself.

Meanwhile, in Italy there burst forth the most fearful Servile War of antiquity. There existed at Capua a great school of gladiators, who, under harsh discipline, were kept within their barracks. Here, in B.C. 73, a number of brave men, former prisoners of war, began the insurrection. Headed by two Celts, and the former Thracian chieftain, Spartaeus, they escaped to the ravines of Mount Vesuvius, and were reinforced by other fugitive slaves and many robbers and proletarians. A successful battle with a detachment of Roman troops, then a victory in Lucania over two legions, encouraged the slaves and other discontented elements in this region to join Spartaeus. All Bruttium, Lucania, and Campania fell into the hands of the insurgents. Spartaeus, though a noble character, and a thoughtful and skilful leader, could not prevent his followers from wreaking their vengeance upon the Romans, retaliating for the barbarous treatment of the prisoners by like atrocities. The Roman commanders were incompetent, and were unable to hinder Spartaeus and his hordes, now amounting to 120,000 men, mostly Thracian, Celtic, and Germanic slaves, from traversing the peninsula from south to north, in the attempt to reach their native lands beyond the Alps. The Celts were defeated on Mount Garganus; but Spartaeus actually fought his way to the neighborhood of Mutina, whence the way lay open for his followers to their homes. They, however, refused to leave Italy, and preferred an aimless course of plunder and wasting within it. Again they turned south, and visited the peninsula with murder, pillage, and conflagration. At last the senate placed Marcus Crassus, as praetor, at the head of eight legions, who drove the insurgents into the southern corner of Bruttium, and tried to cut them off from Italy by an intrenched line thirty-three miles long. Spartaeus succeeded in a winter's night in breaking through this line and reaching Lucania. The Celts and Germans then separated from him, and were overthrown in detail. Spartaeus himself lost a great battle in Apulia, which ended with his death and the utter destruction of his army; and

the Romans crucified 6000 prisoners along the great road from Capua to Rome.

The last remnants of these hordes were left to the sword of Pompey. The war in Spain had at last come to an end. When fortune began to forsake the brave Sertorius, the Roman fugitives about him began to conspire and mutiny ; and the harsh discipline which he maintained led to his downfall. In b.c. 72 some of the staff-officers who had conspired against him were put to death or banished, when those who were undetected, Perpenna at their head, assassinated the great man at an entertainment at Osca. Perpenna seized the command, but soon fell into the hands of Pompey, who had him executed. That ended the war ; and in b.c. 71 Metellus and Pompey led their armies back to Italy, when Pompey, by defeating 5000 of Spartacus's troops that still held together, was able to take to himself the credit of having rooted out the servile rebellion.

His return at the head of an army wholly devoted to him again set in motion the opposition to the constitution of Sulla. Pompey now wished to obtain the consulship, to have land assigned to his soldiers, and to conduct the Mithradatic war. The most that he could expect from the senate was relief from the restrictions of the constitution, which hindered him from at once suing for the consulship. It therefore became necessary for him to have an understanding with the democracy, which could scarcely ally itself honorably with the man who had overthrown Lepidus and Sertorius. None the less, Pompey was now the acknowledged hero of the day, the object of extravagant hopes, so that Crassus, not hitherto his friend, but who was now also a candidate for the consulship, became reconciled with him in order to share his favor, and withdrew his army from the support of the senate. While the troops of both generals still remained under arms, Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls for the year b.c. 70. Pompey, as consul, carried through the renewal of the authority of the tribunes, and withdrew from the senate the right to provide the jurymen. The optimates, in the administration of the provinces, had acted like high-handed robbers ; the senatorial juries were so grossly venal that it was almost impossible to secure the condemnation of any influential man. In that very year of b.c. 70, the fiery young orator, Marcus Tullius Cicero, as advocate for the unhappy Sicilians, impeached one of the most infamous of the Sullan party, Caius Verres, who had been praetor of Sicily in b.c. 73-71, and disclosed a multitude of unheard of atrocities. So the proposal was accepted, by which the senate was to retain only a third of the jurymen,

and the other two-thirds were divided between the knights and a group of rich plebeians that came very near the knights in property. The province of Asia seems to have been left to the knights under the old conditions; but the censorship was renewed, and its first incumbent removed sixty-four men from the senate, probably unpopular partisans of Sulla. But for Pompey fortune had reserved a still more brilliant triumph.

The skilful and energetic Q. Caecilius Metellus, who in b.c. 68 commanded as proconsul in Macedonia, was directed to drive the pirates out of Crete. He landed with three legions, defeated the entire forces of the islanders at Cydonia, and then with relentless cruelty he wasted the beautiful island, city after city, and district after district, till the summer of b.c. 67, when Pompey interfered in Crete as in the other affairs of the East. The conviction at last had become established in Rome, that no more half-measures must be taken against the pirates. A follower of Pompey, the tribune A. Gabinius, proposed that to extirpate them, a military authority, such as had never been heard of, should be conferred upon a single general, who was to be chosen by the senate from the ex-consuls, and for three years was to exercise supreme command over the waters of the Mediterranean, from the Pillars of Hercules to Colchis and Syria, and over all coasts to a distance of forty-six and a half miles from the sea. Not only were the existing resources of the state put at once at his disposal, but he was to have the right to increase his forces to 120,000 foot, 7000 horse, and 500 ships of war, and to control unconditionally the means of the provinces, and even the treasury of the state; and after his election twenty-five legates of senatorial rank were to be named to assist him. Every one knew that Pompey was meant. The senate, practical as these proposals were, raised constitutional objections to the rogation, which undeniably would make the prospective leader the military master of the Roman state for three years. Gabinius carried his proposal to the people, and set aside the intercession of his colleague, L. Trebellius, by proposing his removal. After seventeen tribes of the people, which was enthusiastic for Pompey, had voted against Trebellius, he withdrew his veto. In this enterprise Pompey fulfilled quickly and completely the hopes that were placed in him. The corsairs were everywhere, and had more than 1600 ships of all sizes. In order to attack them all at once, Pompey divided the field of operation into thirteen military districts, each under one of his legates, with instructions to hunt out the pirates, to attack them, and drive the fugitives into the hands of the other com-

manders. He himself with a strong fleet cleared the waters of Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa, and within forty days had rooted out piracy in the western half of the Mediterranean. He refused to treat and execute the prisoners as criminals, and therefore their opposition was seldom a desperate one. From Brundisium he sailed with sixty ships to the eastern part of the Mediterranean, whither the pirates had now gathered from all sides. A naval victory off the western border of Cilicia broke their last resources, and three months after the opening of the campaign the struggle was at an end. 20,000 prisoners were settled by Pompey at various places in eastern Cilicia which had been won from Tigranes, in Achaia, and in Calabria. A serious quarrel grew out of the conflict in Crete. The still unsubdued remnant of the Cretans, who wished to take advantage of the mildness of Pompey, announced their surrender to Pompey, and he accepted it. Metellus paid no attention to this action, but continued his war of devastation against the cities which had surrendered to Pompey, and came into open conflict with Pompey's legate. It looked as if Pompey would have to measure arms with Metellus, when he received from Rome the commission to carry on the war against Mithradates and Tigranes.

Lueullus had in the fall of B.C. 73 entered Pontus, the home of Mithradates. He blockaded the more important coast cities, like Sinope and Amisus, with small divisions, and in person led his army without opposition across the Halys, and then eastward into Cappadocia, where he came upon Mithradates with an army of 44,000 men at Cabira (Niksar), in B.C. 72, and so completely routed him that he was obliged toward the end of the year, after killing all the women in his harem to prevent their falling into Roman hands, to take refuge in Armenian territory. Lueullus subdued Pontus as far as Trapezus, and in B.C. 70 the king's son, Machares, governor of the Cimmerian Bosporus, made peace with him on his own account. Meanwhile the Roman commander sought, by a series of equitable regulations, to save the province of Asia from the terrible distress into which the burden of Sulla's war-taxes (which through the usury of the Italian bankers had reached the height of 120,000 talents) had plunged it. He was convinced that the war could only be brought to a close when Mithradates was either dead or a prisoner. He therefore sent an officer to the Armenian court to demand his surrender. But Tigranes angrily refused to follow the example of Boeckhus, and at once took part in the struggle against the republic. Lueullus had foreseen this, and regarded a war against Armenia as politically indispensable. The senate in Rome

ought now to have defended his rear and to have re-enforced his army. The daring of Lucullus in advancing against the widely extended realm of Tigranes was indeed great. Half of his 30,000 Italian soldiers must be left behind to defend the Pontic lands; and the temper of his veterans, who consisted in large part of the old legions of Fimbria, was mutinous and averse to war, as Lucullus insisted on discipline, and prevented as far as possible the plundering and ill-treatment of the vanquished. He did not possess the talent which Sulla had of winning the attachment of his troops. Nevertheless, his generalship resulted in a truly magnificent campaign. In the spring Lucullus crossed the Euphrates with 12,000 foot and 3000 horse, and passing Amida on the upper course of the western branch of the Tigris, advanced with desperate courage directly upon Tigranocerta. Tigranes thought to crush the Romans with a powerful army of 150,000 foot and 55,000 horse; and on October 6, b.c. 69, at the river Nicephorus, he fell upon Lucullus. The Romans, by attacking his rear with two cohorts that had been set in ambush, threw the unwieldy masses of the Armenians into disorder, completely routed Tigranes, and won a victory which recalled the victories over the Persians of Alexander the Great. Tigranocerta, where Lucullus found immense stores of every kind, was forced to surrender. It was destroyed, and the countless captives which it contained were sent back to their former homes. All Syria now declared its submission to the Romans; and Lucullus established as ruler here a Seleucid, Antiochus. Only the persistence of old Mithradates kept Tigranes from concluding a speedy peace with the Romans, and made it possible, by influencing the Asiatics against Rome, to raise a new army of 70,000 foot and 35,000 horse.

Meanwhile the position of Lucullus was undermined both at Rome, where the senate was weak and foolish enough to abandon him to the money-lenders, with whose operations in Asia his humane regulations had interfered, and in his camp, where the intrigues of some of the officers nourished the discontent of his war-worn veterans. Nevertheless, in the summer of b.c. 68, he ventured the march to the interior of Armenia, to attack Artaxata, the ancient capital. He succeeded in reaching the upper course of the eastern Euphrates; but at the approach of winter, the soldiers broke out in open mutiny, and Lucullus was obliged to turn back. He withdrew from Armenia to Mesopotamia without loss, and took by storm the rich city of Nisibis, where he made his winter quarters. Tigranes and Mithradates now attacked in overwhelming force the weak Roman divisions in southern

Armenia and Pontus. Lucullus was obliged, in the spring of B.C. 67, to retire from Nisibis to the northwest, and was preparing to meet the attacks of the Pontic and Armenian troops, when he received a message that the democrats and knights in Rome had carried through the resolution, that the soldiers of the Asiatic army who had served their time should receive their discharge, and he himself was recalled. But as his appointed successor showed no desire to undertake the conduct of a war that had suddenly become critical, and as the Fimbrian veterans demanded their immediate release, and were with difficulty persuaded to hold together for a little longer, nothing remained for Lucullus, who was obliged still to keep the command, but to retire to Asia, leaving Mithradates to recover the whole of Pontus, while Bithynia and Capadocia lay open to the raids of his cavalry.

Under these circumstances it was natural to turn to Pompey to restore the honor of the Roman arms. Caius Manilius, a tribune who had lost credit with all parties, and now sought the favor of Pompey, proposed to confer upon him, in addition to his existing command, that of the provinces of Asia Minor, and the conduct of the war against Mithradates and Tigranes, with the most extensive authority. Pompey thus received a grant of power such as never before had been united in the hands of a single Roman. He at once vigorously began his preparations. After joining to his command, though not without violent scenes, the remnant of the troops of Lucullus, he had at his disposal, besides Asiatic auxiliaries, 40,000 or 50,000 men, which were afterwards increased by three legions from Cilicia; and as Mithradates rejected his demand for an unconditional surrender, he entered Pontus, and after long manoeuvring was able to force the king to a battle near the later Nicopolis, and completely to destroy the Pontic army of 35,000 men. Meantime a conspiracy, which failed, against Tigranes made him suspicious of Mithradates; and, as he had no desire to fight the Romans, he entered into negotiations with Pompey, and broke summarily with the Pontic king. When Mithradates, after his defeat, reached the boundary of Armenia, he learned that his son-in-law had set a price of a hundred talents upon his head. Nothing remained for him then but to flee to the most northern provinces of his realm.

Pompey (Fig. 51) pursued him as far as Colchis, and then turned to Artaxarta to complete the settlement of peace with Tigranes. The



FIG. 51.—Cnaeus Pompey. Portrait on a coin. (From Imhoof-Blumer.)

Armenian monarch was compelled to give up his Syrian, Cilician, and Cappadocian conquests, and enter into the number of the Roman vassal princes. The Roman army went into winter quarters in northern Armenia, and in b.c. 65 was occupied in subduing the warlike peoples of the Caucasus, the Iberians (in Georgia), and the Albanians.

For several years Pompey was occupied with settling the affairs of all Asia west of the Euphrates, with securing for Rome the heritage of the Seleucids, and in bringing into order the confusion of Syria. The plains along the eastern border were ruled by Arab Bedouins, whose strongholds were in the neighboring oases, but who had extended their power over some of the cities of Syria. In the south were the Nabataeans of Petra, and the warlike Jews, who had conquered the entire coast except Ascalon, from Carmel to the border of Egypt, and extended their rule far beyond the Jordan and the Dead Sea. Among the Jews the party of the old theocracy, known as the Pharisees, was struggling for the mastery with the Sadducees, who favored a military monarchy; and the ruling house itself was divided. In b.c. 79 the high-priest Hyrcanus was hard pressed by his younger brother, Aristobulus, who had the mercenaries on his side, and at last was driven out. The Pharisees called in the Nabataeans, and in b.c. 65 Aristobulus was besieged in Jerusalem by 50,000 Arabs. In that year Pompey sent legates with small detachments to Mesopotamia and Syria, who among other duties were to put an end to the contentions of the Jews. He himself reached Syria late in b.c. 64, and the arrival of his army everywhere put an end to anarchy. Pompey now declared the former kingdom of Syria, excepting Commagene, a Roman province, and took the entire country, from the upper Euphrates and the Gulf of Issus to the boundaries of the Parthians and to the isthmus of Suez, into the possession of Rome; and placed a governor in Antioch, who was to watch over the new arrangement, to make Rome's superiority at once effective, and to collect the taxes of the realm. The new province was divided into a number of free city districts, which had to raise the taxes for the state. In the same way those chieftains whose rule was allowed to continue were used as agents and tax-gatherers for the provincial government. Only in Palestine did serious struggles continue. Although his legate had decided the contest at Jerusalem in favor of Aristobulus, Pompey was persuaded by the priestly party, whose interests coincided with those of the Romans, to set aside his monarchy. On Pompey's arrival at Jericho, Aristobulus submitted; but part of his supporters refused to do homage to the Romans, and in b.c. 63 Pompey spent

three months in besieging the strongly fortified hill on which the Temple stood, till, by taking advantage of the religious observances of the Jews, he captured the place by storm on a Sabbath. Jerusalem lost its walls, the realm of the Maecabees was broken down, their Coele-Syrian possessions, and part of those east of the Jordan and the coast district, were taken away. The district of Judea proper came again to Hyrcanus, who ruled as high-priest and as a Roman tributary 'ethnarch.' His counsellor was the crafty Idumaeon, Antipater, the ancestor of the later Herodian family. Meanwhile in the far north fortune had again favored Pompey. As in b.c. 63 he lay encamped upon the plains of Jericho, messengers from Pontus reached him with the news that Mithradates had met his death at Panticapaeum, whither he had fled in b.c. 65. Here, after putting aside his son, Machares, Mithradates had begun new and extensive preparations for war; and with extreme exertions raised again an army of 36,000 men and a fleet, and thought seriously of making his way through the lands between the Crimea and the eastern Alps to Italy. But his exactions and outrages embittered the people of Bosporus, and his growing fondness for murder alarmed his family and attendants. A rebellion broke out, in b.c. 63, in Phanagoria, in the Crimea. The king's son, Pharnaces, to save himself, placed himself at its head. All the troops went over to him. Mithradates, after poisoning all the women of his harem, ordered a Celtic slave to put an end to his life. Pharnaces received the title of a friend and ally of the Roman people, and was assured possession of the inheritance of his father to the north and east of the Black Sea. The news of Mithradates's death at last made it possible for Pompey to turn away from the Orient, where the Romans had reached the limits which, save for Octavian's taking of Egypt, were not to be overstepped till Trajan's time. Unfortunately, in the overthrow of Armenia, Pompey, by various overbearing acts and encroachments, had put an end to the good relations which had hitherto existed between Rome and the Parthians.

During the Mithradatic War two new provinces came to Rome. Crete remained in her hands, as the result of its conquest by Metellus; while Cyrene, in Northern Africa, which had been bequeathed to her by a member of the fast dying out Lagidae, was first organized in b.c. 74. The kingdom of the Ptolemies (Lagidae) meanwhile steadily fell away into helpless weakness. When, in b.c. 81, the direct line of the Lagidae became extinct, the Romans permitted two brothers, illegitimate sons of Ptolemy VIII., to secure the government. One estab-

lished himself in Cyprus; the other, Ptolemy XIII. Auletes, took the valley of the Nile. The senate gave them a provisional, but not formal recognition; for the greedy oligarchy wished them to be compelled to send large and repeated presents to Rome to make sure of their crowns.

In the spring of B.C. 62 Pompey (Fig. 52) sailed from Pontus to Athens, and thence to Brundisium, where the illustrious general, in whom the entire Orient already recognized the new monarch of the Roman realm, again trod Italian soil. All Italy awaited his coming


with the utmost tension; men thought that the days of the republic were numbered.

During his long absence from Italy, his many enemies in Rome had not been idle. The oligarchy, which regarded him with the strongest aversion, was for the time completely powerless. But the leaders of the democracy repeatedly tried to create a military position for themselves, by which they might eventually be able to withstand the seizure of kingly power which all feared would be made by the imperator on his return. It is believed that the moves of the democracy after B.C. 66 must be

FIG. 52.—Pompey. Antique statue in the Palazzo Spada in Rome. (From photograph.)

explained by their opposition to the future monarch: but, as the politics then were, every intrigue tended to become a conspiracy, and there were also elements of another sort, which seized on opportunities for private advantage, regardless of the common good.

Among the older politicians, M. Crassus had lately drawn closer to the democracy. An able advocate, but above all a banker of immense wealth, he was then seeking an alliance with a young politician of the most ancient nobility, whose family traced its descent to Aeneas, but



who was now regarded as the clearest head in the democratic party. This was Caius Julius Caesar, who was born July 12, b.c. 102, the son of a former praetor, C. Julius Caesar, who died in b.c. 84, and the nephew of Marius's widow, Julia. Of extraordinary talents, he had enjoyed an excellent education, and even in his early years had awakened great expectations; though for a long time no one suspected the political and military genius which slumbered in this gay and graceful young man, who seemed to care only for the elegant enjoyments of life. In the times of Sulla's proscriptions he attracted attention by the determination with which he refused to obey the command of the dreaded Sulla to divorce his wife, the daughter of Cinna. It was with difficulty that the dictator, who recognized in Caesar 'more than a Marius,' was induced to pardon him. When Caesar entered political life, he was at first forced to support the power of Pompey; but from b.c. 71 events tended to drive him more and more into opposition to the optimates. The next ten years of his life were exceedingly important for him, but also very prejudicial to his future. Then it was that there became rooted, among the optimates and a considerable part of the wealthy classes, an abiding mistrust of his ultimate purposes. None of the opponents of the senatorial government pushed forward so relentlessly as Caesar in the war of the democracy against the remnants of the aristocratic party and against prominent individuals of the oligarchy. In the year b.c. 68, in which as quaestor he began the course of curule honors, he ventured, against the prohibition of the government, to display publicly, at the burial of his aunt Julia, the image of Marius; and in b.c. 65, when curule aedile, to set up again upon the Capitol the old trophies of Marius which Sulla had removed. But the act which most compromised him in public estimation, to the time of his crossing the Rubicon, was his association with Catiline. As early as the year b.c. 66, Caesar and Crassus, with their friends, determined to get into their hands the highest offices of the republic, then to secure for themselves the command in Spain, or to make use of the affairs of Egypt, as Pompey had those of the Orient, and under cover of legal forms to secure a strong military force. The consuls elected for the year b.c. 65 were legally convicted, in September, b.c. 66, of gross bribery in the elections, and their election therefore annulled. Caesar and Crassus made common cause, as it appears, with these men and their supporters, and laid plans for a daring act of violence. On the first of January, b.c. 65, the senate was to be overawed by the appearance of armed troops, and the consuls were to be forcibly put

into office. To what lengths the managers of the scheme were ready to go is unknown. Their object was the creation of a military power, having its basis in Spain, and the control of the government in Rome. To carry out this scheme Caesar and Crassus allied themselves with Lucius Sergius Catilina, a man whom public opinion charged with many personal crimes besides the acts of cruelty which he had committed as agent of Sulla in the time of the proscriptions. Born about b.c. 108, with rich mental gifts, personal bravery, and military ability, he had a truly fiendish nature, and had attached to himself men hopelessly in debt, men who had lost all character through dissipation and vice, and such impoverished veterans of Sulla as were ready for any violence. But the intrigue failed on the first of January, and again

on February 5, from circumstances which Catiline could not foresee. Caesar and Crassus continued with their schemes, even entering into an alliance with P. Sittius, a bankrupt who had fled to Mauretania, and had turned freebooter. For the year b.c. 63 they wished the government, at all events, to come into democratic hands. Catiline and an insignificant person, C. Antonius Hybrida, were nominated as candidates for the consulate. No man among the optimates desired to compete with such dangerous opponents; but there was found among the young plebeians a *homo novus*, who



FIG. 53.—Cicero. Antique bust in Madrid. (From Hübner.)

had the ambition to sue for the honor,—the gifted advocate, Marcus Tullius Cicero (Fig. 53).

He was the son of a wealthy knight, and was born at Arpinum, January 3, b.c. 106. Of uncommon intellectual gifts and great promise as a boy, he received an excellent education in Rome. His talent as an orator and as a skilful advocate was first clearly displayed in the case of Sextus Roscius of Ameria in the year b.c. 80. He then gained the sympathy of the opponents of the measures of Sulla, and acted with them, particularly in b.c. 70, when he conducted for the Sicilians the impeachment of Verres, the follower of Sulla. The unfavorable judgment that obtains to-day concerning his political character rests mainly upon his weak and vacillating position in the period after his consulate until the appearance of young Octavianus. It is a pity that this fine

and brilliant mind, destined to obtain enduring and deserved renown as an able jurist, as the creator of a brilliant style, as the chief model of the noble Latin tongue, as a rhetorician, and as an expounder of Greek philosophy, should have sought a career in which he could not shine. In the existing party life at Rome there was no room for men of his character. Dissatisfied with the measures of Sulla, but no democrat, he stood at first in the ranks of the opposition to the oligarchy, and afterward sought to lean on Pompey. But when he saw that there was no room for a middle party, he steadily approached the optimates, with the idea that by an accord between the order of the knights and the senators a new support for the republic might be established. We must remember that the preservation of his correspondence makes it possible for us to follow his inner vacillations and changing moods in very troublous times, which we cannot do for any of his contemporaries; and we must not lose sight of his nobler qualities, his moral uprightness and unselfishness. Yet there was one brilliant period in his political life, that of the struggle against Catiline. The nobility saw with pleasure the Pompeian Cicero enter the contest, and whoever was opposed to the policy of Caesar and Crassus supported Cicero. He was successful. Catiline failed, and Cicero at once won over to the senatorial policy the double-faced Antonius, who was burdened with debt, by promising to leave to him the province of Macedonia, with the plunder there to be obtained.

The year B.C. 63 opened with democratic propositions of every sort, intended to help Caesar, who was zealously supported by the tribune T. Labienus and Crassus against Pompey, and to shatter still more the power of the senate. The contest against these propositions drove the consul Cicero more definitely into opposition to the democracy. But now there arose an independent agitation, dangerous to all alike, that of Catiline, who, having broken with Caesar and Crassus, was seeking in his own personal interest to gain the consulship for the year B.C. 62. For the elections in July, B.C. 63, he announced himself as the leader of the ‘oppressed and needy,’ so that he was joined by all who hoped or desired a social change, by all who were burdened with debts, or wished for new assignments of land. The conservative elements were so aroused by this danger that Catiline was again defeated. This new defeat turned Catiline’s agitation first into a conspiracy, and then into open revolution. In Etruria, near Faesulae, C. Manlius, a brave centurion of Sulla, gathered an effective army for Catiline. In Rome, Catiline labored personally to prepare the way for an armed revolt.

In opposition to him Cicero displayed great energy and activity, and by his spies was able to watch all his steps in the capital. Before Catiline was able to give the signal for the rising in Rome, according to agreement, on October 25, Manlius raised at Faesulae the banner of revolt, proclaiming, as his programme, relief from debt. On the night of November 1, an unsuccessful attempt was made to surprise the fortress at Praeneste. The conspirators, on the night of November 6, then determined upon a carnival of blood and fire for Rome. The next morning Catiline's plan to murder the consul was foiled by his watchfulness; and on the 8th Ciceron's fiery speech in the senate convinced him that in spite of the lack of legal proof of his guilt, his stay in Rome was no longer safe. He retired on the following night to his army in Etruria, and proclaimed himself consul. This simplified matters. The measures taken by the government prevented the spread of the flame over Etruria; and in Rome the confession of an embassy of the Allobroges, whom the friends of Catiline had endeavored to draw into their plot, gave the consul all needful legal proof, so that their leaders could at once be arrested. The anger of all classes in Rome against the Catilinarians went beyond all bounds, but there was fear of a forcible attempt to free the prisoners. When Ciceron brought the question of their fate before the senate, the majority favored their execution; although such a course without a regular trial was contrary to the constitution, and did not lie within the competency of the senate. All opposition to the course was removed by a speech of M. Porcius Cato, a great grandson of the old censor (born in B.C. 95), whom he strongly resembled in stern morality and honorable intention, as also in fidelity to the republic. On the evening of December 5 the arrested conspirators were delivered to the executioner. The army of Catiline, two legions strong, was forced by the consul Antonius into a valley near Pistaria, and in the beginning of B.C. 62 was completely overcome after a stubborn engagement. Catiline, Manlius, and 3000 insurgents fell.

The victory of Ciceron and the senate over the Catilinarians had strange consequences. The democratic party, from which the angry knights broke away, fell into disrepute. Caesar found that men did not forget that for several years he had been on intimate terms with Catiline. The uncertain shadow which naturally rested on their earlier intrigues made it possible for his opponents at a later time to ascribe to their relations a far worse character than they seem to have had. On the other hand, the optimates had gained a new feeling of strength, which led them, when Pompey, on his return, contrary to all expecta-

tion, made no attempt to seize the sovereignty, to oppose him with suicidal folly. When at the end of B.C. 62 Pompey landed at Brundisium, to the universal surprise, he disbanded his army, and returned to Rome in the simplest manner. It was the resignation of the conqueror of Asia. It does not seem difficult to explain this step. At that moment, if Pompey was not content with the glory of the 'Roman Alexander,' nothing remained for him but the assumption of a crown. Hitherto in all the great political crises of his life he had allowed others to work for him. Now, however, it was impossible to find a form by which he could come forward as monarch without destruction of the republican order, and especially of republican phrases. Pompey shrank from the usurpation as soon as it became real. He, too, was affected by the still powerful influence which a tradition of five centuries exercised, even in the days of the decline of the republican constitution, upon the feelings and imagination of the citizens. And, finally, he plainly lacked, in the decisive moment, the political courage for a bold leap into the dark.

Pompey had possibly hoped for some circumstance that would allow him, without a breach in the old forms, to return to Rome with his army; but even the army of Catiline had been put down. Not long after, one of the tribunes, in connection with Caesar, who was praetor in B.C. 62, introduced a rogation by which Pompey was to be recalled with his army to save the country, endangered by the violent measures against the Catilinarians. This move was checked by the intercession of the tribune Cato, and the employment of the armed companies of the senate. The measure showed at once that Caesar was trying to renew the democratic alliance with Pompey, and to prevent any reconciliation between the oligarchy and the imperator, for whom the tribunes, Labienus and Balbus, had already allowed the voting of unexampled triumphal honors. After Pompey's entrance into Rome, at the beginning of B.C. 61, Caesar went as propraetor to Farther Spain, so burdened with debt that his friend Crassus was obliged to be surety for a quarter of what he owed, about 830 talents. During his absence, affairs in Rome took such a shape that after a year and a half he was able to interfere decisively in the fate of the republic.

Pompey had thus, at the end of the year B.C. 62, divested himself of the dreaded power before which all had trembled. He hoped by his 'renunciation' to win the additional glory of the most ideal civic greatness, and by the favor of the people to see his wishes fulfilled without the weight of his sword. On September 29 and 30, B.C. 61 (the latter

his forty-sixth birthday), he celebrated, with more than royal pomp, the most magnificent triumph which the Roman world had ever seen; but he soon found that his many and bitter enemies in the senate took his purpose to be a citizen like themselves in earnest, and treated him only as such. Instead of winning this man, whom nature intended as an aristocrat and not as a monarch, and of making him the support of their party, they proceeded by their treatment of his personal wishes and his political demands, to irritate him, and at last to give him a complete check. Pompey asked for himself a second consulship; the ratification, as a whole, of all his acts in Asia; and finally, for his veterans, the assignment of lands which he had promised them. But the consulship was refused him; the promise of settlements for his soldiers was indeed sanctioned, but its accomplishment indefinitely postponed; and in reference to his measures in Asia, the proposal of Lueullus was adopted, that they should be considered in detail, which opened the way to endless delay and confusion. Out of humor and completely checkmated, Pompey found himself, in the summer of B.C. 60, in an extremely uncomfortable position, when unexpectedly the prospect opened to him of once again rising to power by the help of the democracy.

## CHAPTER XVII.

CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR.

IT was Caesar (Fig. 54) who now extended the saving hand to Pompey. He had shown himself in Spain an excellent administrator, had subdued the races between the lower Tagus and the Duero, and in Galicia, and obtained the means which freed him from his most pressing debts. In June, b.c. 60, he appeared again in Rome, and obtained the consulship, having as his colleague M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the brother-in-law of Cato, and one of the most violent and obstinate of the oligarchy. Caesar now proposed to Pompey an alliance against the aristocracy, and brought about a reconciliation between him and Crassus. What the united influence of these three men, whose association is popularly called the First Triumvirate, was able to accomplish, was soon shown. Caesar, on entering upon his consulship (b.c. 59), hastened to care for the veterans of Pompey; without limiting the assignment specially to them, he demanded the division of the Campanian domains and the purchase of private estates, for which the large sums turned by Pompey into the state treasury were to be used. As it seemed impossible to carry through the senate this proposal, although it had been carefully prepared, and was expedient, and without demagogic elements, Caesar turned to the commonalty, where it was passed regardless of the veto of the tribunes, though Cato and Bibulus had to be forcibly silenced. He further obtained from the commonalty the ratification of all Pompey's acts in Asia, and by some financial concessions gained the equestrian order to his side. Bibulus thereupon sullenly withdrew to his house, and busied himself with issuing useless protests against all the acts of his colleague. Caesar now gained his great object. The tribune, P. Vatinius, obtained for him from the people an extraordinary command, similar to the earlier one of Pompey. He was to have the Cisalpine province (that is, Upper Italy), which had long been friendly to him, and where he had strong supporters, with three legions and the Illyrian contingent for five years. On the proposal of Pompey the senate added the province of Narbonensis with one legion, a grant which was to be of incomparable importance to

Caesar. The triumvirs then directed the new consular elections to men upon whom they could rely, and the alliance between Caesar and Pompey was strengthened by the marriage of Pompey to Caesar's young daughter Julia.



FIG. 54. — Julius Caesar. Ancient marble bust, in the British Museum. (From a photograph.)

400 miles from Rome, razed his house on the Palatine, and consecrated the site to a temple of Liberty, in which he characteristically set up, as the cult image, a statue of a Greek hetaera which his brother had stolen in Tanagra. At the same time he secured a vote, extremely re-

The triumvirs thought it advisable to humiliate the optimates by the temporary removal of the stubborn Cato and of Cicero, whom the democracy wished to punish for the execution of the confederates of Catiline. For this they made use of the worthless P. Clodius Pulcher, a degenerate member of the noble house of the Claudii, who, to be elected tribune, had had himself adopted into a plebeian family. As tribune in b.c. 58 he began his attack upon Cicero, against whom he had grounds for personal hatred, by introducing a rogation, that "whoever had put to death a Roman citizen uncondemned and without trial should be banished." Cicero gave himself up as lost, and in utter dejection went voluntarily into exile in Macedonia. Clodius now had him banished in due form, to a distance of

pugnant to the honorable Cato, by which the latter was forced practically to confiscate the kingdom of Cyprus, and execute a shameless act of violence.

But now the interest centres in the camp of Caesar. By the end of March, b.c. 58, he was able to leave for his province, where he was sorely needed, and where a career of world-wide importance awaited him. The command in Transalpine Gaul enabled him to carry out the project of the ablest minds of his party since the time of Caius Gracchus,—the conquest and Romanizing of the Celtic lands. Meantime, the political complications of the Celts, caused chiefly by the pressure upon them of the Germanic peoples along the whole line of the Rhine, forced upon him from the outset military tasks of the grandest character.

In the northeast of Gaul the Belgians, dwelling between the Rhine, the Seine, and the English Channel, and retaining a comparatively simple mode of life, formed a number of forest cantons, which were united in a confederacy, and bravely maintained their position against the Germans. The Helvetians in the south, however, had lost to the Germans all the land south of the Main to the southern edge of the Black Forest, and felt so keenly the pressure from the north and northeast that in b.c. 61 they determined to abandon their country, between Lake Constance, the upper Rhine, Lake Geneva, and the Jura, and to conquer a new home in the interior of Gaul, whither the Germans of Ariovistus, from Alsace, had already led the way, and the German Usipetes and Tencteri along the delta of the Rhine and the Meuse were preparing to follow. Since the downfall of the Arverni, the Haedui, the friends of the Romans, had struggled with the powerful Sequani for the hegemony among the civilized Celts that dwelt between the Seine and the Garonne. In the course of an exhausting war the Sequani in b.c. 71 had secured the help of a German king, Ariovistus, who gradually brought increasing numbers over the Rhine, and in b.c. 61 defeated the Haedui, and compelled them to submit to the Sequani. In b.c. 59 Ariovistus was recognized by the senate as the friend of the Roman people; but the next year, at the head of 120,000 men, he attacked the Sequani, and forced them to make considerable cessions of land.

Caesar believed that the confusion that must arise would be prejudicial to Roman interests, and at once interfered with a master hand. When he entered his province the Helvetii, 368,000 in number, of whom a fourth part bore arms, were already in motion, trying to force

an entrance into Gaul by way of Geneva. Caesar, who could not permit them to overflow the Roman lands and those of the dependent Celts, nor allow the Alpine lands deserted by them to be occupied by the Germans, blocked the passes on the Rhone, whereupon the Helvetii turned north, and passed the defiles of the Jura. On learning of this, Caesar hastily drew from Italy the three legions at Aquileia and two newly recruited ones, marched into the country of the Haedui, destroyed a division of the Helvetii, which he found still on the left bank of the Arar (Saône), and for fifteen days followed their main body up the right bank of this stream. Near Bibracte (Autun), the chief town of the Haedui, they came to an engagement; after a terrible struggle, in which the Romans lost heavily, the Helvetii were so disastrously defeated that they were obliged to submit, and to return to their own land, only 110,000 having survived the journey and the battle. Caesar now determined to break the power of Ariovistus, and thus began the contest between Rome and the Germans which was to end only with the fall of the empire. The races of central Gaul were easily won to help the Romans. At the request of Caesar, the Haedui refused to pay tribute; and when Ariovistus undertook to reduce them, Caesar interfered, with the demand that he should cease hostilities, and allow no more Germans to enter Gaul. The German king returned a haughty refusal, and, confiding in his right and strength, boldly turned upon the Roman. Caesar was met by an unexpected difficulty. The remembrance of the terrors of the conflict with the Teutones and the Cimbri still lived among the Italian troops. Their general had not yet shown his ability, so that the legions became demoralized and were ready to give way to a panic. Then Caesar, bringing into play his incomparable talent for controlling men, roused their sense of shame, filled them with enthusiasm, and infused into them a part of his own fire and confidence of victory. The decisive battle was fought in the beginning of September, b.c. 58, near Mülhausen. In a stubborn contest, Caesar at the head of his right wing gained the advantage; but the Germans were successful on the other wing, when young Publius Crassus, the able son of the triumvir, on his own responsibility called to its aid the Roman reserves, and thereby decided the victory. The Germans were pursued as far as the Rhine, beyond which Ariovistus escaped, and for the first time the weapons of Roman soldiers were mirrored in its waters. The German peoples which had settled on the left bank from upper Alsace to the neighborhood of Mayence, the Triboei in Alsace, the Nemetes near Spires, the Vangiones near Worms, were allowed, as

it seems, to remain, acknowledging the supremacy of Rome, and agreeing to prevent new immigrations of Germans. The year B.C. 58 became, by these two daring and brilliant campaigns of Caesar, important not only to his party, which now with joy saw that its political leader was a general of the first rank, but even more to Rome and the Western world. The Rhine, from Lake Constance to its delta, became, mainly through Caesar, the new boundary of Rome in the north, while the supremacy of the Romans was established to the Atlantic Ocean. Caesar here first showed that he was far more than a bold and fortunate party-leader. It was already his definite purpose to win for his nation a new territory in the northwest, as a field for freer expansion and for the Romanizing of 'barbarian' races; to put an end once for all to the danger from the Celts; to avert betimes the danger from the Germans; and by the conquest of a distant land with easily defended boundaries, to create a new and strong defence for the hitherto disconnected members of the Roman empire on the Mediterranean and Rome itself. Yet it is not to be forgotten that this new development of the power of Rome, that the glory and greatness which Caesar gained as conqueror and discoverer, were purchased only at the cost of the freedom and the political existence of the great Gallie nation, and the destruction of an entire generation of Celts.

These victories for the first time brought under the sway of Rome the races inhabiting the land between the Roman province of Narbonensis, the Garonne, the upper Rhine, and the Seine. The Celts had no political unity. The powerful Belgian tribes, and the league of Armorican cantons in Normandy and Brittany, were wholly independent of the races of the interior. Their only connecting bond was the powerful priesthood of the Druids, which was spread over all Gaul and the British Isles, and had its chief centre near the modern Chartres. The Druid priests cared for their schools, their peculiar religious practices, and exercised great power, not only through their worship, which involved human sacrifices, but also through their independent jurisdiction, and their influence upon the political relations of the tribes. The Romans hoped that the Celts would gradually assimilate with the Italian mode of life. They had developed in their thickly populated cantons, as far as the Seine, an independent civilization of considerable importance. They had many walled towns and thickly populated cities; they had roads and bridges for their active commerce: their rivers and adjacent sea were dotted with their sailing-vessels. They were skilled in metal-work, and worked their mines. Their political

condition was favorable to foreign domination. For the internal dissensions of Gaul we can find a parallel only in Hellas after the Peloponnesian war. The dominant nobility, except perhaps in Belgica, had developed into an order of knighthood, controlling masses of hired mounted retainers, and had reduced the common freemen far and wide to subjection; but it possessed no common spirit, and supported sometimes the one, sometimes another, of the powerful tribes that strove for hegemony. Yet, notwithstanding these divisions, the knights, with the Druids, were in a sense the upholders of the feeling of nationality.

Caesar strengthened the army, which afterward became his chief weapon in the Civil War, by new enlistments and levies from the Roman population in his province, and from the other people there enjoying the ‘Latin right.’ The system of warfare developed since Marius reached under Caesar its perfection. Besides the legions formed of Italians (each now 6000 strong), and the excellent cavalry composed of subject and friendly Celts, Caesar had in his command Spanish horsemen, Balearic slingers, Numidian spearmen, and Cretan archers. Afterward he enlisted even Germans for his service. Moreover, the artillery and the art of the engineer were peculiarly well developed. Caesar personally displayed increasingly brilliant talents as a general, and by his serene composure in danger, his inexhaustible fertility in resources in the most difficult conditions, his personal bravery, and his incomparable rapidity and energy of action, inspired his troops with absolute confidence.

In the spring of b.c. 57 Caesar, with the army now raised to eight legions, advanced against the Belgians. Of these only the Remi (near Rheims) came over to him. He found the enemy, 300,000 strong, north of the Axona (Aisne); and was able to exhaust them, by avoiding a general engagement and by maintaining the defensive in a wisely chosen place, till the Belgie army broke up, and foolishly decided that each tribe should defend itself with the help of its neighbors in its own country. Caesar then advanced against the western tribes, where the Suessiones (Soissons), the Bellovaci (Beauvais), and the Ambiani (Amiens) surrendered to his tactics and his siege artillery. In the east they showed more vigor. Only the Treveri (Treves) joined the Romans, while the warlike Nervii, the Atrebates, the Viromandui (Arras), and the Aduatuci (Namur) formed a close alliance, and assembled at the river Sabis (Sambre). When Caesar, advancing with all his force, had reached with six legions the heights on the left bank of the Sabis, the enemy made a general attack upon him. His left

wing, under T. Labienus, and the centre gained the advantage from the outset; but the two legions on the right wing, where Caesar commanded in person, were pressed so hard that Caesar himself was compelled to fight in the ranks, till the arrival of the two legions of the reserve and of Labienus with one legion from the left wing turned the balance. The Nervii were annihilated. Almost all Belgica did homage to the Romans. The peoples of Normandy and of Brittany, when Crassus with a Roman detachment appeared in their borders, in their first surprise submitted; but soon, discontented with the new dominion of the strangers, under the head of the Veneti, in southwest Brittany, broke into rebellion along the entire coast, from the delta of the Loire to that of the Rhine. They were aided by various inland tribes. Caesar energetically led in person the chief campaign against the Veneti. When he saw that from the land nothing was to be done against their towns, situated on the steep cliffs of a rocky shore, he turned to the sea. One of his legates, Decimus Brutus, had built upon the Loire a strong fleet of vessels propelled by oars. At first these low ships, notwithstanding their rapid movement, could not match the 220 high-decked sailing-vessels of the Veneti; but the Roman sailors, by cutting the cordage of the enemy's ships with sickles fastened to long poles, rendered them unmanageable, and so could board them. The first naval battle on the Atlantic resulted in a victory for Caesar's fleet, which led to the submission of the Celts in Brittany; and Caesar, as a warning example, put to death the council of the Veneti, and sold the whole people into slavery. While the Roman fleet fought upon the sea, Crassus, in a rapid and brilliant campaign, had also subdued the district of Aquitania, which lay between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, and was inhabited mostly by Iberian tribes. Thus at the end of the year B.C. 56 Gaul could be regarded in the main as a Roman province.

The borders, which were endangered by the neighborhood of warlike peoples, must now be made secure. Caesar first turned against the Germans. At the end of B.C. 56 the Usipetes and Teneteri, said to number 430,000 men, had crossed the Rhine near Emmerich. Caesar advanced against them, but found them unwilling to fight, and anxious to settle down on land under the protection of Rome. During the negotiations, an attack on his cavalry aroused Caesar's suspicions, and led him to an act of cruelty and faithlessness. He seized on their chiefs during a conference, attacked the unsuspecting Germans without warning, and the greater part were destroyed by the sword or in

trying to recross the Rhine ; the remnants took refuge with the Sigambri, on the Lippe and Lahn. To increase the terror, Caesar built a bridge on piles across the Rhine, marched his army over it into the country of the friendly Ubii, and after eighteen days returned to Gaul. In the same year (B.C. 55), with still greater boldness, he crossed with two legions from the harbors of the Morini, on the Strait of Dover, and forced a landing in southeastern Britain (perhaps at Walmer Castle). He returned to Gaul, and prepared a fleet of 800 transports with which, in the spring of B.C. 54, he sailed from Itius Portus with five legions and 2000 cavalry for Kent. Pressing into the interior he found a brave opponent in Cassivellaunus, a chieftain on the lower Thames, who, avoiding a general engagement, was able with his cavalry and war-chariots to hamper the Romans. Caesar crossed the Thames above London ; but after an attack of Celts on his ships, he made a treaty with Cassivellaunus, who consented to a purely formal submission. The connection, however, between the Celts of Gaul and of Britain had been seriously interrupted.

Meanwhile, Caesar's attention was called to affairs in Rome. While his new laurels were consigning to oblivion the glory of Pompey's Asiatic conquests, Pompey was showing that he himself lacked the skill and the vigor to become the political leader of the Romans, and to control the democracy of the capital. Rome, filled with a restless mob, with no garrison of troops, and no effective police, was in the hands of bands of ruffians, often united with gladiators belonging to powerful individuals, who were paid by the different parties to intimidate and overpower their opponents in the Forum. A master in this business was the insolent demagogue, P. Clodius, who, after Caesar's departure, unceasingly harassed the senate, and soon opposed even Pompey. Unable otherwise to cope against this man, who for a while kept him blockaded in his own house, Pompey in turn supported similar bands, of whose leaders the best known is T. Annus Milo. In B.C. 57 Pompey came to an understanding with the senate, and earnestly co-operated with it in ending Cicero's banishment.

But Pompey, who desired a military position similar to Caesar's in Gaul, could obtain nothing from the senate. In September, B.C. 57, on the occasion of an extraordinary rise in prices, he asked for the superintendence of the grain supply of the entire Roman realm, with authority superior to that of the governors, with full control of the state treasury, and with an army and a fleet, but received merely the commission to provision the city, with only proconsular authority for

five years. He then fell out with Crassus, when the party of the senate became bolder, and prepared to attack the laws passed in Caesar's consulship, especially those for the assignment of the Campanian domains, which were to be invalidated on the ground of serious informalities. Caesar's intervention was immediate and masterful. At a conference with Crassus and Pompey at Luca, in April, B.C. 56, the Triumvirate was again made strong, and Crassus was reconciled with Pompey. Crassus and Pompey were to receive the consulship again for the year B.C. 55; and after its expiration Pompey was to obtain, by vote of the citizens, the Spanish provinces, and Crassus Syria, each for five years, while Caesar, who directed Clodius to give Pompey no further molestation, after the close of his first quinquennium (the end of February, B.C. 54), was to have the command in Gaul for a new period of five years, till B.C. 49, and then was to stand for the consulship for B.C. 48. Meanwhile the number of his legions was to be increased to ten.

The renewed alliance of the triumvirs disarmed the senatorial party in the city. The essentials of their agreement were sanctioned by the people and by their instruments among the tribunes. But gold and violence had to be repeatedly and recklessly employed. Pompey and Crassus secured their election as consuls only by the use of brutal violence, and in the discussion on the assignment of the Spanish and the Syrian provinces to Pompey and Crassus, the extension of Caesar's command in Gaul, any veto of the tribunes was made physically impossible. Pompey now held court at Rome, and governed Spain by his legates, while Crassus, who was growing old, sought new glory, money, and power by brilliant deeds in war. This was possible for him only in one part of the Orient. The Parthians attacked the king of Armenia, the successor of Tigranes, and vassal of the Romans, and wrested from him northern Mesopotamia. The proconsul in Syria, Gabinius, prepared to interfere, and had already led his troops over the Euphrates; but was obliged to retire (B.C. 55) to put down an insurrection in Egypt, where the oppression of Ptolemy Auletes had driven Alexandria to revolt.

Crassus appeared in Asia to undertake the Parthian war, which he regarded as a task of no especial difficulty; but after beginning operations in Mesopotamia in the summer of B.C. 54, he made a series of blunders. He went back to Syria early in the season, affording the Parthians full time for preparation, and meanwhile embittered the people of his province by cruel extortions and by plundering the Temple

at Jerusaiem. Paying no regard to the topography or climate of the field of operations, or the character of his enemy, whose chief strength was in his cavalry, instead of advancing through Armenia, and of following the Euphrates, Crassus, with seven legions, 4000 horsemen, and 4000 slingers and archers, set out from Zeugma, on the Euphrates, to march across the waste and burning plains of northern Mesopotamia. Near Carrhae he met the countless swarms of the Parthian cavalry, to whose long lances and iron-tipped arrows the legionaries, overcome by heat and thirst, could make no effective resistance ; 20,000 were slain, including Crassus himself, 10,000 were captured ; the eagles fell into the hands of the enemy. The quaestor, C. Cassius, drew off the remnants of the army, and by desperate exertions saved Syria and Asia Minor for Rome.

One would suppose that Pompey would have eagerly seized the opportunity to equal the conqueror of Gaul by new deeds of glory in Asia. But polities were even then taking that turn which was to plunge the Roman state into civil war. It was disastrous for the relation between Pompey and Caesar, that in b.c. 54 Pompey's wife, Julia, the daughter of Caesar, suddenly died ; and Pompey, who while consul had built the first permanent stone theatre in Rome, that thereby he might gratify the masses, at last, through the unceasing violence in Rome, secured the control of Italy. The elections for the year b.c. 52 were bitterly contested ; and in January, b.c. 52, on the Via Appia, an accidental meeting of the bands of Clodius and Milo led to a fight, in which Clodius lost his life. Thereupon a furious tumult broke out in the city, which at last induced the senate to grant Pompey dictatorial power. The country was declared in danger. Pompey, clothed with extraordinary authority, was named 'sole consul' with the right to appoint his own colleague at discretion. He took vigorous measures for the restoration of order, while steadily advancing his own interests. He again enforced the laws in reference to canvass for office, and carried through a series of laws, some of which were important. The governorships were not henceforth to be assigned to the consuls and praetors at the close of their official year in Rome, but only after the lapse of an additional five years. Now Pompey began to loosen his connection with Caesar : and as the new regulation of the governorships could be employed on occasion to destroy Caesar's position in Gaul, it was suggestive that in b.c. 52 Pompey secured the prolongation of his Spanish government for five years without proposing the like for Caesar.

The conquest of Gaul seemed to be complete in the year B.C. 54. But the priesthood and nobility, the orders hitherto dominant, and now filled with fierce aversion to the Roman yoke, determined upon an uprising against Caesar. This was attempted in the winter of B.C. 54-53, when the legions were widely divided, but before Caesar had set out upon his customary winter journey to Italy. The revolt was begun by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, chiefs of the Eburones, on the Meuse, who attacked Titurius Sabinus on the march to the next Roman post, and cut to pieces his cohorts. The Nervii, Aduatuci, Eburones, and Menapii, in all 60,000 men, threw themselves upon the intrenched camp near Namur, where Quintus Cicero commanded; but he held out with great bravery until Caesar brought up 7000 men from Amiens to his support. A brilliant victory over the Belgae put an end for the time being to this insurrection, and discouraged other tribes that were ready for defection. Caesar hastened to make good his loss, and, to enlarge his army, borrowed one legion from Pompey, and enrolled two new ones, so that in the spring of B.C. 53 he had ten legions under his command. He everywhere put down the Celts, and again crossed the Rhine.

But when, later in the year, Caesar, disturbed by the events at Rome, had gone to Upper Italy, the Celtic chiefs, who must have known of the estrangement between him and Pompey, again arose against the legions. On the appointed day the Carnutes began the revolt by massacring the Roman tradesmen at Cenabum on the Loire (Orleans, or Gien); and the insurrection spread in all directions. The lead was taken by a knight of the Arverni, the noble, brave, and prudent Vercingetorix, who was greeted by his followers as king, and in a very short time gained to his cause almost all the tribes of the country as far as the Garonne and as Normandy, and even attempted to rouse the Roman province. Only the Haedui, the Sequani, and the Helvetii still held to Rome. The Belgae north was kept down for a while by the legions quartered there. Thither Caesar hastened, and marching with unexampled boldness with a small force clear through the enemy's country, he assembled his entire army, in February, B.C. 52, enlisting large masses of German warriors to supply his lack of cavalry, in the district of the Lingones (Langres), and advanced with eight legions against Avaricum (Bourges), the beautiful capitol of the Bituriges. Already, at his command, Cenabum had been laid in ashes: and Avaricum, near which the Celtic infantry had a strong camp, was to be captured. The Celts were unable to maintain their position. The

unhappy city was taken by the Romans, who there massacred fully 40,000 persons. Caesar now divided his army. Labienus went with four legions against the Senones and Carnutes, till at Lutetia (Paris) he was compelled to halt by masses of the enemy. Caesar, with six legions, threw himself upon Gergovia, the strong capital of the Arverni (near Clermont-Ferrand), under whose walls the enemy had again formed a strong camp. Caesar's troops were here repulsed in an assault upon the city by the Arverni; and the Haedui, including even the contingent in Caesar's army, fell away,—an example which was followed by most of the Belgians, and by the German tribes on the Upper Rhine. In this desperate strait Caesar turned north, and united at Sens with the corps of Labienus, who had defeated the Senones, and then proposed to reach the old province by a circuit by way of Besançon. But on the route he fell in with the army of Vercingetorix, who was marching northward, and who had fortified himself in a strong position at Alesia. Here Caesar completely enclosed the great Celtic army of 80,000 foot and 15,000 horse by an intrenched line nearly eleven miles long. The entire country from the Ardennes to the ocean was aroused for the ‘levy *en masse*’ for the relief of Alesia. In four weeks, when the scarcity of provisions began to make itself frightfully felt by the besieged, the great Celtic army of 250,000 foot and 8000 horse, to which all the insurgent tribes had sent their contingents, made its appearance. By that time Caesar had not only strengthened his works against Alesia, but also had secured his position on the outside by intrenchments fourteen miles in extent. The attempts of Vercingetorix from Alesia, and those of the Celts from without, to break through the Roman lines were unsuccessful; and Vercingetorix determined to give himself up as an offering to Caesar for his people. The great war thus came to an end. Caesar's prudent mildness soon restored the old relations with the Haedui and the Arverni, but some tribes were reduced only after hard conflict. The last opponents far in the south were overcome at Uxellodunum on the Lot (near Cahors): and, as a warning, their right hands were cut off. By the beginning of B.C. 50 the Celtic nation was so effectually subjugated that, during the trying years of the civil war, Caesar had no further anxiety about an uprising.<sup>1</sup>

The command of a powerful, victorious, and devoted army, by one who had always been connected with their side, was looked upon by the

<sup>1</sup> In Figs. 55–57 are illustrated several objects discovered in Roman Gaul.



FIG. 55.—Altar of Dionysus. Marble altar, about 3 feet high, probably of late Greek workmanship, brought to ancient Lugdunum (Lyons). (Museum at Lyons.)



FIG. 56.—Bronze statuette of a Victory found in 1866 near Lyons. Probably the figure formed part of a *recillum*, or standard; the right hand may have held a wreath. (Museum at Lyons.)



FIG. 57.—Ancient bronze casket, inlaid with silver (3 natural size; now at Vaison). The centre of the scene is the seated figure of Venus, accompanied by three doves and two Graces, one of the latter holding a parasol. At the left, leaning against a sepulchral stele, is Adonis, to be recognized by the taenia, or band. At the right is a group of six Cupids, whom Venus beckons to approach. The nude parts of the figures are of silver, inlaid. The disks on the right and left are the top (defective) and bottom of the casket.

Memorials of Roman civilization in Gaul. (From Gaz. archéol., 1878.)

democracy, now that military power was to decide the supremacy in the state, as meaning only the ultimate and permanent victory of their party. But Caesar, who far surpassed all his contemporaries in keenness of political insight and vigor of comprehension, had long perceived that the time of the old aristocratic republic was past, and that at last the decaying government of the senate must be succeeded by that of a military imperator; and to him, conscious of his own imperial genius, it was no longer doubtful that he must be the new master of the state. He probably would gladly have avoided a civil war. He seems to have intended to obtain a second consulship for the year B.C. 48, immediately after the close of his Gallic government, and then by all political means, among which force must have a place, to broaden his consulship into a dictatorship, and thus establish his ascendancy. The other parties in Rome were fully determined to prevent this at any price. The oligarchy in the senate knew that the sympathies of the middle classes were still for the republic, and hated and feared no man more than the conqueror of Gaul. It was not till the summer of B.C. 52 that they saw their way to resist, by permitting the accession to their number of Pompey, who would not again voluntarily resign his authority, and who, in case of a final break with Caesar, secured by alliance with the senate the great advantage of being able to appear as the representative of the legal government, and the champion of the republic; an alliance which could have no honest basis, for Pompey must still have hoped after Caesar's downfall to become in some form the sole master of the state. While the optimates hoped to checkmate his clumsy moves as they had done before, the party of the republic, after the union of the aristocratic policy with the personal policy of Pompey, instead of striking vigorously at Caesar, began a war of intrigue, in which that master of diplomacy easily won the victory, and put his enemies formally in the wrong. For Caesar's enemies it became all-important to prevent him from passing directly from his proconsular position into the consulship he desired; for if he could be reduced for a time to the position of a private citizen, they hoped to ruin him by a series of prosecutions in the courts. By a proposition of the tribunes in B.C. 52, during Pompey's dictatorship, Caesar had been allowed to stand for the consulship for B.C. 48 during his absence. When, soon after, the old rule forbidding such exceptions was revived, his claim was silently passed over, and his demand for the restoration of the clause in his favor was not formally accepted by the people. Its legality thus remained in doubt. Much more critical for him was the new regulation for filling the gov-

ernorship. His term of government in Gaul would end on the last of February, b.c. 49; but as, according to the old practice, he could be succeeded as a proconsul only by one of the consuls of the year, he had the right to continue his command till the arrival of his successor at the end of b.c. 49. But since, by Pompey's regulation, the outgoing consuls and praetors were no longer to receive governorships, but only those who had been out of office five years or more, there was nothing to prevent any former ex-consul from being intrusted with the administration of Gaul from March 1, b.c. 49, which would leave Caesar a private citizen, accountable for his official acts, for the rest of the year.

In b.c. 51 it was proposed that appointments should then be made to the two provinces administered by Caesar; but owing to the temporizing policy of Pompey, and the timidity of many senators, the matter was referred to the consuls of the year b.c. 50. An attempt to recall Caesar's veterans after their discharge, to enlist them on the side of the senate, was foiled by the veto of some of the tribunes and the fidelity of the soldiers. On the other hand, Caesar made use of his Gallic plunder. By an enormous bribe he brought one consul to his side, and by the payment of his debts bought the tribune, C. Scribonius Curio, an orator of great gifts and rare audacity, who had hitherto violently opposed him, and made him an extremely effective instrument. Meanwhile he maintained the most pacific attitude. He kept only one legion in Upper Italy; and when, in the spring of b.c. 50, the senate demanded from him and Pompey one legion each to defend the border against the Parthians, Caesar at once sent one of his own veteran legions, and at the request of Pompey returned the legion he had borrowed from him. These were foolishly retained at Capua as a reserve against Caesar. When in March, b.c. 50, the question of the government of Gaul arose, the tribune Curio utterly confounded the Pompeians by assenting to the plan of reassigning those posts, but declaring that he would interpose his veto unless Pompey also were required to lay down his extraordinary proconsular authority, for thus only could peace and the constitution be preserved. This brought to a standstill all measures against Caesar, who, in Curio's proposition, had found the fitting means for displaying his own peaceful temper, and for blocking the senatorial majority. In the senate the war-party suffered a severe blow; 370 senators against twenty voted in favor of Curio's rogation, that Caesar and Pompey should be required to lay down their offices at the same time. The leaders of the war party now lost their patience and abandoned the basis of law. In October, b.c. 50, on the false report that Caesar had

brought four legions to Placentia, the consul Marcellus, on his own responsibility, and against the wish of the senate, hastened to Pompey, and urged him to take command of the legions at Capua, and to enrol the Italian contingents. Caesar now gave marching orders to his legions in the country of the Celts, but at the same time he proposed a new compromise. He offered to give up Gaul, March 1, b.c. 49, and to disband eight legions, and to retain only Upper Italy with two legions till the consular elections for b.c. 48. On January 1, b.c. 49, Curio made this proposal in the senate; but the consuls refused the consideration of this or of any other measure favorable to Caesar, and, driven by the war-party, the senate issued its ultimatum. Caesar was to evacuate the two Gallie provinces (Fig. 58), and disband his army before a given day; failing which he was to be considered a traitor.



FIG. 58.—Reverse of a silver denarius of Julins Caesar. A trophy of Gallic weapons: two spears, shields, trumpets which end in heads of animals with open jaws, helmet with horns; torques. Below: CAESAR. (Berlin.)

The violent threats made against the tribunes, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus, who interposed their veto, enabled Caesar to represent himself as the champion of the violated rights of the tribunate, and when at last, on January 7, b.c. 49, the country was declared in danger, and the nation called to arms, while Pompey was named as the senate's general with unlimited authority, these two tribunes fled in haste to Caesar's camp. The war-party had deceived itself if it had hoped that its procedure would tend to detach Caesar's supporters from him. Only one man, Titus Labienus, we know not for what reason, now left him.

Caesar was now forced to act, or see the failure of all his undertakings. The task before him was a difficult one. Against the power of the government, resting upon strong sympathies for the republic, and against a general like Pompey, at whose command stood the forces of Spain and the East, from the Adriatic to the Euphrates, and for whom also Massilia and Numidia declared, Caesar could count only on his own splendid army of 50,000 veterans, which clung to him with enthusiasm, and on his province of Upper Italy, the home of his best soldiers, and to the people of which, whom he already treated as citizens, he promised, in case of victory, admission to full citizenship.<sup>1</sup> It was of vital importance to take advantage of the

<sup>1</sup> During the second century b.c. many Roman settlers had gone into the country beyond the Po and helped to Romanize it. Cremona and Aquileia had acquired citizenship in the Social War, and the rest of the country had been divided into a small number of city districts with 'Latin right.' The inhabitants of the 'barbarian' districts were attached to the cities as tributary subjects.

imperfect preparations of his opponents, to overrun quickly the central land of the state, and by all means to remove the prejudices of the men who saw in him only the nephew of Marius and the accomplice of Catiline.

Pompey had at Capua only 7000 regular troops and some horsemen, and these of doubtful fidelity. With astounding boldness Caesar, whose main army was now on its march from Gaul, with only 5000 foot and 300 horse, on January 12, b.c. 49, crossed the Rubicon, entered Italy proper, broke up the preparations of the enemy, and gained a decisive advantage before Pompey's legions could arrive from Spain. Amid the helpless consternation of his opponents, his troops pressed southward along the two great roads past Ariminum and Arretium without resistance from the recruits that were gathering for Pompey. Pompey, who had ordered the two legions at Capua to Lueeria in Apulia, hastily left Rome, which he could not defend, with many senators and the consuls, who in their haste left behind the state treasures, and joined his army, hoping to arouse the people of Picenum, who were devoted to him and their countryman, Labienus. But Caesar left him no time. The levies of this province made no stand against Caesar's united forces advancing from Aneona. Only one corps of 7000 reached Corfinium, where L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the designated successor of Caesar in Gaul, had assembled 15,000 disciplined troops. Instead of leading these forces to Luceria, as Pompey wished, Domitius thought best to stay at Corfinium; but he soon saw himself entirely in the power of Caesar, who now, by the addition of two more of his legions and of numerous volunteers, had with him 40,000 men. The troops of Domitius seized him as he was about to flee, delivered him to Caesar, and themselves entered his service. Caesar allowed Domitius, with a considerable number of knights and senators, to depart unharmed to Pompey. Pompey then retreated in all haste to Brundisium, intending to abandon Italy for the time, and conduct the war from Greece. He was able successfully to beat back the attacks of Caesar, who had no fleet, and by March 17 had transported his army of 25,000 men to Epirus.

Thus within sixty days Italy had fallen into Caesar's hands, truly a very great advantage. The good discipline of his soldiers, and his wholly unexpected mildness toward his political opponents, gradually gained for him the confidence of the people. In Rome he caused a law to be passed admitting the Transpadane population to citizenship, and appeared in person toward the end of March, when he took possession

of the state treasury, containing about sixteen and a half millions of dollars. Naming as city prefect the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus (Fig. 59), afterward triumvir, he sent Curio with four legions, mostly soldiers from Corfinium, to subdue Sicily, and then to cross to Africa, provided for the security of Upper Italy, and in April, with nine of his best legions and 6000 German and Celtic cavalry, proceeded to attack the strong position of the Pompeians in Spain. Leaving part of his troops to besiege Massilia, which had been led to declare for Pompey by Domitius Ahenobarbus, he advanced with six legions and the cavalry against the five legions of the enemy, and encamped between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. The struggle centred chiefly about the town of Ilerda (Lerida), which after a protracted siege surrendered in August, when Caesar granted the conquered very favorable terms, and contented himself with disbanding the Pompeian army. Caesar



FIG. 59. — Lepidus.  
Portrait on a coin.  
(From Imhoof-  
Blumer.)

was then able quickly to subdue the rest of Spain, and leaving Q. Cassius Longinus, as his legate, two of the conquered legions and two of his own, hastened back to Italy, receiving on the way the surrender of the city of Massilia, which yielded after a stubborn defence.

Curio's expedition had utterly failed. After overrunning Sicily, he had crossed to Africa with two legions, but after some successes was destroyed, with all his force, by King Juba, after a hard-fought battle on the Bagradas in September.

Meanwhile Pompey had established his headquarters at Thessalonica, whither assembled fugitive senators from Rome, and Pompeian officers who had been defeated in the west, together with the contingents of the Asiatic vassals, of the Greek republics, and the legions stationed in the East; so that by the end of b.c. 49 he had collected an army of nine effective legions, to which two were to be added from Syria, with cavalry and light-armed troops of every kind. Money, provisions, and war supplies were at hand in abundance, and, above all, a fleet of 500 ships under M. Bibulus.

In the camp had developed a wild and fanatical spirit of revenge, which Pompey himself and the better men like Cato tried in vain to repress, and which promised evil days for Rome if the senate was victorious. What Pompey's plan for the recovery of Italy was, cannot be determined. The organization of his army occupied him till the fall of b.c. 49, when he was in condition to receive Caesar's attack

on Greeian soil ; while the fleet was little used, though squadrons checked Caesar's forces in Dalmatia, and even cut off and captured a considerable force on the island of Curieta.

Caesar, on arriving in Rome, caused himself and P. Servilius Isauricus to be appointed consuls for the year b.c. 48, and then hastened, with the twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry gathered at Brundisium, to carry the war into Greece. Pompey was already in full march on the strong position of Dyrrhaeum, which he had selected as his headquarters for the winter of b.c. 48, while Bibulus was stationed at Corcyra with 110 ships of war. Caesar found at Brundisium only twelve ships of war and transports enough to carry from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Hoping that by his rapidity he might disconcert the movements of the enemy, he boldly embarked, and landed safely below the Aeroceraunian mountains, intending to secure the towns of Oricum and Apollonia. But now he met with a check. At an opportune time Pompey reached Dyrrhaeum ; and Bibulus defended the sea with great watchfulness, and destroyed a part of Caesar's fleet of transports. Caesar, with his far weaker army, was obliged to spend weeks in inaction, until Marcus Antonius succeeded in bringing four legions and 800 cavalry from Brundisium to Lissus, north of Dyrrhaeum, and by drawing off Pompey relieved Caesar, and enabled him once more to take the offensive. With an inferior force he contended with Pompey for Dyrrhaeum for four months, and was finally, after a hot engagement, so severely defeated that he seems to have been at Pompey's mercy. If Pompey had crossed to Italy without delay, there seems to be no reason why he should not quickly have won again everything which his opponent had gained in the west. Even the energetic pursuit of his defeated enemy might have ended the war, and this Pompey attempted. But Caesar again got the better of his slow opponent. With great strategical skill he escaped from his adversary to Apollonia, and then turned rapidly eastward into Thessaly, where he was able to collect and refresh his troops.

The Pompeians, fully confident of victory, advanced to Larissa, in Thessaly, where they were joined by the Syrian legions under Metellus Scipio. The hostile armies soon met. Caesar was posted at Pharsalus, on the left bank of the Enipeus, a tributary of the Peneus, that divides the plain between Cynoscephalae and Othrys, while Pompey, four and a half miles distant, lay on the declivity of the hills on the right bank. Caesar, who was suffering from scarcity of provisions, saw with pleasure, on the morning of August 9, b.c. 48, that Pompey,

urged by the senators, who wished to return to Rome, was leaving his favorable position, and preparing, with 47,000 foot and 7000 horse, to attack his 22,000 veteran foot and 1000 horse. Pompey crossed the river, resting his right wing on the bank. It was his plan to have his infantry act at first on the defensive, and make the first great charge with his cavalry. When the conflict between the legions was well under way, Labienus, with the cavalry, threw himself upon the horse that covered Caesar's right wing, intending to outflank him. But a picked reserve of 2000 of Caesar's best troops turned against him, and soon threw the Pompeian cavalry into confusion. These troops then outflanked the left wing of the Pompeians, and with the vigorous charge of Caesar's third line, the strength of the Pompeians was broken; and at noon, with heavy loss, they retreated to their camp across the Enipeus. Pompey now despaired of the cause of the senate, lost faith in his star, and abandoned his camp when it was stormed by Caesar's troops, hastening as rapidly as possible to Larissa, and thence sought the East. His army was overtaken as it fled to Larissa by Caesar, with four legions, and on the following morning, still 20,000 strong, was obliged to surrender. By this victory fortune had decided in favor of the man, who, in clearness of thought, definiteness of purpose, and ability as a general, stood far above all his opponents.

The old Roman republic, however, was too deeply rooted to fall under a single blow. The captured armies did, to be sure, take service under Caesar: the Greeks everywhere gave in their subjection; the peoples and the princes of the Orient hastened to pay homage to the new master of the state, and recalled their armies or squadrons; but many of the Romans determined to hold out longer. Eighteen cohorts under Cato at Dyrrhachium, and other remnants of the land forces, supported the many high officers of the Pompeians and republicans who escaped after the defeat. Coreyra became the gathering-place for the fragments of the army, and for the many fugitives who would not, or could not, make terms with the victor: and when it was evacuated, the refugees sought a retreat in Africa with King Juba. Caesar could not prevent this, for the number of men at his command was still too small for the great extent of the theatre of war.

His first care was to pursue the fleeing Pompey to the East and to prevent a renewal of the war in this quarter. Pompey, after meeting his wife and son Sextus in Lesbos, and learning of the defection of Syria from his cause, had directed his course to Egypt, where, at the death of Ptolemy Auletes in May, B.C. 51, the government had passed

to his young, beautiful, and fascinating daughter, Cleopatra (born in b.c. 69 or 68), and to her ten-year old brother, Ptolemy XIV. A break had occurred between Cleopatra and the boy's guardian, Pothinus. She had been driven out, and was seeking to regain her realm with the help of Syria. Pothinus, at the head of the Egyptian army, which consisted of the old troops of Gabinius, strengthened by Italian and Cilician mercenaries, was on the Casian promontory near Pelusium. Pompey, with his little squadron, came hither, but was refused permission to land; and as he sailed away along the shallows of the coast he was murdered by some of his former soldiers in the Egyptian service, on September 28, b.c. 48. Caesar, with a small force, had pursued Pompey in hot haste from Thessaly to the Hellespont, and then with 3200 foot and 800 horse had followed him to Egypt, appearing at the beginning of October in the harbor of Alexandria, where, with deep emotion, he learned of his death. To the alarm of the Lagid court, he expressed his horror at their crime, and declared his intention of remaining in Alexandria, where, after taking possession of the royal castle, and demanding the sum of ten million denarii, he undertook to decide their difficulties according to his own judgment. The restless Graeco-Egyptian rabble of Alexandria was stirred with defiant hatred for the Romans, who they feared would destroy the independence of their country. Cleopatra boldly made her way to the castle by night from the sea, and by her graces and beauty completely bewitched the great Roman. The adjustment made by Caesar was distasteful to Pothinus, who had everything to fear from the queen, and who therefore employed every means to stir the fanaticism of the people against the strangers. The Alexandrines rose in insurrection, and, with the aid of Ptolemy and his army, succeeded in penning up Caesar in the castle on the light-house island of Pharos for five months, until March, b.c. 47, when a relieving army freed him from his dangerous position. Egypt was quickly subdued. Three legions were left behind, and Cleopatra was recognized as queen under Roman supremacy.

While Caesar was blockaded at Alexandria, in Italy, in b.c. 48, the efficient consul, Servilius Isauricus, and in b.c. 47 Mark Antony (Fig. 60), who with all his mad excesses was an adroit and energetic man, had great difficulty in keeping in check movements of a communistic tendency. In Dalmatia the conflict was continued till b.c. 47. In Asia Minor, Pharnaces, the king of the Bosporus, had entered the former domains of Mithradates, and, in spite of Caesar's commands, refused to evacuate Lesser Armenia, and toward the end of

B.C. 48 routed the Romans at Nieopolis. Caesar determined to interfere first here. He restored order in the Orient, and then threw himself with only one veteran legion and auxiliary troops upon Pharnaces, and utterly defeated him at Zela, August 2, B.C. 47.

Caesar was now able to return to Rome, where he was at once obliged to quell a dangerous mutiny of his troops, which, encamped in Campania since Pharsalus, had forgotten their discipline, and disliking the prospect of a new and exhausting war in Africa, marched in open

revolt to the Campus Martius in Rome. Caesar at once disbanded them, promising them the rewards due them; but by addressing them no longer as 'fellow-soldiers,' but as 'citizens' (*quirites*), he so affected his veterans as to win them back completely. In Africa his enemies had made good use of his long delay. There the best republican and Pompeian leaders had assembled, provided with abundant resources. They had, under the command of Metellus Scipio, ten Roman legions and four of Juba, 120 elephants, and a very numerous cavalry; their animosity and fanaticism were boundless. Caesar, after being chosen consul for B.C. 46, put to sea with one old and five new legions; but owing to stress of

weather, it was January 3, B.C. 46, before he had gathered his army at his landing-places of Ruspina and Leptis Minor, which he then united into a strong camp by a line of intrenchments. After stubborn conflicts with the masses of African horsemen and archers, Caesar was able to stir up the Mauretanian and Gaetulian chiefs to attack Numidia. Instead of retiring into the interior, Metellus Scipio made the mistake of remaining in the maritime districts, where there were many cities little inclined to the republican cause. The war, which centred about Hadrumetum, Ruspina, and Thapsus, was prolonged for two months in indecisive skirmishes, till Caesar was able



FIG. 60.—Mark Antony. Antique bust.  
(From a photograph.)

to bring over his old legions from Italy. On April 6, b.c. 46, he attacked the important town of Thapsus, drew the enemy into a battle on unfavorable ground, and defeated him. The soldiers of Caesar, infuriated by their long campaign, fell upon the Pompeians with such merciless fury that 50,000 of them were slain. Juba and most of the other leaders were killed in flight. Labienus and the sons of Pompey escaped to Spain, which became the last refuge of the vanquished. Cato, who commanded at Utica, put himself to death, that he might not outlive the downfall of the republic. The western part of Numidia was given to the Mauretanian king, Boeckus: the eastern, with Cirta, was erected into the province of New Africa. In July of the year b.c. 46 Caesar celebrated in Rome his triumph over Celts and Egyptians, Bosporans and Numidians.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE DOWNFALL OF THE REPUBLIC.

AFTER the decisive victory at Thapsus, in April, b.c. 46, Caesar engaged in the difficult task of reorganizing the state,—suffering as it was from the results of the civil war and the long misgovernment of the aristocracy,—and of finding the proper place in it for his new authority. It was impossible to continue the republic, for the virtues had vanished which in better times had formed its true foundations; and it was equally impossible to secure general acquiescence to a monarchy.

The external aspects of Roman life were very brilliant. The civilization of Hellas had conquered Rome. Many young Romans studied philosophy at Athens, rhetoric at Rhodes, and visited the classic scenes of Greek history and the home of art. In oratory and literature, under the powerful influence of Cicero and Caesar, the noble Latin language had reached its highest development. Books were eagerly sought for, supplied by the labor of the countless educated slaves who copied them. Cicero's friend, T. Pomponius Atticus, is counted among the creators of this new industry by which books were made accessible. The literature of the Romans was not yet rich in works of permanent worth. The chief writers of history were L. Caelius Antipater (b.c. 180–120), who, with some rhetorical pretension, wrote of the Second Punic War; L. Cornelius Sisenna, praetor in b.c. 78, who wrote a bombastic history of the Social and Civil Wars; C. Licinius Macer (died b.c. 66), who recounted the struggles of the orders from the democratic standpoint; and Valerius Antias, notorious for his uncritical exaggerations. But we first come to work of real historical and literary worth in the writings of Caesar himself and those of one of his zealous supporters, Caius Sallustius Crispus (b.c. 86–35), whose accounts of the Jugurthine war and of the conspiracy of Catiline are marked by vivacity, and delicate discrimination in language and description. M. Terentius Varro (b.c. 116–27), a Sabine from Reate, a productive and versatile writer, won reputation as an investigator of the Latin language and a scholar of Roman antiquities. But it is Cicero, who in his numerous political and legal speeches, in his many

writings on the art of oratory, in his correspondence, and in his philosophical writings, stands out as the great master of Latin style.

The poetical productions of this period are few, but include two brilliant names,—Q. Valerius Catullus from Verona (B.C. 87–54), who launched against the triumvirs keen and elegant epigrams, and in his elegies showed great mastery of form and an enchanting grace; and Titus Lucretius Carus (B.C. 99–55), who in his didactic poem, “On the Nature of Things,” unfolded the views of Epicurus with warm conviction and genuine poetic fire. Roman mimes have a peculiar interest.




FIG. 61.—Tomb of Caecilia Metella, near Rome. (From a photograph.)

They were a new kind of comedy, of a loose erotic character, which had driven out the old Atellan farces as a representation of daily life, and since B.C. 82 were represented at Rome, where for the first time parts were played by women. The peculiarly Roman *satura*, or satire, was developed by Caius Lucilius of Suessa (B.C. 148–103). Varro, in a peculiar medley of prose and verse, imitated from the cynic Menippus of Gadara (fl. B.C. 280) the so-called Menippean satire, giving lively and vigorous expression to his discontent at the degenerate age.

Rome had sadly deteriorated since the second century B.C. The

immense wealth which from all sides flowed to Italy, and, above all, to the capital, supplied the means for ever-increasing luxury, which was displayed mainly in wanton prodigality and sensuous enjoyment, joined to barbaric taste in art, and the adornments of house and table. (PLATE XIV.) Villas, gardens, and fish-ponds were laid out on an extensive scale: and a great advance was made in a heavy and massive architecture, in which with prodigal expenditure were used the marbles of Greece, Italy, and Africa.<sup>1</sup> In the theatrical representations, external



FIG. 62. — Pyramid of Cestius, near Rome. (From a photograph.)

display, richness of costume and decoration, and technical completeness, gratified the coarser taste; but it was at the table that gross extravagance reached an insane point. Here Lueullus won a fame which has cast into the shade his great talents and heroic qualities. Nobility, knights, and commonalty were united, in feeling at least, when they looked on the bloody sport of gladiatorial combats and the baiting of wild beasts. Along with this a deep immorality penetrated social life.

<sup>1</sup> Characteristic of this style are the great tombs, still existing, like that of Caecilia Metella (Fig. 61), south of the city, on the Via Appia, a massive stone cylinder, which had probably a conical roof; and the pyramid over the grave of Caius Cestius (Fig. 62), on the Via Ostiensis, built of squared blocks of travertine, covered with white marble, and rising to the height of 116 feet.





WALL PAINTING IN A HOUSE OF THE FIRST CENTURY BC. IN ROME (TRASTAVERE)  
MON. DELL' INST. ARCH. 1882

The noble dignity of the Roman women had long since disappeared; countless divorces on slight or political grounds went hand in hand with loose intrigues and adultery. Family life in all classes was shaken to the foundation. Venality was common in all classes; perjury and forgery were usual crimes; while in the furious party spirit, and the anarchy of the city, murder and assassination were every-day occurrences. There was no safety for person or property in the city and in its suburbs, and the municipal supervision of public works and the public health was equally inefficient.

The old state religion, with its attendant priestly colleges, augurs, and auspices, though enlarged by the gods of Olympus, had long since lost its moral force, and, in face of the outspoken unbelief of a steadily widening circle, existed merely as a political institution. While the people supplied its place by adopting Oriental cults, especially that of the Egyptian Isis with its mysteries, the cultivated classes fell under the influence of Greek philosophy. The doctrines of the Stoics easily fell in with the Roman way of thinking, and especially with Roman ethics and the old Roman pride of virtue; and the teachings of Epicurus had many followers.

The uneven distribution of wealth and the sharp division of classes were fatal to the nation. The splendid cultivation of the land was due to the labor of millions of slaves. The Roman freemen were divided into two unequal classes,—the very rich, merchants, bankers, great land-owners, and the very poor, the new commonalty. This consisted of some free tenants and farmers, who could not compete with the slave-labor, the market-gardeners, retail traders, and artisans, freed and free, in the capital; and of the great mob of persons without occupation, supported at the public expense, the proletariat, from which the legions were recruited, and which was increased by the provincials who flocked to Rome, including many Greeks and Jews. The free citizens in Italy were hardly more than 7,000,000. But though republican life was at an end, the traditions of all classes opposed the establishment of a monarchy, whose very name was regarded with abhorrence. Even the democracy was taken aback when, after centuries of strife with the senate, it realized that the greatest of its leaders had passed into a tyrant. For a tyranny it was, in the ancient sense, which Caesar, when once he had reached his goal, was obliged to set up, as the logical and inevitable result of the policy begun by Caius Gracchus. Caesar saw before him the task of securing his new position as master by the application of existing political forms. He was, however, prevented

by his sudden death from sharply defining the line between his own powers and those of the senate and of the comitia. The temporary success of the republican reaction prevented the definite establishment of the monarchy; and under Caesar's successors appears that open contradiction between form and substance, between name and reality, in the Roman political system, which marks the history of the Empire. Though Caesar himself early fell, he was survived by the many reforms in administration, and by other creations, which are the monument of the incredible activity and wonderful versatility of the mind of this great man.

Following many precedents, the senate had heaped upon its new master on his return from Africa a multitude of honors and rights, of which the most important was his appointment as dictator for ten years. At the beginning of B.C. 44 Caesar caused himself to be named dictator for life, after the example of Sulla.

Besides this general and unlimited authority, he received, by special enactments, the independent determination of war and peace, the control of the army and treasury of the state, the naming of the provincial governors, and the rights of the censors, to whom belonged appointment to the senate. Caesar would probably have retained his dictatorship only till the completion of the new conditions. After being invested with the inviolability of the tribuneship, he caused himself, in B.C. 45, to

be named as imperator for life, with the highest military, judicial, and administrative authority; and in B.C. 44 his head appears upon Roman coins (Fig. 63). The senate was reduced to the position of a merely advisory council; but the comitia were to sanction as before the laws and ordinances of the imperator. The number of senators was increased to 900; and they were to be taken from the quaestors, of whom forty were to be elected annually. Comprehensive reforms in administration were also introduced, which served as foundations for the work of Augustus. Caesar as imperator took the administration of the finances into his own hand, and managed these, as also the coinage, through his freedmen and slaves. In collecting the taxes he retained the system of farming only in case of the indirect taxes; the direct taxes were either to be paid in kind or changed into fixed sums, and the tax districts collected their individual contributions. The gratuitous distribution of corn to the people, introduced by Clodius, was changed into an actual support of



FIG. 63.—Julius Caesar. Portrait on a coin. (From Imhoof-Blumer.)

the poor, by withdrawing it from those who possessed property, which reduced the list from 320,000 to 150,000. The state taxes were carefully examined, and in many ways lightened; and in spite of the reduction and of new outlays, Caesar succeeded, by intelligent reforms and economy, in making the receipts equal expenditures, and even showing a surplus. Attempts were made to check the inner decay of the Roman people; the city, where the Jews were allowed to introduce their worship, was to be freed from its idle mob of paupers. He provided permanent support for many by employing them on the great public works which he undertook, and adopted on a magnificent scale the project of Gracchus to settle the poor of Rome in the provinces, and thus turn them into thrifty citizens. Gracchus had emphatically declared that the land of subject communities was lawfully to be regarded as the private property of the state, where it had not been alienated to communities and individuals by the special act of the Roman government, and that other occupants were only tenants at will. This harsh theory Caesar made the fundamental law of his new monarchy, mainly that he might be able to colonize the impoverished population of Rome and of Italy, as well as his veterans, in the provinces, and thus Romanize the provinces. During his short government he sent 80,000 such colonists to provinces beyond the sea, to Narbonensis, to the district taken from the Massiliots, and to Spain. His most celebrated foundations were, in b.c. 44, Corinth (*Laus Julia Corinthus*), and Carthage, and the Phoenician Berytus.

The policy thus introduced of putting on an equality the peoples united under Roman supremacy, was continued systematically during the entire course of the empire. The Roman character and ideas, penetrated as they were by Grecian culture and civilization, spread thoroughly throughout the entire West. Among the Transpadane peoples, which received the full Roman franchise in b.c. 49, the culture and language of Rome spread with wonderful rapidity. From this time the 'Latin right' was spread far beyond the limits of Italy. The Sicilians now were relieved from the payment of tithes, and received the Latin right; and Caesar seems to have intended to bring in a great part of the Celtic land beyond the Alps, which in b.c. 44 was divided into three provinces, Belgica, Narbonensis, and Lugdunensis with Aquitania, and where a very considerable number of places obtained the Latin right, among them Nemausus (*Nîmes*), Antipolis (*Antibes*), and Avenio (*Avignon*). Gades in Spain was granted Roman citizenship in b.c. 49; and in Africa, Utica received the Latin right, and the

newly acquired Cirta ‘Julia’ the rights of a Roman military colony. Caesar gave the greatest care to the welfare of the provinces. It was a blessing for them that the Roman officials no longer remained as independent satraps, but were under the control of a superior, and responsible to him.

In matters of general government Caesar (Fig. 64) arranged for the survey and registration of land throughout the realm, and introduced the ordinance for a general valuation; imperial coinage was introduced for all the nations under Rome’s authority.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar’s reform of the calendar, which had fallen into inextricable confusion, brought about with the aid of the Alexandrine mathematician Sosigenes, was important for centuries to come. The new Julian calendar began with January 1, b.c. 45. The conclusion of his work was the reorganization of the army, for the chief conduct of war rested permanently in Caesar’s own hand. Caesar had no desire to establish a



FIG. 64.—The head of Julius Caesar, covered with bay. Silver coin. (Berlin.)

military monarchy, and Augustus was careful to follow his example in this. The victorious army of the Civil War, richly rewarded with money, was disbanded and provided with settlements, for the most part in Italy, the various companies being near one another only in the Campanian domains. The new army was to be composed, for the legions, of Roman-Italian citizens; but the time of service was materially shortened, a more frequent change in the composition of the legions was provided for, and

the plan introduced of spreading the troops along the frontiers of the state, and of regularly colonizing them after the lapse of their time of service. The cavalry and light infantry came from the provincials.

Caesar had not a long time in which to complete these plans. The Pompeians and republicans, who had escaped from Africa to southern Spain, had been able with the help of insurgent inhabitants, Roman settlers, and some Pompeian troops remaining there from earlier times, to form thirteen legions, with which Pompey’s sons Cnaeus and Sextus,

<sup>1</sup> Throughout the West the denarius alone received legal sanction, although some communities were allowed to coin small silver and copper pieces for local trade. In the Greek-speaking East, the many old coins had a legal circulation in their respective districts; but by their side the denarius had legal course, and official accounts were reckoned in denarii. With this Caesar introduced the gold standard, although the double standard continued till Nero’s time, and instead of gold bars gold coins were issued. His *aureus*, the first gold coin of the state, with a normal weight of 126.33 grains,  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a pound of gold, was to be taken for a hundred silver sestertes; at the present value of metal it was about \$5.49.

Labienus, and others again opened the war. Caesar's legates were not able to control the uprising, which spread dangerously, and the dictator himself was forced to take part. He went to Baetica, and in a few months drove the Pompeian army back into the mountains of Granada, where it took up a strong position at Munda (north of Ronda), on the road from Cordova to Gibraltar. Here, on March 17, b.c. 45, Caesar, with eight legions, attacked the superior force of the enemy. It was the hardest fought of all his battles, and the decision wavered long. Only when toward evening his ally, the Mauretanian chieftain Bogud, fell upon the enemies' camp, and Labienus withdrew five cohorts to check him, did Caesar's presence of mind seize his opportunity. His cry "They flee!" rang like a shout of victory through his ranks, and carried confusion into those of the enemy, who gave way. 33,000 Pompeians fell, among them Labienus

and Cn. Pompey; of the leaders only Sextus Pompey and Labienus's son Quintus (Fig. 65), escaped. After subduing the remnants of this rising, and newly organizing Spain, Caesar returned in September to Rome to continue the renovation of the state, and to prepare for war against the Parthians beyond the Euphrates, for the death of Crassus was still to be avenged. This war, which, it was expected, would last three years, was to turn the increasing discontent from the internal matters against the enemy. A part of the troops were ready in Macedonia, the great officials of the state and the provinces for a long period had been selected, and in Apollonia Cains Octavius (Fig. 66), then eighteen years old (born in Rome, September 23, b.c. 63), the grand-nephew and prospective heir of



FIG. 66.—The young Octavian (Augustus). Rome, Vatican. (From photograph.)

Caesar, who took a deep interest in him, and paid careful attention to his education, was awaiting the arrival of the imperator, when the frightful news came that Caesar had fallen a victim to a republican conspiracy.



FIG. 65.—Labienus the younger. Portrait on a coin. (Berlin.)

With the battle of Munda began that series of conspiracies against the lives of the emperors (imperators), which, to the accession of Dioecletian, darkens Roman history. For Caesar (PLATE XV.) difficulties began when as victor he undertook to set up a beneficent and magnanimous government, and ceased to be a party-leader. Caesar showed toward all his opponents a spirit of reconciliation hitherto unknown in Rome, and employed without hesitation able men of the opposition if they were willing to serve the state. But the rancor of the aristocratic republicans, who revered Cato as the 'last Roman,'

was not to be overcome. Men like Cicero, whom Caesar had treated with personal distinction, maintained a hostile attitude; and Caesar's former democratic supporters showed signs of discontent, some because they felt betrayed when Caesar became master, others because they thought their rewards inadequate; a discontent increased by the thoughtless eagerness of some of his zealous supporters in displaying the outward signs of royalty, which Caesar with difficulty put aside, and by breaches of republican etiquette on his own



FIG. 67. — M. Junius Brutus. Rome, Capitol. (From a photograph.)

part. A conspiracy was formed against his life in the spring of b.c. 44. Among the more than sixty conspirators, besides old supporters of Caesar, like Decimus Brutus and Caius Trebonius, the leading spirit was Caius Cassius Longinus, who had saved Syria after the fall of Crassus, and who after Pharsalus had joined Caesar. The purest character, however, among them all was M. Junius Brutus (Fig. 67), born b.c. 85, in b.c. 44 city praetor, a severe and earnest man, with the ideas of honor of his uncle Cato, whom Caesar had many times distinguished. The conspirators had chosen for their attempt the last meeting of the senate before Caesar's departure for Asia on the Ides

PLATE XV.



Julius Caesar. Statue, larger than life, in Naples.  
(From a photograph.)



of March (March 15, b.c. 44); and falling upon the imperator in open session, in a hall of Pompey's theatre, they struck him down with their daggers. Pierced with twenty-three wounds, the great man sank lifeless at the foot of Pompey's statue.

The madness of the act of Cassius and Brutus was at once apparent. They seem to have really thought that to restore the 'republic' it was enough to put the 'tyrant' out of the way. The first result of the deed was such a panic throughout Rome that the assassins could only withdraw to the Capitol with a troop of gladiators, where they lost two days without coming to any decision. They had absolutely no resources at their command, and, to gain some power without injury to the constitution, were obliged to treat with a man who was naturally their opponent, the consul, M. Antonius. Mark Antony (born b.c. 83) was only known as a distinguished officer and a devoted supporter of Caesar. In his youth prominent among the young nobility for madly rushing into debt, and, till his marriage in b.c. 46 with the jealous Fulvia, widow of Curio, a shameless libertine, he now showed that under stress of need he possessed no common gifts as a general and as a bold and crafty politician. An impetuous speaker, of imposing appearance and winning manners, he at once formed the purpose of becoming Caesar's heir and avenger. At first, indeed, he was obliged to proceed with caution, for it was by no means certain that the other great officers of the imperator would follow his leadership. As soon as he saw that the assassins did not venture to attack him, he took possession, as consul, of the public moneys and of Caesar's private fund, amounting together to about \$33,000,000, and prevailed upon Caesar's widow, Calpurnia, to give him the papers of her murdered husband. At the same time Lepidus, who had been appointed to the command of Narbonensis and northern Spain, returned to Rome with his troops, and took possession of the Forum; and Antony won him over by the promise of the place of *pontifex maximus*. On March 16 the assassins tried to negotiate with Antony; but he referred them to the senate, which he called together on the 17th in the temple of Tellus. Under his adroit management the senate proposed a compromise. Caesar's death was not approved. Amnesty was granted to the assassins; but sanction for all of Caesar's acts was promised, as well those which might be found in his papers, as those already known. A solemn reconciliation was then made between Antony, Lepidus, and the assassins. The people regarded peace as secure, but Antony soon showed his purpose. Caesar's will was to be publicly announced, and the

illustrious dead to receive a solemn burial. When the corpse of the imperator, which was committed to the flames on the Campus Martius, was exhibited in the Forum to a monstrous gathering of the people, Antony delivered the funeral speech, and artfully passed from eulogy of the imperator to a fearful invective against his enemies and assassins. The unfolding of Caesar's bloody toga, rent with the daggers of the conspirators, and the exhibition of a waxen image of the dead leader, on which the wounds were realistically represented, kindled the fury of the people and the veterans present. The body was burned upon the spot, on a funeral pile gathered in tumultuous haste; and then the mob rushed through the streets of the city threatening death to the assassins. Caesar's murderers escaped their fury; but presently, no longer secure in Rome, hastened to leave the city. Decimus Brutus went to Cisalpine Gaul, which had been allotted to him by Caesar as praetor for B.C. 44; Caius Trebonius, to Asia; Tullius Cimber, to Bithynia; Brutus and Cassius, who, as praetors, could not leave the city for more than ten days, were obliged to employ Antony's mediation in securing a commission from the senate, allowing them, under the pretext of providing the city with provisions, to remain outside of Rome. Antony, left in control of the city, by disgraceful misuse of the papers and the treasures of Caesar, sought to increase his power, and to win over the veterans, whom he bound to himself by a new agrarian law, by which rich districts in Campania and Samnium were confiscated for assignment, a task which occupied Antony in Lower Italy till May. Gradually his great political plan came to light. He caused the province of Macedonia, already assigned to M. Brutus, to be conferred upon himself. To indemnify Cassius and Brutus, Bithynia and Crete were promised them; but to supply the city with provisions they were to proceed to Sicily and Asia at once. Antony cared little for Macedonia; he wished to gain the six legions assembled there for the Parthian war. Late in June, B.C. 44, Antony threw off the mask when he demanded from the senate the transfer to himself of the province of Upper Italy, which was already in the hands of Decimus Brutus; and, when he was refused, carried his purpose in the assembly of the people, which conceded to him Cisalpine Gaul and the Macedonian legions. A new civil war was thus proclaimed, but the struggle did not at once break out. Brutus and Cassius at last saw the purpose of Antony. In August they formally renounced allegiance to the consul. In October they went to the East, to the provinces first allotted them, Macedonia and Syria, to secure a strong military position. In

Spain Pompey's son (Fig. 68), Sextus (born b.c. 75), who, after the battle of Munda, had maintained himself in the mountains as a guerrilla chief, had again brought together seven legions. Antony himself had withdrawn four legions from Macedonia, and placed them in camp at Brundisium; and in October he left Rome to join the troops. But now his path was crossed by a new rival. The young Octavius, after the murder of Caesar, had returned to Italy. As soon as he learned that Caesar had adopted him in his will, and made him his heir, he took the name of Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus, and hastened to Rome with the determination of taking possession at once of the personal inheritance of his adoptive father. It was clear that the time would come when he would also succeed to the political inheritance; for in a weak and sickly body he united great personal beauty and grace, with an early maturity, a burning ambition, a rare political talent, a craftiness, adroitness, and relentless energy that soon were to amaze the world. Antony met this uncomfortable heir with a contemptuous coldness; but Octavian gave up his private property to gain the favor of the people by fulfilling the promises of Caesar's will, which had not yet been carried out by Antony, and entered into alliance with the senate that he might gain here a support against Antony, whom the senate in turn hoped he might check. For a time the relation between him and Antony was externally peaceable.

At the end of September the consul's attitude became openly hostile toward the senate,—those were the days when Cicero began to launch his Philippias against Antony,—and Antony thought best to lead his army to Rome and Upper Italy. Octavian now vigorously interfered; enrolling, by great sums of money and still greater promises, thousands of the veterans settled in Campania, he formed three legions, and drew closer to the senate, which under Cicero's influence did not hesitate to treat him with favor. Antony made serious mistakes; although the soldiers well knew that the decisive power lay in their hands, and so demanded great largesses, he exhibited at Brundisium a most unreasonable penuriousness, and attempted to enforce severe discipline, with the result that on the march north two of the legions declared for Octavian. He hastened on, hoping in the struggle with Caesar's murderer, Decimus Brutus, to infuse a different spirit into his troops. He entered Upper Italy in December, b.c. 44; and Decimus threw himself into the strongly fortified city of Mutina, in order



FIG. 68. — Sextus Pompey.

to keep his opponent in this district till succor could reach him from the east or south. The unconcealed threats of the consul united against him all elements in the senate in Rome, even the Caesarians; but on the question of what to do parties divided. The old Pompeians and republicans, headed by Cicero, and supported at first by Octavian, wished a war to the knife against Antony, while the Caesarians desired only his humiliation. In January, b.c. 43, Cicero secured the recognition of Octavian as propraetor, who was then at Spolegium with five legions, and the sanction of his promise of reward to his soldiers; but the senate despatched an embassy to Antony, and when this effected nothing, instead of outlawing him and declaring him ‘an enemy of his country,’ as Cicero wished, it merely proclaimed his action a *tumultus* (a breach of public peace), and then opened the conflict. Octavian, joined by the consuls, A. Hirtius and C. Bibius Pansa, soon encamped at Mutina, close by Antony. On April 15 Hirtius and Pansa defeated Antony near Forum Gallorum, though Pansa was mortally wounded. Cicero now secured the proclamation of Antony as a public enemy. On April 27 Antony was drawn into a battle by Hirtius under unfavorable circumstances, and was so badly defeated that he was forced to flee to the west; Hirtius, however, was slain. The hopes of the republicans rose to the highest pitch, for the news from the East was also favorable. Marcus Brutus had succeeded in driving out of Macedonia Caius, Antony’s brother, and forcing him to surrender. He was intrusted with Macedonia, Illyria, and Greece by the senate, with the most comprehensive power, and the same power was given to Cassius in Syria. The governors of Africa, Spain, and Gaul gave assurances of their fidelity.

The republican leaders now thought it possible and expedient to destroy the work of Caesar, and to restore the supremacy of the optimates. Utterly underestimating the talents of Octavian, they began by thrusting the ‘boy’ aside; and Decimus Brutus received the command of the troops at Mutina, and the instructions to push hard after the fragments of Antony’s army. Still more insulting was it for Octavian that the senate formally recognized the position of Sextus Pompey, and raised him to the chief command of the naval forces. Octavian remained quietly at Mutina, looking round for allies for the inevitable conflict with his natural opponents, the republicans and Pompeians. His crafty inactivity saved Antony from destruction; for he put no obstacles in the way of P. Ventidius, a legate of Antony and an excellent general, who brought three newly levied legions to Antony.

While Decimus increased his army to ten legions, and prepared to cross the Alps, Antony, by another road, entered the Narbonensian province, and tried to come to an understanding with Lepidus and Plancus, who, still regarded as friends of the senate, had already set their troops in motion toward the Alps. Only Plancus, however, was loyal to the senate. On the approach of Antony in May, Lepidus, pretending to be forced by his troops, united his seven legions to Antony's army, and was in consequence proclaimed a public enemy by the senate. Plancus united with Decimus Brutus near Lyons. Meantime Octavian again took vigorous measures to make sure of a strong position between the contending parties. He sent a military deputation to Rome to ask for the consulship for himself, that he might hold some legitimate authority. On the refusal of the senate, he at once marched on Rome with eight legions. The legions of the senate immediately went over to him, and nothing was left for that body but to consent that the young Caesar should be chosen as one of the consuls for the rest of the year b.c. 43. He now entered the city, fulfilled Caesar's will in all particulars, brought indictments against all the murderers of Caesar, and condemned them and Sextus Pompey *in contumaciam*. He then returned to the north to meet Lepidus and Antony, whose proscription he caused to be recalled. The city and the senate remained in the greatest apprehension, but the event was far worse than even their fears.

In September, upon the report of the turn of affairs in Rome, the governor of Spain led his army into the camp of Lepidus and Antony. Plancus no longer ventured to hold to the senate, and also went over. This was disastrous for Decimus Brutus, who turned back to go to Macedonia, but was deserted by his soldiers, and was afterward murdered in crossing the Alps. When Antony, at the head of the entire forces of the West, again entered Upper Italy with seventeen legions, he found Octavian with his eleven legions ready for agreement. Lepidus acted as mediator; and in the neighborhood of Bononia (October 27–29, b.c. 43), these three men in conference came to a complete understanding, and formed an alliance,—a result which the troops received with enthusiasm. Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian then constituted themselves, in regular form, for five years a 'Triumvirate for the government of the state'; that is, they took for five years the highest power in the state jointly upon themselves. The ordinary offices were to be continued, but were to be filled by the triumvirs. The west of the realm they so divided that Lepidus received Spain and Narbonensis; Antony, Transalpine Gaul and Upper Italy; Octavian,

Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. War was at once to be begun against the republicans in the East by Antony and Octavian with twenty legions.

The means of satisfying the soldiers, and for the new preparations, they hoped to gain by a measure which at the same time should put an end to the Pompeian-Republiean party. They decided on a series of proscriptions far more atrocious than those of Sulla; for they were directed by murderous greed and cold state policy; and as the interests of the leaders were to be harmonized, they made an infamous barter of the lives of the foremost men of Rome, deliberately trading to one another the heads of near relatives and friends. In November, b.c. 43, the army of the triumvirs approached the city. The associates entered it with three legions, caused their new position to be ratified by the people, and signalized their accession to office, on November 27, by the publication of the lists of the proscribed. The number of outlawed senators is reckoned at 300, that of the knights at 2000. The officers of the legions with small detachments served as executioners. Every freeman who voluntarily put to death one of the proscribed was to receive as his reward 25,000 denarii, and every slave for a similar service 10,000 denarii and his freedom. The heads of the proscribed were to be exhibited upon the rostra in the Forum, and the penalty of death was to be visited on any who aided them to escape. The most famous victim was Cicero, who was pursued by the hatred of Antony, and overtaken by his executioners, December 7, b.c. 43, at his Formian estate, near Caieta. When, with the success secured by the proscriptions, the triumvirs found that they still needed 200,000,000 denarii, Italy was subjected to every kind of fiscal extortion, and treated as the cruelest Roman governors had treated the subject provincials, while the soldiers were allowed to plunder and act as if they were in a conquered land.

At the same time heavy burdens were put upon the East by the preparation of the republicans for the last trial of arms with Caesar's successors. During the year b.c. 43 Brutus and Cassius had steadily strengthened their position, going so far as to coin money and to have their likeness stamped upon it, a course which Antony and Octavian at once imitated. By levying all the forces of the provinces and the allies of Rome, they had been able to bring together considerable supplies, and an army of more than twenty-one legions and 20,000 horse. The advice of Brutus, to advance at once with all their forces toward the Ionian Sea, which would have made possible co-operation with the

fleet of Sextus Pompey, was overborne by Cassius, who thought that the last adherents of the Caesarian party in Asia, especially the Lyicians and the island of Rhodes, should first be overcome. In the late summer of b.c. 42 the Balkan peninsula again became the battle-ground of the Roman civil war. The legates of the triumvirs, with eight legions, took possession of Philippi, in southeastern Macedonia. Brutus and Cassius dislodged them from their position, and established themselves, with all their available force, 80,000 foot and 17,000 horse, in and near Philippi. The whole force of Antony and Octavian soon appeared, equal in infantry, but with only 13,000 horse, and encamped at a distance of about a mile. Since the republicans controlled the sea, and had a rich country behind them, while the Caesarians were dependent upon the depopulated and exhausted lands of Greece and Macedonia, the republican leaders wisely endeavored to prolong the war; but Antony, who here showed his brilliant qualities as a general, succeeded in bringing on a battle. Antony, on the right, fought successfully against the division of Cassius, while Brutus drove victoriously from the field the wing of Octavian, who was then lying sick. Cassius committed suicide. Nevertheless, the position of the triumvirs was anything but comfortable, as the republican admirals had cut off upon the Adriatic a very considerable re-enforcement of veteran troops and supplies of every kind. Brutus was unable to restrain the impatience of his troops; and twenty days after the first battle the decisive engagement was brought on, very much against his wish. He was again victorius with the right wing; but his left wing gave way before Antony, and at evening nothing was left for him but a hopeless retreat with four legions to the mountains in the north, where on the next morning the soldiers refused to continue the struggle. Then Brutus, with other prominent republicans, sought a voluntary death, and his troops surrendered on the promise of amnesty.

The civil war was not yet at an end. Not only was Sextus Pompey still unsubdued, but it was easy to see that the falling out of the victorious successors of Caesar was only a question of time. At first Octavian and Antony united in putting aside, as far as possible, Lepidus, who was charged with secret negotiations with Sextus Pompey, by taking from him Spain for Octavian and Narbonensis for Antony, and indemnifying him with Africa. But from the beginning the relation between the victors at Philippi carried in it the seed of new conflicts. For the time being the two divided their work. Antony undertook the easy task of making the supremacy of the Caesarians

secure throughout the Orient, and particularly of furnishing the money, estimated at \$178,900,000, with which they could fulfil the promises which they had made to their soldiers. To Octavian fell the horrible task of leading back to Italy the remaining legions and those whose service had expired, and in their favor of driving out of house and home the inhabitants of eighteen Italian cities. Only a politician so hard and far-seeing as Octavian, who knew his rival and his weaknesses thoroughly, could hope out of such a detestable labor in the chief country of the realm to secure the means to outwit Antony. His position at first was almost unendurable. The settlement of the veterans in Italy (B.C. 41) encountered very serious difficulties. The inhabitants of the eighteen towns resisted with force the infamous eviction, and filled the country and the city with their bitter and just complaints. The lack of discipline and the insolence of the soldiers overstepped all bounds, and at times turned against Octavian himself.



FIG. 69.—Lucius Antonius. (Berlin.)

In the city, which the young Caesar entered in the spring of B.C. 41, the family of Antony used every means to increase the embarrassment of Octavian, by despicable falsehoods and disloyal methods inflaming against him a part of the soldiers and great masses of the despairing population. The leaders of the intrigues were the passionate Fulvia, the triumvir's wife, and his brother, Lucius (Fig. 69), who was consul, and who counted on the affection of the army for Antony.

The fleet of Sextus Pompey and that of Brutus, under Domitius Ahenobarbus, cut off communications. At last, in the summer of B.C. 41, Octavian and his opponents came to open conflict. Octavian sent back to Fulvia her daughter Clodia, whom he had married; and Lucius and Fulvia took up their quarters in the fortress of Praeneste. Fulvia hoped to withdraw her husband from the witchery of the Egyptian Cleopatra by kindling a new war. Lucius then occupied Rome for a time, but was afterward obliged to shut himself up in the strong Etrurian town of Perusia, from which this war takes its name, where Octavian's legates blockaded him. Contrary to his hope, the legates of Antony, who did not know what the position of their chief would be in this quarrel, advanced with great slowness and hesitation; and Lucius, under the pressure of starvation, was obliged to capitulate at the end of the winter B.C. 41–40. A rescuing army which had been formed by Tib. Claudius Nero now dissolved; and its leader, with his beautiful wife, Livia Drusilla, and his two-year-old son, Tiberius, fled

to Antony. Octavian allowed Lucius and his army to leave Perusia without humiliation; but it was a question how Mark Antony, whose wife, Fulvia, had fled to Athens, would regard this strife. Antony, after leaving Philippi, had made a progress through Greece and Asia Minor. Given to the enjoyment of the present, and naturally not of a harsh disposition, he was willing to be gracious to the Hellenic republicans and Athens. But when he came to Ephesus in b.c. 41, while showing great mildness to individuals, he renewed the financial oppression of the provincials and vassals, and from Asia alone he drew 200,000 talents. He next went to Tarsus, where he was overtaken by his fate in the form of Queen Cleopatra, who appeared before him to justify her attitude in the Civil War. This princess, then in the full ripeness of her charms, completely enthralled Antony, and led him with her to Egypt, where he remained, sunk in a life of sensuous enjoyment, till he was roused by the news of the Perusian War and by the outbreak of a new conflict with the Parthians.

Not long before the battle of Philippi, the republicans had attempted to gain to their side the Parthian king, Orodæs. The leader of their embassy, the young Labienus, had prevailed upon the Parthians to make war upon the Asiatic provinces of Rome, which were embittered by the extortions of Antony, and were but weakly garrisoned. Toward the end of b.c. 41 a Parthian army under Labienus and the Parthian crown prince, Paeorus, fell upon Syria, captured Antioch, and then turned against Asia Minor. Antony was obliged to tear himself from the arms of the queen, and leaving to Plancus the protection of Asia, hastened to settle the Italian difficulty. In Athens he met Fulvia, whom he overwhelmed with reproaches and left broken-hearted. He then courteously declined the proposition of Sextus Pompey for an alliance. Octavian had, meantime, entered into a compact with Sextus Pompey, marrying his relative, Scribonia; but as he had no fleet, Antony, by the accession of Domitius Ahenobarbus with 500 ships, was able to exercise a strong pressure upon Italy. War seemed inevitable; but after some military moves in the summer of b.c. 40, the disinclination of the veterans to fight without visible gain forced the leaders to make peace, which was brought about with the more ease as Fulvia had died meantime. A treaty was made at Brundisium. Antony was to receive the government of the entire East, Octavian that of the West, Lepidus kept Africa; the Adriatic and the city of Seodra in Illyria were to be the boundary line; and to seal the peace, the beautiful Octavia, the sister of the young triumvir (born in b.c. 71 or 70), a lovely, cultured

woman, who had just lost her husband, C. Claudius Marcellus, was to become the wife of Antony.

The estrangement between Antony and Octavian seemed still further removed by the dangerous condition of the Orient. During the year b.c. 40 the Parthians had made great gains; their horsemen had penetrated as far as Caria. Pacorus, meantime, conquered Syria, Phoenicia, and at last Palestine, where the high priest Hyrcanus, and the military party under Antigonus, were struggling against the party of the Idumeans, Phasaël and Herod, whom Antony had named tetrarchs. The Parthians made Antigonus king, killed Phasaël, and carried Hyrcanus to Babylon; while Herod fled to Rome to the triumvirs. Antony opened his court at Athens in the autumn of b.c. 39 with Octavia (Fig. 70), and despatched P. Ventidius with a strong force to Asia Minor. This distinguished officer took Labienus by surprise, drove



FIG. 70.—Mark Antony and Octavia.  
(Imhoof-Blumer.)

him and his following of Roman deserters into the gorges of the Taurus, where they perished, and on the approach of Parthian troops from Cilicia victoriously repelled their attack upon his camp, and after recovering Cilicia dispersed a second Parthian army, and regained all Syria. In b.c. 38 Pacorus again crossed the Euphrates, but on June 9 was defeated and killed with the loss of 20,000 men by Ventidius. Thereupon Antony hastened to Asia, and re-established Herod in the government of Judea. He then returned to Athens to observe the course of affairs in Italy. Octavian committed the administration of Gaul, in b.c. 38, to his friend Agrippa (Fig. 71), who had great success, and was the first Roman commander after Caesar to cross the Rhine. He prevailed on the Ubii, who, on account of their friendship with Rome, were hard pressed by their German neighbors, to leave their position on the right bank of the Rhine, and to cross to the left bank, where they occupied a long line from Coblenz and Andernach to Neuss, and where 'civitas Ubiorum,' Cologne, became their chief city. Agrippa was a man of inexhaustible energy, fearless, brave, full of resources, prompt and bold in action, wholly devoted to Octavian, yet always thoughtful of the interests of the realm and the people.

Meanwhile Octavian had divorced Scribonia in order to wed the beautiful Livia Drusilla; and the war with Sextus Pompey broke out



FIG. 71.—Agrippa.  
(Berlin.)

afresh, b.c. 38. In the first campaign Octavian was worsted. He now displayed extraordinary energy; secured ships from Antony, summoned Agrippa from Gaul to build a new fleet, and in July, b.c. 36, re-enforced by Lepidus with an army from Africa, attacked Sextus in Sicily, the chief seat of his power. Sextus was completely defeated in a naval battle off Naulochus, and fled to Asia Minor, where he was put to death next year by one of Antony's lieutenants. Lepidus, who showed signs of restiveness, was deprived of everything except his private fortune and the title of *pontifex maximus*, which he retained until his death in b.c. 13.

The affairs of Rome were thus decidedly simplified. Octavian, now master of the entire West, with a force of forty-five legions, 25,000 horse, 40,000 light-armed troops, and 600 ships, began at once to take up the labors of peace, to heal the wounds of the state, and after discharging 20,000 old soldiers, to restore discipline among the lawless troops. After a magnificent entry into Rome on November 13, b.c. 36, he began that series of measures of reconciliation that was broken only once, by his last struggle for the sole supremacy. A large part of the exceptional regulations was now done away with, and he declared to senate and people that he proposed as soon as possible to lay down his extraordinary authority. The senate bestowed upon Octavian, as formerly upon Caesar, legal equality with the tribunes for the period of his life, so that he had a seat in the senate, and was like them *sacer-sanctus*, or inviolable. He could now exchange the rôle of a party leader for that of a regent zealous for the welfare of the people, and restore the public safety which had fallen to the lowest ebb in Italy. To his work was added a war against foreign enemies. In b.c. 42 the Cisalpine province had been raised to a footing of legal equality with Italy, whose boundaries were extended northerly to the foot of the Alps, westerly to the river Varus (Var), easterly toward Istria to the river Formio (Risan), six miles beyond Tergeste. To secure this east side Octavian and Agrippa had to subdue the wild border tribes of Dalmatia. A part of the Pannonians were also overthrown, and their chief city, Seiscia (Szszek), made into a military dépôt by the Romans. A position was thus secured for reaching sooner or later the line of the Danube, which Caesar had already determined upon as the northern boundary of the realm in Europe. In Rome Octavian began a series of public works, which were partially conducted or completed by his friend Agrippa; such as his care for the *cloacae* (drains), and restoration of the old, and building of new, aqueducts.

Meanwhile, Antony was losing all credit by gross mismanagement in the East. His legate Canidius had won back the Armenians to the Roman alliance, while the cruelty of Phraates IV., the successor of King Orodes, caused dissension among the Parthians. Antony, who had brought together a powerful army of more than 100,000 men in Laodicea of Syria, called to him his Egyptian charmer, and shamefully wasted precious time, besides shocking Roman sentiment by investing her with a number of possessions for which the Lagids had striven since the days of the first Ptolemy, Cyprus, part of Cilicia, Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, and portions of the Jewish and Nabataean countries. In the summer of B.C. 36 he opened the war from Armenia. His siege of the capital of Atropatene, Phraaspa, failed on account of the destruction of his great train of siege artillery with the two legions which composed it; and the Parthians, after losing one battle, avoided every encounter. Winter and a scarcity of supplies forced the Romans to make a truce, which the Parthians did not keep, and to retreat. After twenty-seven days of extraordinary suffering and constant engagements with the pursuing Parthians, they again reached Armenia. The discipline of the troops and the skill of Antony had, to be sure, saved this army from the fate of Crassus; but 24,000 men had fallen, and on the farther retreat to Syria 8000 more dropped by the way.

Antony still had it in his power to retrieve his reputation by a brilliant campaign. Octavia had collected for her husband considerable supplies of money and war materials; but Antony ordered her to return to Rome, and contented himself, in B.C. 34, with the reducing of Armenia. In Rome it was taken as a grievous insult that he celebrated a triumphal entry into Alexandria, enriched that city with the plunder of Asia and with the library of Pergamum, and dared to proclaim Cleopatra as ‘queen of queens,’ with her son by Caesar (Caesarion-Ptolemy) as co-regent.

The year B.C. 33 began with a correspondence between Octavian and Antony, which became more and more acrimonious; in it the triumvirs attacked each other’s policy. The decisive war was at hand. In B.C. 33 Antony sailed to Ephesus, and began to collect his fleet and land forces. The term of the triumvirate probably expired with the end of the year. Antony offered to lay down his office if Octavian would do the same. As this did not have the desired effect, Antony, who had crossed to Athens, now formally divorced Octavia. On January 1, B.C. 32, in Octavian’s absence, the consuls, zealous partisans of Antony, attacked in his behalf the measures of his rival, especially his

occupation of Sicily and Sardinia after the fall of Lepidus, and demanded a declaration of war against him. A tribune interposed his veto; and after some days Octavian appeared in the senate with an armed train, made violent counter-complaints against Antony, and promised to bring forward definite proofs in support. The consuls and their supporters in the senate now left the city, and hastened to Athens, where, with their assistance, Antony formed an opposition senate. The presence of Cleopatra in Athens, whither she had followed her lover, was very injurious to him. She interfered with the business of the state by continual amusements, and was hated to the last degree by the Romans of his party, many of whom her treatment drove back to Octavian. But she never left his side, because she constantly feared a reconciliation between Antony and Octavian and his sister. Octavian at Rome gained possession of Antony's will, in which he ordered that at his death his body should be laid in Alexandria, in a tomb with that of the queen. Everything now found credence that was told of the folly of Antony. Octavian shrewdly obtained a resolution of the senate by which Antony was deprived of the authority and honors conferred upon him, and war was declared against Cleopatra,—war, that is, against the queen of Egypt, and not against Antony, who was more pitied than hated in Rome, but who would clearly put himself in the wrong if he took up arms against his country for his Egyptian paramour.

Antony had a powerful army gathered in the Graeco-Macedonian peninsula, where now, for the third time within twenty years, the forces of the East were arrayed to decide the future of Rome. He had 500 ships of war, of which the queen furnished 200. The valley of the Nile supplied provisions; Cleopatra alone poured 20,000 talents into the military chest. With nineteen legions, with contingents from Arabia and Judea, from the provinces on the Parthian border, from Cilicia, Cappadocia, Pontus, and Galatia, from Thrace and from Mauretania, Antony in the autumn of b.c. 32 had, under his command, 120,000 foot and 12,000 horse. On the other side, the exhaustion of the West, and of Italy in particular, made it very difficult for Octavian to provide the necessary resources; and dangerous tumults followed the imposition of the war-tax (a fourth of the income of the free inhabitants, and an eighth of the property of freedmen possessing more than 50,000 denarii). If Antony had fallen upon Italy with all his forces, Octavian would have been in a critical position. Instead, he made the serious mistake of spending the whole winter at Patrae, with the army encamped along the west coast of Greece, the chief division being in Aearnia,

near the promontory of Actium, on the south side of the Ambracian Gulf, while the fleet anchored in a harbor outside the gulf, and south of the cape. During the winter desertion, want, and pestilence diminished the number of sailors to a third; men had to be pressed from all parts of Greece.

In the spring of b.c. 31 Antony left the opening of the campaign to his opponent, and interposed no hindrance, while Octavian, as consul, with an army of 80,000 foot and 12,000 horse, with 250 small but fast-sailing war-ships, crossed to Epirus, and established himself on the north side of the Ambracian Gulf, in the place where he afterward built Nicopolis, while his fleet lay in the harbor of Comarus, north of the entrance to the gulf. For months they faced one another, with only the gulf between, almost inactive, though Agrippa made some captures with the fleet. As the summer advanced, when provisions grew scarcer, and the health of the troops on the swampy coast suffered, and strong supporters began to go over to Octavian, Antony was at last forced to a decisive step. But instead of marching toward Macedonia, and using the legions, he yielded to the wishes of Cleopatra, who pressed for a sea-fight, although his vessels were insufficiently manned. On the morning of September 2, b.c. 31, Antony arranged his fleet for the battle, and placed on board 22,000 men from the legions and 2000 archers. The fleet stood in a close line across the entrance of the Ambracian Gulf, and behind it lay sixty fast-sailing Egyptian boats. Antony himself commanded the right wing. Without delay Octavian's far smaller ships, with Agrippa in command on the left, came up to within a mile, but for a long time were able to get no nearer.

The calm of the morning gave way at noon to a stiff breeze, that made it impossible for Antony's fleet to retain its position. His left wing advanced, spreading out as it entered the open sea; the rest of the fleet followed. A wide opening appeared between the divisions, and into this Octavian's admiral sailed. The battle became general, and soon broke up into engagements between individual ships. The quick movements of Octavian's ships, and the missiles of their crews, produced little effect upon the heavy vessels and projectiles of Antony's, when an unexpected movement in his fleet brought about the catastrophe. Cleopatra could not endure the strain of the battle, and taking advantage of a favorable land wind, broke through an opening, and with her sixty ships fled south with all speed. Antony completely lost his head, and followed her on a swift-sailing quinquereme. Perhaps he intended to hold her back; he certainly blindly followed her, and left his

fleet and his army to their fate. His troops bravely continued the battle for hours, till Octavian ordered burning arrows and live coals to be hurled upon their ships, which brought resistance to an end.

The noble land army of Antony held out with steadfast fidelity for seven days, and only when the legate Canidius had taken flight did the troops, disregarding Antony's orders for a retreat to Asia Minor, do homage to the victor of Actium. That day gave into Octavian's hand the unquestioned supremacy over the entire Roman world.

The site of his camp was set apart to found a colony, which he named Nicopolis. To perpetuate the memory of his victory, new Aetian games were to be celebrated here every five years, beginning b.c. 28. The veterans of both armies were dismissed to Italy with the promise of great rewards from the prospective Egyptian booty, and a part of the remaining troops were sent to the provinces. Agrippa, with Maecenas, hastened to Rome to watch the course of affairs. Octavian himself went to the coast of Asia, where he chose Samos as his winter quarters, and put an end to the authority of Antony throughout Asia; but in the winter he was recalled to Italy by the disturbance made by the veterans, who demanded their rewards and their discharge, and threatened violence. He had great difficulty in appeasing them.

In the spring of b.c. 30 Octavian, on reaching Syria, was met by propositions of compromise from Alexandria. After the battle of Actium, Antony fled to Taenarum, where he was again reconciled with Cleopatra, who in Egypt once again showed energy, and used every means to prepare for resistance. Octavian advanced slowly but unhesitatingly through Syria to the border of Egypt, then advanced toward Alexandria. Antony gained one last success in a cavalry engagement, but the last great struggle ended in complete disaster (August 1). His fleet went over to his opponent, the cavalry fled after the first encounter, and the infantry under his own command, after a hard struggle, was defeated. Cleopatra withdrew to a strong mausoleum, near the temple of Isis, within the royal castle, which she herself had built and filled with her treasures, and sent to Antony, on his return from the battle, the false message that she had put an end to her life. This broke his courage. With nothing more to live for, he stabbed himself with his sword, and was carried to the asylum of the woman to whom he had sacrificed his fortunes and his honor, where, in her arms, he breathed his last. Cleopatra now prepared once more to cast her spell on a master of the Roman state, and at least to save herself the shame of being dragged in the triumphal procession at Rome. Octavian's

agents, after securing the treasures, drew her from her refuge to the palace, where at first she was again treated as queen. But an interview with Octavian convinced her that she had nothing to hope for; and, eluding the vigilance of her guards, she put an end to her life by the bite of an asp (after August 29, b.c. 30). (Cf. Fig. 72.)

The house of the Lagidae was extinct. Octavian sent to death Caesariion, and Antony's oldest son by Fulvia. But the time of mildness now began. The long peace was at last to bless the peoples between the Euphrates and the Atlantic, which since the social uprising had been so fearfully harrowed by war. When Octavian again reached Italy he was received by the senate with boundless honors, and, August



FIG. 72. — Cleopatra. Rome, Vatican. (From a photograph.)

13, 14, and 15, b.c. 29, celebrated his Dalmatian, Actian, and Egyptian triumphs. Out of the Egyptian treasures he was able to bestow rich gifts upon the soldiers and the people of the city, to pay his debts and fulfil his promises, and to remit all overdue taxes and outstanding claims of the state treasury. At the direction of the senate, Octavian completed the celebration of his victory by closing the temple of Janus, an act that was greeted as the symbol of the return of universal peace.

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